demolition under the statute, although he is not proved to have been [*888 1 present when the house was originally set on fire. R. v. Simpson and others, Carr. & M. 669."

Where an election mob pursued a person who took refuge in a house, upon which they attacked the house, shouting, "pull it down," and broke the door and windows, and destroyed much of the furniture, but being unable to find the person they were in search of, went away; Tindal, C. J., ruled that the offence was not within the statute, the object of the rioters not being to destroy the house, but to secure the person they were in search of. Price's case, 5 C. & P. 510.°

But the case may fall within the statute, though the intent to demolish may be accompanied with another intent, which may have influenced the conduct of the rioters. Thus where a party of coal-whippers having a feeling of ill-will towards a coal-lumper, who paid less than the usual wages, collected a mob, and went to the house where he kept his pay-table, exclaiming that they would murder him, and began to throw stones, &c., and broke the widows and partitions, and part of a wall, and after his escape, continued to throw stones, &c. till stopped by the police; Gurney, B., ruled that the parties might be convicted under the 7 and 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, s. 8, of beginning to demolish, though their principal object might be to injure the lumper, provided it was also their object to demolish the house, on account of its having been used by him. Batt's case, 6 C. & P. 329.P

On an indictment under this statute for riotously, &c., beginning to demolish and demolishing a dwelling-house, total demolition is not necessary, though the parties were not interrupted. If the house be destroyed as a dwelling it is enough. Four men, members of and connected with the family of the owner of the cottages, with great violence, and to his terror, drove him from it, and pulled it down all but the chimney; it was held sufficient to satisfy the statute, though no other persons were within reach of the alarm; they having no bonâ fide claim of right, but intending to injure the owner. R. v. Phillips and others, 2 Moo. C. C. 252; S. C. entitled R. v. Lanford and others, Carr. & M. 602. If rioters destroy a house by fire, this is a felonious demolition of it within the statute, and the persons guilty of such an offence may be convicted on an indictment, founded on that enactment, and need not be indicted for arson under s. 2, of the same statute. Per Tindal, C. J., R. v. Harris and others, Carr. & M. 661.

Proof of a rout.] A rout seems to be, according to the general opinion, a disturbance of the peace, by persons assembled together, with an intention to do a thing, which, if executed, would make them rioters, and actually making a motion. towards the execution thereof. (1) Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 65, s. 8; 1 Russ. by Grea. 266.

Proof of an unlawful assembly.] Any meeting whatsoever of great numbers of people with such circumstances of terror as cannot but endanger the public peace, and raise fears and jealousies amongst the king's subjects, seems properly to be called an unlawful assembly, as where great numbers complaining of a common grievance, meet together armed in a warlike manner, in order to consult respecting the most proper means for the recovery of their interests, for no one can foresee

what may be the event of such an assembly. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 65, s. 9. The [*889] circumstances which constitute an unlawful *assembly were much discussed in the case of Redford v. Pirley, 3 Stark. N. P. C. 76. In that case, Holroyd, J., said, an unlawful assembly is where persons meet together in a manner, and under circumstances which the law does not allow, but makes it criminal in those persons meeting together in such a manner, knowingly, and with such purposes as are in point of law criminal. He then proceeded to state what may constitute an unlawful assembly, adopting the language used by Bayley, J., in Hunt's case at York. All persons assembled to sow sedition, and bring into contempt the constitution, are an unlawful assembly. With regard to meetings for drillings, he said, "If the object of the drilling is to secure the attention of the persons drilled to disaffected speeches, and give confidence by an appearance of strength to those willing to join them, that would be illegal; or if they were to say, we will have what we want, whether it be agreeable to law or not, a meeting for that purpose, however it may be masked, if it is really for a purpose of that kind would be illegal. If the meeting, from its general appearance, and all the accompanying circumstances, is calculated to excite terror, alarm and consternation, it is generally criminal and unlawful. And it has been laid down by Alderson, B., that "any meeting assembled under such circumstances as, according to the opinion of rational and firm men, are likely to produce danger to the tranquillity and peace of the neighbourhood, it is an unlawful assembly; and in viewing this question, the jury should take into their consideration the way in which the meetings were held, the hour at which they met, and the language used by the persons assembled, and by those who addressed them; and then consider whether firm and rational men, having their families and property there, would have reasonable ground to fear a breach of the peace, as the alarm must not be merely such as would frighten any foolish or timid person, but must be such as would alarm persons of reasonable firmness and courage." R. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91. All persons who join an assembly of this kind, disregarding its probable effect, and the alarm and consternation which are likely to ensue, and all who give countenance and support to it, are criminal parties. Per Littledale, J., R. v. Neal, 9 C. & P. 431."

A question, with regard to the admissibility of evidence, showing previous meetings for the purpose of drilling, arose in Hunt's case, 3 B. & Ad. 566,' which was an indictment containing counts for a conspiracy, unlawful assembly and riot; and in which the jury found the defendants guilty, on the count for an unlawful assembly. On a motion for a new trial, on the ground that this evidence had been improperly received, the application was rejected. Abbott, C. J., said, "It was shown that a very considerable part of the persons assembled, or at least a very considerable part of those who came from a distance, went to the place of meeting in bodies, to a certain extent arranged and organized, and with a regularity of step and movement, resembling those of a military march, though less perfect. The effect of such an appearance, and the conclusion to be drawn from it, were points for the consideration of the jury, and no reasonable person can say, that they were left to the consideration of the jury in a manner less favourable to the defendants than the evidence warranted. And if this appearance was in itself proper for the consideration of the jury, it must have been proper to show to them, that at the [*890] very place from *which one of these bodies came, a number of persons had assembled before day-break, and had been formed and instructed to march as soon as there was light enough for such an operation, and that some of the persons Eng C. L. Reps. xiv. 166. t Id. xxxviii. 48.

" Id. xxxviii. 176.

▾ Id. v. 377.

thus assembled had grossly ill-treated two others, whom they called spies, and had extorted from one of them, at the peril of his life, an oath never to be a king's man again, or to name the name of a king; and that another of the bodies, that went to the place of meeting, expressed their hatred towards this person by hissing as they passed his doors. These matters were, in my opinion, unquestionably competent evidence upon the general character and intention of the meeting.

Robbery from the person, which is a felony at common law, is thus defined; a felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence against his will, by violence and putting him in fear.(1) 2 East, P. C. 707.

Where an indictment stated that the prisoner with force of arms, &c., made an assault on W. M. and him the said W. M. then and there feloniously did rob of, &c., without averring that the act was committed with "force and violence," or that the party was put in "fear," according to the usual form; Lord Lyndhurst, B., inclined to think the indictment insufficient, but said he should reserve the point. At the following assizes Parke, B., stated that his Lordship had conferred with some of the judges, and amongst others with himself, and they were of opinion that as the objection must be supposed to have been taken after verdict, it was unnecessary to decide whether the objection would have been good on demurrer, inasmuch as the omission was cured by the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 21. Lennox's case, 2 Lew. C. C. 268.

The 7 and 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, used the words "rob any other person of &c." The new statute merely says, "rob any person."

(1) 1 Wheeler's C. C. 420.

any chattels,

Statute 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 87.] The 7 Wm. 4, and 1 Vict. c. 87, (E. [*892] & I.) *by which the provisions of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, relating to this offence are repealed, abolishes the punishment of death for simple robbery, and restricts it to cases where the crime is attended with cutting or wounding.

Robbery attended with cutting or wounding.] By the 7 Wm 4 and 1 Vict. c. 87, s. 2, "whosoever shall rob any person, and at the time of, or immediately before, or immediately after such robbery, shall stab, cut or wound, any person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall suffer death."

This sentence may be recorded under the 4 Geo. 4, ante, p. 245.

For the punishment of accessaries under the recent statute, see ante, p. 219. The evidence to support an indictment under this section will be the same as that required on an indictment for simple robbery, see post; and in addition it must be proved that the prisoner either immediately before, at the time of, or immediately after the robbery, stabbed, cut, or wounded the prosecutor, as the case may be. With respect to the evidence requisite to sustain the allegation of stabbing, &c. see ante, p. 781. If the prosecutor should fail to prove the stabbing, &c., the prisoner may still be convicted of robbery, and if the proof of the latter should also fail, the party may be found guilty of an assault under the 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 11, ante, p. 294; see Ellis's case, post, p. 893.

An indictment under the 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 87, s. 2, laying the wounding "at the time" is not sustained by evidence of wounding "immediately before." Alderson, B., advised that for the future there should be three counts laying the offence in each way. R. v. Hammond, 1 Cox, C. C. 123.

Robbery attended with violence, &c.] By the 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 87, s. 3, "whosoever shall, being armed with any offensive weapon or instrument, rob, or assault with intent to rob any person, or shall, together with one or more person or persons, rob, or assault with intent to rob any person, or shall rob any person, and at the time of, or immediately before, or immediately after such robbery, shall beat, strike, or use any other personal violence to any person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be transported beyond the seas for the term of his or her natural life, or for any term not less than fifteen years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding three years."

By s. 10, in cases of imprisonment the court may award hard labour, and also solitary confinement not exceeding a month at one time, or three months in any one year.

The evidence to support an indictment founded on the third section of the above statute will depend upon the particular offence charged; whether it be a robbery or an assault with intent to rob by a party armed with an offensive weapon; or by two or more persons, or whether such robbery be accompanied by striking or other personal violence. Should the prosecutor fail to make out the circumstances of aggravation, the prisoner may be convicted of the simple robbery, or if the proof be insufficient to support the latter charge, then of an assault. [*893] *The prisoner was charged under the last mentioned section with a robbery. The evidence was that the prisoner committed the offence together with others (who were not apprehended,) but it was not so charged in the indictment. On the question whether in order to bring him within the higher penalty imposed by that section, it ought not to have been so averred; Patteson, J. said, "where several parties are indicted for committing the offence, it is not necessary to aver

that they were together; but if one be indicted alone who committed the act with others, it is proper it should be so averred." Raffety's case, 2 Lew. C. C. 271. See R. v. Stringer, post. p. 910.

The prisoner was indicted under the same section for a robbery accompanied by personal violence. The jury found him "guilty of an assault but without any intention to commit any felony." Park, J., and Alderson B., held that such a special finding did not take the case out of the operation of the 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 11, (ante, p. 294) and the prisoner was sentenced under that section to imprisonment with hard labour. Ellis's case, 8 C. & P. 654. See also R. v. Boden, 1 C. & K. 395.b

Simple Robbery.] By the 7 Wm. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 87, s. 5, "whoever shall rob any person [or shall steal any property from the person of another, see as to this title, Larceny, ante p. 605,] shall be liable at the discretion of the court, to be transported beyond the seas for any term not exceeding fifteen years, nor less than ten years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding three years."

The provisions of the statute with regard to stealing from the person; assaulting with intent to rob; and demanding property with menaces, or by force, with intent to steal; the accusing or threatening to accuse of any infamous crime; and the sending of threatening letters demanding money, are all separately noticed under distinct heads.

Evidence in cases of robbery.] On a prosecution for robbery, the evidence will be, 1st, proof that certain goods &c., were taken; 2d, that they were taken with a felonious intent; 3d, from the person or in the presence of the owner; 4th, against his will; 5th, that they were taken, either by violence or by putting the owner in fear.

Proof of the goods, &c., taken.] It must be proved that some property was taken, for an assault with an intent to rob is an offence of a different and inferior nature. 2 East, P. C. 707. But the value of the property is immaterial, a penny, as well as a pound, forcibly extorted, constitutes a robbery, the gist of the offence being the force and terror. 3 Inst. 69; 1 Hale, P. C. 532; 2 East, P. C. 707; 1 Russ. by Grea. 869; R. v. Morris, 9 C. & P. 349. Thus where a man was knocked down and his pockets rifled, but the robbers found nothing, except a slip of paper containing a memorandum, an indictment for robbing him of the paper was held to be maintainable. Bingley's case, coram Gurney, B., 5 C. & P. 602. In the following case it was held that there was no property in the prosecutor so as to support an indictment for robbery. The prisoner was charged with robbing the prosecutor of a promissory note. It appeared that the prosecutor had been decoyed by the prisoner into a room for the purpose of extorting *money from him. Upon a table covered with black silk were [ *894 ] two candlesticks covered also with black, a pair of large horse pistols ready cocked, a tumbler glass filled with gunpowder, a saucer with leaden balls, two knives, one of them a prodigiously large carving knife, their handles wrapped in black crape, pens and inkstand, several sheets of paper, and two ropes. The prisoner, Mrs. Pipoe seized the carving knife, and threatening to take away the prosecutor's life, the latter was compelled to sign a promissory note for 20007. upon a piece of stamped paper which had been provided by the prisoner. It was objected that

Eng. Com. Law Reps. xxxiv. 570.

b Id. xlvii. 395.

• Id. xxxviii. 148.

d Id. xxiv. 474.