common seal by which it acts, although it have not the name of a college 3 & 4 Will. 4, (per Holt, Skinn. 484). There are many hospitals not incorporated in c. 27, s. 1. which the succession is kept up by trustees (10 Rep. 31, 35). There are "LAND." other corporations which may be classed under the head of eleemosynary, as their object is, by means of trustees or governors incorporated, to carry into execution some public charity; such is the corporation created in the reign of Queen Anne, under the name of "The Governors of the Bounty of Queen Anne, for the Augmentation of the Maintenance of the Poor Clergy" (2 Anne, c. 11; 5 Anne, c. 24; 6 Anne, c. 27; 1 Geo. 1, stat. 2, c. 10; 3 Geo. 1, c. 20). And such are many corporations of trustees or governors of free schools (see 1 Kyd on Corporations, 25-27). All these eleemosynary corporations are, strictly speaking, lay and not ecclesiastical, even though composed of ecclesiastical persons (1 Ld. Raym. 6), and although they, in some things, partake of the nature, privileges and restrictions of ecclesiastical bodies (1 Bl. Com. 471). Each university of Oxford and Cambridge is a lay corporation and not eleemosynary, as particular colleges are, although some salaries are attached to some of their officers (R. v. Cambridge, 3 Burr. 1652; see Shelford on the Law of Mortmain and Charities, 8—34; Tudor's Charitable Trusts, 3rd ed.). Corporations aggregate consist of many persons, of which kind are the mayor and commonalty of a city, the head and fellows of a college, the master and brethren of a hospital, the dean and chapter of a cathedral church (10 Rep. 29 b; 11 Rep. 69 b). Corporations sole consist of one person only and his successors, in some particular station, who are incorporated by law, in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense the king is a corporation sole (Co. Litt. 43). So are archbishops, bishops, deans and prebendaries, distinct from their several chapters; and so is every parson and vicar (10 Rep. 29 b; Wood's Inst. 109; 1 Bl. Com. 470; 1 Kyd on Corporations, 20). Corporations are as liable to the operation of prescription as private persons (Dundee v. Dougall, 1 Macq. H. L. C. 317). (e) The term freehold, as denoting an estate of a given quantity, or Meaning of rather of a peculiar quality, is opposed to the term chattel (Co. Litt. 43 b; the term 1 Burr. 108). An estate of freehold may be defined to be “an estate in “ freehold." possession, remainder, or reversion, in corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments, held for life, or some uncertain interest, created by will, or some other mode of conveyance, capable of transferring an estate of freehold, which may last the life of the devisee or grantee, or of some other person" (Watk. on Conv. by Morley and Coote, 63; Prest. on Estates, 200— 203; see observations on an Estate of Freehold, by Manning, 2 Jur. 459). All interests in land for a shorter period than a life, or, more properly speaking, all interests for a definite space of time, measured by years, months, or days, are deemed chattel interests (1 Prest. on Estates, 203), which may subsist in both corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments (Noy's Maxims, by Bythewood, 142, 357; Bac. Abr. Executors (II. 3)). Chattels real are such as concern the realty, as terms for years in land, the next presentation to a church (Dyer, 135 a), estates by statute-merchant, statute-staple, elegit, or the like (Co. Litt. 118 b). By the common law no estate of inheritance or freehold is comprehended under the word chattels. (3) (f) The following have been held to fall within the definition "RENT.” of rent in sect. 1, viz.: Quit rents payable in respect of freeholds (De Payments Beauvoir v. Owen, 5 Ex. 166), or in respect of copyholds (Howitt v. within the Harrington, 1893, 2 Ch. 497); rent-charges granted by deed (Jones v. definition of Withers, 74 L. T. 572); the yearly sum payable under the Land Tax Act, rent. 1802, s. 123, by way of interest on money paid for redeeming land tax (Skene v. Cook, 1901, 2 K. B. 7; 1902, 1 K. B. 682); annuities charged on land by will (James v. Salter, 3 Bing. N. C. 544), or by deed (Hughes v. Coles, 27 Ch. D. 231); payments for tithe imposed in "RENT." 3 & 4 Will. 4, London by 37 Hen. 8, c. 12 (Payne v. Esdaile, 13 App. Cas. 613); tithe c. 27, s. 1. rent-charge (Irish Land Commission v. Grant, 10 App. Cas. 31); certain services not involving pecuniary render (Doe v. Benham, 7 Q. B. 981). In a case which arose between landlord and tenant it was said that rent in sect. 2 was confined to rents existing as an inheritance distinct from the land, and for which before the statute the party entitled might have had an assize, such as ancient rent service, fee farm rents, or the like (Grant v. Ellis, 9 M. & W. 113, 122). And Lord St. Leonards said, rent, in the second section, meant rent of inheritance (Ely v. Bliss, 2 D. M. & G. 472). In a recent case, however, where interest on money paid to redeem land tax had not been paid for twenty years, it was said that if by statute a periodical payment charged upon land is created, and is a property distinct from the land, though not real property, it is rent within the statute (Skene v. Cook, 1901, 2 K. B. 14; 1902, 1 K. B. 682). The word does not include a conventional rent reserved by a lease (Irish Land Commission v. Grant, 10 App. Cas. 26). See generally as to the use of the word “rent” in the statute, Doe v. Angell, 9 Q. B. 328. And as to annuities see further, p. 118, post. Heriots: heriot custom; (g) Heriot is defined to be the best beast, or other thing, due to the lord on the death or alienation of his tenant. Heriots are usually divided into heriot service; two sorts, heriot service and heriot custom. The former are such as are due upon a special reservation in a grant or lease of lands (Lanyon v. Carne, 2 Saund. 166); the latter depend merely upon immemorial usage and custom (Co. Cop. s. 24). Heriot service may be recovered either by seizure (Plowd. 96; Cro. Eliz. 589; 1 And. 298; Gouldsb. 191; 1 Salk. 356; 1 Show. 81; Willes, 192), or by distress within the manor (Plowd. 96 a; Cro. Car. 260; Bro. Har. 2; Kich. 133 b; 3 Bl. Comm. 15; Gilbert's Distresses, 10, 11). Quare whether it can exist in the case of copyholds (Western v. Bailey, 1896, 2 Q. B. 234; 1897, 1 Q. B. 86). Any goods belonging to another, found upon the lands charged with heriot service, may be distrained (Bro. Har. 6; Cro. Car. 260; Austin v. Bennet, 1 Salk. 356). A heriot due by the custom of a manor may be payable on the death of every tenant of an estate of inheritance, or for life or years (21 Hen. 7, 13 & 15; Keilw. 80; Bro. Har. 5), or at will (Hix v. Gardiner, 2 Bulstr. 196), and may be seized outside the manor although the beast was never within it (Western v. Bailey, 1897, 1 Q. B. 86). Ås the property of it vests immediately in the lord on the death or aliena tion of the tenant, the lord may seize the identical thing, though he cannot distrain any other chattel for it (Cro. Eliz. 590; Keilw. 82 a, 84 b, 167 a; Br. Har. 2, 6, 7; Parker v. Gage, 1 Show. 81). The property in any particular beast will not vest in the lord before selection of it (Abington v. Lipscomb, 1 Q. B. 776); see Copyhold Acts, 1841, 1843, 1852, 1858, providing for the commutation of manorial rights in respect of copyholds. See further, as to heriots, Shelford on Copyholds and the Supplement thereto, pp. 119-133; 2 Watk. on Cop. c. 6; 2 Saund. Rep. 168, n.; Cruise, Dig. tit. X., c. 4, ss. 49--63; Com. Dig. Copyhold (K. 18), (K. 27); Scriven on Cop. 244-258, 7th ed.; Croome v. Guise, 4 Bing. N. C. 148). A heriot may be due by custom on the death of a tenant in respect of a tenement of free lands held in fee simple of a manor (Damarell v. Protheroe, 10 Q. B. 20). In a case of heriot service, where a manor had been settled, it was held that the right of the remainderman to seize a heriot in 1847 (he being then entitled in possession) was not barred by sects. 2 and 3, owing to the nonpayment of a heriot to the tenant for life in 1824 (Chichester v. Hall, 17 L. T. (O. S.) 121). In Lord Zouch v. Dalbiac (L. R. 10 Ex. 172), a case of heriot custom, where it was admitted that more than twenty years before the heriot the subject-matter of the action became due, a previous heriot had become due which the lord had not seized, the lord's right of seizure was not barred under this statute. Opinions were expressed that neither heriot custom nor heriot service were within sects. 2 and 3 (Ib. 182); and that if rent did anywhere in the statute include heriots, it might be in sect. 42 (Ib. 179). Bramwell, B., doubted whether it 3 & 4 Will. 4, was the general intention of the statute to bar not merely the right c. 27, s. 1. to a particular heriot, but the title generally (see the relation of the "RENT." statute to heriots discussed in Owen v. De Beauvoir, 16 M. & W. 566; De Beauvoir v. Owen, 5 Exch. 166; Darb. & Bos. Stat. Lim. 2nd ed. 280). ments for In the absence of evidence adverse to the rights of the lord of a manor, negligence the court will not presume the enfranchisement of land shown to have in exacting been copyhold more than a century ago, from mere negligence by the acknowledglords in exacting the small acknowledgments for fines, &c., which were fines. then commuted. Wood, V.-C., said it was not a case to which any statute of limitations applied (Turner v. West Bromwich Union, 9 W. R. 155; see also, as to these presumptions, Chichester v. Hall, 17 L. T. (0. S.) 121). are (h) A rent (reditus) is properly a sum of money, or other thing to be "Services rendered periodically, in consequence of an express reservation in a grant and suits for or demise of lands or tenements, the reversion of which is in the grantor which disor person demising (2 Bl. Comm. 31; Gilb. on Rents, 9, &c.). There tress may be at common law three sorts of rents: rent service, rent-charge, and rent- made." seck (Litt. s. 213). Rent-service is so called because it hath some corporeal Different service incident to it, as at least fealty or the tenant's feodal oath of kinds of rents: fidelity (Co. Litt. 142). And for these, in case they be in arrear, the rent-service; lord may distrain of common right, without reserving any special power of distress; provided he hath in himself the reversion or future estate of the lands, after the lease or particular estate of the lessee or grantee is expired (Litt. s. 215). A rent-charge is where the owner of the rent hath rent-charge; no future interest or reversion expectant in the land; as where a man by deed maketh over to others his whole estate in fee-simple, with a certain rent payable thereout, and adds to the deed a covenant or clause of distress if the rent be in arrear. In this case the land is liable to distress, not of common right, but by virtue of the clause in the deed, and therefore it is called a rent-charge, because in this manner the land is charged with a distress for the payment of it (Co. Litt. 143; see Re Gerard and Beecham, 1894, 3 Ch. 308). A rent for equality of partition is not a rent-service, but a rent-charge of common right, and may be distrained for (Litt. s. 253). Rent-seck (reditus siccus), or barren rent, is, in effect, rent-seck; nothing more than a rent reserved by deed, but without any clause of distress (2 Bl. Comm. 42; see Dodds v. Thompson, L. R. 1 Č. P. 133). Either a rent-service disconnected from the reversion (Ards v. Watkin, Cro. Eliz. 637, 651) or a rent-charge may be divided by will or by deed, operating under the Statute of Uses, so as to make the tenant liable without attornment to several distresses by the devisee or cestuis que use. It seems that since the stat. 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 9, a rent-charge may be so divided by a conveyance of any kind (Rivis v. Watson, 5 M. & W. 255; see Colborne v. Wright, 2 Lev. 239). There are also other species of rents, which are reducible to these three. other rents. Rents of assize are the certain established rents of the freeholders and ancient copyholders of a manor (2 Inst. 19), which cannot be departed from or varied. Those of the freeholders are frequently called chief rents (reditus capitales); and both sorts are indifferently denominated quit-rents (quieti reditus), because thereby the tenant goes quit and free of all other services. A fee-farm rent is a rent-charge issuing out of an estate in fee, of at least one-fourth of the value of the lands at the time of its reservation (Co. Litt. 143; see Bradbury v. Wright, Dougl. 627, n. 1). The above are the general divisions of rent; but the difference between Remedy by them (in respect of the remedy for recovering) is now abolished. By the distress for Landlord and Tenant Act, 1730, the same remedy was given by distress, recovering and by impounding and selling the same, in cases of rents-seck, rents of assize, and chief-rents, which had been duly answered or paid for the of three years within the space of twenty years before the first day of that space rents-seck 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 1. "RENT." Distress for rents. Right of executors to distrain. Distress after end of term. Action of debt for rentcharge. session of parliament, or which should be thereafter created, as in case of rent reserved upon lease. As to this section, it was held that, unless the case was brought within it, a rent-seck could not be recovered by distress (Bradbury v. Wright, Dougl. 627). It was not, however, necessary that the three years mentioned in the statute should be continuous; it was sufficient if, for the space of three whole years within twenty years before the passing of the act, the rent was paid, though those years might not be consecutive (Musgrave v. Emerson, 10 Q. B. 326). A rent-charge granted by deed containing no power of distress is within the section (Dodds v. Thompson, L. R. 1 Č. P. 133). Whenever land is sold reserving a rent, that rent may properly be called a rent-charge, for under the above section the right of distress is incident to it (Re Gerard and Beecham, 1894, 3 Ch. 311). Now by Conv. Act, 1881, s. 44, post, where an annual sum is, by an instrument coming into operation after December 31, 1881, charged on land or the income thereof, whether by way of rent-charge or otherwise, and which annual sum is not a rent incident to a reversion, such annual sum can be recovered by means of (1) a distress, (2) an entry, (3) a demise of the land charged. As a general rule, a person who has parted with the reversion cannot distrain (Parmenter v. Webber, 8 Taunt. 593; Langford v. Selmes, 3 K. & J. 226; see as to a mortgage, Trent v. Hunt, 9 Exch. 14). So a lessee who has parted with his whole term (which amounts to an assignment, Beardman v. Wilson, L. R. 4 C. P. 57; Hyde v. Warden, 3 Ex. D. 83), reserving a rent, cannot distrain (- v. Cooper, 2 Wils. 375). Under certain circumstances, however, the rent reserved may amount to a rentcharge (see Williams v. Hayward, 1 E. & E. 1040), to which, apparently, the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1730, s. 5, would apply. 66 It is laid down in Co. Litt. 142 a, that "rent may as well be in delivery of hens, capons, roses, spurs, bows, shafts, horses, hawks, pepper, comine, wheat, or other profit that lieth in render, office, attendance, and such like, as in payment of money;" and that for these things there may be a distress. So in Co. Litt. 96 a, it is said, A man may hold of his lord to shear all the sheep depasturing within the lord's manor; and this is certain enough, albeit the lord hath sometime a greater number and sometime a lesser number there; and yet this uncertainty being referred to the manor, which is certain, the lord may distrain for this uncertainty." So in Litt. s. 137, it is laid down, that if land be holden by the service of singing a mass every Friday, the lord may distrain for not doing it (Doe v. Benham, 7 Q. B. 982). The keeping up of a grindstone upon land for the convenience of the parish, was held not rent, or "profits of land" within the third section of the act (Doe v. Hinde, 2 M. & Rob. 441; Doe v. Benham, 7 Q. B. 978). By the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, ss. 37, 38, the executors or administrators of any lessor or landlord may distrain upon the lands demised for any term, or at will, for the arrearages due to such lessor or landlord in his lifetime, in like manner as such lessor or landlord might have done in his lifetime (sect. 37). And such arrearages may be distrained for after the determination of such term or lease at will, in the same manner as if such term or lease had not been ended or determined: provided such distress be made within the space of six calendar months after the determination of such term or lease, and during the continuance of the possession of the tenant from whom such arrears became due; and all powers and provisions in the several statutes, made relating to distresses for rent, are made applicable to the distresses so made as aforesaid (sect. 38). See before that act, Prescott v. Boucher, 3 B. & Ad. 849. Since the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1709, s. 6, rent accruing before the expiration of a tenancy can be distrained for within six months after the tenancy expires, and while the tenant continues in occupation. See before that act, Williams v. Stiven (9 Q. B. 14). Since the abolition of real actions, a rent-charge in fee may be recovered in an action of debt from the terre-tenant entitled to a freehold interest, "RENT." either under a covenant binding him (Varley v. Leigh, 2 Exch. 446), or 3 & 4 Will. 4, independently of one (Thomas v. Sylvester, L. R. 8 Q. B. 368; Ex p. c. 27, s. 1. Graham, 42 Ch. D. 343; Searle v. Cooke, 43 Ch. D. 519); and that, whether he has or has not received rents and profits equal to the amount of rent-charge claimed (Pertwee v. Townsend, 1896, 2 Q. B. 129). But a tenant for years is not liable in such an action (Re Herbage Rents, Charity Commrs. v. Green, 1896, 2 Ch. 811). The rule as to suing the freeholder does not apply when the land is situate out of England (Whitaker v. Forbes, 1 C. P. Div. 51). See as to the old law, Webb v. Jiggs (4 M. & S. 112). heredita Rent cannot as a general rule issue out of an incorporeal hereditament, Rents not in so as to warrant a distress, which can only be made in respect of a fixed general issuascertained rent reserved out of land (2 B. & Ad. 339). A rent cannot, able out of strictly speaking, be reserved out of an advowson in gross, tithes, or any incorporeal other incorporeal hereditament (Co. Litt. 47 a, 142 a; Gilb. on Rents, 20, 22; Re Alms Corn Charity, 1901, 2 Ch. 759). Nor can a rent be reserved ments; out of a rent (2 Roll. Abr. 446; Keilw. 161); but part of a rent may be granted (2 Ves. sen. 178). Nor, at common law, can a rent be reserved by a subject out of a mere privilege or easement in land (Buzzard v. Capel, 8 B. & C. 141; Re Gerard and Beecham, 1894, 3 Ch. 315); but payment of money in respect of an easement may be secured by covenant (Hastings v. N. E. Ry., 1898, 2 Ch. 674), and such a payment may sometimes be called rent (4.-G. v. Emerson, 1891, A. C. 659). The king, however, may reserve a rent out of an incorporeal heredita- exceptions ment, as well as out of lands, because by his prerogative he may distrain to the rule; for such rent on all the lands of his tenant (Co. Litt. 47 a; 2 Inst. 132; 5 Rep. 4; Gilb. on Rents, 22). And the grantee of fee-farm rents from the Crown might exercise the same power (A.-G. v. Coventry, 1 P. Wms. 306). And a subject may, by statute, reserve a rent out of an easement (Re Gerard and Beecham, 1894, 3 Ch. 315). A rent may be reserved upon a grant of an estate in remainder or reversion, for the remedy by distress will arise when the lessee comes into possession (Co. Litt. 47 a) for all the arrears (2 Roll. Abr. 446). A lease by a bishop of tithes only, rendering the ancient rent, was held lease of void against the successor, because there was no remedy for the rent by tithes. distress or assize (Tanlintine v. Denton, Cro. Jac. 111; Windsor v. Gover, 2 Wms. Saund. 230). But by stat. 5 Geo. 3, c. 17, all leases for one, two, or three lives, or for any term not exceeding twenty-one years, of any tithes, tolls, or other incorporeal hereditaments, without any lands by any bishop, college or hall, dean and chapter, precentor, prebendary, hospital, or any other person who is enabled by statute to make such leases of any corporeal hereditaments, are as effectual against the lessors and their successors as any leases of corporeal hereditaments are by virtue of 32 Hen. 8, c. 28, and an action of debt against the lessee is given for the recovery of such rent. It is perfectly clear that, in point of law, tithes, being an incorporeal hereditament, cannot pass by parol, but by deed only (Gardiner v. Williamson, 2 B. & Ad. 336). By stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 2, s. 4 (10 Car. 1, sess. 2, c. 6, Irish), no person Old limitation should make any avowry or cognizance for any rent, suit, or service, and act as to allege any seisin of any rent, suit, or service in the same avowry or cogni- rents. zance, in the possession of his or their ancestors or predecessors, or in his own possession, or in the possession of any other whose estates he shall pretend or claim to have above fifty years next before the making of the said avowry or cognizance. This provision was held to apply only where it was necessary to allege seisin, and not where rent was expressly created by deed, the commencement whereof could be shown (Co. Litt. 115 a; 8 Rep. 64), or by act of parliament (Faulkner v. Bellingham, Cro. Car. 80), or by will (Collins v. Goodall, 2 Vern. 235); as to which there was no prescribed period of limitation, either at law or in equity (Cupit v. Jackson, M'Clel. 495; 13 Price, 721; see White v. James, 4 Jur. N. S. 1214; and Stackhouse v. Barnston, 10 Ves. 467; Foster's case, 8 Rep. 128; De Beauvoir v. Owen, 19 L. J. Exch. 182). So that arrears for any number of years might have been recovered unless there was evidence to raise a presump |