45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 19. Married woman to be liable to the parish for the maintenance of her husband. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 122. Married liable to the parish for ante, p. 320. And as to enforcing against restrained income judgments recovered against a married woman since the act, see the cases quoted ante, p. 345. (1) The latter part of the section has no operation on settlements made before the act (Beckett v. Tasker, 19 Q. B. Î. 12; Smith v. Whitlock, 34 W. R. 414; 55 L. J. Q. B. 286). The words "before marriage" mean before her existing marriage, and include the period of a previous marriage and the interval between the two marriages (Jay v. Robinson, 25 Q. B. Div. 472). The word debts" includes both common law debts contracted by a woman whilst a feme sole, and debts contracted under the act in respect of her separate property (Ib. 474). 66 20. Where in England the husband of any woman having separate property becomes chargeable to any union or parish, the justices having jurisdiction in such union or parish may, in petty sessions assembled, upon application of the guardians of the poor, issue a summons against the wife, and make and enforce such order against her for the maintenance of her husband out of such separate property as by the thirty-third section of the Poor Law Amendment Act, 1868, they may now make and enforce against a husband for the maintenance of his wife if she becomes chargeable to any union or parish. Where in Ireland relief is given under the provisions of the acts relating to the relief of the destitute poor to the husband of any woman having separate property, the cost price of such relief is hereby declared to be a loan from the guardians of the union in which the same shall be given, and shall be recoverable from such woman as if she were a feme sole by the same actions and proceedings as money lent. 21. A married woman having separate property shall be woman to be subject to all such liability for the maintenance of her children and grandchildren as the husband is now by law subject to for the maintenance of her children and grandchildren: Provided nance of her always, that nothing in this act shall relieve her husband from any liability imposed upon him by law to maintain her children or grandchildren. the mainte children. See Peters v. Cowie (2 Q. B. D. 131); Coleman v. Birmingham (6 Q. B. D. 615). 22. The Married Women's Property Act, 1870, and the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, Amendment Act, 1874, are hereby repealed: Provided that such repeal shall not affect any act done or right acquired while either of such acts was in force, or any right or liability of any husband or wife, married before the commencement of this act, to sue or be sued under the provisions of the said repealed acts or either of them, for or in respect of any debt, contract, wrong, or other matter or thing whatsoever, for or in respect of which any such right or liability shall have accrued to or against such husband or wife before the commencement of this act. This section prevented sect. 11 of this act from applying to policies effected under the M. W. P. Act, 1870 (Re Turnbull, T. v. T., 1897, 2 Ch. 415). The section was repealed by S. L. R. Act, 1898, as also the preamble to the present act, which being of a formal character has been omitted. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 23. 23. For the purposes of this act the legal personal repre- Legal representative of any married woman shall in respect of her separate sentative of estate have the same rights and liabilities and be subject to the same jurisdiction as she would be if she were living. A husband who takes separate property jure mariti is a "legal personal representative" within this section, and liable thereunder to the extent of the property so taken (Surman v. Wharton, 1891, 1 Q. B. 491). married woman. 24. The word "contract" in this act shall include the accept- Interpretaance of any trust, or of the office of executrix or administratrix, tion of terms. and the provisions of this act as to liabilities of married women shall extend to all liabilities by reason of any breach of trust or devastavit committed by any married woman being a trustee or executrix or administratrix either before or after her marriage, and her husband shall not be subject to such liabilities unless he has acted or intermeddled in the trust or administration. word "property" in this act includes a thing in action. V. The Before this act, the separate estate of a married woman was not in general liable for breaches of trust or torts committed by her (Wainford Heyl, L. R. 20 Eq. 321). Since the act, she may be ordered to make good a loss occasioned by her devastavit, for which purpose the order should be in the Scott v. Morley (20 Q. B. D. 120) form (Re Turnbull, Turnbull v. Nicholas, 1900, 1 Ch. 180). Where there is no devastavit, an order directing her to pay money into court should be in the common form (ib.). Where letters of administration are granted to a married woman, it is not now necessary that her husband should join in the administration bond (Re Ayres, 8 P. D. 168). An acknowledged deed and the concurrence of her husband are necessary for an effectual conveyance of freeholds held by a married woman on trust for sale (Re Harkness and Allsopp, 1896, 2 Ch. 358). 25. The date of the commencement of this act shall be the Commencefirst of January one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three. 26. This act shall not extend to Scotland. ment of act. Extent of act. 27. This act may be cited as the Married Women's Property Short title. Act, 1882. c. 14. VII. THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1884. 47 & 48 VICT. c. 14. An Act to Amend the sixteenth section of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882. [23rd June, 1884.] 47 & 48 Vict. WHEREAS by section sixteen of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, a wife is, under the circumstances therein mentioned, declared to be liable to criminal proceedings by her husband, and a doubt has arisen as to whether the husband is admissible as a witness against his wife in such criminal proceedings, while section twelve of the same act declares that in any proceeding under that section a husband or wife shall be competent to give evidence against each other; and it is desirable that the said doubt should be removed, and the said act otherwise amended; Be it therefore enacted as follows: Husband or wife competent witness in criminal proceedings under 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75. Short title. 1. In any such criminal proceeding against a husband or a wife as is authorized by the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, the husband and wife respectively shall be competent and admissible witnesses, and, except when defendant, compellable to give evidence. See Re Brittledon (12 Q. B. Div. 266). 2. This act may be cited as the Married Women's Property Act, 1884, and this act, and the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, may be cited together as the Married Women's Property Acts, 1882 and 1884. 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63, s. 1. Effect of contracts by married women. VIII. THE MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1893. 56 & 57 VICT. c. 63. 1. Every contract hereafter entered into by a married woman, (b) shall bind all separate property which she may at that c. 63, s. 1. Provided that nothing in this section contained shall render 56 & 57 Vict. available to satisfy any liability or obligation arising out of such contract any separate property which at that time or thereafter she is restrained from anticipating. See sect. 1, sub-sects. (3) and (4), of the M. W. P. Act. 1882 (now repealed), and the cases decided thereunder, ante, pp. 342, 346. In a case decided since this act, judgment was taken in the Scott v. Morley form, with the addition of the words of sub-sect. (c) and the proviso. It was recovered against a divorced woman in respect of a contract made before the divorce; and was held not to cover instalments of restrained income which had accrued after the divorce but before judgment (Barnett v. Howard, 1900, 2 Q. B. 784). a 2. In any action or proceeding now or hereafter instituted by woman or by a next friend on her behalf, the court before which such action or proceeding is pending shall have jurisdiction by judgment or order from time to time to order payment of the costs of the opposite party out of property which is subject to a restraint on anticipation, and may enforce such payment by the appointment of a receiver and the sale of the property or otherwise as may be just. This section was held to apply to actions pending at the date of the act (Re Godfrey, Thorne George v. Godfrey, 63 L. J. Ch. 854; 72 L. T. 8; where see form of order charging costs on restrained income); but not to the case of an order for payment of costs made before the act (Re Lumley, Ex p. Hood-Barrs, 1894, 3 Ch. 135; Lowry v. Derham, 1895, 2 Ir. R. 123). The "proceeding" must be one which initiates litigation; and so the section does not apply in the case of an appeal by a married woman defendant (Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, 1894, 3 Ch. 376; Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, 1897, A. C. 177); nor to a petition in an action presented by a married woman defendant (Hollington v. Dear, 1895, W. N. 35); nor to a probate action brought by an executor in consequence of a caveat entered by a married woman (Moran v. Place, 1896, P. 214). But the section does apply to a counterclaim by a married woman defendant (Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, 1895, 1 Q. B. 873); and to a written claim made by her to goods taken in execution and served on the sheriff (Nunn v. Tyson, 1901, 2 K. B. 487); and to an application by her to intervene in a probate action (Crickitt v. Crickitt, 1902, W. N. 94). An order under this section may be made subsequently to the order directing payment of costs (Hood-Barrs v. Cathcart, 1895, 1 Q. B. 873). An order was made in Paget v. Paget (1898, 1 Ch. 470). As to the form of order, see Davies v. Treharris Brewery Co. (1894, W. N. 198; 13 R. 219). See also the power to charge the costs of a married woman on a fund preserved (Solicitors Act, 1860), s. 28. woman. 3. Section twenty-four of the Wills Act, 1837, shall apply to Will of the will of a married woman made during coverture whether she is or is not possessed of or entitled to any separate property at the time of making it, and such will shall not require to be reexecuted or republished after the death of her husband. In the case of every married woman who dies after 5th December, 1893, this section applies to her will whether made before or after that date (Re Wylie, Wylie v. Moffat, 1895, 2 Ch. 116). Before the M. W. P. Act, 1882, it was held that sect. 27 of the Wills 56 & 57 Vict. c. 63, s. 3. Repeal. Short title. Extent. Act, 1837, applied to the wills of married women (Bernard v. Minshull, Johns. 296). As to the joint effect of sects. 24 and 27, see the cases quoted under sect. 27 of the Wills Act, 1837 (post). 4. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of section one of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, are hereby repealed. 5. This act may be cited as the Married Women's Property Act, 1893. 6. This act shall not apply to Scotland. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 105, s. 1. Meaning of the words in "the act. "Land." Number. The objects of this act. IX.-DOWER AND CURTESY. THE DOWER ACT, 1833. 3 & 4 WILLIAM IV. CHAPTER 105. § 1. Interpretation...362. $2. Equitable Estates liable to Dower...366. $ 3. Seisin of Husband not necessary...367. $$ 4-10. How Husband may bar or restrict Dower.....368. § 11. Agreement not to bar Dower enforceable...370. $ 12. Priority of Legacies in lieu of Dower...370. § 13. Certain Forms of Dower abolished...371. BE it enacted, that the words and expressions hereinafter men- The principal objects of this statute are- 1st. To make equitable estates in possession liable to dower, and to dispense with the necessity of the actual seisin of the husband. 2nd. To take away the right of dower out of lands disposed of by the husband in his lifetime or by his will, and to give partial charges created by the husband priority over the right of dower. 3rd. To enable the husband to bar the right of dower by a declaration in a deed or in a will. The act does not extend to widows married on or before the 1st of January, 1834. |