question after question must arise upon their construction, of which the numerous questions on statutes with which the courts are pressed day after day form a melancholy proof, but there is no attempt at uniformity of language or frame among the different Acts. It may be said that this is mere matter of form, and that may be true enough, but its consequences are just as prejudicial to the public as if it were matter of substance. Substantial defects too abound. Last year two Acts passed imposing pecuniary penalties, none of which amounted to above 201., and the appeal clause actually empowered the court that tried the appeal to inflict a penalty of 1007., and if the clause gave the court any power to quash the conviction, it was by implication only. Again, bills occasionally pass the Houses, which, if their provisions were known, would certainly be rejected. Last year, at the solicitation of several gentlemen, I called the attention of the Committee of the Lords to the multitudinous thefts that are committed in the iron, cotton, and other manufactures, and the great encouragement that is given by marine store dealers to those who commit such depredations; and I submitted to them several clauses framed on the Metropolitan Police Act, by which marine store dealers found. in possession of stolen property under suspicious circumstances were rendered liable to account for the manner in which they came in possession of them, or in default of so doing were subjected to a penalty. The Committee of the Lords refused to adopt these clauses on the ground that a man's guilt ought to be proved by thosewho accuse him, and that he ought not to be put to prove his innocence until evidence of his guilt has been given. The same question was brought this year before the Committee of the Commons, and they were informed of what had occurred on the subject in the Lords, and that committee adopted the view of the Lords; and yet in this very session we have an Act, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 110, which provides that any justice, on complaint on oath that the complainant

has reason to believe that any old metal stolen or unlawfully obtained is kept in any house, &c., by any dealer in old metals, may grant a warrant to search for such old. metal, and if such metal is found, the dealer may be summoned, and if on his appearance he shall not prove how he came by it, he is made liable to a penalty not exceeding 51. Surely this Act must have slipped through Parliament unnoticed. Such things plainly call for some superintending body, who may not only call the attention of the Houses to the object and effect of each bill as it passes, but may see that it is put in the best form and language for the purpose of effecting that object.

Now, a Board of the ablest and most experienced lawyers would constitute such a superintending body. Its members ought to consist of men of the greatest ability and largest practical experience that could be induced to accept the office. They ought to be required to devote substantially their whole time to their duties, and their salaries ought to be at least equal to those of the common law judges. No one thinks that a judge is overpaid for the duties he discharges, and I venture to think that the benefit reaped by the community at large from the labours of each member of such a Board would be at least equal to the benefit derived from the labours of a single judge, and in saying this I must by no means be understood to undervalue the benefit conferred by any judge.

Then the members of such a Board ought to be selected from the different branches of the profession. Acts of Parliament embrace the subjects that fall within all those branches, and it not unfrequently happens that a single Act embraces matters within all these branches, and such Acts ought to be settled, if not drawn, by those peculiarly conversant with each of those branches. Nor can it be doubted that the views of those who have had large experience in one branch would often afford material assistance on questions arising in other branches, or that the

combined wisdom and experience of such men would in all probability lead to the production of excellent Acts of Parliament.

No doubt it is impossible, before the experiment has been tried, to fix with certainty the number of which such a Board ought to consist; but I venture to think that it would be found that it ought not to be less than five. The number of bills that pass a second reading is so large, and the urgency towards the end of a session is so great, that a smaller Board would probably be found insufficient.

It appears to me also that the President of the Board ought to be a member of the House of Lords, and that another member of the Board ought to be a member of the House of Commons ex officio. The reason for these suggestions are, that it is highly expedient that some one thoroughly conversant with each bill should be able in any discussion in either House to answer objections to it, to explain any clause that may be called in question, or to show that any amendment is uncalled for or objectionable. One of the great causes of the bad legislation of the present day is that each bill is drawn by a gentleman who never has an opportunity of supporting it in either House, and although the peer or member who has charge of the bill may know its general bearings, he rarely is familiar enough with its details to be able to deal satisfactorily with questions unexpectedly raised as to them. Again, it is highly expedient that the bills for the amendment of the law should be in charge of a member unconnected with the Ministry for the time being. Such bills are in no sense party measures, and though they ought to be supported by the Government, they ought not to be dropped when a change of Ministry takes place, but they ought to be steadily and regularly proceeded with. The Lord Chancellor and the Law Officers of the Crown have more than enough on their hands, and would find it a great relief to be freed from the charge of such bills altogether. Lastly, there is

nothing that facilitates the passing of a bill more than free communication with the members who may have objections to urge against it, or amendments to propose, and it cannot be doubted but that a member of either House would have much freer communication with the other members than any one who was not a member.

As to the duties of the Board. Every bill that had reached a certain stage in the House in which it was introduced, should be transmitted to the Board. It should be their duty to examine it, and to report to the House as to the alterations it made in the law, as to its object and effect, and especially to point out any defects and imperfections in it, and the Board should be at liberty to reframe any part of the bill in order to make it more perfect. All these things should, however, be done merely by way of suggestion for the consideration and approval of the House. In some stages of bills at present the amendments intended to be proposed are printed. In all such cases the amendments should be submitted to the Board, and they should deal with them in the same way as with the bill.

The Board should have power to draw up rules as to the general requisites of all bills subject to the approval of each House, and these rules, when approved, should be binding on all framers of bills. For instance, rules might well be laid down as to specifying the territorial extent of each bill, as to the manner of repeals, as to the user of particular expressions, and so forth.

Any member should be at liberty to require the Board to draw or settle any bill for him. In such a case the Board should be at liberty to point out to the member any objections to the bill, but they should nevertheless be bound to frame the bill in the best manner to effectuate his deliberate intentions, leaving their objections to be dealt with by the House itself. For this purpose the Board should be entitled to have the assistance of any draftsman they required. This provision would probably

soon lead to all bills brought in by independent members being framed by the Board; for such members would perceive that a bill so framed would in its framework and details come before the House with the sanction of the Board, and the principle and provisions of the bill would be all that remained for discussion. It is obvious that if such were the effect, there would be a great step gained towards uniformity in the language and provisions in all such Acts.

Either House should be at liberty to direct the Board to frame any clauses to carry out any resolution that might have been adopted by the House, or to consider and report upon any subject the House might think fit to refer to it.

Such appear to me to be the principal duties to be performed by the Board, and I cannot doubt that the Board, acting as the counsellor and adviser of the House, in suggesting and pointing out the advantages of, or the objections to bills, and in aiding and rendering them as perfect as possible, would produce the most beneficial results. Their known experience and acquirements would induce independent members freely to resort to them for information and assistance, and their recommendations would carry with them all the weight to which they were entitled from the known ability and learning of the Board, and from their standing in a perfectly impartial position as the advisers of the Houses.

Then it should be their duty to prepare a number of bills every year for the amendment of the Statute Law. These bills should be prepared on the plan I have pointed out as the best, and the Board might devote the time during which Parliament was not sitting to their preparation. A sufficient number should always be ready to be introduced at the earliest period in each session, by which means no opportunity would be lost of passing them through Parliament.

The Board should also keep its eyes on the proceedings