This offence is not triable at quarter sessions. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126).

Evidence.

Prove that the defendant sent, delivered, or uttered, or caused to be received, the letter, as directed, ante, p. 532. Whether the letter amounts to a threat to accuse the prosecutor of the offence mentioned, is a fact to be determined by the jury. See R. v. Girdwood, 2 East, P. C. 1120; 1 Leach, 142. If it does not appear from the letter itself of what offence the defendant threatened to accuse the prosecutor, the defendant's declaration of meaning of the letter may be given in evidence to explain it. R. v. Tucker, ubi supra. The threat need not be to accuse before a court of justice. R. v. Robinson, 2 M. & Rob. 14; 2 Lewin, 273.

The intent must also be proved, as in the last case; and in order to prove it, other letters received by the prosecutor from the defendant upon the same subject may be given in evidence, or from the previous contemporaneous or even subsequent conduct and expressions to third persons. R. v. Menage, 3 F. & F. 310; cf. R. v. Cooper, 3 Cox, 547.

Punishable with penal servitude for not less than seven years.]—See observations on evidence under s. 47, post, p. 537.

Infamous crime.]—These words are defined in s. 46. They first occur in 4 G. 4, c. 54 (rep.) (see R. v. Hickman, 1 Mood. C. C. 34); that statute repealed 30 G. 2, c. 24, which contained the words "any crime punishable with death, transportation, pillory, or other infamous punishment." As to evidence of a threat to accuse within s. 46, see the cases under s. 47, post, p. 537.

Indictment for threatening to accuse a Man of a Crime with Intent, etc. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 47, ante, p. 522).

Commencement as in the last precedent]-feloniously did threaten one J. N. to accuse ("accuse or threaten to accuse") him the said J. N. ("either the person to whom such accusation or threat shall be made, or any other person") of a certain infamous crime as defined by the forty-sixth section of the Larceny Act, 1861, to wit, of having attempted and endeavoured to commit the abominable crime of buggery with the said J. S. ("any crime punishable by law with death or penal servitude for not less than seven years, or of any assault with intent to commit any rape, or of any attempt or endeavour to commit any rape, or of any crime in and by the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 46, defined to be an infamous crime"), with a view and intent thereby then to extort and gain money (" any property, chattel, money, valuable security, or other valuable thing," see 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 1, ante, p. 427) from the said J. N.; against the form [as ante, p. 465]. Second count.-And the jurors [see the observations as to the third and other counts of the indictment under s. 46, ante, p. 521]. It is not necessary to state the property in the security or money to be obtained: R. v. Tiddeman, 4 Cox, 389.

Felony penal servitude for life or for not less than three years, or imprisonment for not more than two years, with or without hard labour, and, if a male under sixteen, with or without whipping.-24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 47 (ante, p. 522); 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1, sub-ss. 1, 2 (ante, p. 235). As to requiring the offender to enter into recognizances and find sureties for keeping the peace, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 117 (ante, p. 431).

This offence is not triable at quarter sessions. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126).

Evidence.

Prove the threat or accusation, and the intent. It is for the jury to decide what the defendant meant by the threatened accusation: R. v. Cooper, 3 Cox, 547 : R. v. Braynell, 4 Cox, 402. It is submitted that the meaning of the words in 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 46, " any crime punishable by law with penal servitude for not less than seven years" is any crime for which a sentence of seven years or more may be awarded; and therefore that where the threatened accusation is one of indecent assault upon a male person such an accusation is within the above statute, the maximum punishment for an indecent assault upon a male person being penal servitude for ten years by virtue of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 62, post, ch. ii. s. 8. Before the passing of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96 it was held that where the threatened accusation was one of indecent assault (upon a male person) it was for the jury to determine whether such an accusation might not amount to an "infamous crime" within 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29, s. 8, as being "a solicitation to permit or commit such crime." R. v. Cooper, ubi supra, Cresswell, J.: cf. R. v. Braynell, ubi supra: R. v. Middleditch, 1 Den. 92; 2 Cvx, 313. It is to be observed that the offence of gross indecency between male persons created by 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, s. 11 is not within ss. 46 or 47: see R. v. Gilgannon, 53 J. P. 457.

The words "any other person" in ss. 46 and 47 render it unnecessary to consider the earlier cases as to proof of the person threatened.

The threat must be a threat to accuse, or an accusation if J. N. be indicted, or in custody for an offence, and the defendant threaten to procure witnesses to prove the charge, this will not be a threat to accuse within the meaning of the statute. R. v. Gill, 1 Archbold's Peel's Acts, 302. But it need not be a threat to accuse before a judicial tribunal; a threat to charge before any third person is sufficient. R. v. Robinson, 2 M. & Rob. 14. And it is immaterial whether the prosecutor be innocent or guilty of the offence imputed to him; R. v. Gardner, 1 C. & P. 479; if the prisoner intended to extort money by the accusation, R. v. Richards, 11 Cox, 43. And therefore, although the prosecutor may be crossexamined as to his guilt of the offence imputed to him, with a view to shake his credit, yet no evidence will be allowed to be given, even in cross-examination, by another witness, to prove that the prosecutor was guilty of such offence. R. v. Cracknell, 10 Cox, 408. If the prisoner makes the accusation believing it to be true and without any purpose at that time to extort money thereby, and afterwards endeavours to compromise it by payment of money, he may be guilty of the offence of compounding a felony, but not of an offence under s. 47. R. v. Richards, 11 Cox, 43, Blackburn, J. The last-named case appears to be hardly reconcilable with the above cited cases of R. v. Gardner and R. v. Cracknell, but the facts in R. v. Richards were exceptional. Proof that the prisoner went to the prosecutor and threatened to accuse his son of an unnatural offence with a mare unless the prosecutor would buy the mare for 37., was held to sustain an indictment under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 47. R. v. Redman, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 12; 35 L. J. (M. C.) 89; 10 Cox, 159.

The intent must be proved as laid; a variance will be fatal, unless amended. Where the intent laid was to extort money, and the intent proved was to extort a bill of exchange, it was (before 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100) held a fatal variance. R. v. Major, 2 East, P. C. 1118; 2 Leach, 772. If the intent do not appear sufficiently from the accusation or threat itself, it must be proved by circumstances from which the jury may fairly

presume it (see ante, p. 303); as by subsequent expressions of the defendant. R. v. Kain, 8 C. & P. 187. Evidence of an exactly similar act committed by the prisoner on a previous occasion has been held admissible as evidence of intent. R. v. Cooper, 3 Cox, 547, Cresswell, J., and see ante, pp. 303, 308-312.

Indictment for inducing another by Threats to execute Documents with Intent to defraud. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 48, ante, p. 522.)

For precedent, see R. v. John, 13 Cox, 100.

Felony penal servitude for life, or not less than three years, or imprisonment with or without hard labour for not more than two years. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 48 (ante, p. 522); 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1 (ante, p. 235). As to requiring the offender to enter into recognizances and find sureties for keeping the peace, see 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 117 (ante, p. 431).

The offence is not triable at quarter sessions. 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, s. 1 (ante, p. 126).

Evidence.

Prove the threats as directed (ante, p. 537), that the document was executed in consequence of the threats, etc., and that it is a valuable security within the section. A document in the following terms:"London, July 19th, 1875.-I hereby agree to pay you 1007. sterling on the 27th inst. to prevent any action against me," has been held to be a valuable security within s. 48. R. v. John, 13 Cox, 100, Brett, J.

Indictment for threatening to publish a Libel, etc., with Intent to extort Money, etc. (6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 3, ante, p. 523.)

Commencement as ante, p. 531]-unlawfully did threaten one J. N. to publish a certain libel of and concerning him the said J. N. [or one E. F. -if any person shall publish, or threaten to publish, any libel upon any other person, or shall directly or indirectly threaten to print or publish or shall directly or indirectly propose to abstain from printing or publishing, or shall directly or indirectly offer to prevent the printing or publishing of any matter or thing touching any other person"] with intent thereby then to extort money from the said J. N. [" with intent to extort any money or security for money, or any valuable thing, from such or any other person, or with intent to induce any person to confer or procure for any person any appointment or office of profit or trust"]; against the form [as ante, p. 465]. If it be doubtful whether the matter threatened to be published be libellous, and a count charging that the defendant "did propose to the said J. N. to abstain from printing and publishing a certain matter and thing touching the said J. N. [or one E. F.], with intent," etc.

Misdemeanor: imprisonment, with or without hard labour, not exceeding three years. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 3 (ante, p. 523). The punishment seems not to be affected by 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1; see ante, pp. 235, 236.

Evidence.

Prove the threat by the defendant to publish libellous or other matter concerning the prosecutor. Or, if the indictment be for proposing to the prosecutor to abstain from publishing matter concerning him, prove the proposal, and the nature of the matter proposed to be suppressed. Prove the intent as directed (ante, pp. 303, 308, 312). The intent to extort money may be implied from the circumstances, and does not require an express

demand of money. R. v. Coghlan, 4 F. & F. 316. But, if it appears that the object is to compel the delivery of accounts of moneys honestly believed to be due and owing, there is no evidence of the intent to extort money. Id. An intent to extort bank-notes may be given in evidence under this indictment. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 18 (ante, p. 54).

PIRACY JURE GENTIUM.

Indictment.

Yorkshire, to wit:-The jurors for our lord the King upon their oath present, that J. S., K. S., and L. T., on the first day of August, in the year of our Lord with force and arms, upon the high seas, to wit, in and on board of a certain ship, called the Windsor Castle, in a certain place upon the high seas, distant about ten leagues from Cutcheen in the East Indies, then being, in and upon certain mariners, to the jurors aforesaid unknown, in the peace of God and of our lord the King, then and there being, piratically and feloniously did make an assault, and then the said mariners in bodily fear and danger of their lives on the high seas aforesaid then and there piratically and feloniously did put, and the said ship called the Windsor Castle, and the apparel and tackle of the said ship, of the value of twelve hundred pounds, and seventy chests of opium, of the value of fourteen hundred pounds, in and on board the said ship then being, of the goods and chattels of certain subjects of our said lord the King, to the jurors aforesaid unknown, and then in the custody and possession of the mariners aforesaid, from the care, custody, and possession, and against the will of the mariners aforesaid, then, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, upon the high seas aforesaid, piratically, feloniously and violently did steal, take and carry away, against the peace of our lord the King, his crown and dignity. [Framed from the indictment in R. v. Kidd, 14 St. Tr. 147; and see R. v. Bonnet, 15 St. Tr. 1231. As to the venue and place of trial, see ante, p. 39.]

Piracy jure gentium is robbery within the Admiralty jurisdiction; Att.Gen. for Hong-Kong v. Kwok a Sing (L. R. 5 P. C. 179, 200; 42 L. J. P. C. 64; 12 Cox, 565: R. v. Dawson, 13 St. Tr. 451; Holt, C.J.). Unlike piracy under municipal law, it is justiciable by the courts of every nation. In England it was justiciable only by the admiral (2 Hale, 370), until by 23 H. 8, c. 15, it was made triable according to the course of the common law, and punishable with death, and with loss of lands and goods, in the same manner as upon an attainder for robbery on land. The Offences at Sea Act, 1799 (39 G. 3, c. 37), ss. 1, 2, made all offences committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty punishable in the same manner as if they had been committed on land. See R. v. Curling, R. & R. 123. The Offences at Sea Act, 1820 (1 G. 4, c. 90), s. 1, extended to such offences the benefit of clergy, as if committed on land; and subjected the offences so made clergyable to the same punishment as if committed on land. And the Criminal Law Act, 1827 (7 & 8 G. 4, c. 28), s. 12, enacts that "all offences prosecuted in the High Court of Admiralty of England should, upon every first and subsequent conviction, be subject to the same punishment, whether of death or otherwise, as if such offences had been committed upon the land." See now 7 W. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 88, s. 3 (post, p. 544). The law as to piracy jure gentium and the mode of trying that offence is not altered by the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 73); see s. 6. But where such offence is also an offence defined by that Act it may be tried under the Act.

The procedure as to arraignment, pleading, etc., on the trial of piracy is the same as in the case of felony. See 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 28, ss. 1, 2, 3 (ante, pp. 179, 183, 200). 12 G. 3, c. 20, as to the consequences of standing mute on arraignment, is virtually repealed as to England.

Evidence.

Prove a robbery, and prove it to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. Attend also to the following particulars of evidence:

Upon the high seas.]-The offence must be proved to have been committed within the jurisdiction of the court of Admiralty, that is, upon some part of the sea which is not infra corpus comitatûs. See 13 R. 2, st. 1, c. 5; 15 R. 2, c. 3. According to Coke, all rivers in this country, until they flow past the furthest point of land next the sea, are within the jurisdiction of the courts of common law, and not of the court of Admiralty (see 3 Co. Inst. 113; Velthasen v. Ormsley, 3 T. R. 315); and the Admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to any haven, creek, arm of the sea, or other place within the body of a county: 3 Co. Inst. 113; 1 Hawk. c. 37, s. 16; thus, where the sea flows in between two points of land in this country, a straight imaginary line being drawn from one point to the other, the courts of common law have jurisdiction of all offences committed within, the court of Admiralty of all offences without it. According to Hale, whose opinion seems to be better, the Admiralty had concurrent jurisdiction in such waters as to murder and maiming, and exclusive jurisdiction as to piracy. R. v. Bonnet, 15 St. Tr. 1231; and see ante, p. 39. And if a robbery be committed in creeks, harbours, ports, etc., in foreign countries, the court of Admiralty indisputably has jurisdiction of it, and such offence is consequently piracy. R. v Jemot, Old Bailey, 28th Feb. 1812, MS. For the court of Admiralty has jurisdiction over British ships in foreign rivers, below the bridges, where the tide ebbs and flows, and where great ships go, although the municipal authorities of the foreign country may be entitled to exercise concurrent jurisdiction. R. v. Anderson, L. R., 1 C. C. R. 161; 38 L. J. (M. C.) 12, ante, pp. 39, 40: R. v. Carr, 10 Q. B. D.76; 52 L. J. (M. C.) 12, ante, p. 40. Indeed, on an indictment for larceny out of a vessel lying in a river at Wampu, in China, the prosecutor gave no evidence as to the tide flowing or otherwise where the vessel lay; but the judges held that the Admiralty had jurisdiction, it being a place where great ships go. R. v. Allen, 1 1 Mood. C. C. 494. As to offences committed on the coast, the Admiralty have exclusive jurisdiction of offences committed beyond the low watermark; and between that and the high water-mark the court of Admiralty has jurisdiction over offences done upon the water when the tide is in; and the courts of common law over offences committed upon the strand when the tide is out. But see Embleton v. Brown, 3 E. & E. 234; 30 L. J. (M. C.) 1, and ante, p. 39 et seq. All the other parts of the high seas are indisputably within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. See ante, p. 39.

In and on board, etc.]-This must be proved as laid. If the name of the ship be unknown, it must be stated so in the indictment. (See ante, p. 56).

In the peace of our lord the King.] -Some evidence must be given of this; for if the persons robbed be subjects of a state at enmity with this