prove that such lessee was possessed, although the indictment allege that the premises were his freehold. Lloyd's case, Cald. 415. Proof that the party holds colourably, as a freeholder or leaseholder, will suffice, for the court will not, on the trial, enter into the validity of an adverse claim, which the party ought to assert by action and not by force. Per Vaughan, B., Williams' case, Talf. Dick. Sess. 239.

Proof that the offence was committed by the defendant.] This offence may be committed by one person as well as by several. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 64, s. 29. All who accompany a man when he makes a forcible entry, will be adjudged to enter with him, whether they actually come upon the land or not. Id. s. 22. So also will those who, having an estate in land by a defensible title, continue by force in possession, after a claim made by one who has a right of entry. Id. s. 23. But where several come in company with one who has a right to enter, and one of the company makes a forcible entry, that is not a forcible entry in the others. 3 Bac. Ab. Forcible Entry, (B.). And a person who barely agrees to a forcible entry made to his use, without his knowledge or privity, is not within the statutes, because he no way concurred in, or promoted the force. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 64, s. 24.

An infant or feme covert may be guilty of a forcible entry, for actual violence done by such party in person; but not for violence done by others at their command, for such command is void. A feme covert, it is said, may be imprisoned for such offence, though not an infant, because he shall not be subject to corporal punishment, by force of the general words of any statute in which she is not expressly named. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 64, s. 35. A feme covert may be guilty of a forcible entry, by entering with violence into her husband's house. Eliza Smyth's case, 5 C. & P. 201.

Award of restitution.] The court in which the indictment is found, or the court of King's Bench upon the removal thither of the indictment by certiorari, has power on the conviction of the defendant to award restitution to the party upon whose possession the entry has been made. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 64, s. 49, 50, 51. Though by the provisoes in the statutes of Hen. 6, and James 1, the defendants may set up a possession for three years to stay the award of restitution. Id. s. 53. A supersedeas of the award of restitution may be granted by the same court that made the award. Id. s. 61. And a re-restitution may be awarded by the King's Bench, Id. s. 66. See Wilson's case, ante, p. 483.

*Before a conviction it is in the discretion of the judge of assize to [*485] award a restitution or not, although a true bill has been found by the grand jury for a forcible entry. Harland's case, 2 Lew. C. C. 170; 8 Ad. & E. 826 ;o 1 P. & D. 93; 2 M. & R. 141.

Witnesses.] The tenant of the premises was not formerly a competent witness. Williams' case, 9 B. & C. 549 ;h Beavan's case, Ry. & Moo. 242; but now see ante, p. 134.

'Eng. Com. Law Reps. xxiv. 279.

Id. xxxv. 536.

h Id. xvii. 440.

1 Id. xxii. 428.

The offence of forestalling, with which may likewise be considered those of engrossing and regrating, was defined to be every practice or device, by act, conspiracy, words, or news, to enhance the price of victuals, or other merchandize. 3 Inst. 196; 3 Bac. Ab. 261; 1 Russ. by Grea. 168. All endeavours whatever to enhance the common price of any merchandize, and all kinds of practice which had an apparent tendency thereto, whether by spreading false rumours, or by buying things in a market before the accustomed hour, were offences at common law, and came under the general notion of forestalling, which includes all kinds of offences of this nature. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 80, s. 1. These offences were prohibited by several old statutes, but those acts were repealed by the 12 Geo. 3, c. 71; leaving the offences as they stood at common law, and punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both.

In modern times prosecutions have seldom been instituted for any of these offences; but in one case, an information for enhancing the price of hops was sustained. R. v. Waddington, 1 East, 143.

Now by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 24, s. 1, it is enacted, "that after the passing of this act the several offences of badgering, engrossing, FORESTALLING, and regrating be utterly taken away and abolished, and that no information, indictment, suit, or prosecution shall lie either at common law, or by virtue of any statute, or be commenced or prosecuted against any person for or by reason of any of the said offences or supposed offences."

Fictitious name

In the name of the party-assuming the name of a person in existence

Party forging having the same name

Assumed and borne by the party forging

Proof of the false making-with regard to the apparent validity of the matter forged
Substantial resemblance to true instrument

489

490

493

493

497

498

Forgery of instruments not made, or purporting to be not made in England Interpetation clause

Forging bills of exchange, promissory notes, and undertakings, warrants or
orders for payment of money, &c.

Forging warrants, orders, or requests for the delivery of goods, &c.

Proof of forging transfers of stock, and power of attorney to transfer stock

535

Proof of personating owner, and endeavoring to transfer stock

536

Proof of forging attestation to power of attorney, or transfer of stock

537

Proof of clerks in the bank making out false dividend warrants
Proof of forging exchequer bills, East India bonds, &c.

537

538

Forgery and similar offences with regard to bank notes

Proof of uttering and forging bank notes

Proof of purchasing, receiving, &c., forged bank notes

Proof of making or having moulds, &c.

Proviso as to papers used for bills of exchange, &c.
Proof of engraving any bank note, &c.

Forgery of seals, stamps or signatures, and false printing of private acts or journals of

543

544

546

549

*Under the present head will first be stated, the law of forgery, as it [ *488] regards all forged instruments, with the general proofs necessary to establish the act of forging, uttering, &c. The evidence required to prove the forgery of particular documents, both private and public, will then be given.

Forgery at common law.] At common law the offence of forgery was punishable as a misdemeanor. It is defined by Sir W. Blackstone as "the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right;" 4 Com. 247; and by Mr. East, as "a false making, a making malo animo, of any written instrument for the purpose of fraud and deceit." 2 East, P. C. 852.(1)

With regard to the nature of the instruments or writings, the forgery of which is punishable at common law, it has been held that the falsification of records and other matters of a public nature is a misdemeanor, as a privy seal; 1 Roll. Ab. 68; a license from the barons of exchequer to compound debts; Id. 65; Gregory v. Wilks, 2 Bulst. 137; a parish register; Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 70; or a certificate of holy orders, or a matter of record. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 70, s. 9, 10. So a forged letter in the name of a magistrate, to the governor of a gaol, directing the discharge of a prisoner, has been held to be a forgery. Harris's case, 6 C. & P. 129;a 1 Moody, C. C. 393; S. C. And see Fawcett's case, 2 East, P. C. 862, post, p. 489.

So with regard to private writings, it is an offence at common law to forge a deed or will. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 70, s. 10. And though doubts were formerly entertained on the subject, it is now clear that forging any private document, with a fraudulent intent, and whereby another person may be prejudiced, is within [*489] the rule. (2) Thus, after *much debate, it was held that the forging an order for the delivery of goods was a misdemeanor at common law. Ward's case, Str. 747; 2 Ld. Raym. 1461. And the same was held by a majority of the judges, with regard to a document purporting to be a discharge from a creditor to a gaoler, directing him to discharge a prisoner in his custody. Fawcett's case, 2 East, P. C. 862. Ward's case is considered by Mr. East to have settled the rule, that the counterfeiting of any writing, with a fraudulent intent, whereby another may be prejudiced, is forgery at common law. 2 East, P. C. 861.

Upon an indictment for forgery at common law, it must appear in the indictment what the instrument is, in respect of which the prisoner is charged. The prisoner was indicted for forging a certain paper instrument in the words and figures following:

"Fol. 44, 4, Sarum public weighing engine, July 27, 1802, One load of coals from Mr. Wilcox to Mr. Webb.

With intent to defraud John Webb. It appeared that the prisoner had altered. this instrument, so as to render the prosecutor liable to pay more than it originally expressed. The prisoner being convicted, the judges, on a case reserved, were of opinion that the indictment was bad, as it did not state what the instrument was, in respect of which the forgery was alleged to have been committed, nor

(1) Forgery is the alteration of a deed or writing in a material part to the prejudice of another, as well as when the whole deed or writing is forged. 5 Strobhart, 58. (2) Ames's case, 2 Greenl. 365. Penna. v. M'Kee, Addison, 33.

a Eng. Com. Law Reps. xxxv. 315.

2 Eng. C. C. 393.

how the party signing it had authority to sign it. R. v. Wilcox, Russ. & Ry. 50.

It is not necessary to the sustaining an indictment for forgery at common law, that any prejudice should in fact have happened by reason of the fraud. (2) Ward's case, Str. 747; 2 Ld. Raym. 1461. Nor is it necessary that there should be any publication of the forged instrument. 2 East, P. C. 855. 951; 1 Russ. by Grea. 318.

It is not forgery fraudulently to procure a party's signature to a document, the contents of which have been altered without his knowledge; R. v. Chadwicke, 2 Moo. & R. 545; or fraudulently to induce a person to execute an instrument on a misrepresentation of its contents. Per Rolfe, B., R. v. Collins; MS., 2 Moo. & R. 461.

Proof of the false making—in the name of the party—assuming the name of a person in existence. The most usual kind of forgery is, where the party assumes the name and character of a person in existence, and by means of the credit attached thereto, carries his fraud into effect; as in the following case. The prisoner, whose name was Hadfield, appeared in the neighbourhood of the lakes of Cumberland, calling himself the Hon. Alexander Augustus Hope, brother of the earl of Hopetown, and in that name imposed upon several persons in the neighbourhood. During his residence near the lakes, he drew a bill upon a gentleman in the neighbourhood, which would have been paid, had not the prisoner been detected. For this forgery, he was *indicted, convicted, and executed. Hadfield's case, [*490 } 6 Ev. Stat. 580; 2 Russ. by Grea. 331.

The adoption of a false description and addition, where a false name is not assumed, and there is no person answering the description, has been held not to be forgery. Webb's case, Russ. & Ry. 405.

Of the false making—in the name of the party-party forging having the same name.] A man may be guilty of forgery by the fraudulent making of an instrument, though in his own name; as if he makes a feoffment of lands to J. S., and afterwards a deed of feoffment of the same lands to J. D., of a date prior to that of the feoffment to J. S. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 70, s. 2. And the offence, it is said, would have been the same, if he had passed only an equitable interest for a good consideration, and had afterwards by such a subsequently antedated conveyance endeavoured to avoid it. Id. So if a bill of exchange, payable to A. B. or order, come to the hands of a person named A. B. (not the payee) who fraudulently indorses it for the purpose of obtaining the money, this is a forgery.(1) Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28; see also Parke's case, 1 Cox, C. C. 4. The prisoner, whose name was Thomas Brown, was charged together with Matthias Parkes, with forging a promissory note, purporting to be made by Thomas Brown. It appeared that the prisoner Brown had passed the note in question to a tradesman, representing it to him as the note of his brother. The note was dated at Roughton, Salop, and was made payable at Thornton and Co., bankers, London. It was proved that there was no person of that name and description residing at Roughton, and that no such person kept an account at Thornton and Co.'s It was objected for the prisoner Brown, that the note being made in his own name, could not be a forgery;

(2) Arnold v. Cost, 8 Gill & Johns. 220.
(1) The People v. Peacock, 6 Cowen, 72.
1 Eng. C. C. 405.