1834. MEEKIN V. WHALLEY. defendant, the Master refused to allow the costs; but the Court held that the defendant was not entitled. In Paterson v. Powell, the defendant was held to be entitled to costs only to the extent of the actual advances made by him to his attorney on account of the suit. TINDAL, C. J.-I think we may determine this case without touching the authority of Reader v. Bloom. There, the action proceeded in the ordinary course: here, it proceeded solely for the benefit of plaintiff's attorney, the debt having been paid. I think this is a case in which we shall be well warranted in withholding costs from the plaintiff, seeing that he never could be liable to his attorney for them. PARK, J.-Having been one of the Judges concurring in the decision of Reader v. Bloom, I should be unwilling to overturn it. For the reasons assigned by my Lord Chief Justice, I think this case is distinguishable. GASELEE, J.-Reader v. Bloom proceeded upon the idea of something having been paid by the client to the supposed attorney on account of the suit. Here no such fact appears: the plaintiff was not interested in the action. BOSANQUET, J.-It is enough to say that this case is materially different from Reader v. Bloom, in the circumstance that here the suit proceeded solely for the benefit of the attorney. Rule absolute. 1834. HUMPHRYS v. HARVEY. tent to an attorinrolled to sue for any fees or disbursements: who has not been WILDE, Serjt., on a former day, obtained a rule call- It is not compeing upon the defendant to shew cause why all further proceedings upon the judgment of nonsuit in this cause should not be stayed, without costs, on the ground that the attorney by whom the defence was conducted, had not been duly inrolled. The affidavit upon which the motion was founded stated that a very small sum, if any thing, had been advanced by the defendant to his attorney on account of the costs in the cause. Robinson shewed cause.-This is an application, not against the attorney who has been guilty of the supposed irregularity, as will be found to have been the case wherever this question has hitherto come before the Courts, but against the party. In Reader v. Bloom (a) this Court decided that a party who has obtained a verdict is entitled to his full costs, although the person who conducted his cause was not an attorney. [Bosanquet, J., referred to Latham v. Hyde (b), and Young v. Dowlman (c).] In v. Sexton (d), Mr. Justice J. Parke recognised and acted upon the case of Reader v. Bloom. The attorney has substantially complied with all that the acts of parliament require. The 5th section of the 34 Geo. 3, c. 14, enacts" that any person who shall be admitted to be a solicitor or attorney in any of his Majesty's Courts at Westminster, by virtue, &c., may be admitted to be a solicitor or attorney in all or any of the Courts in that act mentioned, without payment of any further stamp-duty in pursuance of that act; subject nevertheless to all and every the provisions prescribed by 1 Dowl. P. C. 594. (a) 10 J. B. Moore, 261; 3 Bing. 9. (b) 1 Crompton & Meeson, 128; (c) 3 Younge & Jervis, 24. where, therefore, the defendant's attorney (duly qualified in other respects to act as an attorney) had omitted to cause himself to be inrolled, and the defendant had 1834. HUMPHRYS v. HARVEY. law with relation to the admission of solicitors and attornies in such Courts respectively before the passing of that act." As far as regards the admission, all has been done in the present case that the act requires: the only question is whether inrolment be also necessary; and, if so, whether the attorney has not been duly inrolled. The 2 Geo. 2, c. 23, s. 1, enacts that no person shall be permitted to act as an attorney, or to sue out any process, or to commence, carry on, or defend any action or actions, or any other proceedings, either before or after judgment obtained, in the name or names of any person or persons, in his Majesty's Courts of King's Bench, &c., unless such person shall be sworn, admitted, and inrolled in the said respective Courts in such manner as is thereinafter directed. And the 2nd section enacts" that the Judges of the said Courts respectively, or any one or more of them, shall, and they are thereby authorized and required, before they shall admit such person to take the said oath, to examine and inquire, by such ways and means as they shall think proper, touching his fitness and capacity to act as an attorney; and, if such Judge or Judges respectively shall be thereby satisfied that such person is duly qualified to be admitted to act as an attorney, then, and not otherwise, the said Judge or Judges of the said Courts respectively shall, and they are thereby authorized to administer to such person the oath thereinafter directed to be taken by attornies, and, after such oath taken, to cause him to be admitted an attorney of such Court respectively, and his name to be inrolled as an attorney of such Court respectively, without any fee or reward other than one shilling for administering such oath; which admission shall be written on parchment in the English tongue, in a common legible hand, and signed by such Judge or Judges respectively, whereon the lawful stamp shall be first impressed, and shall be delivered to such person so admitted." The reasonable construction of these enactments is, that inrolment is not necessary to enable a party to practise as an attorney: the second section would seem to make the inrolment the act of the Judge, or the Court. Besides, it appears from the affidavit that the defendant's attorney did actually sign the roll of the Court upon his being sworn (a). Wilde, Serjt., in support of his rule. It is important that the public should have the means of ascertaining who are qualified to act as attornies of the Courts; the inrolment is the only means by which this object can be effected. With this view, the acts of parliament relating to attornies expressly require inrolment as well as admission. The 5th section of the 34 Geo. 3, c. 14, is the only enactment in which the inrolment is not actually mentioned; but it expressly relates back to the statute of the 2 Geo, 2, c. 23, all the provisions of which shew inrolment to be necessary. By the 4th section of the 34 Geo. 3, c. 14, it is enacted, that, in case any person shall, in his own name, or in the name of any other person, sue out any writ or process, or commence, prosecute, or defend any action or suit, or any proceedings in any of the Courts at Westminster as an attorney or solicitor, for or in expectation of any gain, fee, or reward, without being admitted and inrolled an attorney or solicitor in one of the said Courts at Westminster, according to the directions of the several acts in force for the regulation of attornies and solicitors, every such person shall, for every such offence, forfeit the sum of 100%.; and such person is thereby also made incapable to maintain or prosecute any action or suit in any Court of law or equity for any fee, reward, or disbursements, on account of prosecuting, carrying on, or defending any such action, suit, or proceeding. In the present case it is admitted that the person by whom the defence has been conducted has not been inrolled, and therefore has not put (a) For the practice upon the subject of inrolment, see Tidd's Practice, 9th edit. p. 71. 1834. HUMPHRYS v. HARVEY. 1834. HUMPHRYS v. HARVEY. himself in a situation to practise as an attorney of the costs. TINDAL, C. J.-The simple question here is, whether, where an attorney has not been duly admitted and inrolled as an attorney of the Court, we can lend our aid to enable him indirectly to recover his costs, when he cannot do so directly. The principal case relied on on the part of the defendant is that of Reader v. Bloom. That case proceeded upon the assumption that money is usually advanced by the client in the progress of the cause. Undoubt edly, Young v. Dowlman has considerably weakened the authority of Reader v. Bloom. Is the inrolment a condition precedent to the attorney's right to recover costs? It has been contended on the part of the defendant, that inrolment is not necessary to enable the attorney to practise as such; and that on the authority of the 34 Geo. 3, c. 14, s. 5, which enacts that any person who shall be admitted to be a solicitor or attorney in any of his Majesty's Courts at Westminster, by virtue &c., may be (a) 3 M. & Scott, 195; and ante, p. 738. |