1852. DOE d. HYDE v. THE MAYOR &c. OF MANCHESTER. but the remedy sought by this rule is wholly inapplicable here. Cowling, in support of his rule. The three years within which the corporation might exercise the compulsory powers for taking land, given to them by their acts, having expired, they are compelled to fall back upon the 124th section of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18. The case clearly falls within that section: the corporation failed to acquire the slip of land in question within the prescribed period, through mistake or inadvertence: see Hyde v. The Mayor &c. of Manchester (before Parker V.C.), 16 Jurist, 189. JERVIS, C. J. I am of opinion that this rule should be made absolute, not in its terms, for it asks too much, but in a modified manner. It would not, I think, be right to set aside the writ, which is perfectly regular, though I think the execution should be stayed. Nor do I think there is any ground for calling upon the lessor of the plaintiff to pay costs. The 126th section of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, contemplates proceedings of which the undertakers are to pay the costs. It enacts, that, "in addition to the said purchase-money, compensation, or satisfaction, and before the promoters of the undertaking shall become absolutely entitled to any such estate, interest, or charge, or to have the same merged or extinguished for their benefit, they shall, when the right of any such estate, interest, or charge, shall have been disputed by the company, and determined in favour of the party claiming the same, pay the full costs and expenses of any proceedings at law or in equity for the determination or recovery of the same to the parties with whom any such litigation in respect thereof shall have taken place and such costs and expenses shall, in case the same shall be disputed, be settled by the proper officer of the court in which such litigation took place." The three years within which the corporation were impowered to take land compulsorily, having elapsed, they must rest upon the 124th section of the act, which gives them six months within which to perfectt heir right, pay the money, and executea deed-poll. All the other matters are disposed of by this view of the case. The rule, therefore, will be absolute in the modified manner I before suggested. CRESSWELL, J. I am of the same opinion. There is no great difficulty in the construction of the act when the facts are once ascertained. The rest of the court concurring, Rule absolute," that the writ of habere facias 1852. DOE d. HYDE D. THE MAYOR &c. OF MANCHESTER. Upon the taxation of the costs under this rule, the Costs. master construed the 126th section of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 18, to mean, by "the full costs and expenses" of the proceedings, liberal costs as between party and party, and not costs as between attorney and client. Welsby, for the lessor of the plaintiff, moved for a review of the taxation. He submitted that the object of the rule was to give the lessor of the plaintiff such 1852. DOE d. HYDE v. THE MAYOR &c. OF MANCHESTER. costs as the 126th section contemplates, and that that section contemplates that they shall be such as to be a full and complete indemnity to the party for all that he may have reasonably expended in the litigation,-to place the party in the position he would have been in but for the unlawful acts of the corporation. The rule was granted, and afterwards made absolute without any opposition. Rule accordingly. April 28. A final order under the statutes 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, and 7 & 8 Vict. tection against an execution on a judgment BEAVAN v. WALKER. AN action upon the case was brought against the defendant for a false and fraudulent representation made by him upon a sale to the plaintiff of a shop and the c. 96, is no pro- goodwill of a business, and a verdict was given on the 5th of December, 1851, for the plaintiff, damages 307. 18. 6d. On the 12th of December, the plaintiff's attorney delivered his bill of costs to the defendant. On the 17th, the defendant petitioned the court of bankruptcy for protection under the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, and obtained a final order for his discharge on the 30th of January, 1852. Judgment was signed in the action on the 5th of April, 1852, and the defendant was taken in execution. in an action of tort signed after, upon a verdict obtain ed before, the making of such final order. Hawkins, on a former day in this term, obtained a rule nisi for his discharge from custody, on the ground that the final order released him from the claim. He referred to Sharpe v. Iffgrave, 3 B. & P. 394, and Berry v. Irwin, antè, Vol. VIII, p. 532. Petersdorff now shewed cause. The question turns upon the construction of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 116, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96. The former statute clearly extends only to cases where the relation of debtor and creditor subsists between the parties. The first section recites that "it is expedient to protect from all process against the person such persons as have become indebted without any fraud, or gross or culpable negligence," &c., and enacts that any person not being a trader, or, being a trader, owing less than 3007., on giving certain notices, may present a petition to the court of bankruptcy, stating the debts owing to and by him. The 4th section enacts that the commissioner may, if satisfied that the debts of the petitioner were not contracted by fraud or breach of trust, &c., make a final order, which is to be "for the protection of the person of the petitioner from all process, and for the vesting of his estate and effects in the official assignee," &c. And section 10 enacts, that, if any suit or action is brought against any petitioner for or in respect of any debt contracted before the date of filing his petition, it shall be a sufficient plea in bar of the said suit or action, that such petition was duly presented, and a final order for protection and distribution made by a commissioner duly authorized, whereof the production of the order signed by the commissioner, with proof of his handwriting, shall be sufficient evidence." The 7 & 8 Vict. c. 96, which was passed to amend that act, in s. 3, requires a certain notice to be given to creditors "whose debts respectively shall amount to 51." The 6th section enacts, "that any prisoner in execution upon any judgment obtained in any action for the recovery of any debt, either not being a trader within the meaning of the statutes relating to bankrupts, or, being a trader within the meaning of the said statutes, owing debts amounting on the whole to less than 3007., may be a petitioner for protection from process; and 1852. BEAVAN v. WALKER. 1852. BEAVAN บ. WALKER. every such prisoner to whom an interim order for protection shall have been given, shall not only be protected from process as provided by the said recited act, but also from being detained in prison in execution upon any judgment obtained in any action for the recovery of any debt mentioned in his schedule," &c. The 22nd section enacts "that the final order to be made under the provisions of the said act, as amended by this act, shall protect the person of the petitioner from being taken or detained under any process whatever, in the cases hereinafter mentioned, that is to say, from all process in respect of the several debts and sums of money due, or claimed to be due, at the time of filing the petition, from such petitioner, to the several persons named in his schedule as creditors, or as claiming to be creditors, for the same respectively, or for which such persons shall have given credit to such petitioner before the time of filing such petition, and which were not then payable, or in respect of the claims of any other persons not known to such petitioner at the time of making the final order, who may be indorsees or holders of any negotiable securities set forth in such schedule: Provided always, that every such final order may be made without specifying therein any such debt or debts, or sum or sums of money or claims as aforesaid, or naming therein any such creditor or creditors as aforesaid." That section evidently points to debts, or something which must end in a debt, or is susceptible of calculation. The 24th section, like the 4th section of the former act, enables the commissioner to make a final order for protection, if satisfied that the debts have been contracted without fraud, &c. The 26th section, which will probably be relied on by the other side, enacts" that the final order for protection from process shall and may extend to all process issuing from any court for any contempt, ecclesiastical or civil, for non-payment of money or of costs or expenses in |