venue of the offense is in the county where the sale is completed.32 One who through traveling salesmen sells such food can be prosecuted in any county in which the sale was made.33 [§ 290] 31. Sale of Intoxicating Liquors.34 A prosecution under a statute for an unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors must be brought in the county in which the sale was made and the liquors delivered.35 A statute against selling liquors without a license is not broken in the county where the order is taken, where the goods are in another county; for the sale is executory only until the delivery.36 Since delivery to a common carrier is a delivery to the consignee, a dealer in one county who sends liquor by express to a buyer residing in another cannot, as a rule, be prosecuted in the latter county for illegally selling therein.37 But where the dealer does not ship direct to the purchaser, but to his own agent, to be delivered to the person sending the order, and this is accordingly done, the sale is consummated in the latter county;38 and this is so although the person ordering the goods pays for them in advance and his name is marked on the package containing them when the same is shipped to the dealer's agent.39 Another exception to the rule exists where approval and conclusion to purchase are necessary to complete the sale; in such a case the venue of the offense is in the county where the buyer resides.40 And, in the case of a sale to a minor, the crime becomes complete in the county where the minor actually obtains possession of the liquor and the venue may be laid there as well as where delivery was made to the common carrier.41 The solicitation by mail of orders for whisky or other intoxicants, to be filled for persons who live in counties where, by law, the sale of intoxicating liquors is prohibited, is made an offense by some statutes; and the crime is committed upon the receipt of the letter by such party, so that the venue of the offense is in that county.4: 42 Property, and Other Like Offenses. Questions as to the venue of offense of sale or removal of mortgaged property and of other like offenses are elsewhere treated.43 [§ 292] 33. Threatening Letter. It would seem clear that the offense of sending a threatening letter is committed in the county in which it is dispatched, as where it is sent by mail, although it is received in another county, since the sending of it completes the offense; and so it has been held. But there are authorities to the effect that if a person by an innocent agent, like the post office, sends a threatening letter into another county, where it is delivered, the venue may be laid in the latter county.45 And where it is made an offense, not only to send such a letter but also to exhibit it, the courts of both counties have concurrent jurisdiction.46 [§ 293] 34. Violation of Anti-Trust Laws. To bring a prosecution under the anti-trust laws within the venue of a particular county, the illegal combination must have been entered into in such county, or some act must have been committed therein in furtherance of the unlawful purposes of such combination.*7 49 [§ 294] 35. Offenses Committed Partly in One County and Partly in Another.48 It was a rule of the common law that, when an offense was constituted by a series of acts, a part of which were done in one county and a part in another, there could be no prosecution in either, unless so much was done in the one as would constitute a complete offense. This, however, has long been changed by statute in England;50 and in the United States it is now very generally provided by statute that, where a crime is committed partly in one county and partly in another, that is, where same acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one county and some in the other, accused is indictable in either;51 and it has been held that such a statute is not repugnant to the constitutional provision that accused shall be entitled to a trial in the county where the crime was [§ 291] 32. Sale or Removal of Mortgaged 32. Com. v. Weaver, 10 Pa. Dist. | deliver the liquor to the connecting | unless the offense is consummated 533, 32 PittsbLJ 17. carrier in U county, which consti[a] In Porto Rico it has been held tuted an offense separate from that that the seller and consignor of adul- committed by the original delivery of terated milk could not be prosecuted the liquor to the initial carrier at D, in the district in which such milk for which accused could be prosecutwas received, where the shipmented properly in U county. Phillips v. was made from another district. Peo. State, 73 Tex. Cr. 627, 167 SW 353. V. Nogueras, 23 Porto Rico 309. 38. Hopson v. State, 116 Ga. 90, 42 SE 412; Peo. v. DeGroot, 111 Mich. 245, 69 NW 248. 33. Meyer v. State, 54 Oh. St. 242, 43 NE 164; Bissman v. State, 9 Oh. Cir. Ct. 714, 6 Oh. Cir. Dec. 712 [aff 54 Oh. St. 242, 43 NE 164]. 34. Place of sale as element of offense see Intoxicating Liquors [23 Cyc 185]. 35. State v. Hughes, 22 W. Va. 743. 36. Brechwald v. Peo., 21 Ill. A. 213; Duff v. Com., 68 SW 390, 24 KyL 201; State v. Hughes, 22 W. Va. 743. [a] County of residence.-A charge of selling liquors cannot be maintained in the county of the residence of accused, although he may have kept liquors in store there, where he sold them in another county, Duff v. Com., 68 SW 390, 24 KyL 201. 37. Brechwald v. Peo., 21 Ill. A. 213. [a] Delivery to connecting carrier. Where accused delivered a trunk containing intoxicating liquor, unlabeled, to a railroad company at D for shipment to G in U county, knowing that it would be necessary for the carrier to transfer the liquor to a connecting carrier at a junction point in U county, accused thereby made the initial carrier his agent to State, 116 Ga. 90, 39. Hopson v. 41. Newsome v. State, 1 Ga. A. 42. Golden v. Woodland Tp. Justice's Ct., 23 Cal. A. 778, 140 P 49; Rose v. State, 4 Ga. A. 588, 62 SE 117; Hayner v. State, 83 Oh. St. 178, 93 NE 900. 43. See Chattel Mortgages § 384. 44. Landa v. State, 26 Tex. A. 580, 10 SW 218. 45. Peo. v. Griffin, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 427; Rex v. Girdwood, 1 Leach C. C. 169; 1 Chitty Cr. L. p 191; 2 East P. C. p 1120. See infra § 300. 46. Com. v. Morton, 140 Ky. 628, 131 SW 506, AnnCas1912B 454. 47. International Harvester Co. v. Com., 144 Ky. 403, 138 SW 248; International Harvester Co. v. Com., 124 Ky. 543, 99 SW 637, 30 KyL 716; Hughes v. State, 29 Oh. Cir. Ct. 237. [a] The formation outside the county of an unlawful combination for the purpose of raising the price of a commodity is not an offense within the jurisdiction of the county, there by selling the commodity at more than its real value. International Harvester Co. v. Com., 137 Ky. 668, 126 SW 352. 48. Cross references: Averments in indictment see Indictments and Informations [22 Cyc 312]. Constitutional and statutory provision see supra §§ 169, 183, 261. Locality of offense in general see supra § 197. Offenses against United States see infra § 249. Principals and accessaries see infra § 301. 49. In re Kelly, 46 Fed. 653: Brown v. State, 108 Ala. 18, 18 S 811; Searcy v. State, 4 Tex. 450; 4 Blackstone Comm, p 303; 1 Chitty Cr. L. p 178; 1 East P. C. p 361; 1 Hale P. C. p 126; 1 Hawkins P. C. e 13 § 13; Bacon Abr. tit Indictment. See supra § 275. 50. St. 7 Geo. IV c 64 § 12 (providing that if any felony or misdemeanor is begun in one county and completed in another, it may be dealt with in either county as if wholly completed therein). 51. Ala.-Brown V. State, 108 Ala. 18, 18 S 811; Prestwood v. State, 87 Ala. 147, 6 S 392. Ariz.-Reynolds v. State, 18 Ariz. 388, 161 P 885. Cal.-Peo. v. Grubb, 24 Cal. A. 604, 141 P 1051. Fla. Smith v. State, 42 Fla. 605, 28 S 758. Ind. Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, ment must be in the latter.5% 61 Applications of rule. Among the offenses to which such statutes have been applied are murder and manslaughter,58 abortion,59 seduction under promise of marriage, promise of marriage,60 living in adultery, the illegal sale of intoxicating liquors,62 larceny and embezzlement,63 false pretenses and fraud,64 forgery,65 a false statement of the condition of a bank, enticing away a laborer or servant from his employer, and a nuisance by the defilement or pollution of a river.68 66 67 committed.52 But such a statute does not apply where the crime is complete in one county;53 and a single, indivisible offense, not consisting of several parts, is not within the operation of the statute.54 Before it can become operative in any criminal case, one of two things must appear: Either the offense must be divisible, and each part must be unlawful in and of itself, and committed at a different time and place,55 or it must consist of more than one act, each of which acts, or the effect of each, must constitute an unlawful element of the offense, without the presence of which the offense [§ 295] 36. Offenses at or near County Boundcould not be consummated.56 These statutes do not aries. In the absence of a statute an offense comchange the rule that a person who while absent com- mitted near the boundary between two counties must mits a crime through an innocent agent must be be prosecuted in the county in which it was comprosecuted where the crime was committed. Thus mitted, except perhaps such offenses as are comit does not apply where a forged instrument is mitted on the county line, or so near that the dismailed in one county and received in another; but in tance therefrom is inappreciable, which may with such a case the prosecution for uttering the instru- propriety be regarded as committed in either 46 NE 127, 47 NE 465; Archer v. Ind. Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, cur in two or more counties, the juState, 106 Ind. 426, 7 NE 225; State 7 NE 225. risdiction is in either, does not auv. Herring, 21 Ind. A. 157, 48 NE Kan.-State v. Wade, 55 Kan, 693, thorize a conviction for living in 598, 69 AmSR 351. 41 P 951; State v. Price, 55 Kan. 606, adultery in a county in which the 40 P 1000. parties agreed to go to another county for such purpose, although they lived in adultery in the latter county). Iowa.-State v. Gibson, 132 Iowa 53, 106 NW 270; State v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., 117 Iowa 524, 91 NW 794; State v. Spayde, 110 Iowa 726, 80 NW 1058; State v. Hengen, 106 Iowa 711, 77 NW 453; State v. Smith, 82 Iowa 423, 48 NW 727; State v. Kriechbaum, 81 Iowa 633, 47 NW 872; State v. Hollenbeck, 36 Iowa 112. Kan.-State v. Mason, 61 Kan. 102, 58 P 978; State v. Price, 55 Kan. 606, 40 P 1000; State v. Rider, 46 Kan. 332, 26 P 745. Ky. Collins v. Com., 141 Ky. 564, 133 SW 233; Com. v. Morton, 140 Ky. 628, 131 SW 506; Hargis, v. Parker, 85 SW 704, 27 KyL 441, 69 LRA 270; Com. v. Jones, 118 Ky. 889, 82 SW 643, 26 KyL 867, 4 AnnCas 1192; Allison v. Com., 83 Ky. 254. La-State v. Fields, 51 La. Ann. 1239, 26 S 99. Mass.-Com, v. Parker, 2 Pick. 550. Miss. Murray v. State, 98 Miss. 594, 54 S 72; State v. Hughes, 96 Miss. 581, 51 S 464. Mont. State v. Hudson, 13 Mont. 112, 32 P 413, 19 LRA 775. Nev.-State v. Pray, 30 Nev. 206, 224, 94 P 218 [cit Cycl. N. M.-Terr. v. Hicks, 6 N. M. 596, 30 P 872. N. Y.-Peo. V. Hudson Valley Constr. Co., 217 N. Y. 172, 111 NE 472; Peo. v. Mitchell, 168 N. Y. 604, 61 NE 182 [aff 49 App. Div. 531, 63 NYS 522, 14 N. Y. Cr. 5391; Peo. v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 47 NE 883 [aff 43 NYS 1160]; Peo. v. Dimick, 107 N. Y. 13, 14 NE 178; Peo. v. Wicks, 11 App. Div. 539, 42 NYS 630 [aff 154 N. Y. 766 mem, 49 NE 1102 mem]: Peo. v. Thorn, 21 Misc. 130, 47 NÝS 46; Peo. v. Murray, 95 NYS 107; Peo. v. Crotty, 9 NYS 937; Peo. v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. 509. S. C.-State v. McCoomer, 79 S. C. 63, 60 SE 237. S. D.-State v. Allen, 21 S. D. 121, 110 NW 92; State v. Huston, 19 S. D. 644, 104 NW 451, 117 AmSR 970, 9 AnnCas 381. Tenn.-State v. Adams, 137 Tenn. 521, 194 SW 579. Wis. In re Eldred, 46 Wis. 530, 1 NW 175; State v. Pauley, 12 Wis. 537. Eng.-Rex v. Burdett, 4 B. & Ald. 95, 6 ECL 404, 106 Reprint. And see supra § 275. [a] An offense commenced within the state and consummated outside its boundaries is sometimes made punishable in the county where the offense was commenced. State v. Adams, 137 Tenn. 521, 194 SW 579. 52. Fla. Smith v. State, 42 Fla. 605, 28 S 758. Ky.-Com. v. Jones, 118 Ky. 889, Oh.-American Strawboard Co. v. Wis. State v. Pauley, 12 Wis. 537. Brown v. State, 108 Ala. 18, 18 [a] The offense of receiving sto- 55. State v. Graham, 23 Utah 278, 56. State v. Indiana Standard Oil State v. Hudson, 13 Mont. 112, 58. See supra § 275. 59. Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 NE 127, 47 NE 465 (holding, under a provision that, "where a public offense has been committed partly in one county and partly in another, or the act or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either county," that a person charged with procuring an abortion may be indicted and tried in the county in which the woman miscarried and died, although the acts of defendant producing the miscarriage and death were done and committed in another county). And see supra § 265. 60. Peo. v. Crotty, 9 NYS 937 (holding that, where a man promises in one county to marry a woman, and on the same day takes her into another county and there seduces her under such promise, he may be prosecuted in either county). 61. Brown v. State, 108 Ala. 18, 18 S 811 (holding, however, that Code [1886] § 3719, providing that, where an offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another, or the acts constituting the offense oc 62. State v. Kriechbaum, 81 Iowa 633, 47 NW 872. 63. Peo. v. Mitchell, 168 N. Y. 604, 61 NE 182 [aff 49 App. Div. 531, 63 NYS 522, 14 N. Y. Cr. 539]. And see supra §§ 272, 280. 64. Murray v. State, 98 Miss. 594, 54 S 72; Peo. v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 47 NE 883 [aff 43 NYS 1160]: Peo. v. Dimick, 107 N. Y. 13, 14 NE 178. And see supra § 273. 65. State v. Spayde, 110 Iowa 726, 80 NW 1058 (holding that, where one signs another's name to a note in one county and fills up the blanks in another county, he is guilty of forgery therein, and the venue may be laid properly in the latter county). And see supra § 274. 66. State v. Mason, 61 Kan. 102, 58 P 978 (holding that, where a false report or statement of the condition of a bank is made, subscribed, and sworn to by an officer of the bank in one county, and is then transmitted to and received by the bank commissioner in another county in which his office is held, the jurisdiction of the offense is in either county). .67. Prestwood v. State, 87 Ala. 147, 6 S 392 (holding that, on a trial for enticing away a laborer from his employer, the local jurisdiction is not necessarily the county in which defendant made the contract of hire with the laborer; but that, where the acts necessary to the consummation of the offense occurred in two counties, the jurisdiction is in either, as provided by Code [1886] § 3719). 68. State v. Smith, 82 Iowa 423, 426, 48 NW 727 (holding, under a provision that "when a public offense is committed in part in one county and part within another, or when the acts or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties, jurisdiction is in either,” that, where the acts of defilement of a river were committed in one county and the injury resulted to residents of another, the prosecution was properly brought in the latter). To same effect State v. Herring, 21 Ind. A. 157, 48 NE 598, 69 AmSR 351; State v. Wabash Paper Co., 21 Ind. A. 167, 48 NE 653, 51 NE 949; State v. Glucose Sugar Refining Co., 117 Iowa 524, 91 NW 794. And see supra § 282. 69. In re McDonald, 19 Mo. A. 370; Armstrong v. State, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 338; State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va. 782, 45 AmR 570. 71 county.70 In some jurisdictions, however, statutes provide that where an offense is committed on a boundary between counties, or within a specified distance of the same, jurisdiction shall be in either county. Such a statute has been held to apply, although a river is the boundary line of the county;72 but special provision is sometimes made for such a case.73 The statute does not cover a case where a crime is committed on an island, where there is no showing as to the distance of the island from the respective counties on either side of the river, nor the width of the river at that point. So it applies only to offenses against the state which may be tried in either county, and not to a local offense, where it must be proved that it was actually committed in the place alleged.75 76 Constitutionality. While there are some cases to the contrary, the weight of authority is that these statutes do not deprive accused of the constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed."7 un division of the old county or otherwise, the courts 81 Until the organization of the new county is perfected the courts thereof do not acquire jurisdicTenn.-Armstrong V. State, 1 Coldw. 338. the death ensued in S county within [296] 37. Organization of New County. Where the territory in which a crime has been committed is created into a new county by the sub[a] Presumption-A person having received a fatal wound in one county near the border of another will be presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to have remained in the county where the Wound was given, until his death. Binfield v. State, 15 Nebr. 484, 19 NW 607. 70. See Buckrice v. Peo., 110 I11. 29. 71. Ala.-Granberry v. State, 184 Ala. 5, 63 S 975; Jackson v. State, 90 Ala, 590, 8 S 862; Grogan v. State, 44 Ala. 9; Davis v. State, 8 Ala. A. 147, 62 S 1027. Cal-Peo. v. Cipolla, 155 Cal. 224, 100 P 252. Iowa.-Carter v. Barlow, 105 Iowa 78, 74 NW 745; State v. Rockwell, 82 Iowa 429, 48 NW 721. Mass. Com. V. Matthews, 167 Mass, 173, 45 NE 92; Com. v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1. Mich-Peo. v. Hubbard, 86 Mich. 440, 49 NW 265; Bayliss v. Peo., 46 Mich. 221, 9 NW 257. N. Y.-Peo. v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 [aff 45 Barb. 494]. Tex-Madrid v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. 420, 161 SW 93; McElroy v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 57, 111 SW 948; McKinney v. State, (Cr.) 68 SW 176; Walls v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 70, 63 SW 328; Willis v. State, 10 Tex. A. 493. Wis.-State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 NW 429, 50 AmR 388. [a] Doubt as to boundary.-Although there is doubt as to which one of two lines constitutes the boundary between two counties, proof that a crime was committed west of both of such lines is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the western County. State v. Branton, 33 Or. 533, 56 P 267. [b] In New Jersey, under 1 Gen. St. p 1003 § 33, all criminal offenses which are committed on any highway which is a boundary line between two counties are triable in the County in which the offender last resided previous to the commission of such offense. Keer v. State, 61 N. J. L. 385, 39 A 907. 72. Hackney v. State, (Tex. Cr.) 73. See statutory provisions. 74. Patterson v. State, 156 Ala. 75. McKay v. State, 110 Ala. 19, 20 S 455 (holding that, under Code § 3720, providing that when an offense is committed on the boundary of two or more counties, or within a quarter of a mile thereof, the jurisdiction is in either county, one illegally selling liquor in a county, but within a quarter of a mile of the boundary line between it and another county, could not be convicted in the latter, where each had a statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicants, differing in the definition of the offense and in the punishment to be inflicted therefor). [a] But in other jurisdictions such statutes have been held applicable to prosecutions for keeping a liquor nuisance. State v. Rockwell, 82 Iowa 429, 48 NW 721; Com. v. Matthews, 167 Mass. 173, 45 NE 92. [b] Under the Massachusetts statute it was held that if an offense of which police courts and trial justices have general jurisdiction is committed within one hundred rods of the dividing line between two counties, police courts and trial justices in either county have jurisdiction to entertain and try a complaint therefor. Com. v. Gillon, 2 Allen 502. [c] The English statute of 7 Geo. IV c 64 § 12, as to offenses commit[c] Homicide.-Under the Massa- ted within five hundred yards of the chusetts statute providing that if boundaries of counties, was held to death ensues in one county from a be confined to county boundaries and mortal wound given in another coun- prosecutions in counties, and not to ty the offense may be prosecuted in apply to prosecutions in limited jueither, and the statute providing that risdictions. Rex v. Welsh, 1 Moody a strip one hundred rods wide on C. C. 175. each side of the boundary line shall be regarded as being in either county, it was held that a conviction for murder might be had on an indictment in N county, if a pistol was La. 155, 38 S 949. fired in S county more than one hundred rods from the dividing line, and 370. 76. Ill.-Buckrice v. Peo., 110 Ill. W. Va.-State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va. 782, 45 AmR 570. 77. Jackson v. State, 90 Ala. 590, 8 S 862; Grogan v. State, 44 Ala. 9; State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447; State v. McDonald, 109 Wis. 506, 85 NW 502; State v. Stewart, 60 Wis. 587, 19 NW 429, 50 AmR 388. And see cases supra note 71. 78. U. S.-Ex p. Moran, 144 Fed. 594, 75 CCA 396. Ark.-McElroy v. State, 13 Ark. 708. 675. N. J.-State v. Jones, 9 N. J. L. 357, 17 AmD 483. N. C.-State v. Hart, 26 N. C. 222. Okl.-Moran v. Terr., 14 Okl. 544, 78 P 111 [aff 203 U. S. 96, 27 SCt 25, 51 L. ed. 105]. Tenn.-State v. Marshall, 124 Tenn. 230. 135 SW 926; State v. Donaldson, 3 Heisk. 48. Tex.-Hernandez v. State, 19 Tex. A. 408; Weller v. State, 16 Tex. A. 200. Ont.-Reg. v. Kennedy, 26 U. C. Q. B. 326. Contra State v. Strathmann, 4 Mo. A. 583. 79. State v. Fish, 26 N. C. 219. 80. Peo. v. Stokes, 103 Cal. 193, 195, 37 P 207, 42 AmSR 102; State v. Marshall, 124 Tenn. 230, 135 SW 926. 81. Bundrick V. State, 125 Ga. 753, 54 SE 683; Pone v. State, 124 Ga. 801, 53 SE 384, 110 AmSR 197; Com. v. Meadors, 149 Ky. 769, 149 SW 1005, AnnCas1914B 345; State v. Marshall, 124 Tenn. 230, 135 SW 926. 82. Com. v. Meadors, 149 Ky. 769, 149 SW 1005, AnnCas1914B 345. See also State v. Kring, 74 Mo. 612. 83. Com. v. Meadors, 149 Ky. 769, 149 SW 1005, AnnCas1914B 345. 84. Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 545; State v. Jones, 9 N. J. L. 357, 17 AmD 483. 85. Peo. v. Stokes, 103 Cal. 193, tion; until then the courts of the old county have jurisdiction.86 Unconstitutional statute. Where an act taking territory from one county and adding it to another is unconstitutional, an indictment for a crime committed in the territory so changed should be found in the original county.87 the Under a statute attaching an unorganized county to an organized county for "judicial purposes, grand jury of the organized county has jurisdiction to indict, and its courts can try and punish for offenses committed in the unorganized county.8 88 [§ 297] 38. Offenses on Public Conveyances. It is a statutory rule in some jurisdictions that where an offense is committed on a railroad car, steamboat, or other public conveyance, and it is impossible to determine in what county it was committed, accused may be tried in any county through any part of which the vessel or other public conveyance passed on that trip or voyage.89 By the weight of authority such statutes violate no constitutional provision;90 but the contrary has also been held.91 committed on a ship on navigable water below lowwater mark is within the jurisdiction of the courts of the county adjoining.92 A statute providing that "the jurisdiction over navigable streams, not included within the limits of any county, belongs to the county or counties whose jurisdiction extends to the margin thereof" applies, in respect to venue, to offenses committed on a river;93 but it does not extend to offenses committed on an island located in the river, which is included within the limits of, or belongs to, a particular county.94 [§ 299] 40. Offenses against United States. The United States constitution provides that the trial of crimes shall be had in the state "where the crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the congress may by law have directed,' ,795 and by an amendment that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been previously ascertained by law.'' 96 These constitutional provisions apply only to prosecutions in the federal courts for crimes against the made against defendant, although the witnesses whose names are indorsed upon the indictment were summoned before the grand jury and were in actual attendance upon the court before the passage of the act. Post v. U. S., 161 U. S. 583, 16 SCt 611, 40 L. ed. 816. [§ 298] 39. Offenses on Water. An offense 37 P 207, 42 AmSR 102; Com. v. | (Mass.) 387; Manley v. Peo., 7 N. Y. Meadors, 149 Ky. 769, 149 SW 1005, 295; Peo. v. Wilson, 3 Park. Cr. (N. AnnCas1914B 345. Y.) 199; State v. Stevens, 1 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 82, 2 WestLJ 66. See supra § 220. 93. Patterson v. State, 156 Ala. 62, 69, 47 S 52; Jackson v. State, 90 Ala. 590, 8 S 862. 86. Peo. v. McGuire, 32 Cal. 140. [a] Thus a homicide occurring in that portion of B county transferred to C county by the act of March 5, 1901, on the day of the election required by the act to determine if such portion of the county shall be transferred to C county, and before the polls were closed, was within the jurisdiction of B county, as it could not be determined whether there had been any change of territory until after the election had been held. Jackson v. State, 131 Ala. 21, 31 S 380. 87. Kline v. State, 146 Ala. 1, 41 S 952. 88. Robinson v. State, 71 Nebr. 142, 98 NW 694; Portales First Nat. Bank v. McElroy, 51 Tex. Civ. A. 284, 112 SW 801. 89. Ill-Watt v. Peo., 126 Ill. 9, 18 NE 340, 1 LRA 403. Iowa.-Nash V. State, 2 Greene 286, 287 (holding that a statute which provides that "when a person shall commit an offence on board of any vessel or float, he may be indicted for the same in any county, through any part of which such vessel or float may have passed on that trip or voyage," is not confined to that part of the trip or voyage which had been performed before the offense was committed, but extends to the entire trip). N. Y.-Peo. v. Dowling, 84 N. Y. 478; Peo. v. Hulse, 3 Hill 309. Wis.-Powell v. State, 52 Wis. 217, 9 NW 17. Eng-Reg. v. French, 8 Cox C. C. 252; Reg. v. Sharpe, 6 Cox C. C. 418. 90. Watt v. Peo., 126 Ill. 9, 18 NE 340, 1 LRA 403. And see cases supra note 89. 91. State v. Gorman, 191 Mo. 150, 90 SW 100; State v. Meyers, 191 Mo. 149, 90 SW 100; State v. Clarke, 191 Mo. 148, 90 SW 100; State v. Anderson, 191 Mo. 134, 90 SW 95; Steerman v. State, 10 Mo. 503; Craig v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 227 (where it was held that a statute, providing that offenses committed on board a vessel navigating the waters of the state might be tried in any county through which the boat should pass in the course of its voyage, was in violation of the constitutional provision for trial in the county or district in which the crime should be committed). 94. Patterson v. State, 156 Ala. 62, 47 S 52. [c] Conspiracy to commit federal offense.-(1) Laying the venue of the trial of a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, under Rev. St. § 5480, by using the mails to defraud, in the state and federal judicial district where the overt act is performed, satisfies Const. Amendm. VI, that all crimes shall be tried in the state and district where committed. Brown v. Elliott, 225 U. S. 392, 32 SCt 812, 56 L. ed. 1136; Hyde v. U. S., 225 U. S. 347. 32 SCt 793, 56 L. ed. 1114, AnnCas 1914A 614 [aff 35 App. (D. C.) 451]; U. S. v. Reddin, 193 Fed. 798; Robinson v. U. S., 172 Fed. 105, 96 CCA 307. (2) Such a conspiracy also may be prosecuted where it was formed. U. [a] Island in Mississippi river. The venue of a trial for homicide committed on an island in the Mississippi river was held to be in a county which had assumed jurisdiction over the island many years, although the island was never formally attached to the county. Laxton v. State, 126 Tenn. 302, 148 SW 1059. 95. U. S. Const. art 3 § 2 cl 3. 96. U. S. Const. Amendm, 6. See Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S. 344, 26 SCt 688, 50 L. ed. 1057, 6 AnnCas 362; Barrett v. U. S., 169 U. S. 218, 18 SCt 327, 42 L. ed. 723; Cook v. U. S., 138 U. S. 157, 11 SCt 268, 34 L. ed. 906; U. S. v. Jackalow, 1 Black. (U. S.) 484, 17 L. ed. 225; U. S. v. Dawson, 15 How. (U. S.) 467, 14 L. ed. 775; Gut v. Minnesota, 9 Wall. (U. S.) 35, 19 L. ed. 573; Ex p. Lair, 177 Fed. 789 [rev on other grounds 195 Fed. 47, 115 CCA 49]; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 169 Fed. 69, 94 CCA 437; Vernon v. U. S., 146 Fed. 121, 76 CCA 547; U. S. v. Dixon, 44 Fed. 401; U. S. v. Bird, 24 F. Cas. No. 14,597, 1 Sprague 299 [rev on other grounds 3 Wheat. 336, 4 L. ed. 404]; Mahaffey v. Terr., 11 Okl. 213, 66 Pact that violations shall be prose342. [a] Time for ascertainment.-The district in which the trial is had must have been ascertained by law previous to the commission of the crime, and not merely previous to the trial. U. S. v. Maxon, 26 F. Cas. No. 15,748, 15 Blatchf. 360. [b] Provision for prosecution in division of district where offense committed.-Under the act of July 12, 1894 (28 St. at L. 102 c 132), enacting that "all criminal proceedings instituted for the trial of offences against the laws of the United States arising in the District of Minnesota shall be brought, had and prosecuted in the division of said district in which such offences were committed," the court has no jurisdiction of an indictment afterward presented by the grand jury for the district in one division, for an offense committed in another division before the passage of the act, and 92. Com. V. Peters, 12 Metc. for which no complaint has been S. v. Wells, 192 Fed. 870, 113 CCA 194 [writ of certiorari den 225 U. S. 714, 32 SCt 842, 56 L. ed. 1269]. [d] The offense of obtaining transportation of property in interstate or foreign commerce at less than the carrier's published rates, created by the Elkins Act of Febr. 19, 1903 (32 U. S. St. at L. 847 c 708), is made triable in any federal district through which such transportation is had by the provision of that cuted in any court of the United States having jurisdiction of crimes within the district in which such violation was committed, or through which the transportation may have been conducted; and this provision does not violate the constitutional requirement above mentioned. Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S. 56, 28 SCt 428, 52 L. ed. 681 [aff 153 Fed. 1, 82 CCA 135, 14 LRANS 400]; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S. 90, 28 SCt 439, 52 L. ed. 698 [aff 157 Fed. 830, 85 CCA 194]; Northern Cent. R. Co. v. U. S., 241 Fed. 25, 154 CCA 25. [e] Applying military supplies to defendant's use.-The offense of applying to the use of accused subsistence and supplies furnished to him to be used for military service should be indicted in the division of a district, in which such subsistence and supplies were obtained. U. S. v. Buchanan, 238 Fed. 877. [f] Under § 298 of the Judiciary 97 United States. They are inapplicable to offenses committed in a territory.98 It is not required that the prosecution of defendant shall be in the district in which he resided at the time of the commission of the offense, or in which he may have been at that time, provided he is prosecuted where the offense is committed. The constitutional requirement is as to the locality of the offense and not as to the personal presence of the offender.99 Nor does it apply where the state in which prosecution is to be had is clearly defined by the statute itself.1 Offense begun in one district and completed in another. By a federal statute it is provided that "when any offense against the United States is begun in one judicial circuit and completed in another, it shall be deemed to have been committed in either, and may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in either district, in the Act of 1789, providing that in capital, 392; Putnam v. U. cases the trial shall be in the county where the offense was committed, or where that cannot be done without great inconvenience, twelve petty jurors at least shall be summoned from thence, it was held that the fact that the whole county was in a state of insurrection was sufficient to make it inconvenient to hold the trial there within the meaning of the statute. Fries' Case, 9 F. Cas. No. 5,126, 3 Dall. (Pa.) 515, 1 L. ed. 701. 97. Cook v. U. S., 138 U. S. 157, 11 SCt 268, 34 L. ed. 906; Jones v. U. S., 137 U. S. 202, 11 SCt 80, 34 L. ed. 691; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 9 SCt 28, 32 L. ed. 252; U. S. v. Dawson, 15 How. (U. S.) 467, 14 L. ed. 775; Ex p. Pritchard, 43 Fed. 915; State v. Caldwell, 115 N. C. 794, 20 SE 523; Dies v. State, 56 Tex. Cr. 32, 117 SW 979. 98. Billingsley v. U. S., 178 Fed. 653, 101 CCA 465; Mahaffey v. Terr., 11 Okl. 213, 66 P 342. 99. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 30 SCt 249, 54 L. ed. 569, 17 AnnCas 1112; Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 209 U. S. 56, 28 SCt 428, 52 L. ed. 681; Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S. 344, 387, 26 SCt 688, 50 L. ed. 1057, 6 Ann Cas 362 (where it was said that "the constitutional requirement is that the crime shall be tried in the State or District where committed, not necessarily in the State or District where the party committing it happened to be at the time"); Palliser v. U. S., 136 U. S. 257, 265, 10 SCt 1034, 34 L. ed. 514. [a] The physical absence of accused from the state of Missouri when the acceptance by a St. Louis corporation of his offer to render services in consideration of the compensation forbidden by Rev. St. § 1782 was dispatched by mail or telegram did not deprive the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Missouri of jurisdiction of the offense, on the theory that the crime was not committed in that district, within the meaning of Const. art 3 § 2 and Const. Amendm. VI, requiring the trial of all crimes against the United States to be held in the state and district where such crimes shall have been committed. Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S. 344, 26 SCt 688, 50 L. ed. 1057, 6 AnnCas 362. 1. U. S. v. Hopkins, 199 Fed. 649. [a] Under Pure Food and Drugs Act § 2, jurisdiction of a prosecution for shipping adulterated drugs existed in the federal court of the district from which the shipment was made, although defendant resided in another district. U. S. v. Hopkins, 199 Fed. 649. 2. Rev. St. § 731. And see Hyde v. U. S., 225 U. S. 347, 32 SCt 793, 56 L. ed. 1114 [aff 35 App. (D. C.) 4511: Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 30 SCt 249, 54 L. ed. 569, 17 AnnCas 1112; Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S. 344, 26 SCt 688, 50 L. ed. 1057, 6 AnnCas same manner as if it had been actually and wholly committed therein." 2 This provision applies to a continuing offense, a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy;3 where such an act or series of acts runs through several jurisdictions, the offense is committed and cognizable in each. It does not apply where the offense consists in the commission or omission of a single act at a single place." Crimes committed out of jurisdiction of particular state or district. By another federal statute it is provided that "the trial of all offenses committed upon the high seas or elsewhere, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district where the offender is found, or into which he is first brought;' under this pro V. S., 162 U. S. 687, 16 SCt 923, 40 L. ed. 1118; Shea v. U. S., 236 Fed. 97, 149 CCA 307; New York Cent., etc., R. Co. U. S., 166 Fed. 267, 92 CCA 331; Arnold v. Weil, 157 Fed. 429; Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 153 Fed. 1, 82 CCA 135, 14 LRANS 400 [aff 209 U. S. 56, 28 SCt 428, 52 L. ed. 681]: Bridgeman v. Weil, 157 Fed. 429, 72 CCA 145; U. S. v. Murphy, 91 Fed. 120; U. S. v. Noblom, 27 F. Cas. No. 15,896; U. S. v. Rindskopf, 27 F. Cas. No. 16,165, 6 Biss. 259. 3. See cases infra note 4. 4. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 166 Fed. 267, 92 CCA 331; Armour Packing Co. v. U. S., 153 Fed. 1, 82 CCA 135, 14 LRANS 400 [aff 209 U. S. 56, 28 SCt 428, 52 L. ed. 681]. [a] An offense committed by mailing a letter (1) is continued in the place where the letter is received, and triable in either place. Palliser v. U. S., 136 U. S. 257, 10 SCt 1034, 34 L. ed. 514. (2) This case was cited in Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1, 15, 25 SCt 569, 49 L. ed. 919, which was concerned with extradition proceedings against one charged with the crime of bribery alleged to have been committed by mailing a letter in the state of California, directed to certain officers of the general land office in the District of Columbia. It was objected to the removal of defendant to the District of Columbia for trial that the crime was committed, if at all, in California. The contention was held untenable. (3) It was also applied in Burton v. U. S., 202 U. S. 344, 387, 26 SCt 688, 50 L. ed. 1057, 6 AnnCas 362, in which it was held that there was jurisdiction in Missouri of a criminal charge against Senator Burton for agreeing in that state to receive prohibited compensation for certain services to be rendered by him while he was a United States senator, the offer being carried to Missouri by an agent and accepted there, Burton not being personally present in the state. court said, per Harlan, J.: "The constitutional requirement is that the crime shall be tried in the State and District where committed, not necessarily in the State or District where the party committing it happened to be at the time. This distinction was brought out and recognized in Palliser v. U. S., 136 U. S. 257, 265, 10SCt 1034, 34 L. ed. 514." (4) But a prosecution under Rev. St. § 5480, prohibiting the use of the post office for promoting a scheme to defraud, can be the district instituted only in which matter was placed in the post office. U. S. v. Sauer, 88 Fed. 249. The viding a civil government for Alaska, which prohibits the importation of intoxicating liquors into the territory; and the exportation of such liquors with intent to import them into Alaska constitutes a part of the offense which, having been begun in the United States and completed in Alaska, is cognizable in the courts of either jurisdiction, the act of congress creating the crime being a part of the supreme law of both. U. S. v. Murphy, 91 Fed. 120. [c] Where a conspiracy to defraud the United States of public lands was originally formed in one federal district, but was carried out by means of false and fraudulent entries of such lands in another district, made with the knowledge and consent of all the conspirators, each of such overt acts constituted a renewal of the conspiracy in the latter district, and the offense may be prosecuted in either district. Arnold v. Weil, 157 Fed. 429. [d] Presenting false claim.-Under Rev. St. § 731 which provides that offenses begun in one judicial circuit and completed in another may be prosecuted in either, where a false claim and voucher against the United States are made in one state and transmitted from there to the appropriate department in the city of Washington for approval and allowance, the offense of presenting the false claim may be prosecuted in the state where the papers were made. Bridgeman v. U. S., 140 Fed. 577, 72 CCA 145. 5. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 166 Fed. 267, 92 CCA 331; Davis v. U. S., 104 Fed. 136, 43 CCA 448; In re Belknap. 96 Fed. 614. [a] The failure to file a rate sched ule" with the interstate commerce commission is in no sense a continuous offense running into different dis tricts. The offense consists in the failure to do a single act in a single place. New York Cent., etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 166 Fed. 267, 92 CCA 331. [b] The offense of importing a female alien for prostitution in violation of the Act of Febr. 20, 1907 (34 St. at L. 899 c 1134 § 3), is committed and is complete the moment the immigrant is landed in the United States, at which point the offense is triable, under Const. art 3 § 2 cl 3. declaring that the trial of all crimes except cases of impeachment shall be held in the state where the crime has been committed and the sixth amendment, declaring that accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial in the state and district wherein the crime has been committed. U. S. v. Krsteff, 185 Fed. 201; [b] Importation of Intoxicating U. S. v. Lavoie, 182 Fed. 943; Ex p. liquors into Alaska.-An indictment Lair, 177 Fed. 789 [rev on other charging that defendant exported in-grounds 195 Fed. 47, 115 CCA 49]; toxicating liquors from a port of the U. S. v. Capella. 169 Fed. 890. United States, to a port of Alaska. 6. Rev. St. § 730. And see Jones and there landed the same, charges v. U. S., 137 U. S. 202, 11 SCt 80, an offense under § 14 of the act pro- 34 L. ed. 691; U. S. v. Arwo, 19 Wall. the fraudulent in |