roads, and the general topography of the state and of the territory within the jurisdiction of the court.10 [§ 955] b. Existence, Boundaries, Location, and Population of Political Divisions of States.11 The courts of a state are bound to take judicial cognizance of the territorial divisions of the state, 8. Hill v. State, 112 Miss. 375, 73 S 66. 9. Williams v. State, 64 Ind. 553, 31 AmR 135. 10. Campbell v. U. S., 221 Fed. 186, 136 CCA 602. 11. See also Evidence [16 Cyc 859]. Judicial notice as affecting proof of venue see infra § 991. 12. State v. Mahoney, 115 Me. 251, 98 A 750; State v. Southern R. Co., 141 N. C. 846, 54 SE 294. 13. Ala.-Overton v. State, 60 Ala. 73 (where the caption of an indictment had the name of the county printed in German letters, and the word "Wadison" was recognized to indicate "Madison"). Ind.-Turbeville v. State, 42 Ind. 490 (county). Me.-State v. Mahoney, 115 Me. 251, 98 A 750 (towns); State v. Simpson, 91 Me. 83, 39 A 287. Mass.-Com. v. Desmond, 103 Mass. 445 (county). Miss.-Hill v. State, 112 Miss. 375, 73 S 66 (municipalities). Mo-State v. Nolle, 96 Mo. A. 524, 70 SW 504. N. Y.-Peo. v. Breese, 7 Cow. 429. N. C.-State v. Southern R. Co., 141 N. C. 846, 54 SE 294 (county); State v. Glasgow, 1 N. C. 38, 2 AmD 629. Okl.-Filson v. Terr., 11 Okl. 351, 67 P 473 (county). [a] "St. Louis is, under the Constitution and laws of the State, a separate political subdivision of the State, of whose existence the courts are required to take judicial notice." Per Bland, P. J., in State v. Nolle, 96 Mo. A. 524, 526, 70 SW 504. 14. Ala.-Guarreno v. State, 157 Ala. 17, 48 S 65. Ariz.-Erickson v. State, 14 Ariz. 253, 127 P 754 (judicially noticing that an Arizona county had the same boundary under statehood that it possessed in Arizona territory). Ark.-Lyman v. State, 90 Ark. 596, 119 SW 1116 (county boundaries). Ga.-Cooper v. State, 2 Ga. A. 730, 59 SE 20. Ill.-Gunning v. State, 86 Ill. A. 676 [rev on other grounds but aff on this point 189 Ill. 165, 59 NE 494, 82 AmSR 433] (boundaries of towns created by acts of the legislature). Kan.-State v. Dollar, 88 Kan. 346, 128 P 365 (county boundaries). Mo.-State v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 459, 150 SW 1038 (county boundaries); State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 SW 1106 (boundaries of a county also judicially known to be an interior county in the state); State v. Bush, 136 Mo. A. 608, 118 SW 670 (county boundaries). N. C.-State v. Southern R. Co., 141 N. C. 846, 54 SE 294. Okl.-Spencer v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 7, 113 P 224 (county boundaries); Johnson v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 1, 112 P 760 (county boundaries); Fuller v. Terr., 2 Okl. Cr. 86, 99 P 1098 (county boundaries). Tex-State v. Jordon, 12 Tex. 205 (county boundaries); McGill v. State, 25 Tex. A. 499, 8 SW 661 (judicially noticing that the Brazos river is the eastern boundary of Milam county). Vt-State v. Shaw. 89 Vt. 121, 94 A 434, LRA1915F 1087. "Courts will take judicial notice of the political subdivisions of their States, and of the boundary lines of Counties therein, when fixed and declared by public statutes." Per Hoke, J. in State v. Southern R. Co., 141 N. C. 846, 851, 54 SE 294. "Courts are charged with judicial knowledge of the boundaries of incor created by statute,12 such as counties, towns, and cities,1 ,13 their boundaries,14 so far as these are defined by public statutes 15 or in fact claimed by the state,16 the location of counties in respect to prominent geographical features of the state,17 the situation with respect to counties, of municipalities 18 established by public porated town and cities." Per Denson, J., in Guarreno v. State, 157 Ala. 17, 19, 48 S 65. [a] That the boundary between two counties was a straight line was judicially noticed, and also the fact that it was not a stream of water. Cooper v. State, 2 Ga. A. 730, 59 SE 20. [b] Courts "will also take notice of the boundaries of towns when they have been fixed by law." Gunning v. Peo., 189 Ill. 165, 168, 59 NE 494, 82 AmSR 433 [rev 86 Ill. A. 676]. [c] "We judicially know where the respective counties are situated in this State and where and how they are situated with reference to one another." Per Prendergast, J., in Giles v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. 638, 646, 148 SW 317. To same effect Coffman v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. 295, 165 SW 939; Bussey v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. 260, 127 SW 1035. [d] Area of county at a long-ago date.-In one case the court took judicial notice that in 1877 Nueces county was very large, embracing territory much greater than the ordinary county in Texas. Sandaval v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. 368, 162 SW 1148. [e] A point three miles from a judicially recognized county seat, according to the testimony of a witness, was judicially known to be within the county. State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 SW 1106. [1] A place eight miles from a named county seat was judicially known to be within the county. State V. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 459, 150 SW 1038. [g] A point three miles southwest of Dover was judicially known to be in Pope county. "The general situation of Dover which was for years the seat of justice for the county with reference to the county lines was a matter of public notoriety, of which the court had notice without proof; that the county line could not be reached within three miles was common knowledge, and if the jury found, as it might have done on the evidence, that the homicide occurred within three miles of Dover, that fixed it in Pope County." Forehand v. State, 53 Ark. 46, 48, 13 SW 728. [h] A point within a mile and a half of a named town was judicially known to be within the county in which the town was judicially known to be located. State v. Mitchell, 139 Iowa 455, 116 NW 808. [i] "Any point within five miles south of Independence" was judicially known to be in Buchanan county. State v. Heft, 148 Iowa 617, 127 NW 830. [j] "A point 14 miles west of Atoka is about 6 miles east of Wapanucka, and is in Atoka county." Spencer v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 7, 9, 113 P 224. [k] Contiguity of counties to each other is a matter of judicial knowledge. Bussey v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. 260. 127 SW 1035: McGill v. State, 25 Tex. A. 499, 8 SW 661. 15. See cases supra note 14. [a] Boundaries established by some court, board, or commission are not judicially known without proof. State v. Carmody, 50 Or. 1, 91 P 446, 1081, 12 LRANS 828. 16. State v. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 SW 1106 (boundaries of county). 17. State v. Wabash Paper Co.. 21 Ind. A. 167, 48 NE 653, 51 NE 949. [a] Thus the court judicially knows that Wabash and Miami counties are less than four hundred miles distant from the Wabash river. State v. Wabash Paper Co., 21 Ind. A. 167, 48 NE 653, 51 NE 949. 18. See cases infra this note. [a] Counties in which named cities, towns, townships, or villages are located (1) are Judicially known. Howard v. State, 172 Ala. 402, 55 S 255, 34 LRANS 990; Boykin v. State, 148 Ala. 608, 42 S 999; Thomas v. State, (Ala. A.) 72 S 686; Barney v. State, 5 Ala. A. 302, 57 S 598; King v. State, 110 Ark. 595, 597, 162 SW 1087 (where Wood, J., said: "The court and jury were warranted in taking judicial notice that Tyronza was a town situated in Poinsett county, Arkansas, and that a mile and a half south of this town was within the limits of Poinsett county"); Bell v. State, 93 Ark. 600, 125 SW 1020; Lyman v. State, 90 Ark. 596, 119 SW 1116; Wilder v. State, 25 Ark. 293; State v. Powers, 25 Conn. 48; State v. Tootle, 2 Del. 541; Huston v. Peo., 53 Ill. A. 501; Huffman v. State, 183 Ind. 698, 109 NE 401, 748; State v. Fishel, 140 Iowa 460, 118 NW 763; State v. Mitchell, 139 Iowa 455, 116 NW 808; State v. Meyer, 135 Iowa 507, 113 NW 322, 124 AmSR 291, 14 AnnCas 1; State v. Reader, 60 Iowa 527, 15 NW 423; State v. Brooks, 8 Kan. A. 344, 56 P 1127 (taking judi- · cial notice that Topeka, Kan., is in Shanner county, since "courts will take judicial notice of such general facts as everybody in its jurisdiction is supposed to know"); Hendrickson v. Com., 15 KyL 542; State v. Simpson, 91 Me. 83, 87, 39 A 287 (where Whitehouse, J., said: "The court could take judicial notice that the city of Waterville is situated in the county of Kennebec, there being but one town of that name in the state of Maine"); Peo. v. Grimm, 182 Mich. 643, 148 NW 695; Peo. v. Curley, 99 Mich. 238, 58 NW 68; Peo. v. Telford, 56 Mich. 541, 23 NW 213; State v. Burns, 48 Mo. 438; Peo. v. Wood, 131 N. Y. 617, 30 NE 243; Johnson V. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 1. 112 P 760; Brunson v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 467, 111 P 988; Reed v. Terr., 1 Okl. Cr. 481, 98 P 583, 129 AmSR 861; State v. Carmody, 50 Or. 1, 6, 91 P 446, 1081, 12 LRANS 828 [cit Cyc]; Com. v. Kaiser, 184 Pa. 493. 39 A 299; Com. v. Salawich, 28 Pa. Super. 330; Moody v. State, 6 Coldw. (Tenn.) 299; Terrell v. State, 41 Tex. 463; Gossett v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. 43, 123 SW 428; Long v. State, 1 Tex. A. 709. (2) Conversely, the court will take judicial notice that a named town city is not situated in a particular county. Lemuels v. State, (Ark.) 166 SW 741. or [b] Especially is the location of a county seat, (1) designated or recognized by statute, judicially known. Peo. v. Etting, 99 Cal. 577, 34 P 237; State v. Laffer, 38 Iowa 422; Com. v. Patterson, 8 SW 694, 10 KyL 167; State v. Skibiski, 245 Mo. 459, 150 SW 1038; State v. Buralli, 27 Nev. 41, 71 P 532; Hunter v. State, 6 Okl. Cr. 446, 119 P 445; Terrell v. State, 41 Tex. 463; Baker v. State, (Tex. Cr.) 187 SW 949; Stewart v. State. 31 Tex. Cr. 153, 19 SW 908; Seibright v. State, 2 W. Va. 591. also Evidence [16 Cyc 908]. (2) In one case the court took judicial notice that the county seat of one county and that of another county were connected by railroads and that they were not much more than one hundred miles apart. Giles v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. 638, 148 SW 317. See [c] Where a county was divided into two portions for judicial purposes, and the evidence in a criminal case, tried in a court which only had jurisdiction of offenses committed in statute 19 their geographical position with respect to well-known public institutions, 20 20 and facts of physical geography relating to them.21 The boundaries of supervisorial districts, that is, districts laid out by the supervisors of the particular county, are not judicially noticed.22 Local option units. The courts take judicial notice of the fact that in the larger and more populous counties there are many units for local option purposes.23 Population. Judicial notice will be taken of the population of counties 24 and cities 25 as shown by the last federal census.2 26 [ý 956] c. Location of Lots, Buildings, and Streets in Cities.27 A court cannot take judicial notice of the precise location of a mere city lot in a subdivision or resubdivision of urban lands, with reference to township or other divisional lines, without the aid of a public statute.28 Judicial notice cannot be taken of the system employed by cities in numbering houses,29 nor of the relative location of buildings, nor whether there are buildings on certain lots and blocks.31 Nor can a court judicially that portion or the county west of the west line of range 40, showed that the offense was committed at a town described as fifteen miles east of the place of trial, the supreme court took judicial notice of the fact that that point was west of the west line of range 40. State v. Arthur, 129 Iowa 235, 105 NW 422. 30 [d] Location of town in particular part of county.-(1) "The Court will take notice that the town of Sheffield is situated in the north part of the county of Caledonia, and that Peacham is situated in the southern part of the same county, there being in direct line between them two other towns." State v. Shaw, 89 Vt. 121, 124, 94 A 434, LRA 1915F 1087. (2) However, in what part of a county a town was situated which was judicially known to have been formerly within the county the court could not know without proof after the county boundaries were changed. Hite v. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 357. [e] Location of an unincorporated hamlet or village named by a witness was not judicially known so as to establish the venue of an offense declared to have been committed at that place. Huston v. Peo., 53 Ill. A. 501; State v. Bush, 136 Mo. A. 608, 168 SW 670; Anderson v. Com., 100 Va. 860, 42 SE 865 (Lynch's station). [f] Location of a mere place (1) without a corporate or other organization cannot be judicially noticed. Kolman v. State. 124 Ga. 63. 52 SE 82 (corner of "Farm and Brvan"); State v. Fishel, 140 Iowa 460. 118 NW 763; State v. Hartnett, 75 Mo. 251 (Scott's station); Stewart V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 153, 19 SW 908 (M's store); Boston v. State. 5 Tex. A. 383, 32 AmD 575. (2) However, in one case the court took judicial notice that the point indicated as the residence of a named person is twenty or more miles from the city of Lexington. Bates v. Com., 164 Ky. 1, 174 SW 765. [g] Where an indictment alleged that the crime was committed "at Westminster in said county," and the context did not show which of two counties was referred to. the court could not take judicial notice that there was a place named "Westminster" in one of said counties, the indictment not stating that W was a town or a place within such county. Com. v. Wheeler, 162 Mass. 429, 430, 38 NE 1115. 24. State v. Logan, 268 Mo. 169, 186 SW 979; Thomas v. State, 136 Tenn. 47, 188 SW 617. such as counties, townships, cities, | State, 110 Miss. 502, 70 S 579. and villages, the rule has never been, 23. State v. Muller, 80 Wash. 368, and cannot be, extended to cover a 141 P 910. farm or other locality only desig- Judicial notice of local option statnated and identified by the name of utes see infra § 972. its present or former owner." Peo. v. Ayers, 182 Mich. 241, 247, 148 NW 383. (2) That the "Grassel farm" was within five miles of a named and judicially recognized municipality could not be known judicially without proof. State v. Heft., 148 Iowa 617, 626, 127 NW 830. 19. See cases supra note 18 [a]. [a] Statutory or other public recognition of municipality."It has been held by this court that judicial knowledge of the location of towns is limited to such places as are recognized by general statutes, and in the absence of such statute, and in the absence of evidence, a court cannot know that a named place is in a particular county." Fields v. State, (Tex. Cr.) 24 SW 407. 408. Το same effect State V. Burgess, 75 Mo. 541; State v. Quaite, 20 Mo. A. 405; State v. Clark First Nat. Bank, 3 S. D. 52, 51 NW 780; Hutto v. State, (Tex. Cr.) 33 SW 223; Cain v. State, (Tex. Cr.) 25 SW 1119; Latham v. State, 19 Tex. A. 305; Hoffman State, 12 Tex. A. 406 [dist Terrell v. State, 41 Tex. 463]; Boston v. State, 5 Tex. A. 383, 32 AmD 575. V. [b] Capital of state.-A court judicially knows in what county a city is situated which was once the capital of the state. Lewis v. State, (Tex. Cr.) 24 SW 903. [c] As a matter of general information (1) courts will take judicial notice that a town of several hundred inhabitants with post and express offices is located in a certain county. Bell v. State, 93 Ark. 600, 125 SW 1020. (2) "The courts will take judicial notice of the fact that a town the size of Cornettsville is in Perry countv." Johnson v. Com., 171 Ky. 175, 188 SW 339. 20. Heno v. Fayetteville. 90 Ark. 292. 294. 119 SW 287 [cit Cyc]. [a] Illustration.-"It is a matter of public notoriety of which the court had notice without proof, that the entire corporate limits of the city [of Favetteville] were within five miles of the State University." Heno v. Fayetteville, 90 Ark. 292, 294, 119 SW 287 [eit Cycl. 21. State V. Wabash Paper Co.. 21 Ind. A. 167, 48 NE 653, 51 NE 949 (holding that the cities of Wabash and Peru are situated on the banks of the Wabash river). [h] Farm.-(1) "While courts may take judicial notice of the extent and 22. Peo. v. Mueller, 168 Cal. 521, boundaries of political subdivisions, 143 P 748, LRA1915B 788; Elzey v. 25. State v. McBrien, 265 Mo. 594, 178 SW 489. 26. State v. McBrien, 265 Mo. 594, 178 SW 489. And see Evidence [16 Cyc 870]. 27. See also Evidence [16 Cyc 862]. 28. Gunning v. Peo., 189 Ill. 165, 59 NE 494, 82 AmSR 433 [rev 86 Ill. A. 676]. 29. State v. Rogers, 31 Mont. 1, 77 P 293. 30. State v. Rogers, 31 Mont. 1, 77 P 293. 31. State v. Rogers, 31 Mont. 1, 77 P 293. 32. Gunning v. Peo., 189 Ill. 165, 59 NE 494, 82 AmSR 433 [rev 86 111. A. 676]. 33. U. S. v. Chua Mo, 23 Philippine 233. 34. Chicago v. Murphy, 188 Ill. A. 449; State v. Schneiders, 259 Mo. 319, 168 SW 604. 35. Campbell v. U. S., 221 Fed. 186. 136 CCA 602. 36. Peo. v. Rudolph, 28 Cal. A. 683, 153 P 721. See also Evidence [16 Cyc 856]. 37. Cross references: Admissibility of historical works in evidence see Evidence [17 Cyc 423]. Nature of circulating medium at particular time see infra § 963. 38. Historical facts see Evidence [16 Cyc 864-870]. 39. Jeffries v. State, 39 Ala. 655 (promulgation of a certain general order approved by the president); Williams v. State, 67 Ga. 260 (Sherman's march to the sea and its date). 40. Facts of Civil War see Evidence [16 Cvc 865]. 41. 42. 706. Nichols v. State, 30 Tex. 515. 43. General history of state see Evidence [16 Cyc 867]. 44. Coffman v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. 295, 298. 165 SW 939 (where the court took notice that "there were no railroads in the country affording access from one county seat to another." when a certain statute was enacted). 45. Telm Jim v. Terr., 1 Wash. T. 63, 69 (where Strong, J., said: "We also know that no tribe, as a tribe, west of the Cascades was engaged in it, and that Thurston County, where 1 48 46 tory of the country and state, the court judicially knows when a general state election was held, the party designation of tickets submitted to the voters, and the number of votes cast by a political party for particular state officers at such election.49 Well-known facts of local history are sometimes properly noticed judicially by courts sitting in the locality. Facts of general notoriety relating to private corporations 52 may be historical within the rule of judicial notice.53 51 50 [§ 960] 11. Articles in Common Use. Courts judicially know the composition and uses of articles familiar to everybody else.54 [§ 961] 12. Deadly Weapons.55 Where the character of a weapon as being deadly or not is a matter of doubt, or depends upon the manner in which it is used, the question should be left to the jury under a general instruction as to what conthis killing occurred, as charged in judicially notice it. the indictment, was not what might 2 Aik. (Vt.) 89. be called war ground"). 46. Facts relating to political parties judicially noticed see Evidence. 47. State v. Barr, 23 Del. 340, 79 A 730; State v. Patterson, 116 Ind. 45, 10 NE 289, 18 NE 270 (that the election was on Nov. 2, 1886, and could not take place on the 4th of that month, and that there was an election for governor on Nov. 4, 1884). [a] Public statutes providing for elections, (1) being judicially noticed (see infra § 979), (2) inform the courts of such dates without resort to facts termed historical (Jackson v. State, 101 Ark. 473, 142 SW 1153). weapon. 65 [§ 962] 13. Nature of Certain Games and Terminology Thereof. Upon the principle that courts ought judicially to know the general course of the transactions of human life, and whatever ought to be generally known within their jurisdiction, and especially where an instrumentality of gambling has been repeatedly the object of legislative animadversion and legal penalty,66 courts have taken judicial notice of the names and nature of various games and the mode in which they are usually carried on; but judicial knowledge of such matters is State v. Randall, | were facts judicially noticed. lemet v. State, 28 Ala. 83. 67 54. Com. v. Marzynski, 149 Mass. 68, 72, 21 NE 228 (taking judicial notice that "cigars sold by a tobacconist in the ordinary way are not drugs or medicines"). See also Evidence [16 Cyc 872]. 55. Dangerous and deadly weapons generally see Assault and Battery 210-214, 283, 332, 336; Homicide [21 Cyc 713, 795, 802, 825]; Weapons [40 Cyc 863, 871]. Boul [f] Poker.-(1) It has been held that poker is judicially known to be a game played with cards. McClendon v. State, 8 Ga. A. 398, 69 SE 37. See also supra this note [c]. (2) On the other hand, it was said in one case: "In the absence of a showing that the game of poker was played with cards, we will not take judicial knowledge that poker is a game of chance." Per Faris, J., in State v. Solon, 247 Mo. 672, 682, 153 SW 1023. 56. See Assault and Battery § 336. 57. State v. Shields, 110 N. C. 497, [g] "Pool or bagatelle table" is 14 SE 779. judicially recognized. Sterne V. 58. State v. Taylor, (Mo.) 182 SW State, 20 Ala. 43, 46 (dictum per Goldthwaite, J.). 159. 59. State v. Dunn, 221 Mo. 530, 60. State V. West, 51 N. C. 48. State v. Downs, 148 Ind. 324, 120 SW 1179; State v. Phillips, 104 326, 47 NE 670 (that there was a N. C. 786, 10 SE 463. "Republican ticket"). 49. State v. Flynn, 119 Mo. A. 505. 712, 94 SW 543. [a] lustration. In a prosecution of a police officer for neglect of duty in permitting voters at a democratic primary election to be obstructed, judicial notice will be taken that the democratic party cast more than ten thousand votes for governor in Missouri at the election in 1902, and was therefore a political party within the primary election law (Act March 13 [1901] p 149 § 2), defining as political parties entitled to hold such elections in cities having three hundred thousand inhabitants or more to be those political organizations which cast ten thousand or more votes for governor or supreme judge at the last election. State v. Flynn, 119 Mo. A. 712, 94 SW 543. 50. Matters of local history judicially noticed generally see Evidence [16 Cyc 868]. 51. State v. Lundy, 131 La. 910, 914, 60 S 613 (where Monroe, J., said: "This court takes judicial notice of the fact that, when the defendant was called for trial and for some time prior to that date, a considerable portion of the parish . . . was under water from the crevasses in the levees of the Mississippi river, that hundreds of the inhabitants were driven from their homes, and that negro laborers on plantations, to which class the defendant арpears to have belonged, were in many instances so scattered as to be hard, to find"). 52. Matters relating to private corporations judicially noticed see Evidence [16 Cyc 863]. 53. State v. Randall, 2 Aik. (Vt.) 89. [a] For instance, in a prosecution for counterfeiting bills of the Bank of the United States, the corporate existence of the bank and its franchises need not be shown, since courts, because of the fact of its existence and operation being a matter of knowledge and notoriety, will 61. State v. Drumm, 156 Mo. 216, 56 SW 1086 (where it was introduced in evidence and the court said that the jury were competent to judge from their Own observation as whether it was a deadly weapon). 62. Hamilton v. Peo., 113 Ill. 34, 55 AmR 396. to 63. State v. Mace, 262 Mo. 143, 170 SW 1105. 64. State v. Sutterfield, 22 S. D. 584, 119 NW 548. 65. Salomon v. State, 28 Ala. 83. See also supra § 949 et seq; and Evidence [16 Cyc 852]. 66. Ward v. State, 22 Ala. 16, 19 ("faro bank”). 67. See cases infra this note. [a] Cards.-"It is a matter of universal knowledge that a game of chance, to-wit, cards,' means one that is played with an ordinary deck of cards." State v. Tayloe, 111 N. C. 680, 16 SE 168 (per Avery, J.). [b] "Craps (1) is a well-known game of chance, played with dice. The vernacular descriptive of the game is 'shooting craps.' Sims V. State, 1 Ga. A. 776, 777, 57 SE 1029. (2) In another case, however, the court declined to take judicial notice of what constitutes a crap table and how the game of craps is played. State v. Wade, 267 Mo. 249, 183 SW 598. [c] Draw poker.-"It is a matter of common knowledge, concerning which there can be no doubt or dispute, that draw poker is a gambling game, pure and simple, probably more widely recognized as such than any other game known to the American people." Per Monroe, J., in Shreveport v. Bowen, 116 La. 522, 524, 40 S 859. See also infra this note [f]. [d] "Faro bank" is a term of judicially known meaning. Ward V. State, 22 Ala. 16, 19. [e] Lotteries.-The peculiar nature of lotteries and the mode in which they are generally carried on [j] Inferences by jurors.-Affirming a conviction for "keeping or exhibiting" a "gaming table," in the language of the statute, the court said: "The evidence is that Stevens [defendant] was sitting behind a table commonly called a faro-table, that he was dealing or drawing cards from a box, and used pieces of bone for the purpose of carrying on the game. He simply states the facts, and it is for the jury to draw the conclusion whether it amounted to an exhibition or not, and it cannot be denied but that the evidence was such as clearly showed that Stevens, by dealing and drawing the cards from the box, was employed in conducting and exhibiting a gaming table or bank, and that the pieces of bone were used or furnished for the purpose of carrying on the same. It is not necessary, to constitute an offence under this act, that money should be furnished, for the furnishing of any other article is equally as criminal. The jury, in determining upon the case, doubtless went upon the supposition that the bones or pieces of ivory used, spoken of by the witness, represented money, or some valuable thing. in carrying on the game. They were authorized to draw this inference from the facts proved, applying to them their experience and knowledge of conducting such games.” Per Dickinson, J., in Stevens v. State, 3 Ark. 66, 70. not asserted in doubtful cases.68 [§ 963] 14. Existence, Appearance, and Value of Money. Courts will take judicial notice of the acts of congress which define the nature and value of United States currency.69 And the nature of the circulating medium at a particular time will be judicially known as a notorious historical fact.70 Popular language in reference to United States currency is judicially understood.71 Where a state bank was chartered by a public statute, the court took 68. See cases infra this note. [a] "Fan Tan."-"It may be that the game of 'fan tan' is known by persons familiar with gambling games, and it may be that it is one of the games fairly within the prohibited games enumerated in the Hunt law; but, if all this is true, we certainly do not know it, and, without evidence of what it really is, we cannot be expected to judicially know that it is a prohibited game. True, there is a lucid explanation of the game of 'fan tan' by Judge Deady in the case of In re Lee Tong, 18 Fed. 253, 9 Sawy. (U. S.) 333; but, in our opinion, the proper way to ascertain the facts concerning the methods of playing the game, and the object thereof, is on the trial, where witnesses may testify to such facts. Thus alone can it be shown whether it is a lawful gambling game or a prohibited one." State v. Gray, 19 Mont. 206, 208, 47 P 900 (per Hunt, J.). [b] Keno.-"We do not judicially know how 'keno' is played, and therefore we do not know whether it is a game there prohibited"-referring to a statute denouncing "any game played with cards, dice or any device for money." Per Temple, J., In re Murphy, 128 Cal. 29, 30, 60 P 465. [c] "Kentucky drawing," without explanation, is not judicially known to be "a lottery, or anything like one." State v. Bruner, 17 Mo. A. 274, 276 (per Lewis, P. J., continuing: "The words themselves could never, by their inherent force, import as much to any human being. Taking them with the aid of newspaper paragraphs and other hearsay indications, one might well believe himself to be sufficiently informed for conversational purposes, that there is a lottery operated in the state of Kentucky, and that an ordinary reference to 'the Kentucky drawing' may be supposed to have been in contemplation. But this is very far from the kind of knowledge which the law exacts in those who are to condemn a citizen to punishment for crime, whether they be judges, jurors, or witnesses"). [d] "Policy."-Where the record on appeal in a criminal case showed the statement of a witness that he went to defendant's place "to play policy," the court said: "I have read in the newspapers of playing policy, but I am glad to say that I do not know what the expression means, and have no knowledge which enables me to conclude whether or not it is playing at a game of chance. The court could not know judicially the meaning of the expression." Per Thompson, J., in State v. Russell, 17 Mo. A. 16, 18. To same effect State v. Sellner, 17 Mo. A. 39. 69. State v. Moseley, 38 Mo. 380 (treasury notes). To effect U. S. v. Burns, 24 F. Cas. No. 14,691, 5 McLean 23; U. S. v. Fuller, 4 N. M. 358, 20 P 175. same (Tenn.) 86, 88. judicial notice that its notes constituted, in part, the circulating medium and that they were of value.72 Foreign bank bills-those of a sister state, for instance-are not judicially known to have value, and evidence of the value thereof must be produced, where the question of value is material.73 [ 964] 15. Animal Life.74 Courts take judicial notice of well-known facts of natural history, with respect to the animal kingdom,' 75 and the na [b] Treasury notes or "greenbacks."-(1) "It is matter of law that the commercial value of United States treasury-notes is what their face imports." Duvall v. State, 63 Ala. 12, 16. To same effect McDonald v. State, 2 Ga. A. 633, 58 SE 1067; Collins v. Peo., 39 Ill. 233; State v. Moseley, 38 Mo. 380. (2) "Gold certificates, as matter of law, are, prima facie, of commercial value equal to that imported by their face." McDonald_v. State, 2 Ga. A. 633, 636, 58 SE 1067. (3) But in one case the court, reversing a conviction for larceny of treasury notes, when the trial judge was requested to instruct the jury that they must be satisfied of the genuineness of the notes before they could find a verdict of guilty, said: "This, we think, the court should have told the jury. If they were forged and counterfeited, and had no intrinsic or artificial value, they would not be the subject of larceny. Slight evidence on this point would suffice." Collins v. Peo., 39 Ill. 233, 241. ... [c] A ten-dollar bill is judicially known to be worth ten dollars and not twenty dollars. Jones v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 387, 46 SW 250. [d] Coins.-(1) "It certainly was not necessary for the State to prove the value of ten twenty-dollar pieces of American gold coin, or of ninety dollars in silver coin, the value of which is fixed by law." Grant v. State, 55 Ala. 201, 210. (2) One-cent pieces would be judicially inferred to be money of that denomination and value. Ector v. State, 120 Ga. 543, 48 SE 315. Acts of congress judicially noticed by all courts see infra § 978. 70. Barddell v. State, 144 Ala. 54, 58, 39 S 975 [quot Cyc]; Collins v. State, 14 Ala. A. 54, 70 S 995. See also Evidence [16 Cyc 866]. 71. Barddell v. State, 144 Ala. 54, 58, 39 S 975 [quot Cyc]; Collins v. State, 14 Ala. A. 54, 70 S 995; Shaw v. State, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 86. [a] "Bills."-"It is a matter of common knowledge that all forms of paper money are commonly called 'bills.' Long v. State, 94 Ark. 570, 572, 127 SW 961. 55 Ala. 201; McCarty v. State, 127 Ind. 223, 26 NE 665. (2) "The court will judicially recognize that the word 'dollar' is the money unit of the United States, of the value of one hundred cents." McDonald v. State, 2 Ga. A. 633, 634, 58 SE 1067. To same effect State v. Downs. 148 Ind. 324, 47 NE 670; Reed v. State, 66 Nebr. 184, 92 NW 321. [e] Eagle.-"The Court and jury know that a United States gold coin of the denomination and value of 10 dollars is an eagle." Daily v. State, 10 Ind. 536, 537. [f] A fifty-cent piece or a twentyfive-cent piece is judicially known to be identical in meaning with the half and the quarter dollar. U. S. v. Burns, 24 F. Cas. No. 14,691, 5 McLean 23. [g] "The term 'greenbacks,' (1) as a designation of United States treasury-notes, has grown into such general use, that neither courts nor juries can be supposed to be ignorant of the meaning it conveys." Duvall v. State, 63 Ala. 12, 15. (2) "The courts know that the term 'greenback' is the popular name used to designate a certain species of the currency of the United States." Per Russell, J., in Jones v. State, 10 Ga. A. 59, 60, 72 SE 518. To same effect McDonald v. State, 2 Ga. A. 633, 58 SE 1067; State v. Evans, 49 S. C. L. 31 ("evidence that the bill was greenback and good money' is sufficient proof of value"). (3) "The term greenback' is a popular name applied to all United States treasury notes." McDonald v. State, 2 Ga. 633, 58 SE 1067. To same effect Hickey v. State, 23 Ind. 21. [h] Money (1) is judicially known to be something of value. Grant v. State, 89 Ga. 393, 15 SE 488. (2) ""Money' designates the whole volume of the medium of exchange regardless of its character or denomination." State v. Downs, 148 Ind. 324, 327, 47 NE 670. [i] "Nickel".—(1) "We think it may be correctly said that the court judicially knew that there was, at the time of the alleged robbery, in the United States, a lawful current coin representing the value of five cents, called a nickel, and that there was no [b] "The word 'currency,' when ap- money called a nickel other than plied to the medium of trade, means such lawful coin of the United States equally coin, bank notes, or notes is- of America which was known as a sued by the government." Noble v. nickel." Barddell v. State, 144 Ala. State, 59 Ala. 73; Croker v. State, 47 54, 59, 39 S 975 (per Denson, J.). (2) Ala. 53; Leonard v. State, 115 Ala. 80, "A nickel' means five cents." Sims 82, 22 S 564. See also Gady v. State, v. State, 1 Ga. A. 776, 777, 57 SE 83 Ala. 51, 53, 3 S 429 (holding that, 1029. on an indictment for embezzlement, the property "being averred to be 'currency of the United States of America,' the court judicially knows that the bills, as matter of law, were prima facie of a commercial value equal that imported by their face"). [c] Dime.-In one case it was found "unnecessary to determine" whether the court had judicial knowledge in regard to a "dime." Barddell v. State, 144 Ala, 54, 59, 39 S 975. to [a] By law or usage.-"It is well established that the current coin of [d] "The word 'dollars' (1) imthe country will be judicially recog- parts to the common understanding, nized by the courts whether estab- the meaning of a thing of value." lished by law or by immemorial Leonard v. State, 115 Ala. 80, 82, 22 usage." Shaw V. State, 3 Sneed S 564. To same effect Grant v. State, [j] "The word 'quarter,' as used in testimony, the meant twenty-five cents." Sims v. State, 1 Ga. A. 776, 777, 57 SE 1029. 72. Shaw v. State, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 86 (not noticing the apparently con trary decision in the earlier case of State v. Shelton, 7 Humphr. (Tenn.) 31). 73. Corbett v. State, 31 Ala. 329. [a] The value of Canada currency and the rate of interest in Canada are not judicially known by courts within the United States. Kermott v. Ayer. 11 Mich. 181. 74. See also Evidence [16 Cyc 874]. 75. Wheeler v. State, 18 Ga. A. 15. 88 SE 712; Gibson v. State, 7 Ga. ture and characteristics of domestic animals.76 On the other hand, courts will not take judicial notice of a fact dependent largely on the nature and disposition of a particular animal.77 [ 965] 16. Language, Words and Phrases, and Abbreviations.78 The meaning attached to English words,79 phrases,80 abbreviations,81 and initials,82 by common usage,83 and mutations in language which have been popularly accepted 4 are judicially known by courts, and this knowledge may properly be embodied in instructions to a jury,85 provided it coincides with the judicial knowledge of an appellate 84 court reviewing the judgment.88 The court, from the name alone, cannot take judicial knowledge of the sex of a person on whom a crime is alleged to have been committed.87 [§ 966] 17. Laws of the Forum, Sister States, and Foreign Countries-88 a. Unwritten Law of the Forum. Courts judicially know the unwritten law of the forum, which it is their function to administer, as evidenced by authoritative decisions.89 The rules of the common law are judicially noticed by courts in the United States;90 for example, a court knows that a statute has no extraterritorial effect.o1 A. 692, 67 SE 838; U. S. Board, etc., | Evidence [16 Cyc 875]. Co. v. State, 174 Ind. 460, 91 NE 953. [a] Thus (1) judicial notice has been taken that a cow is a female animal, a horned animal, and has cloven hoofs, and that the larceny of a cow is therefore within Pen. Čode (1895) 159, providing that cattle stealing shall include a theft of any horned animal, and of all animals having cloven hoofs except hogs. Wheeler v. State, 18 Ga. A. 15, 88 SE 712; Gibson v. State, 7 Ga. A. 692, 67 SE 838. (2) Also judicial notice has been taken that the smaller streams of the state not inhabited with fish are infested with many forms of animal life, between some of which and mankind an inveterate, perpetual, and implacable warfare has been decreed. U. S. Board, etc., Co. v. State, 174 Ind. 460, 91 NE 953. Diseases of animals see Evidence [16 Cyc 874]. 76. Wilson v. State, 171 Ala. 25, 54 S 572; Pedigo v. Com., 103 Ky. 41, 44 SW 143, 19 KyL 1723, 82 AmSR 566, 42 LRA 432; Ex p. Botts, 69 Tex. Cr. 161, 154 SW 221, 44 LRANS 629. See also Evidence [16 Cyc 874]. [a] Horses and mules."It is no doubt a matter of common knowledge that a mule will shy or take fright when passing a point when it had been previously and recently frightened at said point. It is a matter of common notice that horses and mules will often and repeatedly shy at certain things, although having previously passed them without hurt or harm." Per Anderson, J., in Wilson v. State, 171 Ala. 25, 34, 54 S 572. [b] Hogs. "We should and will take judicial cognizance of the nature and habits of a hog, and the results incident to his keeping and confinement within the limits of a populous portion of a city. It is, we think, known of all men, that hogs when confined within narrow limits, have an offensive odor; that their habits are unclean, and by their mode of life create not only an offensive condition of affairs, but create a condition from which pestilence and disease arise." Per Harper, J., in Ex p. Botts, 69 Tex. Cr. 161, 163, 154 SW 221, 44 LRANS 629. [c] Dogs.-"It is matter of common knowledge, of which courts are authorized to take notice, that dogs of some varieties (as the bloodhound, foxhound, pointer and setter) are remarkable for the acuteness of their sense of smell, and for their power of discrimination between the track they are first laid on and others which may cross it; but it is also matter of common knowledge that all dogs do not possess this power in the same degree, and that some dogs of purest pedigree prove worthless upon trial." Pedigo v. Com., 103 Ky. 41, 49, 44 SW 143, 19 KyL 1723, 82 AmSR 566, 42 LRA 432. 77. Tarrant v. State, 12 Ala. A. 172, 67 S 626 [certiorari den 191 Ala. 664, 67 S 1018]. [a] "The word 'certify,' as applied to bank checks and as used in the statutes under consideration, has become a term of art [in indictments], and the court is bound to take judicial notice of its meaning." Per Hough, J., in U. S. v. Heinze, 161 Fed. 425, 427 [rev on other grounds 218 U. S. 532, 31 SCt 98, 54 L. ed. 1139, 21 AnnCas 884]. [b] "The word 'cow' [in the indictment] does denote the sex of the animal. Any one having any doubt on this proposition can relieve the doubt by consulting the dictionary." Gibson v. State, 7 Ga. A. 692, 693, 67 SE 838. [c] "The word 'pimp' is not, so far as we are informed, a technical word, nor has it acquired any peculiar or appropriate meaning in the law. It is therefore to be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language." Per Champlin, J., in Peo. v. Gastro, 75 Mich. 127, 132, 42 NW 937. Names and nature of gambling games see supra § 962. 80. See cases infra this note; and Evidence [16 Cyc 875]. [a] "Gift enterprise."-"The phrase has attained such a notoriety as to justify us in taking judicial notice of what is meant and understood by the use of it." Lohman v. State, 81 Ind. 15, 18. a [b] "Hawking and peddling," phrase used in an indictment, was held to have a judicially known meaning. Sterne v. State, 20 Ala. 43. [c] "Salad oil' prima facie means olive oil." Brina v. U. S., 179 Fed. 373, 105 CCA 558 [foll Von Bremen v. U. S., 192 Fed. 904, 113 CCA 296] (both cases referring to standard lexicographers). 81. See Evidence [16 Cyc 875]. Diminutives of christian names see Names [29 Cyc 2691. 82. See cases infra this note; and Evidence [16 Cyc 875, 876]. [a] "R. L. D." (retail liquor dealer). As to these letters when used in the records of the office of the United States revenue collector, "their meaning has become a part of our common knowledge and needs no proof." Per Porter, J., in State v. Nippert, 74 Kan. 371, 374, 86 P 478 [foll Billingsley v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 597, 113 P 241]. [D] "R.M.L.D." (retail malt liquor dealer). As to these letters "used in the records of the collector of internal revenue to designate the business carried on ... their meaning has become a part of our common knowledge." Per Porter, J., in Topeka v. Stevenson, 79 Kan. 394, 99 P 589, 131 AmSR 297, 17 AnnCas 491. To same effect State v. Howard, 91 Me. 396, 40 A 65. 83. See cases infra this note. [a] "Words where used in their conversational sense require no proof to show what they mean." Per Lewis, P. J., in State v. Bruner, 17 Mo. A. 274, 276. [b] "Words sometimes acquire a peculiar signification, in a particu78. See also Evidence [16 Cyclar locality, different from their or875]. dinary meaning, but, when such is 79. See cases infra this note; and the case, it is a fact requiring proof, and not a fact which the court can take judicial notice of." Per Champlin, J., in Peo. v. Gastro, 75 Mich. 127, 131, 42 NW 937. [c] "Snuff."—"Webster and Worcester, it is true, speak only of its use in the nose, but the Standard Dictionary also speaks of the use upon the gums. . In North Dakota the word 'snuff' has a well-established meaning in the popular mind. ... We hold, therefore, and we believe, that there is enough of state sovereignty still left in America for us to hold that no matter how the word 'snuff' may be limited in its meaning in other jurisdictions, in North Dakota it embraces tobacco which is intended to be used upon the gums as well as tobacco that is intended to be used in the nose.' Per Bruce, J., in State v. Olson, 26 N. D. 304, 323, 144 NW 661. [d] Meanings not commonly known. -When words are "employed in a technical or in unaccustomed signification differing from the conventional, and so understood by a particular class of persons, in their application to a particular subject matter, this technical or unaccustomed meaning may [and must] be proved like any other fact." State V. Bruner, 17 Mo. A. 274, 276. See also Evidence [16 Cyc 875, 876]. [e] "Boot-legger" is not a word the meaning of which is judicially known. Winslow v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 465, 98 SW 866. 84. See cases infra this note; and Evidence [16 Cyc 875 note 74]. [a] "There is a constant evolution in language, producing new words and phrases, and modifying the significance of old ones. It does not follow that words not found in the dictionaries have no meaning. For example, the term 'turf exchange' is a new combination of old words, indicating a place where persons meet to transact some kind of business appertaining to the 'race course or racing.' But the true meaning of the words cannot be ascertained without taking notice of their popular use." Per Land, J., in State v. Maloney, 115 La. 498, 514, 39 S 539. 85. Brima v. U. S., 179 Fed. 373, 105 CCA 538; Topeka v. Stevenson, 79 Kan. 394, 99 P 589, 131 AmSR 297, 17 AnnCas 491; Billingsley v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 597, 113 P 241. See also Evidence [16 Cyc 851 text and note 21; 926 text and note 1]. 86. Peo. v. Gastro, 75 Mich. 127, 42 NW 937. [a] A judgment of conviction was reversed because of an erroneous instruction as to the meaning of the word "pimp." Peo. V. Gastro, 75 Mich. 127, 42 NW 937. 87. Peo. v. Allison, 25 Cal. A. 746, 145 P 539; Peo. v. Carroll, 1 Cal. A. 2, 81 P 680. |