offence in the river Thames occurred (g). This would, in many instances, be very difficult, and in some perhaps, impracticable; and the inconvenience has been remedied by the last Act (h), which authorizes the action to be brought either in such county, or in Middlesex or London. (1)

(g) Barber (qui tam) v. Tilson, 3 M. & S. 429.

(h) Sect. 86.

(1) A few cases have been decided in the American Courts, on the subject of pilots and pilotage, which may well find a place at the end of this chapter.

While a pilot is on board, who is regularly appointed, he has the absolute and exclusive control of the ship in the absence of the master, and is considered as master pro hac vice; and consequently the master is not liable for any injury happening to another vessel by the fault or negligence of the pilot during his absence, whatever might be the case, if he were present at the time of the injury. Snell v. Rich, 1 John. R. 305; Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick, 23; 3 Kent, (5th ed.) 176. > Whether the owner would in such case be liable for such injury was a question left undecided by the Court in the case above cited. In Bussey v. Donaldson, 4 Dall. R. 206, it was, however, decided, that the owner is liable for such injury, although the pilot is a public pilot of the port; and that the measure of compensation ought to be equivalent to the injury. And such would seem to be the opinion of the Court in Fletcher v. Braddick, 5 Bos. & Pull. 182, as it certainly was in The Neptune the Second, 1 Dodson, R. 467. A pilot, while he has charge of the vessel, is the agent of the owner. Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick. 23. The owner of a vessel, which, through the fault or negligence of any one on board, injures another vessel by running foul of her, is liable to the injured party, although there be a pilot on board, who has the entire control and management of the vessel. ib. See Pilot Boat Washington v. Ship Saluda, U. States Dist. Ct. S. C. April, 1831; Williamson v. Price, 16 Martin, (Lou.) 399; 3 Kent, (5th ed.) 175, 176.

The owner must seek his remedy against the pilot, who is answerable as strictly as if he were a common carrier, for his default, negligence, or unskilfulness. See Yates v. Brown, 8 Pick, 23, 24; 3 Kent, (5th ed.) 176.

Whether the owners are liable for the acts of the pilot when the master is compelled by statute to take him on board. See Atty. Genl. v. Call, 3 Price, 302; Mackintosh v. Slade, 6 B. & C. 657; The Christiana, 2 Hagg. Adm. 183; Curtis's Merchant Seamen, 195, 196, note.

In a case, where a steamboat was hired for the purpose of towing a vessel, to which she was fastened, and both were under the direction of a licensed pilot, the owner of the steamboat was held not entitled to damages on account of injury sustained in the course of the navigation, and not caused by undue negligence of the pilot. Reeves v. The Ship Constitution, Gilpin, 579. >

Where the injury happens on the sea, &c., there is a familiar remedy for it in the Admiralty, in a suit for collision. The Thames, 5 Rob. 308; The Neptune the Second, I Dodson, R. 467; The Woodrop Sims, 2 Dodson, R. 83; The Dundee, 1 Hagg. Adm. R. 109; Gale v. Laurie, 5 Barn. &. Cresw. 156.

The neglect to take a pilot, where it ought to be done, will subject the owners to a suit for the damages, that may happen to shippers and others by such default. See M'Millan v. U. Ins. Co. 1 Rice, (S. C.) 248; Keeler v. Fireman Ins. Co. 3 Hill, 250; 3 Kent, (5th ed.) 176, note. And if captors neglect to take a pilot on board, and the captured ship be lost in consequence of the neglect, a Court of Admiralty will decree restitution in value against them. The William, 6 Rob. R. 316. Of course pilots themselves are responsible for any damages occasioned by their own negligence or default, 3 Kent, (5th ed.) 176, > and are entitled to a proper compensation for their services. See laws of Oleron, art. 23. Molloy, B. 2, ch. 9, § 3, § 7; Gardner v. Ship New Jersey, 1 Peters, Adm. R. 223, 227; The Schooner Anne, 1 Mason, R. 508. Pilots, like other persons, may entitle themselves to salvage by performing services

beyond the mere line of their duty. Dulany v. The Sloop Pelagio, Bee's Adm. R. 212; <Hobart v. Drogan, 10 Peters, 108; Hand v. The Elvira, Gilpin, 60; The Joseph Harvey, 1 Rob. Adm. 306; The Genl. Palmer, 2 Hagg. Adm. 176; The City of Edinburgh, ib. 333. >

A suit lies in the Admiralty for compensation for pilotage performed on the high seas. The Schooner Anne, 1 Mason, R. 508.

< The pilot is a mariner, ib. See Hobart v. Brogan, 10 Peters, 108. >

24*

OF THE CONVEYANCE OF PASSENGERS IN MERCHANT SHIPS; AND HEREIN,

(Ss.)1. Of the Rights and Duties of the Master and Passengers. 2. Contracts for the conveyance of Passengers, and Cases decided upon them.

3. Passenger Acts.

*THE increase of intercourse between the United Kingdom and distant countries, and the extent to which emigration. has of late years been carried (a), suggest the propriety of adverting to that branch of the law of merchant ships and seamen which relates to the conveyance of passengers. It will be convenient to consider the matters connected with this subject under two heads. The rights and duties of the master and passengers; and, the regulations which the Legislature has established in relation to them.

1. The grave responsibility of the person to whose skill and conduct life and property are entrusted on the ocean, and the situations of unforeseen emergency in which he may be compelled to exert himself for their preservation, render it necessary that he should be invested with large, and, for the time at least, unfettered authority. Obedience to this authority, in all matters within its scope, is a duty which should be cheerfully discharged by every passenger on board the ship. Whatever is necessary for the security of the vessel, the discipline of the crew, the safety of all on board, the master may lawfully require, not only of the ship's company, who [212] have expressly contracted to obey him, but †of those

also, whom he has engaged to carry to their destination, on the implied condition of their submission to his rule (b). The exercise of power thus undefined must, at his peril, be restricted to the necessity of the case: and, on the *ground of such necessity, and within its limits, he may en

(a) The number of Emigrants from the United Kingdom to the British possessions in North America, the United States,

the Cape of Good Hope, and Australia, in the years 1833, 1834, 1835, was 183,237. (b) Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Campb. 58.

*force and justify orders, which would otherwise expose him to censure, to civil responsibility, and to punishment. (1)

A passenger who is found on board in time of danger, is bound, at the master's call, to do works of necessity in defence of the ship, if attacked, and for the preservation of the lives of all on board (c). Yet, as he may lawfully, except under peculiar circumstances, depart the ship,-should he voluntarily remain, at the risk of his personal safety, to assist her in her distress, he may be entitled to remuneration for his service (d). In an action of assault and false imprisonment on board an East Indiaman, in a voyage from Bombay to Calcutta, it appeared that the plaintiff was a passenger in the gunner's mess, and that the defendant was captain of the ship. Near the Cape of Good Hope, two strange sail were descried in the offing, supposed to be enemies. The defendant immediately mustered all hands on deck, and assigned to every one his station. The plaintiff, with the other passengers, he ordered on the poop, where they were to fight with small arms. This order all readily obeyed, except the plaintiff, who, conceiving he had been ill-used by the defendant some time before, in being forbidden to walk on the poop, positively refused to go there, but offered to fight in any other part of the ship with his messmates. The defendant, for this contumacy, ordered him to be carried upon the poop, and there kept him in irons during the whole night. Next morning, no enemy appeared, and the ship arrived safe at St. Helena, where the plaintiff quitted her. Lord Ellenborough, at first, said that he did not know that the confinement of the plaintiff was not necessary, and therefore justifiable; but when it came out that he had been kept all night in irons on the poop, he clearly held that the defendant had exceeded the limits of his authority (e). In all such cases, the propriety of the conduct which is questioned, will be most satisfactorily determined, and redress most readily obtained, by appeal to a jury, a mode of trial which thad long fallen into disuse in [† 213] the Court of Admiralty, which, however, continues

to assert its jurisdiction in these as in all other complaints of damage on the high seas (ƒ).

(c) Newman v. Walters, 3 Bos. & Pull.

612.

(d) Ibid., and see the Two Friends, 1 Rob. Ad. Rep. 285; The Beaver, 3 Rob. Ad. Rep. 292; The Joseph, Harry, 1 Rob. Ad. Rep. 306.

(e) Boyce v. Bayliffe, 1 Campb. 58.

*(f) See the case of the Ruckers, 4 Rob. Ad. Rep. 73. It appears from the Black Book of the Admiralty, that jurors were formerly summoned to the Admiralty Sessions. "Si un homme est endite qu'il

(1) See 3 Kent, (5th ed.) 183. >

*2. In the case of an express contract, the rights of the parties will of course be governed by its terms, but the usage of particular trades and voyages may often influence their interpretation. Where the contract is not express, it may also be evidenced by such usage. (1) A few miscellaneous cases on this subject may properly be noticed here (g).

In the case of Corbin v. Leader (h), the defendant, the master of an East Indiaman about to sail from Calcutta, on a voyage to London, by an agreement under seal, granted and let to the plaintiff, the whole of the cabins and accommodations fitted up for the reception, convenience and conveyance of passengers on board the ship, and the defendant covenanted to promote, as far as in him lay, the comfort and convenience of the plaintiff and such persons as he should engage and contract with, and who should be received as passengers in and on board the said ship, in consideration whereof, the plaintiff covenanted with the defendant, among other things, to pay the defendant the sum therein agreed on; and that he would in every respect support and uphold the authority and command of the defendant, and in no way interfere with the management or navigation of the ship, or with the affairs thereof. The plaintiff further covenanted that if in the progress of the voyage, it should be necessary for the convenience and at the request of the plaintiff, to touch or put into any other intermediate port or ports, save and except St. Helena, he would bear and pay all port and other necessary charges which might be incurred thereby. The Court held

that this stipulation as to the payment of the charges [214] of touching at an fintermediate port, thus interwoven with the covenant of the defendant, clearly

a batu une personne on qu'il est un commun bateur et malfaiseur en eau salée en tel cas s'il est convict par 12 il sera emprisonné par 21 jours et plus il sera fin au Roy."- Bl. B. Admiralty, art. 12. By the 3 & 4 Vict. c. 65, s. 11, it is enacted, that in any contested suit depending in the said Court of Admiralty, the said Court shall have power to direct issues of fact to be tried before the Judges of the superior courts. See the Act in the Ap

(1) A contract between a passenger and the master of a vessel for the passage, is a personal contract, and not cognizable in the Admiralty. Brackett v. Brig Hercules, 1 Gilpin, 134.

Where passengers are conveyed, without their consent, to a different port from the one agreed upon at the time of sailing, no recovery can be had for the amount of passage money. McGloin v. Henderson, 6 Lou. 715. >