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THE

CRIMINAL LAW CONSOLIDATION ACTS

OF THE

24 & 25 OF QUEEN VICTORIA.

ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ACTS.

Ir may be well to make a few remarks on the construction of these Acts, as it may be useful in some of the questions that may arise under them to understand the views with which the Acts were framed.

First then as to the statutory provisions bearing on their construction.

Criminal

By the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, s. 14, "wherever this Interpreor any other statute relating to any offence, whether tation of punishable upon indictment or summary conviction, Statutes. in describing or referring to the offence, or the subject matter on or with respect to which it shall be committed, or the offender or party affected or intended to be affected by the offence, hath used or shall use words importing the singular number or the masculine gender only, yet the statute shall be understood to include several matters as well as one matter, and several persons as well as one person, and females as well as males, and bodies corporate as well as individuals, unless it be otherwise specially provided, or there be something in the subject or context repugnant to such construction; and wherever any forfeiture or penalty is payable to a party aggrieved, it shall be payable to a body corporate in every case where such body shall be the party aggrieved."

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B

Interpretation of all Acts

It may be observed that this interpretation clause applies to Acts passed before as well as to those passed after it, and that it clearly embraces the present enactments.

By Lord Brougham's Act, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, s. 4, "in all Acts, words importing the masculine generally. gender shall be deemed and taken to include females, and the singular to include the plural, and the plural the singular, unless the contrary as to gender and number is expressly provided; and the word 'month' to mean calendar month, unless words be added showing lunar month to be intended; and 'county' shall be held to mean also county of a town or of a city, unless such extended meaning is expressly excluded by words; and the word 'land' shall include messuages, tenements, and hereditaments, houses and buildings, of any tenure, unless where there are words to exclude houses and buildings, or to restrict the meaning to tenements of some particular tenure; and the words 'oath,' 'swear,' and affidavit shall include affirmation, declaration, affirming, and declaring, in the case of persons by law allowed to declare or affirm instead of swearing."

Month.

Whosoever.

Any.

This enactment also applies to all the clauses in these Acts.

It may be well to add, that "month" is used throughout these Acts with reference to this clause, and consequently invariably means calendar month.

The word "whosoever" is used throughout these Acts in the widest sense, so as to include every person capable of becoming a criminal.

The word "6. any is also used in like manner so as to include every person or thing, or at least every person or thing, other than the person or thing previously mentioned (a). In sundry instances it has been substituted for the word "such," as that word tied down the enactment to the person or thing previously named: thus in s. 18, of the Offences against the Person Act, post, p. 52, which applies to wounding or shooting at any person, the

(a) This is in strict accordance with Lord Coke's reading on the 1 H. 4, c. 9. See 3 Inst. 33.

former Act had "with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable such person, or to do some other grievous bodily harm to such person;" but in the present clause "any" is substituted for "such."

So also the words "any other" are so used as to Any other. include every other person or thing, except the person or thing previously mentioned. Thus in s. 20, of the Offences against the Person Act, post, p. 53, we have whosoever shall wound " any other person;" and in s. 19 of the same Act, post, p. 52, we have "gunpowder or any other explosive substance;" and as in the former instance "any other person" includes every other person, except the person inflicting the wound; so in the latter" other explosive substance" includes every explosive substance except gunpowder.

any

The word "may" has frequently been used as May. equivalent to "it shall be lawful," or the longer expression, "it shall be lawful, and is hereby authorised."

The word "shall" has also often been used in an Shall. imperative sense, as in s. 2 of the Offences against the Person Act, post, p. 29; and that section affords an example of the use of both "may" and "shall" in these Acts in the manner just explained.

former Act.

The expression "against this or any former Act Against of Parliament," frequently used with reference to this or any previous convictions, was adopted to include any previous conviction of a like offence under any former enactment.

If any question should arise in which any comparison may be instituted between different sections of any one or several of these Acts, it must be carefully borne in mind in what manner these Acts were framed. None of them was re-written; on the contrary, each contains enactments taken from different Acts passed at different times and with different views, and frequently varying from each other in phraseology, and, for the reasons stated in the Introduction, these enactments, for the most part, stand in these Acts with little or no variation in their phraseology, and, consequently, their differences in that respect will be found generally to remain in these Acts. It follows, therefore, from

hence, that any argument as to a difference in the intention of the legislature, which may be drawn from a difference in the terms of one clause from those in another, will be entitled to no weight in the construction of such clauses; for that argument can only apply with force where an Act is framed from beginning to end with one and the same view, and with the intention of making it thoroughly consistent throughout.

A single instance will well explain my meaning. In s. 18 of the Offences against the Person Act, post, p. 52, we have wounding "with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person." In s. 38 of the same Act, post, p. 65, we have assault "with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of himself or any other person." On which difference in the terms used if any argument were founded, the answer would be, that the words in s. 18 are the very words of the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 4, and those in s. 38 are the words of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 25 (except that "himself" is substituted for "the party so assaulting"); and it is clear that the construction of both these clauses in this Act ought to be the same; for the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 4, is a re-enactment of the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 12, and the words "any person" are substituted in the former for "the party so offending or any of his accomplices," "any" being used in the former in its widest sense, as comprehending every person.

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