And here I must advert to interpretation clauses. If an interpretation clause ascribe a new meaning to any known term, or extend or limit its meaning so as to include anything, to which it did not previously extend, or to exclude anything previously contained within it, and a clause containing the term so interpreted, were to be inserted in a Consolidation Bill, either the interpretation clause must also be inserted, or some alteration be made in any clause containing the term, in order to secure its having the same meaning in that clause as it had in the original Act. Thus in the Larceny Act it became necessary to insert the interpretation clauses from the Factors' Act, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39, and the Fraudulent Trustee Act, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 54, in order that the terms interpreted by those clauses might have the same meaning in the clauses consolidated in the Larceny Act, as they had in those Acts. Nor is such a proceeding free from danger; for it may well be that the same terms may occur in other clauses not taken from the Act containing the interpretation clause, and if that clause were inserted in the Consolidation Act without any limitation, it would apply to the other clauses as well, and might peradventure alter the meaning of the terms used in them.

But where an interpretation clause provides that a certain term shall be understood to include another term, which it either included, or had been used as synonymous with, both by the best legal authorities and by the Legislature, it is plain that such interpretation clause need not be introduced in a Consolidation Act, or any alteration made in any clause containing that term; for the simple reason that such an interpretation clause made no alteration whatever in the meaning of the term; and this will be especially the case where the things signified by both terms are identical in legal operation and effect. Thus in s. 6 of the offences against the Person Act, post, the term "indictment" only is used, in like manner as it was alone used in the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 4, although

by s. 30 of that Act the word "indictment" was to "be understood to include," inter alia, inquisition: for a coroner's inquisition, which finds a person guilty of murder or manslaughter, "amounts to an indictment, and by Lord Coke and the older law writers is frequently designated by that name, and a defendant is arraigned upon it in the same way as upon an indictment, and he may plead and take exception to it, precisely as if it had been found by a grand jury."-Jervis' Archb. 103, 13 Ed. And the 1 & 2 Ph. & M. c. 13, s. 5, and 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 4, both speak of a coroner's inquisition "whereby any person shall be indicted for murder or manslaughter," which by itself would prove that such an inquisition was an indictment; and the former clause afterwards calls it "the inquisition or indictment." It is clear, therefore, that the term indictment includes a coroner's inquisition whereby any one is charged with murder or manslaughter.

Next may be mentioned repeals, whether direct or implied. There are many instances in which even direct repeals, which refer to the enactment intended to be repealed, are so worded that it is impossible to ascertain how much of the old statutes are repealed. Here there must be actual legislation to fix what is, and what is not, repealed. A second class of repeals is one that has been adopted of late years. It is the repealing in express terms every enactment inconsistent with the Act in which the repeal is found without referring to any Act at all. So that doubt is thrown on every previous enactment, and it must be compared with the whole and every part of the repealing Act in order to ascertain whether it is repealed or not. Such repealing clauses are nearly as bad as implied repeals, which abound in the Statute Book, and are the most difficult of all to ascertain. These take place whenever any affirmative or negative clause is so far inconsistent with a previous enactment that both cannot be in force at once; and it often requires a solemn decision to determine whether any, and, if so, what part of an older

enactment is impliedly repealed. A single example may show what I mean.

By the Statute of Frauds, 29 C. 2, c. 3, s. 1, it was provided that "all leases not put in writing and signed by the parties, &c., shall have the force and effect of leases at will only, and shall not, either in law or equity, be deemed to have any greater force;" but s. 2 excepted leases for not exceeding three years. By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, it is provided, inter alia, that "a lease required by law to be in writing," "shall be void at law unless made by deed." In the Bill to consolidate the law of Landlord and Tenant, prepared for the Statute Law Commission, both these enactments were introduced without any remark. When I looked over that Bill it at once occurred to me that both these provisions could not possibly stand together in that bill; for it appeared clear that the latter Act impliedly repealed the former Act altogether as to leases for more than three years having the force of leases at will, and made them void unless made by deed. Accordingly the point was brought before the Statute Law Commissioners, and whilst all of them agreed that to some extent the latter Act was a repeal of the former, there was a great difference of opinion as to whether the latter Act did not make such leases void only at Common Law, but leave them valid in Equity, so that they might be enforced by a Court of Equity. It is enough to say that some of the greatest lawyers of the present day, whether on or off the Bench, differed on this question, and it was never settled. Such instances might easily be multiplied; and they prove that mere consolidation is impracticable; for, in such cases, it must first be determined what the law is or ought to be, and then an enactment must be framed accordingly; and if that be done, the bounds of mere consolidation are passed.

But if the preceding difficulties were surmounted, it would be found that where the enactments on a particular subject extend from very early times to the present,

their frame and language vary so substantially, that a mere consolidation of them would produce such a bill as no one would venture to bring into Parliament. The Landlord and Tenant Bill which I have just mentioned, affords a striking example of this. As it was prepared, it contained an accurate copy of the existing enactments, which extend from very ancient times to the present, and it was plain to me that in that state no one could expect that it could be passed. I then endeavoured to alter the wording of the clauses so that they might be made more consistent with each other in their language, and afterwards Sir F. Kelly went over the bill with me with the same view, and after all, the bill remained in a state that was quite unsatisfactory, and the conclusion at which I arrived was, that in order to make a good bill, the whole must be rewritten.

I will only add one objection more, which mightily weighs on my mind. Supposing the statutes could all be consolidated, without alteration or amendment, what would be effected by it? The law would not be altered in any respect, and all that would be done would be that, instead of the enactments on particular subjects being scattered over the Statute Book, they would be collected together in Acts devoted to each. No doubt this would be a considerable advantage on several grounds; but it is to be remembered that such a process would continue bad enactments as well as good, and very possibly might revive some that had become obsolete, and above all, that it would leave every existing defect and every amendment, however much required, wholly unprovided for; and this shows that such a consolidation could only be temporary, and that it would be necessary to follow it up by bills amending the law; and if this course were carried into effect, the result would be that the consolidating Acts would then be useless, and would have to be repealed. And the ultimate result would be, that so much more repealed matter would have been added to the Statute

Book. It is difficult also to see how the mere re-enactment of existing Acts could in any degree facilitate the preparation of amended Acts, and it would seem that such amended Acts might be equally well prepared from the existing enactments, and that by that course of proceeding the time and labour of preparing mere consolidating statutes would be wholly saved.

Having said thus much on the subject of consolidation in general, I will now advert to the objections to the consolidation of the Criminal Law as to indictable offences in particular.

The first objection is that it is altogether a fallacy to suppose that any such consolidation is practicable. Every enactment, which in express terms commands or forbids anything to be done, creates an indictable offence; for every one who wilfully disobeys such an enactment is liable to be indicted for such disobedience. Consequently, a consolidation of all indictable offences, in order to be complete, must contain every such enactment. And this also proves that it is a fallacy to suppose that there is any such marked distinction between civil and criminal enactments that the one can be practically separated from the other.

Nor is the question now what it would have been if there had been no existing enactments; for, if that were the case, there would be nothing to prevent the adoption of any course that might be considered most expedient; but as there are a number of enactments in existence, the question is what course is practicable in this state of things? Now, if the Consolidation Acts above referred to had passed, and the enactments they consolidated had been repealed, the effect would have been indirectly to repeal many other enactments besides; for the course of legislation in criminal matters hitherto has been to insert in the same Act that created any offences any ancillary provisions, which seemed expedient. Thus, provisions as to the costs of prosecutions, the apprehension of offenders,