law or in equity, which any party aggrieved by any such offence might or would have had if this Act had not been passed; but no conviction of any such offender shall be received in evidence in any action at law or suit in equity against him;

And no person shall be liable to be convicted of any of the felonies in this and the last preceding section mentioned (post, p. 497) by any evidence whatever, in respect of any act done by him, if he shall at any time previously to his being charged with such offence, have first disclosed such act on oath, in consequence of any compulsory process of any court of law or equity in any action, suit, or proceeding which shall have been bonâ fide instituted by any party aggrieved; or if he shall have first disclosed the same in any compulsory examination or deposition before any court upon the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy or insolvency. [This section re-enacts 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, ss. 23, 24, with the alterations indicated in italics. The word "first" was inserted to get rid of the doubt expressed in R. v. Skeen, Bell, 97, post, p. 497.]

Indictment.

Commencement as ante, p. 433]-a certain will and testamentary instrument of one J. N., feloniously did steal, take, and carry away [or, feloniously, and for a fraudulent purpose, did cancel, destroy, and obliterate, or did conceal]; against the form [as ante, p. 465]. Where the indictment is for destroying or concealing a will, etc., add another count specifying the fraudulent purpose, if it can be done with certainty. In R. v. Morris, 9 C. & P. S9, Alderson, B., intimated an opinion that such statement was necessary to the validity of the indictment. It is not necessary to allege that the will, etc., is the property of any person. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 29.

Felony penal servitude for life, or for not less than three years, or imprisonment for not more than two years, with or without hard labour. -24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 29; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1, sub-ss. 1, 2 (ante, p. 235). As to requiring the offender to enter into recognizances, and find sureties for keeping the peace, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 117 (ante, p. 431).

This offence is not triable at quarter sessions.-5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126).

Evidence.

Prove a larceny of the will, etc., as directed ante, p. 434 et seq.; or, if the indictment be for destroying or concealing a will, etc., prove the destruction or concealment by the defendant as stated in the indictment, and also the fraudulent purpose for which he did it. The fraudulent purpose can, in most cases, be only matter of inference not capable of direct proof (see R. v. Morris, 9 C. & P. 89); but the mere destruction or concealment, unexplained by the defendant, is evidence from which fraud may fairly be presumed. It is immaterial whether the will, etc., be stolen during the life or after the death of the testator, or whether it relate to real or personal estate, or to both.

No person can be convicted of this offence by any evidence whatever, in respect of any act done by him, if at any time previously to his being charged with the offence he shall "have first disclosed such act on oath, in consequence of any compulsory process of any court of law or equity, in any action, suit, or proceeding which shall have been bona fide instituted by any party aggrieved: or if he shall have first disclosed the same in any examination or deposition before any court upon the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy or insolvency." The words of 7 & 8 G. 4,

c. 29, s. 23 (rep.), were different from the present, in not confining the protection to the case where the defendant shall have first disclosed the act on oath in consequence of the compulsory process of any court, etc., or in any examination or deposition in bankruptcy; and where a defendant, indicted for having fraudulently transferred for his own benefit a bill of lading intrusted to him as a broker, under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39 (rep.), which contained a proviso similar in its term to the last branch of the proviso in 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 23 (rep.) had, after he was charged with the offence before a magistrate, upon which occasion depositions were taken containing full evidence to support the charge, but before he was indicted, made, in his examination in the court of bankruptcy, a statement which was substantially an admission of the facts stated in such depositions, the judges were divided on the question whether the defendant was protected by the proviso: the majority holding that he was not, for that the disclosure intended by the statute was a statement of that which was before unknown or incapable of proof, or which, at all events he had reason to believe was so. R. v. Skeen, Bell, 97; 23 L. J. (M. C.) 91. This difficulty was avoided by the language of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 29 (ante, p. 495), which limits the protection to the case where the party shall, previously to his being charged with (not indicted for) the offence, have first disclosed the act on oath, etc. Evidence of A. that B. had told him that C. had committed an offence, is inadmissible as against C. as evidence of the knowledge of B. as to the fact of C. having committed the offence; and it was therefore inadmissible as evidence that an offence, disclosed by C. a bankrupt, in his examination, had been disclosed previously to such examination, so as to disentitle C. to the protection of the proviso to 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 85 (post, p. 578); R. v. Gunnell, 16 Cox, 154 (C. C. R.), in which case the meaning of the words "first disclosure was fully considered. The proviso discussed in R. v. Gunnell, which was in identical terms with that of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 29, was repealed by 53 & 54 Vict. c. 71, s. 29: see post, pp. 579, 581; but the latter Act has not affected section 29 of the Larceny Act, and R. v. Gunnell seems to be still a guide to the meaning of that section.

STEALING DOCUMENTS OF TITLE TO REAL ESTATE.

Statute.

24 & 25 Vict. c. 96 (Larceny Act, 1861), s. 1.—Definition of Document of Title to Lands.-(Ante, p. 427.)

Sect. 28.]-Whosoever shall steal, or shall for any fraudulent purpose destroy, cancel, obliterate or conceal, the whole or any part of any document of title to lands, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable... to be kept in penal servitude..

;

And in any indictment for any such offence relating to any document of title to lands, it shall be sufficient to allege such document to be or to contain evidence of the title or of part of the title of the person or of some one of the persons having an interest, whether vested or contingent, legal or equitable, in the real estate to which the same relates, and to mention such real estate, or some part thereof. [This section re-enacts 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 23, with the alterations indicated in italics. See Greaves Criminal Law Consolidation Acts (2nd ed.), p. 123.]

Sect. 29.]-Ante, p. 495.

A.C.P.

32

Indictment.

Commencement as ante, p. 433]-a certain deed, the property of J. N., being [or, containing] evidence of the title [or, of part of the title] of the said J. N. to a certain real estate [or, to part of a certain real estate] called Whiteacre, in which said real estate the said J. N. then had, and still hath, an interest, feloniously did steal, take and carry away (or feloniously and unlawfully, and for a fraudulent purpose did destroy [destroy, cancel, obliterate or conceal]); against the form [as ante, p. 465]. Add a second count, describing the nature of the instrument more particularly thus: a certain [other] deed, being a deed of release between A. B. of the one part, and C. D. of the other part, the property of J. N., being evidence, etc. And where the indictment is for destroying, etc., the document, add a count specifying the fraudulent purpose, if it can be done; see ante, p. 496. It is sufficient to allege the document stolen to be or to contain evidence of the title, or of part of the title, of the person, or of some one of the persons, having an interest, whether vested or contingent, legal or equitable, in the real estate to which the same relates; and to mention such real estate, or some part thereof.-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 28.

Mortgage deeds, being subsisting securities for money, are choses in action, and cannot be described in an indictment as “goods and chattels.” R. v. Powell, 2 Den. 403; 21 L. J. (M. C.) 78.

Felony: penal servitude for not less than three years and not exceeding five years, or imprisonment for not more than two years, with or without hard labour-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 28; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1, sub-ss. 1, 2 (ante, p. 235). As to requiring the offender to enter into recognizances and find sureties for keeping the peace, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 117 (ante, p. 431). This offence is not triable at quarter sessions. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126).

Evidence.

Prove a larceny of the deed, as directed ante, p. 434, et seq. Prove also, that it is, or contains, evidence of the title or part of the title of J. N. to the real estate mentioned in the indictment, or part of it, which may be done by producing the instrument, or giving secondary evidence of it (see ante, pp. 315, 316, 380), and by showing how J. N. claims the estate. Prove, also, that at the time of the larceny J. N. had an interest (whether vested or contingent, legal or equitable, is sufficient) in the real estate, of his title to which the deed is evidence.

No person can be convicted of this offence by any evidence whatever in respect of any act done by him, if at any time previously to its being charged with the offence he shall "have first disclosed such act on oath, in consequence of any compulsory process of any court of law or equity, in any action, suit or proceeding which shall have been bona fide instituted by any party aggrieved, or if he shall have first disclosed the samo in any compulsory examination or deposition before any court upon the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy or insolvency." 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 29 (see ante, p. 495).

CONCEALMENT OF INSTRUMENT OF TITLE OR FALSIFICATION OF PEDIGREE BY VENDOR OR MORTGAGOR, OR HIS SOLICITOR OR AGENT.

Statute.

22 & 23 Vict. c. 35 (Law of Property Amendment Act, 1859), s. 24.]—Any seller or mortgagor of land, or of any chattels, real or personal, or choses

in action conveyed or assigned to a purchaser [or mortgagee, see 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 8, infra], or the solicitor or agent of any such seller or mortgagor, who shall, after the passing of this Act (Aug. 13, 1859) conceal any settlement, deed, will, or other instrument material to the title, or any incumbrance from the purchaser [or mortgagee, see 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, s. 8, infra], or falsify any pedigree upon which the title does or may depend, in order to induce him to accept the title offered or produced to him, with intent in any of such cases to defraud, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being found guilty shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to suffer such punishment by fine or imprisonment for any time not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour or by both, as the court shall award, and shall also be liable to an action for damages at the suit of the purchaser or mortgagee, or those claiming under the purchaser or mortgagee, for any loss sustained by them, or either or any of them, in consequence of the settlement, deed, will, or other instrument or incumbrance so concealed, or of any claim made by any person under such pedigree, but whose right was concealed by the falsification of such pedigree; and in estimating such damages, where the estate shall be recovered from such purchaser or mortgagee, or from those claiming under the purchaser or mortgagee, regard shall be had to any expenditure by them or either or any of them in improvements on the land; but no prosecution for any offence included in this section against any seller or mortgagor, or any solicitor or agent, shall be commenced without the sanction of [his] Majesty's attorney-general, or in case that office be vacant, of [his] Majesty's solicitor-general; and no such sanction shall be given without such previous notice of the application for leave to prosecute to the person intended to be prosecuted as the attorney-general or the solicitor-general (as the case may be) shall direct.

Sect. 25.-Interpretation.]-In the construction of the previous provisions in this Act

The term "land" shall be taken to include all tenements and hereditaments, and any part or share of or estate or interest in any tenements or hereditaments, of what tenure or kind soever; and

The term "mortgage" shall be taken to include every instrument by virtue whereof land is in any manner conveyed, assigned, pledged, or charged as security for the repayment of money or money's worth lent, and to be re-conveyed, re-assigned, or released on satisfaction of the debt; and

The term "mortgagor" shall be taken to include every person by whom such conveyance, assignment, pledge, or charge as aforesaid shall be made; and

The term "mortgagee" shall be taken to include every person to whom or in whose favour any such conveyance, assignment, pledge, or charge as aforesaid is made or transferred.

23 & 24 Vict. c. 38 (Law of Property Amendment Act, 1860), s. 8.]— The section 24 in the Act 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35 (supra), shall be read and construed as if the words "or mortgagee" had followed the word "purchaser" in every place where the latter word is introduced in the said section.

STEALING VALUABLE SECURITIES.

Statute.

24 & 25 Vict. c. 96 (Larceny Act, 1861), s. 27.]-Whosoever shall steal, or shall for any fraudulent purpose destroy, cancel, or obliterate the whole or any part of any valuable security, other than a document of title to lands (see ante, p. 427), shall be guilty of felony, of the same nature and in the same degree, and punishable in the same manner, as if he had stolen any chattel of like value with the share, interest or deposit to which the security so stolen may relate, or with the money due on the security so stolen, or secured thereby and remaining unsatisfied, or with the value of the goods or other valuable thing represented, mentioned or referred to in or by the security. [This section re-enacts 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 5, with addition of the words italicized.]

Definition of valuable security.]—Sect. 1, ante, p. 427.

Definition of document of title to goods.]—Ante, p. 426.

Indictment.

Commencement as ante, p. 433]-a certain valuable security, other than a document of title to lands, to wit, one bill of exchange for the payment of ten pounds, the property of J. N. [the said sum of ten pounds secured and payable by and upon the said bill of exchange being then due and unsatisfied to the said J. N.], feloniously did steal, take, and carry away; against the form [as ante, p. 465]. As to the description of the bill or other security, see ante, pp. 74, 75. As the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 27, limits the term valuable security" to securities other than a document of title to lands," it is material, in an indictment under it, to describe the security so as to show that it is within the section. R. v. Lowrie, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 61; 36 L. J. (M. C.) 24. If the instrument be for any reason void in law, the defendant may be convicted on a count charging him with stealing a piece of paper. R. v. Perry, 1 Den. 69; 1 C. & K. 725.

Felony of the same nature, and in the same degree, and punishable in the same manner, as if the defendant had stolen any chattel of like value with the share, interest, or deposit to which the security stolen may relate, or with the money due on the security so stolen, or secured thereby and remaining unsatisfied, or with the value of the goods or other valuable thing represented, mentioned, or referred to in or by the security. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 27 (supra).

Evidence.

Prove a larceny of the bill, etc., as directed, ante, p. 434, et seq. The defendant, a stock-broker, received from the prosecutor a cheque upon his banker, to purchase Exchequer bills for him; the defendant cashed the cheque and absconded with the money. Upon an indictment for stealing the cheque and the proceeds of it, it was held to be no larceny, although the jury found that, before he received the cheque, the defendant had formed the intention of converting the money to his own use; not of the cheque, because the defendant had used no fraud or contrivance to induce the prosecutor to give it to him; and because being the prosecutor's own cheque, and of no value in his hands, it could not be called his goods and chattels; nor of the proceeds of the cheque,