tleman concluded with strongly reprobating the whole course of the proceedings against her Majesty.

Dr Dodson maintained the right of the King to regulate the Liturgy; and Mr Martin conceived, that, after the resolution of Parliament last session, the Queen ought to have acquiesced.

The Attorney-General began by expressing his surprise, that the noble mover, affected apparently by the speech of Alderman Heygate, had directed his attack merely against the expediency of the measure, thus tacitly admitting its legality. If the act was illegal, why discuss its wisdom? Once show this act to be illegal, and no matter what might be the conduct of the Queen-whether it was such as the whole nation might be proud to approve, or such as it must be compelled to condemn, nothing could justify ministers in having advanced that act; there was litera scripta upon the subject; there was a course laid down for them to pursue; and to recommend any other course would be to recommend the exercise of such a dispensing power on the part of the Crown, as no minister in his senses could venture to advise. Mr Wetherell, after first declaring the measure to be illegal, appeared finally to rest his argument chiefly upon usage. He was prepared, however, to meet the argument upon both points. The honourable member for Westminster told the House, that from the year 1546 to the present period, there was no instance in which a Queen Consort had been omitted in the prayers of the church. It would be seen by the prayer-book used in the time of Philip and Mary, that a Queen, not a Queen Consort, but a Queen Regnant, had been in that situation; for during that reign the King was prayed for, and the Queen, though Queen

Regnant, was not. (Hear, hear, from the Opposition benches, and cries of "Queen Consort.") Queen Consort, did the honourable members say? That was the case of a Queen Regnant; and that Queen was not prayed for. The book was to be found in the British Museum; and the form stood, "Pro rege et principibus suis." The honourable and learned member for Oxford had ascribed to the Act of Uniformity, that immutable right of the Queen to be prayed for, which no King, it was insisted, had power to take away. He (the AttorneyGeneral) wished to see the enactment; he desired to have the clause laid before him under which the immutable right was to be claimed. So far from the course having been uniform from the Reformation downwards, there had been repeated instances of deviation. In the reign of George II., the name of Frederick Prince of Wales had been struck out of the form of prayer. In the commencement of the late reign, the same measure had been adopted with respect to the Duke of Cumberland. The words of the act were certainly alter and change." The framers of that act had not probably the copia verborum of the honourable and learned member for Oxford, and did not think it necessary to employ variety of words where the meaning might be expressed by one; but the advisers of George III., at the period alluded to, men upon whom the honourable and learned member, notwithstanding his aversion to anti-radical and to monarchical administrations, would scarcely pass hasty censure, those advisers had recommended to the King to strike the Duke's name out of the Liturgy, he (the Duke) being still in existence. He would now come to that instance, which he took to be an instance of the highest value, and which had

been described to the House as an instance of no value at all-the measures pursued towards the Queen of George I. Did the honourable and learned member really mean to contend that the divorce mentioned by Cox, was a divorce actually annulling the marriage between the parties? Why, the very same page which spoke of the divorce, stated that the Queen was gazetted as Duchess of Zell, and as Duchess Dowager of Hanover. It was said, that the second marriage, the marriage with the Duchess of Kendal, was a good and valid marriage. Why, then, was it not set up as a legal marriage? It was not his intention to provoke discussion as to the question of guilt or innocence; but ministers had believed they were in possession of satisfactory evidence against her Majesty. When a change in the Liturgy became necessary, while such a charge was hanging over her Majesty, if her name of Queen Consort was inserted, with what face could ministers afterwards come down and say, we have a charge against the Queen, which, as we think, forms a ground, not only for degradation, but for divorce? The answer would immediately be, What! you who advised her name to be inserted in the Liturgy, who placed her in the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of Queen Consort of these realms!

Sir James Mackintosh declared, that after the most deliberate consideration of the subject, his mind was brought to this conclusion, that the removal of her Majesty's name from the Liturgy was a violation of the common law; that there was nothing in the statute law to countenance such a proceeding; that it was unwise, inexpedient, and a departure from the principles of justice. The arguments used by Mr Robinson and the Attorney-General, were mere charges of

party feeling, not affecting the merits of the question. It seemed a very singular charge, that the motion was too mild and too respectful to his Majesty. He would now tell his learned friend, the Attorney-General, that his argument drawn from the case of Philip and Mary had no force. To prove it, what did his learned friend do? He quoted the mass book in the time of Philip and Mary. He introduced the popish ritual, as if Philip and Mary were supreme heads of the Church of England, a title they would have looked upon as damnable and heretical. The fact was, that the name of the Queen was never found in the ri tual before the Reformation. He would now come to the case of the Princess Sophia. His learned friend, the Attorney-General, seemed to think that she could not have been divorced, as she was called in the Gazette by the name of the Duchess of Zell. Did he forget that she inherited this title from her father; that she was the daughter of the Duke of Zell, from whom she inherited large estates? Her being styled Duchess of Zell at her death, appeared to him pregnant proof of her having been divorced. His learned friend contended, that there was no divorce e vinculo matrimonii. He (Sir J. Mackintosh) thought there was. Every person knew, that, in all protestant churches, except that of England, a divorce e vinculo matrimonii might be obtained in a Consistorial Court; and the noble lord himself (Castlereagh) admitted, in alluding to this subject last session, that the record of this divorce was still extant in some of the Consistorial Courts of Hanover. George I. could as easily have obtained a divorce e vinculo matrimonii, as a divorce a mensa et thoro; and therefore the probability was that he obtained it. This case of a woman,

about whose guilt he had no doubt, who had been confined eighteen years previous to the divorce, and thirteen years after, and whose divorce passed sub silentio, appeared to him to supply but a wretched argument. Such evidence would not be thought sufficient in a common case of trespass or right of way. The Parliament of England at the time had no means of obtaining information on the subject, for it never occurred to them that they could send clandestine commissions even into Hanover, for the purpose of examining witnesses. (Hear from the Opposition.) The weight at tached to this case appeared to him most decisive proof that the gentlemen opposite felt the weakness of their argument. The question for the House now to decide, was one which they only were competent to decide, and which was a question far more important than the presentnamely, whether or not the Queens of England should be degraded from that constitutional independence in which the wisdom of our forefathers had placed them, and which they had enjoyed for centuries, and be reduced to be the slaves of every administration? The next passage in the act was, "that the names of the King, Queen, and royal progeny, shall be changed and altered from time to time." He asked whether the words "altered and changed" could have any view to delinquency or moral turpitude? Was it not more consistent with common sense to say, that these words had in view the alterations which must take place by births, deaths, or marriages? Could it be said, that, coupled with the words "from time to time," it meant delinquency which must occur from time to time? Some weight had been attached to the words" by lawful authority;" but what did those words

mean? That it was not fit to leave a discretion in the breast of every incumbent of a parish to decide who were the King, Queen, or royal progeny. If that were allowed, we should about 70 years ago have heard Queen Clementina, King James, and Charles Prince of Wales, prayed for in most parishes in England. The cases of George of Denmark and the Princess Sophia, appeared to him, by their specialties, rather to confirm than weaken the general rule. Was there a permanent omission, except in the case of the Duke of Cumberland, of the name of any one branch of the royal family, who had ever been prayed for? Even this instance could not avail those who were compelled to acknowledge that it was the only permanent violation of the Act of Uniformity; it could not avail them, because the hostility of George III. to the Duke of Cumberland was well known. As a Highlander and a Whig, he could not bring himself to eulogise and do justice to the character of the Duke of Cumberland, who was not a merciful commander in Scotland, though a good Whig Prince in England. He never imagined, till he heard the speech of the AttorneyGeneral, that ministers should not have had some better authorities to go upon. As to the intention of effecting an arrangement with the Queen, it appeared to him a most strange preliminary to begin by an insult; by proclaiming her from ten thousand pulpits an adulteress. There was not a man of any party, who would not lay his hand upon his heart, and say, that this was a most unfor tunate measure. The way in which the people of England received this question was— they thought the Queen degraded before accusationprosecuted without necessity-attempted to be convicted without suf

wished their conduct had been equally free from party motives; but he believed every unprejudiced man would allow, that administration had acted a more pure and disinterested part on this occasion than their opponents had done. The members opposite, instead of coming forward in a bold way, had selected one single point, with the view of picking the votes of a few individuals whose opinions were doubtful. They had had recourse to a system of management, which could only be met by management; and when a proposition was made that could lead to no practical good, it was fair to meet it by moving other orders of the day, or by calling for an adjournment. It was extraordinary that twelve months had been suffered to elapse, during which ministers were allowed to perpetrate a great injustice against the Queen, and at the expiration of that time nothing but an abstract proposition was brought forward. As to the law of the question, he thought that there was nothing so decisive in the clause so much relied on by the noble lord, as to render it imperative to insert the Queen's name in the Liturgy. The Act of Uniformity was not pass ed out of any jealousy of the Crown, but to prevent encroachments and alterations from being made in the prayers of the church, and to put down heresies and schisms injurious to the establishment. That clause, therefore, was inserted in the statute to shew, that though no alteration could be made in the general prayers of the church, those collects and litanies which affected the royal family were open to alteration. The opposite party had done the very thing of which they accused ministers, when they struck the name of Lord Melville, before trial, out of the list of privy councillors; also, with regard to the Queen herself, when they

placed her conduct under the investigation of four commissioners, without informing her of the existence of such a tribunal. If the King, in the exercise of his royal prerogative, should be forced to insert the name of her Majesty in the Liturgy, that would be found to be only the first step to greater encroachments; for he should wish to know on what principle, after such an advantage were gained for the Queen, she could be excluded from the coronation, and all those privileges of grace and favour which, in happier times, it would have been the pride of the King to have afforded her. He allowed, that now that the bill was withdrawn, the Queen was in the situation of a person technically innocent, and she was in as full possession of her rights as Queen Consort, as if no stain had ever been cast upon her character. It was one thing, however, for her to enjoy the rights to which she was legally entitled, and another to enjoy those honours which had been granted to her predecessors as matters of grace, favour, and consideration. She had no strict right to have her name inserted in the Liturgy; and when the matter had come to such a pass as it had done in the Lords, where 123 peers had declared her guilty upon their honours, he could not, as a minister of the Crown, allow it to be granted to her as a boon. The conduct of her friends in parliament was very extraordinary; whilst her trial was proceeding, they were making motion after motion for a prorogation, in order to put a stop to it, but now that it was over, they wished again to meet the question, and to drag the House again through all the mass of evidence which they had declared to be so disgusting. If they succeeded in their efforts, on their heads rested the responsibility. His lordship then proceeded to state, that