decide whether that property has been stolen or obtained by false pretences, however cogent the suspicious circumstances may be. The law, therefore, which justifies a private person in apprehending where a felony has been committed, but not where a misdemeanor has been committed, is very unjust to private persons, for it almost acts as a snare to them; and it is highly prejudicial to the public, as it deters private persons from apprehending offenders. Consequently s. 103 of the Larceny Act provided that private persons might arrest any one in possession of property, on or with respect to which there was reasonable cause to believe that any indictable misdemeanor against that Act had been committed, and that such person either committed such misdemeanor, or unlawfully received the property, knowing that offence to have been committed. This clause, though approved by the Committee of the Lords, was struck out by the Committee of the Commons.

Such are the principal alterations made by the Commons, which appear to be very objectionable.

Having now given a history of the origin and progress of the Acts and the manner in which they were passed, a few words may be said as to what they really are. They are chiefly re-enactments of the former Law, with amendments and additions. Each bill contains divers enactments taken from different statutes, and generally in the terms used in those statutes. The history I have given of the bills will show that this not only was the case, but that it was a necessity; and it is perfectly clear to me that if that course had not been adopted, the bills would never have passed at all. The fact that a clause contained the existing law in its very terms carried a weight with it that no reasoning would have obtained in the minds of those who are opposed to legal reforms; and the same provision, if clothed in different language, would have been open to their acute criticisms, and would have led to so much discussion, as would have caused such a

loss of time as would have prevented the bills from passing.

As to the amendments and additions contained in the bills, the object has been to introduce all that were really and practically useful, and it cannot be doubted that these Acts do contain a very large number of really and practically useful amendments. Of this any one may easily satisfy himself if he will only turn over the pages of this volume, and refer to the parts that are printed in italics. It would quite exceed the limits of this preface to point out even the greater part of these amendments, and as they are noticed whenever they occur in the Acts, it is unnecessary to do so. A few, however, of the greatest of them may well be mentioned here.

Hitherto the usual system of framing criminal Acts has been to specify each and every act intended to be subjected to any punishment; such a course has the advantage of calling direct attention to all the acts that are made penal; but such a course is open to this objection, that it often leaves offences of equally great criminality unprovided for, and thus affords the artful a chance of evading punishment. Several courses may be adopted to remedy this defect. A clause may be framed in such general terms as to include all cases of the same kind within it. This is the simplest, and, perhaps, the best course; and it leaves the judgment of the Court entirely unfettered as to the punishment in every case, and it is so perfectly impossible to foresee all the circumstances that may happen to mitigate or aggravate any offence, that it is very advisable to leave a very wide discretion to the Court, and where, as in attempts to murder, the same punishments may well be awarded by the statute to all cases, it would seem better to have only one general clause; and, had I been able to follow my own judgment, sec. 15, in the Offences against the Person Act, post, would have been made so general as to include all attempts to murder, and consequently all that are particularly

enumerated in the preceding sections, and those sections would have been omitted. And this course would place the enactments on a footing precisely similar to all common law offences; for in them every offence of the class, however aggravated or venial, is included; of which manslaughter affords as strong an example as any that can be mentioned; for in it the highest degree of criminality next to murder, and the lowest possible culpable homicide, are included, and the Court has a discretion as to the punishment which ranges from penal servitude for life to the lowest possible fine.

But where it seems advisable to specify the several acts that are intended to be made criminal, or to assign different degrees of punishment to offences of a similar character, this may well be effected either by placing a general clause with the same or a minor punishment first, and other clauses afterwards with the same or a heavier punishment for the offences therein particularly specified, or, by reversing this course, and placing the general clause last. It seems to be quite immaterial which of these courses is adopted. In the Offences against the Person Act the special clauses relating to attempts to murder come first, with a general clause following them with the same punishment. In the Malicious Injuries Act, both with reference to buildings and malicious injuries in general, a similar arrangement is pursued, but the general clauses award minor punishments. See ss. 6, 51, 52, post. The effect of these general provisions is, that, in the former case, no attempt to murder, and in the latter, no malicious injury whatever, whether committed on an existing subject matter, or on one that may hereafter be created, can escape punishment. It may be that that punishment may in some instances of malicious injuries be inadequate to the offence; but at all events no case can occur, for which no punishment can be awarded. By introducing these provisions every attempt at murder is made liable

to the same punishment, instead of some such attempts being felony and liable to penal servitude for life, whilst others were only misdemeanors, liable to imprisonment and hard labour, although the danger to the person attacked, and the malice of the offender might be quite as great as in the former cases. So, by the Malicious Injuries Act, all public and other buildings are protected, instead of being wholly unprotected, or only protected by an indictment at common law for setting fire to a building within a town, or so near to other houses as to cause danger to them.

I have been the more particular in adverting to this subject, because it cannot be doubted that very great benefit will result from the course adopted with respect to it in these Acts, and also because it is to be hoped that a similar course will be taken in future, not only in criminal, but in civil legislation. I am very strongly in favour of general clauses wherever they can be used without any others. They are not only clear and simple; but, if I be not very much mistaken, would reduce the length of our statutes to a greater extent than any other plan that could be devised. Let it be considered what might be effected in forgery alone. No satisfactory reason can be given why the forgery of every written instrument should not be included in a single clause, and subjected to penal servitude for life, &c. That clause might be so framed as to include all existing and future instruments; and, as no forgery can be tried by any Court of Quarter Sessions, there is no reason why the same wide discretion as to punishment should not be given to the Court as in cases of manslaughter.

The Malicious Injuries Act affords the best specimen among these Acts of specific clauses followed by general ones. The old Act had one general clause; but that was confined to awarding compensation only, and the amount thereof could not exceed 57.; so that all the more serious cases which happened not to be specially mentioned in

the Act were wholly unprovided for. The present Act provides for all such cases where the injury done amounts to 5l. There was a difficulty as to this clause; if the limitation of value had been applied to the thing injured, the clause would have included many malicious injuries of far too trifling a nature to be made the subject of indictment; but if the limitation had been applied to the amount of injury done, cases might occur where the injury was less than the amount fixed, though the intent might be very malicious, and the injury liable to be caused very great. But, on the whole, it was considered better to adopt the latter alternative, especially as the next clause provided some punishment, at least, for any offence not falling within this clause. Probably those cases may be few, and it is conceived that this Act will be found very effectually to answer the ends to which it is directed, and to be a very great improvement, indeed, of the former Law.

The Offences against the Person Act, also, by the introduction of the clause, including all attempts to murder not otherwise provided for, and other amendments, would have been a very complete Act but for the alterations made by the Committee of the House of Commons; however, it is much better than the former Acts; and as it provides for all assaults, for assaults occasioning actual bodily harm, and for maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm, very few offences against the person can be committed which will not fall within its provisions.

The Larceny Act also contains very great improvements of the former law. The provisions for breaking into houses with intent to commit a felony; for entering houses by night with like intent, and the other alterations made under the head of "Sacrilege, Burglary, and Housebreaking," have placed the law on these subjects on an excellent footing, and have thrown a protection round the dwelling-house, which has long been wanted, and will prove highly beneficial. The clauses also providing against