on the previous northern circuit, (Reg. v. Bell; Reg. v. Ash,) that the words of the statute being "by secret burying or otherwise disposing of the dead body of such child," the deposit of the body in such a place as that in question, or in a box not intended to be the ultimate place of deposit, does not bring the case within the statute. The case was considered at a meeting of the judges in Michaelmas term, 1841, at which all the judges, except Alderson, B., Patteson, Erskine, and Bosanquett, JJ., were present, when Lord Abinger, C. B., Maule, J., and Rolfe, B., thought the conviction bad; the other judges held it good, and the conviction was affirmed. Reg. v. Goldthorpe, 2 Moo. C. C. 244; S. C. Carr & M. 335. Where a prisoner was stopped going across a yard, in the direction of a privy, with a bundle, which on examination, was found to be a cloth sewed up, containing the body of a child; it was held by Gurney, B., that the prisoner could not be convicted, the offence not having been completed. Sneil's case, 2 Moo. & R. 44. Evidence was given that the prisoner denied her pregnancy, and also, after the birth of the child, denied that also, but she afterwards confessed to a surgeon that she had borne a child. The body of the child was, on the same day, found among the soil in the privy. Patteson, J., held it to be essential to the commission of the offence, that the prisoner should have done some act of disposal of the body, after the child was dead; therefore, if she had gone to the privy for another purpose, and the child came from her unawares, and fell into the soil and was suffocated, she must be acquitted of the charge, notwithstanding her denial of the birth of the child. The prisoner was acquitted. Turner's case, 8 C. & P. 755. See also R. v. Coxhead, 1 C. & K. 623.° Where the dead body of a new born child was found amongst the feathers of a bed, and there was no evidence showing by whom it was put there, and it appeared that the mother had sent for a surgeon, and prepared clothes, the judge on an indictment against the mother for endeavouring to conceal the birth, directed an acquittal. Higley's case, 4 C. & P. 366.d Douglas's case, post, shows that a woman may be convicted, under the statute, where the body of the child is buried or disposed of by an accomplice, who acts as her agent in the matter. It seems also, from the same case, that although by the 14th section, the woman only can be indicted for concealing the birth, an accomplice who has counselled or abetted the offence, is indictable under the 31st sec. of the same statute, which enacts, that "every person who shall conceal, aid, or abet the commission of any misdemeanor, punishable under this act shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished as a principal offender." An indictment merely charging the offence to be "by secretly *dis- [*386 ] posing of the dead body," without showing the mode in which it was disposed of, is bad. Per Maule, J., Hounsell's case, 2 Moo. & R. 292. But where an indictment stated that the defendant cast and threw the dead body of the child into the soil of a certain privy, "and did thereby then and there unlawfully dispose of the dead body of the said child, and endeavour to conceal the birth thereof," it was held sufficient, the word "thereby" applying as well to the endeavour to conceal as to the disposing of the body. R. V. Coxhead, 1 C. & K. 623.° Concealment of the birth.] In defence, the prisoner may prove any circumstances Eng. Com. Law Reps. vol. xli. 186. d Id. xix. 421. b Id. xxxiv. 622. • Id. xlvii. 623. • Id. xlvii. 623. negativing the endeavour to conceal, as that she called for help or confessed herself with child; and upon the same principle evidence was allowed (under the repealed statute 21 Jac. 1, c. 27,) of the mother's having made provision for the birth, as a circumstance to show that she did not intend to conceal it. 1 East, P. C. 228. A disclosure to an accessary was held to take the case out of the statute 21 Jac. 1. Jane Peat was indicted for the murder of her bastard child, and Margaret Peat, her mother, for being present, aiding and abetting. It appeared that Jane Peat was heard by persons in an adjoining room to call her mother. Heath, J., ruled that if any person was present, though privy to the guilt, the case was not within the statute. Peat's case, 1 East, P. C. 229. The prisoner was indicted for the murder of her bastard child, and it was proved that she had thrown the child down the privy. The learned judge told the jury, that the act of throwing the child down the privy was evidence of an endeavour to conceal the birth, within the 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, s. 3, (now repealed,) and the prisoner being convicted of the endeavour to conceal, the judges held that the conviction was right. Cornwall's case, Russ. & Ry. 336.1 Frances Douglas and one Robert Hall, were indicted for the murder of a female child, of which they were acquitted; whereupon the jury were desired to inquire, whether the female was guilty of endeavouring to conceal the birth. The prisoners had been living together for some time, and in the night, or rather about four in the morning, she was delivered of the child, in the presence of the male prisoner, who was the father of it, and who, with his two sons, aged fourteen and ten, all slept on the same pallet with her, up four pair of stairs. The male prisoner very soon afterwards put the child (which had not been separated from the after birth,) into a pan, carried it down stairs into the cellar, and threw the whole into the privy, the female prisoner remaining in bed up stairs. She was proved to have said she knew it was to be done. The fact of her being with child was, some time before her delivery, known by her mother, who lived at some distance, and was apparent to other women. No female was present at the delivery; one had been sent for at the commencement of the labour, about twelve at night, but was so ill she could not attend. There were no clothes prepared, or other provision made, but the parties were in a state of the most abject poverty and destitution. For the female prisoner it was contended, on the authority of Peat's case, and Higley's case, supra, that she could not, under these circumstances, be convicted of concealment; but it being doubted whether these cases would be now considered law, it [*387] was agreed that the opinion of the *jury should be taken upon the fact, and if it should be adverse to the prisoner, that the sentence should be respited, and the point reserved. The jury found her guilty of endeavouring to conceal the birth. The questions for the opinion of the judges were, 1st, Whether there was evidence to convict the prisoner as a principal? 2dly, Whether, in point of law, the conviction was good? The case was argued before all the judges (except Park, J.,) who were of opinion, that the communication made to other persons was only evidence, but no bar, and that the conviction was good; but they recommended a pardon. Douglas's case, 1 Moo. C. C. 480; 7 C. & P. 644; S. C. An indictment for endeavouring to conceal the birth of a child must show that the child was dead, but whether it died before or after the birth need not be proved. Perkin's case, 1 Levin, C. C. 44. So it was said by Bayley, J., that he should rule that the statute 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, extended to all cases, whether it was proved that Eng. Com. Law Reps. xxxii. 670. 1 Eng. C. C. 336. 2 Id. 480. the child was still born, or left the matter in doubt. Southern's case, 1 Burn, 335, 24th ed. Now by the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, it is expressly provided, that it shall not be necessary to prove whether the child died before or after its birth, see ante, p. 384. Nor need the indictment state whether the child died before, at, or after, the birth. Reg. v. Coxhead, 1 C. & K. 623.1 Upon an indictment for the murder of a child, the prisoner, on failure of the proof as to the murder, may be convicted by the statute of endeavouring to conceal the birth. But no person but the mother can be so convicted. Reg. v. Wright, 9 C. & P. 754. And where an indictment for child murder was held bad for not stating the name of the child, or accounting for the omission, the counsel for the prosecution contended that the indictment might be good for the concealment, and the trial ought to go on, as the cases of conviction for concealment generally proceeded on the supposition that the child was born dead, in which case there could be no name. Coleridge, J., after consulting Maule, J., held that the indictment, being bad for its professed purpose, was bad altogether, and that there could be no valid conviction on it for concealment. Reg. v. Hicks, 2 Moo. & R. 502. Where the bill for murder was not found by the grand jury, and the prisoner was tried for murder on the coroner's inquisition, it was held that she might be found guilty of the concealment, the words of the stat. 43 Geo. 3, being, that "it shall be lawful for the jury, by whose verdict any person charged with such murder shall be acquitted, to find," and the judges holding that the coroner's inquisition was a charge, so as to justify the finding of the concealment. Maynard's case, Russ. & R. 240; Cole's case, 2 Leach, 1095; 3 Campb. 371. It may be observed, that the word charge does not occur in the statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 31; yet there seems no doubt that the prisoner might be so convicted under the new statute, for she is "tried for the murder of her child," as much on the inquisition as the indictment. 1 Russ. by Grea. 514. (n.) As to costs, see ante, p. 121. i Eng. Com. Law Reps. xlvii. 623. J Id. xxxviii. 322. * 1 Eng. C. C. 240. Proof of colouring counterfeit coin or metal-and filing, and altering legal coin 390 391 Proof of uttering counterfeit gold or silver coin 391 Proof of the simple uttering 392 Proof of the compound offence of uttering, having other counterfeit coin in 393 Proof of previous conviction 394 Proof of buying or selling counterfeit coin for less value than its denomination-importing counterfeit coin 395 Proof of having counterfeit coin in possession 396 Proof of having in possession five or more pieces of foreign counterfeit coin 399 Proof of offences with regard to coining tools 400 Conveying coining tools, &c. out of the mint 402 The laws against coining, so far as they relate to the current coin of the realm, were consolidated by the 2 Wm. 4, c. 34, (U. K.) by which the former statutes were repealed. Proof of counterfeiting the gold and silver coin.] By the 2 Wm. 4, c. 34, s. 3, "if any person shall falsely make or counterfeit any coin, resembling or apparently intended to resemble or pass for any of the king's current gold or silver coin, every such offender shall, in England and Ireland, be guilty of felony, and in Scotland, of a high crime and offence, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be transported beyond the seas for life, or for any term not less than seven years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding four years; and every such offence shall be deemed to be complete, although the coin so made or counterfeited shall not be in a fit state to be uttered, or the counterfeiting thereof shall not be finished or perfected." [*389] *By s. 19, "where any person shall be convicted of any offence under this act, for which imprisonment may be awarded, it shall be lawful for the court to sentence the offender to be imprisoned, with or without hard labour in the common gaol or house of correction, and also to direct that the offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for the whole, or any portion or portions of such imprisonment, as to the court, in its discretion shall seem meet." Now, by the 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 90, s. 5, it is enacted, that "it shall not be lawful for any court to direct that any offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for any longer period than one month at a time, or than three months in the space of a year.” In order to establish the charge of counterfeiting, the prosecutor must move; 1st, the act of counterfeiting; and 2d, that the coin counterfeited resembled, or was apparently intended to resemble or pass for the king's current gold or silver coin. Counterfeiting the gold or silver coin-proof of the counterfeiting. In order to prove that the prisoner was guilty of counterfeiting, it is not necessary to show that he was detected in the act, but presumptive evidence, as in other cases, will * be sufficient, viz. that false coin was found in his possession, and that there were coining tools discovered in his house, &c. But the evidence must be such as to lead to a plain implication of guilt. Two women were indicted for colouring a shilling and a six-pence, and the third prisoner, a man, for counselling them, &c. It appeared that he had visited them once or twice a week; that the rattling of copper money had been heard whilst he was with them, that on one occasion he was seen counting something after he came out; that he resisted being stopped, and jumped over a wall to escape; and that there was found upon him a bad three shilling piece, five bad shillings, and five bad sixpences. Upon a case reserved, the judge thought this evidence too slight to support a conviction. Isaac's case, 1 Russ. by Grea. 61. Counterfeiting the gold or silver coin-proof that the coin is counterfeited.] It must be proved both that the coin in question is counterfeit, and that it resembles, or is apparently intended to resemble the king's current gold or silver coin. The fact that the coin counterfeited or resembled, is the king's current gold or silver, may be proved by evidence of common usage or reputation. 1 Hale, P. C. 213. The proof that the coin in question is in fact false, is provided for by the 17th sect. of the 2 Wm. 4, c. 34, which enacts, "that where, upon the trial of any person charged with any offence against the act, it shall be necessary to prove that any coin produced in evidence against such person is false or counterfeit, it shall not be necessary to prove the same to be false and counterfeit by the evidence of any moneyer, or other officer of his majesty's mint, but it shall be sufficient to prove the same to be false or counterfeit by the evidence of any other credible witness." In proving the coin to be counterfeit, two questions may arise; first, whether it is in such a state of completion as to be properly described as false or counterfeit coin; and secondly, whether it does resemble or is apparently intended to resemble or pass for the king's current gold or silver coin. With regard to the first question, it is enacted by the 2 Wm. 4, c. 34, s. 3, that 'the offence of counterfeiting shall be deemed to be *complete, although [*390 ] the coin so made or counterfeited shall not be in a fit state to be uttered, or the counterfeiting thereof shall not be finished or perfected. Notwithstanding this provision, it is apprehended, there must still be a substantial making or counterfeiting proved, and that it will not be sufficient merely to show that steps have been taken towards a counterfeiting. The clause appears to have been intended to provide against such cases as that of Harris, where the metal requiring a process of beating, filing, and immersing in aqua fortis, to render the coin passable, the judges held that the prisoner could not be convicted of counterfeiting. Harris's case, 1 Leach, 135. See also Varley's case, 1 Leach, 76; 2 Wm. Black. 682; 1 East, P. C. 164. The question whether the coin alluded to be counterfeit, does, in fact, resemble or is apparently intended to resemble or pass for the king's current gold or silver coin, is one of fact for the jury; in deciding which they must be governed by the |