dence, the jury can say that they have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, then they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, and it is their duty to convict, is proper.38 [2405] k. Conscientious Belief. It has been held that an instruction which defines proof beyond a reasonable doubt to be such proof as satisfies the judgment and conscience of the jury as reasonable men, applying their reason to the evidence before them, that the crime was not committed by accused, and so satisfies them as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible, is correct.37 On the other hand, it has been held that defining belief beyond a reasonable doubt as consisting in a conscientious belief that accused is guilty is error;38 but that it is not error to charge that the jury must conscientiously believe beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty, in order to warrant a conviction.39 [§ 2406] 1. Belief or Doubt as Men. It has been held that an instruction is not erroneous which to warrant reversal). Iowa.-State 531. 31 NW 66. Kan.-State v. Ling, 91 Kan. 647, 138 P 582, AnnCas1915D 374; State v. Patton, 66 Kan. 486, 71 P 840. Mass.-Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295. 52 AmD 711. v. Elsham, 70 Iowa Mont-State v. De Lea, 36 Mont. 531, 93 P 814; State v. Clancy, 20 Mont. 498, 52 P 267. Nebr.-Parrish v. State, 14 Nebr. 60, 15 NW 357. Nev.-State v. Van Winkle, 6 Nev. 340. N. J.-State v. Leo, 80 N. J. L. 21, 77 A 523; State v. Silverio, 79 N. J. L. 482, 76 A 1069 (not prejudicial); Donnelly v. State, 26 N. J. L. 601. Porto Rico.-Peo. v. Rosado, 17 Porto Rico 417. Tex.-Billard v. State, 30 Tex. 367, 94 AmD 317; Cleavinger v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 273, 65 SW 89. Utah.-State v. Thompson, 31 Utah 228. 87 P 709. But compare Claussen v. State, 21 Wyo. 505, 510, 133 P 1055, 135 P 802 (holding that a requested instruction that "reasonable doubt is that state of mind which ... leaves the minds of the jury in that condition that they cannot say that they feel an abiding faith amounting to a moral certainty. . . that the defendant is guilty" does not make the meaning of reasonable doubt any clearer than the phrase itself, and was properly refused, even though the court gave no correct definition). tells the jury that they are not at liberty to disbe- [§ 2407] m. Doubt Influencing Action in Private Affairs. It has been held that an instruction which defines a reasonable doubt as such a doubt as a reasonable man would act upon, or decline to act upon, in the more weighty and important matters relating to his own affairs, is erroneous and may properly be refused.** But on the other hand, it v. Moon, 20 Ida. 202, 117 P 757. Ann Cas1913A 724; Peo. v. Zajicek, 233 Ill. 198, 84 NE 249; Watt_v. Peo., 126 11. 9, 18 NE 340, 1 LRA 403; Fanton v. State, 50 Nebr. 351, 69 NW 953, 36 LRA 158; Barney v. State, 49 Nebr. 515, 68 NW 636. And see cases supra note 40. tionable); Peo. v. Rischo, 262 I11. Peo., 38 Colo. 23, 87 P 796; State 596, 105 NE 8 (holding that an instruction that, if, from all the circumstances, the jury are convinced of accused's guilt, "and that you have an abiding conviction that the defendant is guilty of murder," they should convict was misleading and argumentative in requiring the jury to be convinced that they had an abiding conviction of guilt, instead of that they be convinced of the fact of guilt). 37. State v. Marshall, 105 Iowa 38, 74 NW 763; Peo. v. Ezzo, 104 Mich. 341, 62 NW 407. 38. Jones v. State, 84 Miss. 194, 36 S 243; Ellerbe v. State, 79 Miss. 10, 30 S 57; Powers v. State, 74 Miss. 777, 21 S 657; Brown v. State, 72 Miss. 997, 17 S 278, 72 Miss. 95, 16 S 202; Johnson v. State, (Miss.) 16 S 494; Hemphill v. State, (Miss.) 16 S 491; Burt v. State, 72 Miss. 408, 16 S 342, 48 AmSR 563. 39. Moore v. State, 86 Miss. 160, 38 S 504; Hammond v. State, 74 Miss. 214, 21 S 149. 40. Cal.-Peo. v. Worden, 113 Cal. 569, 45 P 844. But compare Peo. v. Ammerman, 118 Cal. 23, 30, 50 P 15 (holding that from an instruction asked, "You may believe as men that certain facts exist," but as jurors you must act only upon evidence introduced, etc., it was proper to strike the quoted words, since to have left them in would have made the charge confusing). Colo. McQueary v. Peo., 48 Colo. 214, 110 P 210, 21 AnnCas 560. Ida.-State v. Moon, 20 Ida. 202, 117 P 757, AnnCas1913A 724. Ill.-Peo. V. Kingcannon, 276 Ill. 251, 114 NE 508; Peo. v. Zajicek, 233 Ill. 198, 84 NE 249; Spies v. Peo.. 122 Ill. 1, 12 NE 865, 17 NE 898, 3 AmSR 320. Iowa.-State v. Pratt. 20 Iowa 267. Nebr.-Clements v. State, 80 Nebr. 313, 114 NW 271; Bothwell v. State, 71 Nebr. 747, 99 NW 669: Reed v. State, 66 Nebr. 184. 92 NW 321; Savary v. State, 62 Nebr. 166. 87 NW 34; Leisenberg v. State. 60 Nebr. 628. 84 NW 6. Bartley v. State, 53 Nebr. 310, 73 NW 744. [a] Instruction held erroneous.(1) An instruction defining "reasonable doubt" as "the want of an abiding conviction ... a conviction which shall rest with you all the days of your life. however long you may live," is erroneous, "abiding conviction" meaning no more than settled conviction. State v. Silverio, 79 N. J. L. 482, 485, 76 A 1069. (2) An instruction requiring an acquittal if the jury have a reasonable doubt of defendant's innocence is erroneous; the jury being required, by the necessity of being convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not only to have a reasonable doubt of his innocence, but an abiding conviction therein. Parker v. State, 153 Ala. 25, 45 S 248. 36. Parham v. State, 147 Ala. 57, 42 S 1; Harrison v. State, 144 Ala. 20, 40 S 568; Brown v. State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 S 268; Peo. v. Tielke, 259 Ill. 88. 102 NE 229; State v. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa 6, 72 NW 497: Maxfield v. State, 54 Nebr. 44, 74 NW 401. But compare Peo. v. Smith, 164 Cal. 451, 129 P 785 (holding that an instruction that a doubt to justify acquittal must be reasonable, and that. if upon all the evidence the jury had an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, they were satisfied be- 41. McQueary v. Peo.. 48 Colo. 214, yond a reasonable doubt, was objec- 110 P 210, 21 AnnCas 560; Perry v. Pa.-Clark v. Com., 123 Pa. 555, 16 A 795 [foll McMeen v. Com., 114 Pa. 300, 9 A 878]; Fife v. Com., 29 Pa. 429. [a] Omission of charge.-An instruction on reasonable doubt is not to be condemned because it omits the clause that the jury are not at liberty to disbelieve as jurors, if from all the evidence they believe as men, and that their oath imposes on them no obligation to doubt, when no doubt would exist had no oath been administered. Holmes v. State, 82 Nebr. 406. 118 NW 99. 42. Adams v. State, 135 Ind. 571, 34 NE 956; Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 NE 681 [foll Cross v. State, 132 Ind. 65, 31 NE 473]; Peo. v. Johnson, 140 N. Y. 350, 35 NE 604; Nelson v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 368, 114 P 1124; Robinson v. State, 18 Wyo. 216, 106 P 24. [a] Rule applied.-An instruction on reasonable doubt that "you are not at liberty to disbelieve as jurors if you believe as men; your oath imposes on you no obligation to doubt where no doubt would exist if no oath had been administered,"—is erroneous, as it omits the essential element of the necessity for evidence on which to base a verdict, as a lack of evidence to prove guilt cannot be supplied by what the juror knows or believes, regardless of his oath. Robinson v. State, 18 Wyo. 216, 106 P 24. 43. State v. Alderson,. 74 W. Va. 732, 82 SE 1021; State v. Taylor, 57 W. Va. 228, 50 SE 247; State v. Kellison, 56 W. Va. 690, 47 SE 166 (not error when given in connection with a general instruction on reasonable doubt). 44. Ala.-Whitmore v. State, 168 Ala. 45, 52 S 909; Phillips v. State, 162 Ala. 14, 50 S 194; Smith v. State, 161 Ala. 94, 49 S 1029; Williams v. State, 161 Ala. 52, 50 S 59; Kelly v. State, 160 Ala. 48, 49 S 535; Montgomery v. State, 160 Ala. 7, 49 S 902; Medley v. State, 156 Ala. 78, 47 S 218; Lacey v. State, 154 Ala. 65, 45 S 680; Mason v. State, 153 Ala. 46, 45 S 472; Parker v. State, 153 Ala. 25, 45 S 248; Rigsby v. State, 152 Ala. 9, 44 S 608; Kirby v. State, 151 Ala. 66, 44 S 38; Brown v. State, 150 Ala. 25, 43 S 194: Toliver v. State, 142 Ala. 3. 38 S 801; Walker v. State, 139 Ala. 56, 35 S 1011; Thayer v. State, 133 Ala. 39, 35 S 405; Goodlett v. State, 136 Ala. 39, 33 S 892; Allen v. State, 134 Ala. 159, 32 S 318; Pickens v. State, 115 Ala. 42, 22 S 551; Allen v. State, 111 Ala. 80, 20 S 490 [dist Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 78, 15 S 3411: Welsh v. State. 96 Ala. 92, 11 S 450; Diamond v. State, (Ala. A.) 72 S 558 [certiorari den 73 S 1002]: Jones v. State, 13 Ala. A. 10, 68 S 690; Phillips v. State, 11 Ala. A. 15, 65 S 444; Wilson v. State, 7 Ala. A. 134, 61 S 471; Stevens v. State, 6 Ala. A. 6. 60 S 459. Cal.-Peo. v. Wohlfrom. 26 F 236: Peo. v. Bemmerly. 87 Cal. 117, 25 P 266; Peo. v. Ah Sing. 51 Cal. 372. Dak. Terr. V. Bannigan, 1 Dak. 451, 46 NW 597. [§ 2408] n. Doubt for Which Reason Can Be Given. It has been held that an instruction in which a reasonable doubt is defined as one for which a reason can be given is erroneous, and properly may be refused if requested.48 But, on the other hand, it has been held that such an instruction, Fla.-Jenkins v. State, 35 Fla. 737, 18 S 182, 48 AmSR 267; Lovett v. State, 30 Fla. 142, 11 S 550, 17 LRA 705. Ky.-Jane v. Com., 2 Metc. 30. Minn.-State V. Shettleworth, 18 Nev.-State 343. N. M.-Terr. v. Lopez, 3 N. M. 104, 3 P 364. Wyo.-Palmerston v. Terr., 3 Wyo. 333, 23 P 73. 45. U. S.-Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 7 SCt 614, 30 L. ed. 708; Shephard v. U. S., 236 Fed. 73, 149 CCA 283; U. S. v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875; U. S. v. Jones, 31 Fed. 718; U. S. v. Wright, 16 Fed. 112. Ark.-Carpenter v. State, 62 Ark. 286, 36 SW 900. D. C.-U. S. v. Heath, 20 D. C. 272. Ga.-Lewis v. State, 90 Ga. 95, 15 SE 697; Clay v. State, 4 Ga. A. 142, 60 SE 1028; Parker v. State, 3 Ga. A. 336, 59 SE 823. Ida.-Peo. v. Dewey, 2 Ida. (Hasb.) 83, 6 P 103. Ill. Wacaser v. Peo., 134 Ill. 438, 25 NE 564, 23 AmSR 683 (where no adequate definition of reasonable doubt is given). Ind.-Bartlow v. State, 183 Ind. 398, 109 NE 201; Brown v. State, 105 Ind. 385, 5 NE 900; Toops v. State, 92 Ind. 13; Garfield v. State, 74 Ind. 60; Jarrell v. State, 58 Ind. 293; Arnold v. State, 23 Ind. 170. Iowa.-State v. Krampe, 161 Iowa 48, 140 NW 898; State v. Schaffer, 74 Iowa 704, 39 NW 89; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa 347. Kan.-State v. Kearley, 26 Kan. 77 (not prejudicial error). Mont.-State v. Clancy, 20 Mont. 498, 52 P 167; State v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 41 P 998, 52 AmSR 655, 31 LRA 294. Nebr.-Martin v. State, 67 Nebr. 36, 93 NW 161; Lawhead v. State, 46 Nebr. 607, 65 NW 779; Polin v. State, 14 Nebr. 540, 16 NW 898. N. Y.-Peo. v. Hughes, 137 N. Y. 29, 32 NE 1105; Peo. v. Wayman, 128 N. Y. 585, 27 NE 1070. N. C.-State v. Pitt, 166 N. C. 268, 80 SE 1060, AnnCas1916C 422; State v. Mostella, 159 N. C. 459, 74 SE 578. But see State v. Oscar, 52 N. C. 305 (where such an instruction was held erroneous). while open to criticism, is not erroneous, particularly when it is given in connection with other instructions intended to impress upon the jury the distinction between a reasonable doubt and a vague, imaginary doubt.48 W. Va.-State v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. 325, 37 SE 695. Wis.-McAllister v. State, 112 Wiş. 496, 88 NW 212; Butler v. State, 102 Wis. 364, 78 NW 590; Frank v. State, 94 Wis. 211, 68 NW 657; Emery v. State, 92 Wis. 146, 65 NW 848; Ryan v. State, 83 Wis. 486, 53 NW 836. [§ 2409] o. Suspicion or Probability of Guilt. Even though the evidence establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of the guilt of accused, he 416, 65 P 774; State v. Krug, 12 Wash. | doubt arising out of evidence is a 288, 41 P 126; State v. Rosener, 8 mental operation for which it may Wash. 42, 35 P 357. often be very difficult, and, indeed, impossible, to assign any reason, and yet, if honestly entertained by the jury in a criminal case, must be acted upon, for they are only authorized to bring in a verdict of guilty when satisfied and convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused." Owens v. U. S., 130 Fed. 279, 283, 64 CCA 525. (2) Such an instruction erroneously qualifies the definition of "reasonable doubt," in that it puts on accused the burden of furnishing to every juror a reason why he [the juror] is not satisfied of defendant's guilt, before there can be an acquittal. Bennett v. State, 95 Ark. 100, 128 SW 851; Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 NE 681; State v. Cohen, 108 Iowa 208, 78 NW 857, 75 AmSR 213; Browder v. State, 11 Okl. Cr. 174, 144 P 188. [a] Instruction held uncertain.An instruction that reasonable doubt is such a doubt as a juror would hesitate to act on in the most important affairs in the ordinary walks of life is uncertain. Nelms v. State, 123 Ga. 575, 51 SE 588. 46. U. S.-Ayer V. New Mexico, 201 Fed. 497, 119 CCA 589 [rev 15 N. M. 581, 113 P 604]; Pettine v. New Mexico, 201 Fed. 489, 119 CCA 581; Owens v. U. S., 130 Fed. 279, 64 CCA 525. But compare Marshall v. U. S., 197 Fed. 511, 117 CCA 65; Griggs v. U. S. 158 Fed. 572, 85 CCA 596 (both holding that such a charge is not erroneous). 47. Cal.-Peo. v. Manasse, 153 Cal. 10, 94 P 92; Peo. v. Yun Kee, 8 Cal. 82, 96 P 95. Fla.-Wallace v. State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 S 713. Ga.-Lampkin v. State, 145 Ga. 40, 88 SE 563; Arnold v. State, 131 Ga. 494, 62 SE 806; Jordan v. State, 130 Ga. 406, 60 SE 1063; Powell v. State, 95 Ga. 502, 20 SE 483; Vann V. State, 83 Ga. 44, 9 SE 945; Mundy v. State, 9 Ga. A. 835, 72 SE 300. [b] Argumentative. — A charge, that it is not necessary, to constitute a reasonable doubt, that the jury should be able to give a reason Ala. Allen v. State, 146 Ala. 61. 41 therefor, is argumentative. Leonard S 624, 148 Ala. 588, 42 S 1006; Smith v. State, 150 Ala. 89, 43 S 214. Arv. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 S 329; Mitch-gumentative instructions generally ell v. State, 140 Ala. 118, 37 S 76, 103 see infra § 1476. AmSR 17; Bell v. State, 140 Ala. 57, 37 S 281; Cawley v. State, 133 Ala. 128, 32 S 227; Jimmerson v. State, 133 Ala. 18, 32 S 141; Thompson v. State, 131 Ala. 18, 31 S 725; Carroll v. State, 130 Ala. 99, 30 S 394; Williams v. State, 130 Ala. 31, 30 S 336; Bodine v. State, 129 Ala. 106, 29 S 926; Thomas v. State, 126 Ala. 4, 28 S 591; Harvey v. State, 125 Ala. 47, 27 S 763; Avery v. State, 124 Ala. 20, 27 S 505; Roberts v. State, 122 Ala. 47, 25 S 238; Talbert v. State, 121 Ala. 33, 25 S 690; Ray v. State, 50 Ala. 104. But compare Hammond v. State, 147 Ala. 79, 41 S 761; Rose v. State, 144 Ala. 114, 42 S 21; Caddell v. State, 136 Ala. 9, 34 S 191 (all holding that, while such an instruction is calculated to confuse and mislead, it is not reversible error); Ellis v. State, 120 Ala. 333, 25 S 1; Hodge v. State, 97 Ala. 37, 12 S 164, 38 AmSR 145 [appr Cohen v. State, 50 Ala. 108] (both holding that such a charge is correct). Ark. Bennett v. State, 95 Ark. 100, 128 SW 851; Darden v. State, 73 Ark. 315, 84 SW 507 [app dism. 200 U. S. 615, 26 SCt 758, 50 L. ed. 621]. Ind. Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 NE 681. Iowa.-State v. Lee, 113 Iowa 348, 85 NW 619; State v. Cohen, 108 Iowa 208. 78 NW 857, 75 AmSR 213. Miss. Kelly v. State, 112 Miss. 245, 72 S 928; Taylor v. State, 89 Miss. 671, 42 S 608; Klyce v. State, 78 Miss. 450, 28 S 827. Nebr.-Blue v. State, 86 Nebr. 189, 125 NW 136; Childs v. State, 34 Nebr. Okl. Chandler v. State, 3 Okl. Cr. 236, 51 NW 837. 254, 105 P 375, 107 P 735. Or.-State v. Crockett, 39 Or. 76, 65 P 447. Pa.-Com. v. Webb, 252 Pa. 187. 97 A 189; Com. v. Andrews, 234 Pa. 597, 83 A 412. But see Com. v. Miller, 139 Pa. 77, 21 A 138, 23 AmSR 170 (holding such a charge erroneous). Oh.-Morgan v. State, 48 Oh. St. 371, 27 NE 710 (inaccurate and misleading). Okl-Gibbons v. Terr., 21 Okl. 340, 96 P 366; Abbott v. Terr., 20 Okl. 119, 94 P 179, 129 AmSR 818, 16 LRANS 260; Browder v. State, 11 Okl. Cr. 174, 144 P 188; Harris v. State, 10 Okl. Cr. 417, 137 P 365, 139 P 846; Morgan v. State, 7 Okl. Cr. 45, 121 P 1088; Gragg v. State, 3 Okl. Cr. 409, 106 P 350; Reeves v. Terr., 2 Okl. Utah State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541, Cr. 82, 99 P 1021; Price v. State, 1 65 P 494. Kan.-State v. Ling, 91 Kan. 647. 138 P 582, AnnCas:915D 374; State v. Wolfley, 75 Kan. 406, 89 P 1046, 93 P 337, 11 LRANS 87, 12 AnnCas 412; State V. Patton, 66 Kan. 486, 71 P 840. La.-State v. Jefferson, 43 La. Ann. 995, 10 S 199. Mich.-Peo. v. Hoffman, 142 Mich. 531, 105 NW 838; Peo. v. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329, 28 NW 883. Minn. State v. Newman, 93 Minn. 393, 101 NW 499. N. Y.-Peo. v. Barker, 153 N. Y. 111, 47 NE 31; Peo. v. Guidici, 100 N. Y. 503, 3 NË 493 (not misleading when read in connection with the context); Peo. v. Lagroppo, 90 App. Div. 219, 86 NYS 116 [aff 179 N. Y. 126, 71 NE 7371. Or. State v. Morey, 25 Or. 241, 35 P 655, 36 P 573 (open to criticism, but not reversible error when read with the whole instruction). S. C.-State v. Ferguson, 91 S. C. 235, 74 SE 502. S. D.-State v. Sonnenschein, 37 S. D. 585, 159 NW 101; State v. Grant, 20 S. D. 164, 105 NW 97, 11 AnnCas 1017. Wis. Butler v. State, 102 Wis. 364, 78 NW 590. [a] Rule applied.-The adding to a correct definition of "reasonable doubt" that a reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason, and growing out of the testimony and evidence in the case, is not erroneous as requiring the jury to be able to assign a reason for their doubt. Pen. v. Manasse, 153 Cal. 10, 94 P 92; Peo. v. Yun Kee, 8 Cal. A. 82, 96 P 95. 48. State V. Newman, 93 Minn. 393, 101 NW 499. And see cases suWash.-State v. Harras, 25 Wash. [a] Reasons for rule.-(1) "A pra note 47. Porto Rico.-Peo. v. Flores, 17 Porto Rico 166. S. D.-State v. Raice, 24 S. D. 111, 123 NW 708. Okl. Cr. 358, 98 P 447. 49 should not be convicted, and the jury should be so, charged. It is also proper to charge that, before defendant can be convicted, the hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all of them.50 [§ 2410] p. Probability of Innocence. Although there is authority to the contrary,51 it is generally held that an instruction that a probability of defendant's innocence arising from the evidence is a just foundation for a reasonable doubt of his guilt, and therefore for his acquittal, asserts a correct legal proposition, and that it is error to refuse so to charge.52 It is also proper to charge that a reasonable doubt may exist, although the evidence is insufficient to show a probability of innocence.53 But it has been held improper to charge that the jury should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of every probability of innocence, before they can convict;54 or that the jury may entertain a reasonable doubt of guilt, even after the evidence has removed all probability of innocence;5 or that any evidence tending to show innocence would be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.56 An instruction that a probability of innocence ex 49. Ark.-Byrd v. State, 69 Ark. 537, 64 SW 270. Nebr.-Binkley v. State, 34 Nebr. 757, 52 NW 708. N. Y.-Peo. v. O'Bryan, 1 Wheel. Cr. 21. Oh.-State v. Allen, 68 Oh. St. 516, 67 NE 1053. Tex.-Pilkinton v. State, 19 Tex. 214; Barnett v. State, 17 Tex. A. 191; Grant v. State, 3 Tex. A. 1. 50. Bown v. State, 150 Ala. 25, 43 S 194; Neilson v. State, (Ala.) 40 S 221; Gilmore v. State, 99 Ala. 154, 13 S 536. 51. Graham v. State, (Fla.) 73 S 594; Baker v. State, 51 Fla. 1, 40 S 673; State v. Flanagan, 83 N. J. L. 379, 84 A 1046 [aff 84 N. J. L. 766, 87 A 1119] (holding_that an instruction that there can be no probability of innocence and no reasonable doubt of guilt, and that, if there is probability of innocence, there is ground for reasonable doubt, is properly refused). [a] Reason for rule.-The guilt or innocence of accused should not be tested by probabilities, and a charge resting the right to acquittal on probabilities is properly refused. Graham v. State, (Fla.) 73 S 594. 52. Adams v. State, 175 Ala. 8, 57 S 591; Fleming v. State, 150 Ala. 19, 43 S 219; Neilson v. State, (Ala.) 40 S 221; Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 S 274; Bardin v. State, 143 Ala. 74, 38 S 833; Mims v. State, 141 Ala. 93, 37 S 354; Spraggins v. State, 139 Ala. 93, 35 S 1000; Shaw v. State, 125 Ala. 80, 28 S 390; Henderson v. State, 120 Ala. 360, 25 S 236; Bones v. State, 117 Ala. 138, 23 S 138; Howard v. State, 108 Ala. 571, 18 S 813; Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144, 14 S 409, 46 AmSR 28; Smith. v. State, 92 Ala. 30, 9 S 408; Bain v. State, 74 Ala. 38; Mathis v. State, (Ala. A.) 73 S 122; Davis v. State, 7 Ala. A. 122, 61 S 483; Johnson v. State, 4 Ala. A. 47, 57 S 593; Peo. v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, 110 NE 26; Nelms v. State, 58 Miss. 362; Browning v. State, 30 Miss. 656. But see Bell v. State, 140 Ala. 57, 37 S 281 (where such an instruction was held properly refused). [a] Reasonable probability.-A requested instruction, that if, from the evidence, there is "a reasonable probability" of defendant's innocence, then that is a just foundation for a reasonable doubt, and would authorize an acquittal, is not erroneous because of the use of the word "reasonable" as qualifying the word "probability." Mims v. State, 141 Ala. 93, 37 S 354. [b] Instruction held erroneous. .55 ists only when the testimony showing innocence is stronger than that showing guilt is erroneous, since a probability of innocence may exist when no testimony has been offered by defendant and on the part of the prosecution there is a lack of testimony showing guilt.57 Except where the evidence is direct and corroborated,58 an instruction is proper that it is the duty of the jury to acquit if they can reconcile the evidence upon any reasonable theory or hypothesis other than that of defendant's guilt,59 or if defendant's conduct upon a reasonable hypothesis is consistent with his innocence.60 61 [§ 2411] q. Doubt Arising from Evidence or Want of Evidence. It is proper to charge, and error to refuse to charge, that a reasonable doubt may arise either from the evidence or from a want of evidence, and that the absence of sufficiently satisfying evidence may be a ground for a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.62 Hence, as a general rule, an instruction that a reasonable doubt must be one suggested by, or arising out of, the evidence adduced is erroneous, as it excludes all reasonable doubts that may arise from the lack or want of evidence, although there are some decisions to the that a doubt upon | 140, 16 S 387. which defendant might be acquitted must be a reasonable doubt, and not merely one of speculation or probability, is erroneous, because informing the jury that they should not acquit on a mere probability of innocence. Peo. v. Fox. 269 Ill. 300, 110 NE 26; Peo. v. Rosenberg, 267 Ill. 202, 108 NE 54. An instruction 53. Olden v. State, 176 Ala. 6, 58 S 307; Bailey v. State, 168 Ala. 4, 53 S 296, 390; Smith v. State, 165 Ala. 74, 51 S 632; Carter v. State, 145 Ala. 679, 40 S 82; Stewart v. State, 133 Ala. 105, 31 S 944; Davis v. State, 131 Ala. 10, 31 S 569; Carroll v. State, 130 Ala. 99, 30 S 394; Rogers v. State, 117 Ala. 192, 23 S 82; Fealy v. Birmingham, (Ala. A.) 73 S 296. 54. Neilson v. State, (Ala.) 40 S Bell v. State, 115 Ala. 25, 22 221. 55. S 522. 56. Carwile v. State, 148 Ala. 576, 39 S 220. 57. Nordan v State, 143 Ala. 13, 39 S 406. 58. Casper v. State, 100 Nebr. 367, 160 NW 92. 59. Larrance v. Peo., 222 Ill. 155, 78 NE 50. 60. Howard v. State, 151 Ala. 22, 44 S 95; Neilson v. State, (Ala.) 40 S 221; Gregory v. State, 140 Ala. 16, 37 S 259; Lipscomb v. State, 130 Wis. 238, 109 NW 986. But compare Tarver v. State, 137 Ala. 29, 34 S 627 (holding that a charge that, if there can be any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of dedefendant, it is the duty of the jury to acquit, was properly refused as obscure and confusing); Adams V. State, 133 Ala. 166, 31 S 851 (holding that a charge that, "if the conduct of the defendant consistent with his innocence, then he is not guilty of any offense," was properly refused, as indefinite, uncertain, and tending to mislead); Horn v. Terr., 8 Okl. 52, 56 P 846 (holding that it is error to instruct that, if "all" the direct evidence relied on to secure a conviction can be accounted for reasonably on any theory consistent with the innocence of defendant, the jury should acquit). 61. Ga.-Lucas v. State, 146 Ga. 315, 91 SE 72; O'Dell v. State, 120 Ga. 152, 47 SE 577; Burney v. State, 100 Ga. 65, 25 SE 911; Benton v. State, 9 Ga. A. 291, 71 SE 8; Parker v. State, 3 Ga. A. 336, 59 SE 823. Ind. Rains v. State, 152 Ind. 69, 52 NE 450. Miss. Matthis v. State, 80 Miss. 491, 32 S 6; Hale v. State, 72 Miss. Nebr.-Goemann v. State, 94 Nebr. 582, 143 NW 800. Tex.-Massey v. State, 1 Tex. A. 563. See also Mikel v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 615, 68 SW 512 (holding that a charge that the jury should acquit if they had a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt was not erroneous by reason of the fact that it did not state that such doubt must arise from the evidence). Utah.-State v. Thompson, 31 Utah 228, 87 P 709. Wash.-State v. Harsted, 66 Wash. 158, 119 P 24. See also supra § 2402. [a] Accused's statement.-Jordan v. State, 130 Ga. 406, 60 SE 1063; Benton v. State, 9 Ga. A. 291, 71 SE 8. [b] Where evidence of guilt is overwhelming.-Matthis v. State, 80 Miss. 491, 32 S 6. 62. Gaston v. State, 161 Ala. 37, 49 S 876; Carwile v. State, 148 Ala. 576, 39 S 220; Fealy v. Birmingham, (Ala. A.) 73 S 296; Mulligan v. State, 18 Ga. A. 464, 89 SE 541. But see Conner v. State, 10 Ala. A. 206, 65 S 309 (holding that a charge that the absence of sufficiently satisfying evidence of guilt may afford ground for a reasonable doubt is erroneous, as assuming an absence of satisfying evidence). 63. Cal.-Peo. v. Bartnett, 15 Cal. A. 89, 113 P 879. Colo. Mackey v. Peo., 2 Colo. 13. Ga.-McElven v. State, 30 Ga. 869; Passmore v. State, 5 Ga. A. 366, 63 SE 244; McNeal v. State, 5 Ga. A. 368, 63 SE 224; Governor v. State, 5 Ga. A. 357, 63 SE 241. But compare Thomas v. State, 129 Ga. 419, 59 SE 246 (holding that a statement in a charge on reasonable doubt that the reasonable doubt of the law is one that grows out of the evidence is not erroneous because of the exclusion of any inference that such a doubt may arise from the want of evidence or of conflict therein). Ind. Brown v. State, 105 Ind. 385, 5 NE 900; Wright v. State, 69 Ind. 163, 35 AmR 212; Densmore v. State, 67 Ind., 306, 33 AmR 96. Iowa State v. Case, 96 Iowa 264, 65 NW 149. Miss.-Kelly V. State. 112 Miss. 245, 72 S 928; Howell v. State, 98 Miss. 439, 53 S 954; Knight v. State, 74 Miss. 140, 20 S 860; Hale v. State, 72 Miss. 140, 16 S 387. Mo.-State v. Blue, 136 Mo. 41, 37 SW 796. Mont.-State v. De Lea, 36 Mont. 531, 93 P 814. N. J.-State v. Andrews, 77 N. J. contrary.64 [§ 2412] r. Doubt upon All the Evidence; upon Any Fact. The instruction should require that the reasonable doubt justifying an acquittal shall arise from a fair and impartial consideration of all the facts and circumstances in evidence in the case.65 An instruction is erroneous and properly refused which authorizes an acquittal because of a reasonable doubt arising from any particular fact in the case, or from any particular part of the evidence, independent of other parts of the same,66 particularly where the court has charged properly on reasonable doubt."7 It has been held that a charge that, if there is one single fact proved to the satisfaction of the jury which is inconsistent with defendant's guilt, this is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, and that the jury should acquit, is erroneous. An instruction is also erroneous which L. 108, 71 A 109. 68 Wis.-Hedger V. State, 144 Wis. 279, 128 NW 80 (instruction held not erroneous). But compare Dobbs v. State, 5 Okl. Cr. 475, 114 P 358, 115 P 370 and Moore v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 212, 111 P 822 (both holding that an instruction, that if on consideration of all the evidence, facts, and circumstances presented on the trial the jury entertained a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt they should acquit, would not warrant a reversal on the ground that it does not authorize an acquittal, because of lack of evidence against accused). 64. Whitesides v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 151, 58 SW 1016: Tomlinson v. State, (Tex. Cr.) 43 SW 332; Bland v. State, 4 Tex. A. 15 (not reversible error to add the words "deduced from the testimony"). But see Bray v. State, 41 Tex. 560, 561 (holding it erroneous to charge that the doubt must be a doubt "sustained by the evidence, upon a review of all the facts and circumstances of the case"). 65. U. S.-U. S. v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875. Ala.-Pope v. State, 174 Ala. 63, 57 S 245; Thomas v. State, 150 Ala. 31, 43 S 371; Tribble v. State, 145 Ala. 23, 40 S 938; Dodson v. State, 10 Ala. A. 255, 65 S 206; Staton v. State, 8 Ala. A. 221, 62 S 387. Ariz.-Foster v. Terr., 6 Ariz. 240, 56 P 738. Cal.-Peo. v. Shimonaka, 16 Cal. A. 117, 116 P 327. Colo. Pribble v. Peo., 49 Colo. 210, 112 P 220. Il-Peo. v. Curtright, 258 Ill. 430, 101 NE 551; Peo. v. Gray, 251 Ill. 431, 96 NE 268; Peo. v. Buettner, 233 TII. 272, 84 NE 218, 13 AnnCas 235; Henry v. Peo., 198 Ill. 162, 65 NE 120. Ky. Berry v. Com., 149 Ky. 398, 149 SW 824; Benge v. Com., 71 SW 648, 24 KyL 1466. Mo.-State v. Christian, 253 Mo. 382, 161 SW 736; State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 SW 734. Nev.-State v. Simas, 25 Nev. 432, 62 P 242. Pa.-Com., v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 A 571; Com. v. Tresca, 31 Pa. Super. 557; Com. v. Di Silvestro, 31 Pa. Super. 537, 556. Wyo. Claussen v. State, 21 Wyo. 505, 133 P 1055, 135 P 802. [a] Instructions held proper. Staton v. State, 8 Ala. A. 221, 62 S 387; Benge v. Com., 71 SW 648, 24 KyL 1466. [b] Instructions held erroneous.— Davis v. State, 188 Ala. 59, 66 S 67: Peo. v. Gray, 251 Ill. 431, 96 NE 268. 66. Ala.-Ex p. Davis, 184 Ala. 26, 63 S 1010 [den certiorari 8 Ala. A. 147, 62 S 1027]; McClain v. State, 182 Ala. 67, 62 S 241; Saulsberry v. State, 178 Ala. 16, 59 S 476; Pope v. State, 174 69 authorizes an acquittal on account of a reasonable doubt not arising from the evidence. But while all the essential facts constituting a crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not required that each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish defendant's guilt should be so proved; it is sufficient if, taking the testimony altogether, the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty and as a general rule it is proper to instruct the jury to that effect,70 although there are decisions to the contrary.1 It has been held that it is proper to charge, and error to refuse, an instruction that if, upon a consideration of all the evidence, the jury have a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt arising out of the evidence, or any part of the evidence, they must find defendant not guilty.72 But it has been held that even such an instruction is erroneous where it is calculated to Ala. 63, 57 S 245; Davis v. State, 165 that a requested instruction that, if Ala. 93, 51 S 239; Leonard v. State, there was one single fact proved to 150 Ala. 89, 43 S 214; Thomas v. the satisfaction of the jury inconsistState, 150 Ala. 31, 43 S 371; Parham ent with defendant's guilt, it was v. State, 147 Ala. 57, 42 S 1; Barden sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt v. State, 145 Ala. 1, 40 S 948; Pinker- should have been given where there ton v. State, 40 S 224; Bardin was evidence of facts inconsistent State, 143 Ala. 74, 38 S 833; Brown v. with guilt). State, 142 Ala. 287, 38 S 268; Burton v. State, 141 Ala. 32, 37 S 435; Gordon v. State, 140 Ala. 29, 36 S 1009; Smith v. State, 137 Ala. 22, 34 S 396; Holmes v. State, 136 Ala. 80, 34 S 180; Deal v. State, 136 Ala. 52, 34 S 23; Mann v. State, 134 Ala. 1, 32 S 704; Winter v. State, 133 Ala. 176, 32 S 125; Thomas v. State, 133 Ala. 139, 32 S 250; Winter v. State, 132 Ala. 32, 31 S 717; Gordon v. State, 129 Ala. 113, 30 S 30; Bodine v. State, 129 Ala. 106, 29 S 926; Liner v. State, 124 Ala. 1, 27 S 438; Lodge v. State, 122 Ala. 107, 26 S 200; Nicholson v. State, 117 Ala. 32. 23 S 792; Wheeler v. State, 114 Ala. 22, 21 S 941; Pounds v. State, (A.) 73 S 127; Johnson v. State, 13 Ala. A., 140, 69 S 396 [certiorari den 193 Ala. 682, 69 S 1020]; Williams v. State, 13 Ala. A. 133, 69 S 376; Hall v. State, 11 Ala. A. 95, 65 S 427; Thomas v. State, 11 Ala. A. 85, 65 S 863; Dodson v. State, 10 Ala. A. 255, 65 S 206; Roden v. State, 5 Ala. A. 247, 59 S 751; Swope v. State, 4 Ala. A. 83, 58 S 809; Baker v. State, 4 Ala. A. 17, 58 S 971; Robinson v. State, 4 Ala. A. 1, 58 S 121. V. Ark. Lasater v.. State, 77 Ark. 468, 94 SW 59. Colo. Pribble v. Peo., 49 Colo. 210, 112 P 220. D. C.-Wallace v. U. S., 18 App. 152. Fla.-McCall v. State, 55 Fla. 108, 46 S 321; Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174, 28 S 53. Ga.-Cox v. State, 17 Ga. A. 727, 88 SE 214. Ill-Peo. v. Lee, 248 Ill. 64, 93 NE 321; Henry v. Peo., 198 Ill. 162, 65 NE 120; Mullins v. Peo., 110 Ill. 42; Gorgo v. Peo., 100 I11. A. 130. Mo.-State v. Soper, 148 Mo. 217, 49 SW 1007. N. J.-State v. Lang, 87 N. J. L. 508, 94 A 631; State v. Andrews, 77 N. J. L. 108, 71 A 109. 67. Du Bose v. State, 148 Ala. 560, 42 S 862; Williams v. State, 123 Ga. 138, 51 SE 322. 69. McClain v. State, 182 Ala. 67, 62 S 241; Bowen v. State, 140 Ala. 65, 37 S 233; Conner v. State, 10 Ala. A. 206, 65 S 309; Strobhar v. State, 55 Fla. 167, 47 S 4; Butler v. State, 83 Miss. 437, 35 S 569. 70. Ala.-Roden v. State, 13 Ala. A. 105, 69 S 366. Fla.-Bryant v. State, 34 Fla. 291, 16 S 177; Woodruff v. State, 31 Fla. 320. 12 S 653. Ga. Tolbert v. State, 127 Ga. 827, 56 SE 1004; Price v. State, 114 Ga. 855, 40 SE 1015. Ill.-Peo. v. Duncan, 261 Ill. 339, 103 NE 1043; Peo. v. Scarbak, 245 Ill. 435, 92 NE 286; Peo. v. Probst, 237 Ill. 390, 86 NE 588; Keating v. Peo., 160 Ill. 480, 43 NE 724; Siebert v. Peo., 143 Ill. 571, 32 NE 431; Weaver v. Peo., 132 Ill. 536, 24 NE 571; Davis v. Peo., 114 Ill. 86, 29 NE 192. Ind. Rains v. State, 152 Ind. 69, 52 NE 450. Iowa.-State v. Hennessy, 55 Iowa 299, 7 NW 641. Kan.-Wise v. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 AmD 595. Ky. Clark v. Com., 111 Ky. 443, 63 SW 740, 23 KyL 1029; Baker v. Com., 17 SW 625, 13 KyL 571. La. State v. Watkins, 106 La. 380, 31 S 10. Mich.-Peo. v. Rich, 133 Mich. 14, 94 NW 375. Mo.-State v. Wells, 111 Mo. 533, 20 SW 232. Nebr.-Jameson v. State, 25 Nebr. 185, 41 NW 138. N. C.-State v. Crane, 110 N. C. 530, 15 SE 231. Okl.-Hodge v. Terr., 12 Okl. 108, 69 P 1077. Or. State v. Roberts, 15 Or. 187, 13 P 896. Tex. Mason v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 256, 168 SW 115, AnnCas1917D 1094: Carson v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 342, 30 SW 799. Wyo. Horn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80, 73 P 705. [a] Instruction held too broadAn instruction in a criminal case that the doctrine of reasonable doubt applies to each and every incident connected with the case is too broad, and is properly refused. State v. Watkins, 106 La. 380, 31 S 10. 68. Pippin v. State, (Ala.) 73 S 340; Moss v. State, 190 Ala. 14, 67 S 431 [overr Hubbard v. State, 10 Ala. A. 47, 64 S 633]; Davis v. State, 184 Ala. 26, 63 S 1010 [den certiorari 8 Ala. A. 147, 62 S 1027, and overr Roberson v. State, 175 Ala. 15, 57 S 829; Simmons v. State, 158 Ala. 8, 48 S 606; Walker v. State, 153 Ala. 31, 45 S 640]: Morris v. State, 124 Ala. 44, 27 S 336; Roden v. State, 13 Ala. A. 105, 69 S 366; Nail v. State, 12 Ala. A. 64, 67 S 752; State v. Roberts, 15 Or. 187, 13 P 896. But see Doty v. 72. Smith v. State, 182 Ala. 38, State, 9 Ala. A. 21, 64 S 170 (holding 62 S 184; Davidson v. State, 167 Ala. 71. Heard v. U. S., 228 Fed. 503, 143 CCA 85; Spear v. U. S., 228 Fed. 485, 143 CCA 67 [aff 246 Fed. 250]; Wolf v. Peo., 45 Colo. 532, 102 P 20; State v. Ottley, 147 Iowa 329. 126 NW 334; State v. Kimes, 145 Iowa 346, 124 NW 164. impress the jury that they may consider any particular part of the evidence, independent of other evidence, as raising a reasonable doubt73 [§ 2413] 11. Testimony of Accomplice 74. -a. In General. As a general rule where the prosecution introduces the testimony of an accomplice, and the evidence tends to show that he was an accomplice, the court should, particularly when requested, give an instruction concerning the credibility and weight of an accomplice's testimony,75 although there is other evidence beside that of the accomplice tending to show guilt.78 But it has been held that the rule requiring such an instruction is a rule of practice and not of law, and that a failure to comply with it is not error;77 and that it is not erroneous for 68, 52 S 751, 140 AmSR 17; Boyd v. State, 150 Ala. 101, 43 S 204; Griffin v. State, 150 Ala. 49, 43 S 197; Patterson v. State, 146 Ala. 39, 41 S 157; Turner v. State, 124 Ala. 59, 27 S 272; Walker v. State, 117 Ala. 42, 23 S 149; Hurd v. State, 94 Ala. 100, 10 S 528; Rosenberg v. State, 5 Ala. A. 196, 59 S 366; Black v. State, 1 Ala. A. 168, 55 S 948. 73. Saulsberry v. State, 178 Ala. 16, 59 S 476; Olden v. State, 176 Ala. 6, 58 S 307; Phillips v. State, 161 Ala. 60, 49 S 794; Robinson v. State, 4 Ala. A. 1, 58 S 121. 74. Testimony of accomplices generally see supra §§ 1344-1463. 75. U. S.-U. S. v. Sykes, 58 Fed. 1000. Ala.-Moses v. State, 58 Ala. 117. Ark.-Stevens v. State, 111 Ark. 299, 163 SW 778. Cal.-Peo. v. Southwell, 28 Cal. A. 430, 152 P 939. Conn.-State v. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463, 79 AmD 223. Ida.-State v. Grant, 26 Ida. 189, 140 P 959. Ill.-Peo. v. Rosenberg, 267 Ill. 202, 108 NE 54; Hoyt v. Peo., 140 Ill. 588, 30 NE 315, 16 LRA 239. Kan.-State v. Patterson, 52 Kan. 335, 34 P 784. Mo.-State v. Woolard, 111 Mo. 248, 20 SW 27. Ariz. 278, 151 P 952. the court to refuse to instruct in the language of a statute that the testimony of an accomplice should be viewed with distrust.78 However, a charge on the law applicable to accomplice testimony is not necessary where there is not sufficient evidence tending to show that a witness for the prosecution was an accomplice,79 or where each defendant testifies that the other committed the offense,80 or where the accomplice has not testified; 81 and this is true even though there is evidence as to declarations made by the alleged accomplice.82 [§ 2414] b. Propriety and Sufficiency in General. The law relating to the testimony of accomplices S3 should be charged fully, clearly, and concisely in an instruction on such testimony.84 Except Cal-Peo. V. Balkwell, 143 Cal. 259, 76 P 1017; Peo. v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 66 P 372. Fla. Anthony v. State, 44 Fla. 1, 32 S 818; Tuberson v. State, 26 Fla. 472, 7 S 858. Ga.-Rouse v. State, 136 Ga. 356, 71 SE 667; Davis v. State, 122 Ga. 564, 50 SE 376; Baker v. State, 121 Ga. 189, 48 SE 967; Walker v. State, 118 Ga. 34, 44 SE 850; Suddeth v. State, 112 Ga. 407, 37 SE 747; Sparks V. State, 111 Ga. 830, 35 SE 654; Bridges v. State, 9 Ga. A. 235, 70 SE 968. Ky.-Elmendorf v. Com., 171 Ky. 410, 188 SW 483; Wellington v. Com., 158 Ky. 161, 164 SW 333; Nelms v. Com., 82 SW 260, 26 KyL 604; Early v. Com., 70 SW 1061, 24 KyL 1181. Mo.-State v. Richardson, 242 Mo. 563, 154 SW 735, 44 LRÁNS 307; State v. Shapiro, 216 Mo. 359, 115 SW 1022; State v. Bailey, 190 Mo. 257, 88 SW 733; State v. Kuhlman, 152 Mo. 100, 53 SW 416, 75 AmSR 438. Nev.-State v. Burns, 27 Nev. 289, 74 P 983. N. M.-Terr. v. Meredith, 14 N. M. 288, 91 P 731. N. D.-State v. Haynes, 7 N. D. 352, 75 NW 267. Okl. Maggard v. State, 9 Okl. Cr. 236, 131 P 549. S. C.-State v. Lee, 29 S. C. 113, 7 SE 44. Tex.-Castillo V. State, 75 Tex. Utah.-State v. Elmer, 161 P 167. Vt-State v. Dana, 59 Vt. 614, 10 A 727. Wyo.-Smith v. State, 10 Wyo. 157, 67 P 977. 76. State v. Goforth, 136 Mo. 111, 37 SW 801; Peo. v. Thomsen, 3 N. Y. Cr. 562. And see cases supra note 75. 32 SW 896; Pace v. State, (Cr.) 31 Utah.-Peo. v. Chadwick, 7 Utah W. Va.-State v. Morgan, 35 W. Wyo.-Arnold v. State, 5 Wyo. 439, [a] A suborned witness is not an accomplice of the party charged with subornation of perjury so as to require an instruction on accomplice's testimony. State v. Richardson, 248 Mo. 563, 154 SW 735, 44 LRANS 307. 77. Com. v. Phelps, 192 Mass. 591, 78. Peo. v. Ruiz, 144 Cal. 251, 77 P 907; Peo. v. Wardrip, 141 Cal. 229, 74 P 744. Instruction cautioning the jury against such evidence generally see infra 2414. 79. Ariz.-Faltin V. State, 17 not an accomplice with the principal [c] The one who steals goods is [d] Mere silence and concealment of the crime by a witness does not justify an instruction on the evidence of such witness as being an accomplice. Smith v. State, 28 Tex. A. 309, 12 SW 1104; O'Connor v. State, 28 Tex. A. 288, 13 SW 14. 80. Moxie v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 529, 114 SW 375. 81. Wyres v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 28, 166 SW 1150; Gracy v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. 68, 121 SW 705; Moseley v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 578, 37 SW 736, 38 SW 197; Waggoner v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 199, 32 SW 896. 82. Wyres v. State, 74 Tex. Cr. 28, 166 SW 1150. 83. See supra §§ 1344-1463. 84. U. S.-Diggs v. U. S., 220 Fed. 545, 136 CCA 147 [aff 242 U. S. 470, 37 SCt 192, 61 L. ed. 442, LRA1917F 502, AnnCas1917B 1168]. Fla. Shiver v. State, 41 Fla. 630, 27 S 36. Ga.-Chapman v. State, 112 Ga. 56, 37 SE 102. Ill.-Peo. v. Harris, 263 Ill. 406, 105 NE 303; Peo. v. Darr, 179 Ill. A. 130 [aff 262 Ill. 202, 104 NE 389]. Iowa.-State v. Finley, 147 Iowa 563, 126 NW 699. Ky.-Yontz v. Com., 66 SW 383, 23 KyL 1868. Mo.-State v. Kennedy, 154 Mo. 268, 55 SW 293. N. Y.-Peo. v. Katz, 209 N. Y. 311, 103 NE 305, AnnCas1915A 501 [aff 154 App. Div. 44, 139 NYS 137]. Or.- State v. Wong Si Sam, 63 Or. 266, 127 P 683. Tex. Savage v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. 877. [a] Instructions held sufficient or improperly refused.-Hays v. U. s. 231 Fed. 106, 145 CCA 294 [aff 212 U. S. 470, 37 SCt 192, 61 L. ed. 442, LRA1917F 502, AnnCas1917B 1168]; Bailey v. State, 168 Ala. 4, 53 S 296, 390; Shiver v. State, 41 Fla. 630, 27 S 36: Chapman v. State, 112 Ga. 56, 37 SE 102; Peo. v. Harris, 263 II. 406, 105 NE 303; Peo. v. Darr, 179 Ill. A. 130 [aff 262 11. 202. 104 NE 389]: Schuster v. State, 178 Ind. 320, 99 NE 422; State v. Finley, 147 Iowa 563, 126 NW 699; Peo. v. Stehr, 168 App. Div. 119, 153 NYS 296, 156 NYS 1139 mem; State v. Wong Si Sam, 63 Or. 266, 127 P 683; Self v. State, (Tex. Cr.) 188 SW 978; Bailey v. State, 68 Tex. Cr. 119, 150 SW 915; Oates v. State, 67 Tex. Cr. 488, 149 SW 1194; Jones v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. 394, 141 SW 953; Tucker v. State, 58 |