1833. LANCUM v. LOVELL. made, had been uniformly resisted by them. It appears, therefore, that this case falls expressly within Mr. Justice Buller's second exception to the general rule that no person interested can be a witness, viz. that a party who has an interest will be admitted where no other evidence can reasonably be expected (a). Now, how can any other evidence be reasonably expected to rebut a claim made against every individual subject of the realm but that of some of the king's subjects? The Court has been much pressed with the case of The Company of Carpenters, &c., in Shrewsbury v. Hayward, where it was held that a person who had acted in breach of an alleged custom was not a competent witness to disprove the existence of the custom, viz. that he had worked, being a resident in Shrewsbury, without molestation, as a carpenter there, although he was not free of the company, nor an apprentice or journeyman. On that case it is to be observed that it was not a case affecting all the king's subjects, but only a particular class of tradesmen in a particular town: in the next place, it was decided expressly on the ground that they were not witnesses of necessity; for, Mr. Justice Buller says: "The objection to the witness produced for the defendant is certainly decisive; for, it is not true that he could have had no other sort of witnesses. The employers might have been witnesses." The result of the whole is, that we are of opinion that the right claimed is a public right, in which all the king's subjects are interested; and that, consequently, the right on the one hand, and the resistance on the other, can only be substantiated or rebutted by the subjects of the king, who are all equally interested: and therefore the rule for a new trial must be made absolute. (a) Bull. Ni. Pri. 289. Rule absolute. Regula Generalis. HILARY TERM, 3 WILL. IV. IT IS ORDERED, That, in case a rule of Court or Judge's order for returning a bailable writ of capias shall expire in vacation, and the sheriff or other officer having the return of such writ shall return cepi corpus thereon, a Judge's order may thereupon issue, requiring the sheriff or other officer, within the like number of days after the service of such order as by the practice of the Court is prescribed with respect to rules to bring in the body issued in term, to bring the defendant into Court by forthwith putting in and perfecting bail above to the action: and, if the sheriff or other officer shall not duly obey such order, and the same shall have been made a rule of Court in the term next following, it shall not be necessary to serve such rule of Court, or to make any fresh demand thereon, but an attachment shall issue forthwith for disobedience of such order, whether the bail shall or shall not have been put in and perfected in the meantime. T. DENMAN. J. LITTLEDALE. N. C. TINDAL. S. GASElee. J. B. BOSANQUET. 1833. W. E. TAUNTON. MEMORANDUM. In the course of this term, Thomas Noon Talfourd, Esq., was called to the degree of the coif; he gave rings with the motto “ Magna vis veritatis." END OF HILARY TERM. INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. ABATEMENT. See PEER. ACCEPTANCE. See BILLS OF EXCHANGE. ACTION ON THE CASE. ADMINISTRATORS. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. AFFIDAVIT TO HOLD TO 1. In an action by an indorsee 2. An affidavit to hold to bail, It is no objection to an affidavit to K K K 2 I. Charging a benefice. An annuity deed authorized the grantee to sequester a rectory of which the grantor was the incumbent for any arrears of the annuity: a warrant of attorney authorizing the grantee to enter up judgment against the grantor for 1440l., given as a further security, recited the deed, but did not itself directly charge the living:Held, that, although the deed was void as far as it operated as a charge upon the rectory, yet that the warrant of attorney was valid. Faircloth v. Gurney, II. Inrolment of memorial. 822 1. To a cognizance justifying the taking the goods for arrears of an annuity, the plaintiff pleaded that a memorial of every deed, bond, instrument, and assurance whereby the annuity was secured, was not duly inrolled. The defendant replied, that a memorial of every deed, &c., whereby the annuity was secured, was, within twenty days of the execution thereof, inrolled; setting out the memorial verbatim, and concluding with a verification by the record:-Held, on demurrer, that the conclusion was proper. Richardson v. Tomkies, 56 2. The statute 17 Geo. 3, c. 26, does not require anything further than a memorial of every deed given for securing an annuity. The judgment entered up on a warrant of attorney for securing the annuity need not be mentioned in the memorial. Ibid. 3. A policy of assurance on the life of the grantor of an annuity, assigned as a further security for the annuity, need not be mentioned in the memorial, not being a pecuniary consideration within the meaning of the statute 53 Geo. 3, c. 141. Faircloth v. Gurney, 822 4. The annuity originally agreed to be paid by the grantor was 801., and, in consideration of a covenant by the grantee to pay the annual premium on the policy (33l. 19s. 6d.), the grantor consented that that sum should be added to the annuity, which was accordingly described in the deed and in the memorial as an annuity of 1131. 19s. 6d.:-Held, that it was properly so described. Ibid. 5. The deed stated the consideration to have been paid in bank notes and sovereigns; the memorial stated it (according to the fact) to have been paid in bank-notes only:-Held, no ground for setting aside the annuity. Ibid. ANTIENT LIGHTS. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER. APOTHECARY. Rateable to the poor in respect of stock in trade. The plaintiff, an inhabitant of S. M. (an apothecary), was rated to the relief of the poor in respect of his stock in trade:-Held, that, the plaintiff being liable to be rated as an inhabitant, the only mode of impeaching the validity of the rate was by appeal to the sessions. Marshall v. Pitman, 745 ARBITRATION. |