and affairs of men ;* but as a general rule, and particularly in regard to the construction of statutes, courts adhere strictly to the decisions of their predecessors. "Thirty-four years have nearly passed," said Lord Kenyon, in construing a penal statute for the observance of the Lord's Day, "since the decision of the case of Rex vs. Cox, which informed the public that all bakers have a right to do what is imputed to this defendant as an offense. This circumstance alone ought to have some weight in the determination of this case;" and, the word being doubtful, the original decision was adhered to.† Says Lord Mansfield"When solemn determinations, acquiesced under, have settled precise cases and a rule of property, they ought for the sake of certainty to be observed, as if they had originally formed a part of the text of the statute;"‡ and this doctrine has been repeatedly recognized.§ "Whatever might be our impressions were the matter res integra," says the Supreme Court of Louisiana, "we deem it important in the construction of statutes, to adhere to what has been already adjudged. The judicial interpretation becomes, as it were, a part of the statute, and should not be changed but for the most cogent reasons." *"Quicquid agunt homines, is the business of courts," said Lord Mansfield, in Barwell vs. Brooks, 3 Doug. 371, 373; "and as the usages of society alter, the law must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind." See also the language of the same great judge, to the same effect, in Corbett vs. Poelnitz, 1 Term R. 5, 9.-Lord Kenyon, however, was of the opposite way of thinking; Ellah vs. Leigh, 5 Term R. 682; Clayton vs. Adams, 6 Term R. 605; and see Ram on Legal Judgment, p. 32, Philadelphia Law Library, vol. 9. + Rex vs. Cox, 2 Burr. 787. King vs. John Younger, 5 Term. R. 449, 450. Wyndham vs Chetwynd, 1 Burrow, 419. § Nelson vs. Allen and Harris, 1 Yerg. 376. King vs. Inhabitants of Corsham, 2 East, 302. Hammond 18. Anderson, 4 Bos. and P., 69. King vs. Inhabitants of North Nibley, 5 Term R. 21. State vs. Thompson, 10 La. Ann. R. 122, 123. -- Usage. Of a similar value in regard to the construction of statutes is usage, or the construction which custom or practice has put on them. "Optimus legum interpres consuetudo.* The wisdom of this principle is asserted in the civil law: Imperator Severus rescripsit, in ambiguitatibus quæ ex legibus proficis cuntur, consuetudinem, aut rerum perpetuo similiter judicatarum auctoritatem, vim legis obtinere debere.t "It is the common opinion," says Lord Coke, "and communis opinio is of good authoritie in law. A communi observantia non est recedendum."+ These maxims undoubtedly owe their origin to the period when the Common Law, that creature of custom, was formed,-when, in the absence of printing, public opinion being feeble and insufficient, and government divided and distracted, the strong practical minds of the times saw that the best, perhaps the only mode of creating order and system was, to give all possible force and effect to usage, to legalize and establish general habits and practices, and thus to turn custom into law. In a case of the House of Lords on the statute 27 Henry VIII. Lord Hardwicke said, "The opinion of conveyancers in all times, and their constant course, is of great weight. They are to advise; and, if their opinion is not to prevail, must every case come to law? No; the received opinion ought to govern." And Lord Mansfield said, "Consider also the usages and transactions of mankind upon the statute. The object of all laws with regard to real property is * 2 Rep. 81. † L. 38 ff. de Legibus. Coke on Litt. 186, a. note; see Hargrave's note 69, where it is said that this is the origin of the maxim, Communis error facit jus. quiet and repose. As to practice there has almost been only one opinion. The greatest conveyancers, the whole profession of the law, Sir Orlando Bridgeman, Lord Nottingham, there was not a doubt at the bar in Harvey vs. Ashley-Mr. Fazakerley always took it for granted."* So in the Supreme Court of the United States, the practical construction given to an act of Congress was held to be of great weight in assisting the court to arrive at its true construction.+ In New York where at tax sales the comptroller was directed to execute conveyances in the name of the people of the State, and, disregarding the statutes, deeds were given by the comptroller in his name of office, it was held that these deeds were good to pass a legal title, on the ground of a long and uniform custom to give deeds of this kind in this way. The Chancellor said, "Lord Coke's expression, that common opinion is good authority in law, does not apply to a mere speculative opinion in the community, as to what the law on a particular subject is; but when * Earl of Buckinghamshire vs. Drury, 2 Eden Ch. R. 61, 64, and 74. See as to usage in the matter of the appointment of overseers of the poor, Rex vs. Loxdale, 1 Burrows, 445; where Lord Mansfield directed inquiry to be made into the usage of certain parishes in this respect. The understanding of the bar generally, and especially the usual practice of the conveyancers, have always had great weight in England, and casessome even on the construction of statutes-have frequently been decided on the mere weight of their authority. See Smith vs. the Earl of Jersey, 2 Brod. & B. 598, where Lords Eldon and Redesdale bear strong testimony on this point; and see, also, on this subject generally,―The Science of Legal Judg. ment; a treatise designed to show the materials whereof and the process by which the Courts of Westminster Hall construct their judgments, by James Ram, of the Inner Temple; an able and instructive work. It was re-published in 1835, in the 9th vol. of the Philadelphia Law Library. U. S. Bank vs. Halstead, 10 Wheat. p. 51, 63. such opinion has been frequently acted upon, and for a great length of time, by those whose duty it is to administer the law, and important individual rights have been acquired, or are dependent upon such practical construction of the law, this expression of the learned Commentator upon Littleton is entitled to great weight." But though usage may be employed to construe statutes, it cannot be permitted to defeat the general intent of an act. So said Lord Mansfield: "The use of this practice will avail nothing if meant as an evasion of the statute; for usage certainly will not protect usury."* So again, a particular usage cannot be admitted to interpret a general act, as one relating to the English poor rates. So, too, in England, the acts of Parliament fixing one standard of weights and measures have been steadily upheld against all local customs and usages. So, in this country, a contract for the sale of lands by the acre, means the statute acre; and parol evidence of a general understanding to the contrary is inadmissible.§ In Pennsylvania, where a statute directs that twenty hundred pounds shall make one ton, a contract was made to deliver forty tons of pig metal; and an effort was made to show that the usual custom of dealers in the article was to buy and sell by a gross ton of two thousand two hundred and sixty-eight pounds; but the court held that the statute entered into the contract, and formed an essential part of it: "It is a statute which *Floyer vs. Edwards, Cowper, 112. The King vs. John Hogg, 1 T. R. 721. Noble vs. Durell, 3 T. R. 271; Master, &c. of St. Cross vs. Lord Howard De Walden, 6 T. R. 338. § Paull vs. Lewis, 4 Watts, 402. ought to be enforced; and the local customs up the Alleghany river are certainly insufficient to repeal it."* So in Maine, it has been decided that no prescriptive right can be claimed against an existing statute.† We have thus enumerated the modes by which the true interpretation of doubtful legislative provisions is to be arrived at. In the first place, if the act be strictly a remedial one, a clear idea is to be had of the law as it existed before the statute, and of the mischief which it was meant to prevent, for the purpose of ascertaining the remedy which the legislature intended to give. In order to arrive at this result the whole statute is to be taken together, and all its parts are to be consulted; acts on the same subject-matter are to be examined; contemporaneous and subsequent legislative exposition may throw some light upon the point; judicial construction may be appealed to; and, finally, established custom will perhaps determine the question. If the law relates to entirely new matter, as for instance a railroad act, the mind must be steadily turned in the same direction, and its efforts employed to ascertain the true intent of the legislature. But in no other case than those above specified can mere extrinsic facts either be proved or in any way taken into view: the intention of the legislature is to be learned from the language they have used. * Evans vs. Myers, 25 Penn. R. 114, 116. Ham vs. Sawyer, 38 Maine, 37. "We think it much the safer course," said Lord Tenterden, in a case on the Poor Laws, "to adhere to the words of the statute construed in their ordinary import, than to enter into any inquiry as to the supposed intention of the persons who framed it." The King vs. The Inhabitants of Great Bently, 10 Barn. & Cres. 520, 526, 527. |