the nature of the connection between them. Hardy's case, 24 How. St. Tr. 753; Watson's case, Gurney's Rep. 159, 32 How. St. Tr. 100.

The protection extends to all eommunications made to officers of justice, or to persons who form links in the chain by which the information is conveyed to officers of justice. A witness, who had given information, admitted on a trial for high treason, that he had communicated what he knew to a friend, who had advised him to make a disclosure to another person. He was asked whether that friend was a magistrate, and on his answering in the negative, he was asked who was the friend? It was objected, that the person by whose advice the information was given to one standing in the situation of magistrate, was in fact the informer, and that his name could not be disclosed. The judges differed. Eyre, C. J., Hotham, B. and Grose, J., thought the question objectionable; Macdonald, C. B., and Buller, J., were of opinion it should be admitted. Eyre, C. J. said, "Those questions which tend to the discovery of the channels by *which [ *194 ] the disclosure was made to the officers of justice, are not permitted to be asked. Such matters cannot be disclosed, upon the general principle of the convenience of public justice. It is no more competent to ask who the person was that advised the witness to make a disclosure, than it is to ask to whom he made the disclosure in consequence of that advice; or than it is to ask any other question respecting the channel of information, or what was done under it." Hotham, B., said, that the disclosure was made under a persuasion, that through the friend it would be conveyed to a magistrate, and that there was no distinction between a disclosure to the magistrate himself, and to a friend to communicate it to him. Macdonald, C. B., said, that if he were satisfied that the friend was a link in the chain of communication, he should agree that the rule applied, but that not being connected either with the magistracy or the executive government, the case did not appear to him to fall within the rule; and the opinion of Buller, J. was founded on the same reason. Hardy's case, 24 How. St. Tr. 811.

What matters are privileged-official communications.] Upon the same principle it has been held, that communications between the governor and law officers of a colony, Wyatt v. Gore, Holt, N. P. C. 299, between the governor of a colony and one of the secretaries of state, Anderson v. Hamilton, 2 Br. & Bingh. 156, between a governor of a colony and a military officer, Cooke v. Maxwell, 2 Stark, 183, are privileged. In the latter case the communication was in writing, and Bayley, J., said, "if the document cannot on principles of public policy be read in evidence, the effect will be the same as if it was not in existence, and you may prove, not the contents of the instrument, but that what was done by the orders of the defendant."

But where the information has been given, not to the government, or to any person connected with the administration of justice, nor to any other, for the purpose of being conveyed to such person, a disclosure of the circumstances attending it may be required. See the opinion of Macdonald, C. B., and Buller, J., Hardy's

case, supra.

So communications, though made to official persons, are not privileged so as to justify the exclusion of the evidence, where they are not made in the discharge of any public duty; as, for instance, a letter from a private individual to the secretary of the postmaster general, complaining of the conduct of the guard of a mail. Blake v. Pilfold, 1 Moo. & R. 198.

Eng. Com. Law Reps. iii. 111.

▾ Id. vi. 49, n.

• Id. iii. 306.

What matters are privileged-matters of state.] Matters communicated confidentially, in furtherance of the administration of justice, are, as it has been stated, privileged from disclosure, and upon the same ground, matters of state, as official communications between different members or officers of government, receive a like protection. (1) Some cases of this kind have been already mentioned; ante, p. 193. So, where on a trial for high treason, Lord Grenville was called upon to produce a letter, intercepted at the post-office, and which was supposed to have come to his hands, it was ruled that he could not be required to produce it, for that secrets of state were not to be taken out of the hands of his majesty's confidential subjects. Case cited by Lord Ellenborough, Anderson v. Hamilton, 2 Br. [*195] & Bingh. 157,(n)* *What passes in parliament is in the same manner privileged. Thus on a trial for libel upon Mr. Plunkett, a member of the Irish parliament, the speaker of the Irish house of commons being called and asked, whether he had heard Mr. Plunkett deliver his sentiments in parliament on matters of a public nature; Lord Ellenborough said that the speaker was warranted in refusing to disclose what had taken place in a debate in the house o commons. He might disclose what passed there, and, if he thought fit to do so, he should receive it as evidence. As to the fact of Mr. Plunkett having spoken in parliament, or taken any part in the debate he was bound to answer. That was a fact containing no improper disclosure of any matter. Plunkett v. Cobbett, 5 Esp. 136; 29 How. St. Tr. 71, 72, S. C. On the same ground, viz. that the interests of the state are concerned, an officer of the Tower of London was not allowed to prove that a plan of the tower, produced on behalf of the prisoner was accurate. Watson's case, 2 Stark, N. P. C. 148. (2)

The two following cases, however, are at variance with the rule above stated. Upon the trial of Lord Strafford, the confidential advice given by that nobleman to the king, at the council table, was allowed to be disclosed, and given in evidence against him. Strafford's case, 1 St. Tr. 723, fo. ed. And in the case of the seven bishops, 4 St. Tr. 346, fo. ed., the clerk of the privy council was compelled to state what passed at the council-board, and even what the king himself said, although the counsel for the crown objected to it. However, in Sayer's case, 6 St. Tr. 288, fo. ed., it seems to have been considered, that minutes taken before the privy council were not to be divulged, and it cannot be doubted that at the present day the practice adopted in the case of Lord Strafford and of the Seven Bishops would be overruled, as contrary to the principles of the law of evidence, and injurious to the public interests.

What matters are privileged-where oath of office has been taken not to divulge.] Where, for revenue or other purposes, an oath of office has been taken not to divulge matters which have come to the knowledge of a party in his official capa

(1) The officer who apprehended the prisoner is not bound to disclose the name of the person from whom he received the information which led to the prisoner's apprehension. The U. States v. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. Rep. 126. But a police officer will be compelled to answer at the instance of the Commonwealth. Mina's case, Pamph. p. 9.

In the trial of an indictment for larceny, a witness from whom the party is charged to have been stolen, is not bound to disclose the names of persons in his employment, who gave the information which induced him to take measures for the detection of the person indicted. State v. Saper, 16 Maine, 293.

(2) The Secretary of State is not bound to disclose any official confidential communications. But the fact whether a commission has been in his office or not, he is bound to disclose. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 142. See 1 Burr's Trial, 180. Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & Rawle, 23.

city, he will not be allowed, where the interests of justice are concerned, to withhold his testimony. Thus, where the clerk to the commissioners of the property tax being called to produce the books containing the appointment of a party as collector, objected on the ground that he had been sworn not to disclose any thing he should learn in his capacity of clerk, Lord Ellenborough clearly thought that the oath contained an implied exception of the evidence to be given in a court of justice, in obedience to a writ of subpoena. He added that the witness must produce the books, and answer all questions respecting the collection of the tax, as if no such oath had been administered to him. Lee q. t. v. Birrell, 3 Campb. 337.

*DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

[ *196 ]

The 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, facilitating the admission of certain official and other documents 196 Proof of acts of parliament

197

Verdicts.

Records.

Office copies and copies by authorized officers, &c.

Inquisitions

Affidavits made in causes

Proceedings in equity

201

The 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113.] By this statute (E. & I.) for facilitating the admission, in evidence of certain official and other documents, it is enacted (s. 1,) "that whenever by any act now in force, or hereafter to be in force, any certificate, official or public document, or document or proceeding of any joint stock, or other company, or any certificated copy of any document, bye-law, entry in any register or other book, or of any other proceeding, shall be receivable in evidence of any particular in any court of justice, or before any legal tribunal, or either house of parliament, or any committee of either house, or in any judicial proceeding, the same shall respectively be admitted in evidence, provided they respectively purport to be sealed or impressed with a stamp, or sealed and signed, or signed alone, as required, or impressed with a stamp and signed, as directed by the respective acts made or to be hereafter made, without any proof of the seal or stamp, where a seal or stamp is necessary, or of the signature, or of the official character of the person

appearing to have signed the same, and without any further proof thereof in [*197] *every case in which the original record could have been received in evidence."

By s. 2, "All courts, judges, justices, masters in chancery, masters of courts, commissioners judicially acting, and other judicial officers, shall henceforth take judicial notice of the signature of any of the equity or common law judges of the superior courts at Westminster, provided such signature be attached or appended to any decree, order, certificate, or other judicial or official document."

By s. 3, "All copies of private and local, and personal acts of parliament, not public acts, if purporting to be printed by the Queen's printers, and all copies of the journals of either house of parliament, and of royal proclamations, purporting to be printed by the printers to the crown, or by the printers to either house of parliament, or by any or either of them, shall be admitted as evidence thereof by all courts, judges, justices, and others, without any proof being given that such copies were so printed."

Sec. 4, after enacting (see post, Forgery) that persons who forge such seals, stamps, or signatures as above-mentioned, or who print any private acts or journals of parliament with false purport, are guilty of felony, further provides, "that whenever such document as before mentioned shall have been received in evidence by virtue of this act, the court, judge, commissioner, or other person officiating judicially who shall have admitted the same, shall, on the request of any party against whom the same is so received, be authorized at its, or at his own discretion, to direct that the same shall be impounded, and be kept in the custody of some officer of the court, or other proper person, until further order touching the same shall be given, either by such court, or the court to which such master or other officer belonged, or by the person or persons who constituted such court, or by some one of the equity or common law judges of the superior courts at Westminster, on application being made for that purpose."

Proof of acts of Parliament, &c.] The courts will take notice of public acts of parliament without their being specially proved, but previously to the above statute, private acts of parliament must have been proved by a copy examined with the parliament roll, B. N. P. 225, unless the mode of proof were provided for by the act. (1) Where there was a clause in the act, declaring that it should be taken to be a public act, and should be taken notice of as such by all judges, &c., without being specially pleaded, it was not necessary to prove a copy examined with the roll, or a copy printed by the king's printer, but it stood upon the same footing as a public act. Beaumont v. Mountain, 10 Bingh. 404; Woodward v. Cotton, 4 Tyr. 689; 1 C. M. & R. 44; see also Forman v. Dawes, Carr. & M. 127. If for other purposes, however, as with regard to the recital of facts contained in it, such a clause did not give the statute the effect of a public act. Brett v. Beales, Moo. & M. 421.

A private act may contain clauses of a public nature, and then the act, as far as

(1) 1 Stark. on Ev. 196, n. 2. Ibid. n. 1. New ed.

The public seal of a state, affixed to the exemplification of a law, proves itself. Robinson et al. v. Gilman, 20 Maine, 299.

A copy of the laws published annually by the authority of the legislature, is evidence of the statutes contained in it, whether they be public or private. Gray v. The Monongahela Nav. Co. 2 Watts & Serg. 156.

The written laws of the other States of the Union cannot be proved here by parol evidence. But the printed statute books purporting to be published by authority are primâ facie evidence here of the statutes they contain. Comparit v. Jernigan et al. 5 Blackf. 375.

a

Eng. Com. Law Reps. xxv. 183.

b Id. xli. 75.

• Id. xxii. 344.

these clauses are concerned, is to be regarded as a public act. Thus a clause relating to a public highway, occuring in a private inclosure act, was held by Holroyd, J., to be provable in the same way as a public act. Utterby's case, 2 Phill. Ev. 610, 9th ed.

*By the 41 Geo. 3, c. 90, s. 9, the statutes of England and (since the [*198] union with Scotland) of Great Britain, printed by the king's printer, shall be received as conclusive evidence of the statutes enacted prior to the union of Great Britain and Ireland, in any court of civil or criminal jurisdiction in Ireland; and in like manner the copy of the statutes of the kingdom of Ireland, made in the parliament of the same, printed by the king's printer, shall be received as conclusive evidence of the statutes enacted by the parliament of Ireland, prior to the union of Great Britain and Ireland, in any court of civil or criminal jurisdiction in Great Britain.

Formerly the journals of the lords and commons must have been proved by examined copies.(1) Lord Melville's case, 24 How. St. Tr. 683; Lord G. Gordon's case, 2 Dougl. 593; but now see the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, ante, p. 197.

Proof of records.] Where there is a plea of nul tiel record, the record is proved by its production, if it be a record of the same court, Tidd. Pr. 801; if of an inferior court by the tenor of the record, certified under a writ of certiorari, issued by the superior court; if of a concurrent superior court, by the tenor certified under a writ of certiorari issued out of chancery, and transmitted thence by mittimus. Id.

Where nul tiel record is not pleaded, a judgment is proved either by an exemplification under the seal of the court, or by an examined copy. Such exemplifications under the seal of a public court in this country, are evidence without proof of the genuineness of the seal. Tooker v. Duke of Beaufort, Sayer, 297. But the seal of a foreign court must be proved to be genuine. Henry v. Adey, 3 East, 221.

A record is not complete until delivered into court in parchment. Thus the minutes made by the clerk of the peace at sessions, in his minute book, are neither a record nor in the nature of a record so as to be admissible in evidence as proof of the names of the justices in attendance. Bellamy's case, Ry. & Moo. 172. And where, to prove an indictment for felony found by the grand jury, the indictment itself, (which was in another court) indorsed "a true bill," was produced by the clerk of the peace, together with the minute book of the proceedings of the sessions, at which the indictment was found, the court of King's Bench held that in order to prove the indictment, it was necessary to have the record regularly drawn up, and that it should be proved by an examined copy. Smith's case, 8 B & C. 341.* Cooke v. Maxwell, 2 Stark. 183. So an allegation that the grand jury at sessions found a true bill, is not proved by the production of the bill itself with an indorsement upon it, but a record regularly made up must be produced. Porter v. Cooper, 6 C. & P. 354; 4 Tyr. 456; 1 C. M. & R. 388, S. C. So it has been ruled, on an indictment for perjury, that in order to prove that an appeal came on to be heard at sessions, it must be shown that a record was regularly made up on parchment. Ward's case, 6 C. & P. 366; and see Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Pembridge, Carr. & M. 157. A plea of autrefois convict, in like manner, must be proved by the record regularly made up; and the indictment with the finding of the jury indorsed upon it by the proper officer is not sufficient. Bowman's case, 6 C. & P. 101. But in Tooke's case, 25 How. St. Tr. 446, the minutes of the court were received to prove the acquittal of Hardy. This case is distinguished by *Lord [ *199 ]

Eng. C. L. Reps. xxi. 40.

(1) 1 Stark. on Ev. new ed. n. 1.

• Id. xv. 232. Id. iii. 305. Id. xxv. 435. h Id. xxv. 800.