article demanded. Smithies v. Bridge, 71 L. J., K. B. 555; [1902] 2 K. B. 13; 87 L. T. 167; 50 W. R. 686; 66 J. P. 740; 20 Cox, C. C. 342 ; 18 T. L. R. 575—D.

Per Lord Alverstone, C.J.-Lane v. Collins (54 L. J., M. C. 76; 14 Q. B. D. 193) was decided upon a special state of facts. Ib.

In proceedings under s. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, in respect of a sale of milk, it was proved that the milk sold contained only 2.81 per cent. of milk fat as against the 3 per cent. laid down by the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901, as the prima facie standard for genuine milk, but that the milk sold had in fact not been tampered with, and that the deficiency was accounted for by the length of the interval that had been allowed to elapse between successive milkings of the cows from which the milk was obtained-Held, that under these circumstances the justices were not bound to convict, and that it was a question of fact whether the article sold was or was not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded. Smithies v. Bridge (71 L. J., K. B. 555; [1902] 2 K. B. 13) explained. Wolfenden v. McCulloch, 92 L. T. 857: 3 L. G. R. 561; 69 J. P. 228; 20 Cox, C. C. 864; 21 T. L. R. 411-D.

Ten per cent. added Water-Milk exceptionally Good-Trifling Offence.]-The respondent was charged with selling milk contrary to s. 6 of the Food and Drugs Act, 1875. At the hearing of the information the certificate of the analyst was produced and proved on behalf of the appellant, and showed as follows: "I, the undersigned public analyst for the county of Essex, do hereby certify that I received on June 5, 1899, a sample of milk. I am of opinion that the same contained the parts as under: Fat, 3.55 parts; nonfatty solids, 7.46 parts; water, 88.99 parts; total, 100.00. I am therefore of opinion that this milk contains 10 per cent. of added water." The justices received the certificate of the analyst as sufficient evidence of the facts as herein stated, but it appeared to them that the milk was exceptionally good, the butter fat being above normal, and, having regard to all the circumstances, they thought that, though the charge was proved, the offence was of so trifling a nature that it was inexpedient to inflict any punishment, and they therefore dismissed the information:-Held, remitting the case to the justices, that if the milk was exceptionally good after the adulteration they need not convict, but if it was only exceptionally good before, the offence was one for which they should convict. Banks v. Wooler, 81 T. L. 785; 64 J. P. 245; 19 Cox, C. C. 432-D. See Bosomworth v. Bridge, [1892] 36 S. J. 594.

Milk not Tampered with.]-The respondent was charged on an information with having consigned to a purchaser milk which was not of the nature, substance, and quality contracted to be sold, the milk being deficient in fat to the extent of 26 per cent. of the minimum amount fixed by the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901. At the hearing the facts stated in the information were proved or admitted, and evidence was also given and admitted that another consignment of the same morning's milk from the

same cows shewed on analysis 3.1 per cent. fat (being in excess of the said minimum), and that the morning's milk from the same cows seven days later shewed on analysis a deficiency in fat below such minimum of 3 per cent. only. The justices, on this evidence, were of opinion that, although the sample, the subject of the summons, was not of the nature, substance, and quality contracted to be sold, yet the respondent had not tampered with the milk and that the milk was as it came from the cows. They accordingly dismissed the information:-Held, that the case must be remitted to the justices to convict the respondent unless further evidence was given before them bearing upon the question whether or not the difference between the quantities of fat in the two consignments on the day in question was consistent with there having been ordinary milking. Marshall v. Skett, 108 L. T. 1001; 77 J. P. 173 ; 11 L. G. R. 259; 23 Cox C. C. 435; 29 T. L. R. 152-D.

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Deficiency of Fat in Milk Due to Method of Feeding.]-J. was charged with selling "sweet milk which was not of the nature, substance, and quality of sweet milk, the article demanded by the purchaser, in respect that " it did not contain the percentage of milk fat and solids required by the regulations, trary to the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, s. 6, and to the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901.” It was proved that the milk did not contain the percentage of milk fat and solids required by the regulations; that it had not been tampered with or adulterated, but had been sold in the same condition as yielded by the cows; and that the deficiency of milk fat and solids was due to the method of feeding, which had been purposely adopted to produce quantity of milk irrespective of quality:-Held, that the milk was genuine," and that the accused was not guilty of the offence charged. Smithies v Bridge (71 L. J., K. B. 555; [1902] 2 K. B. 13) commented on. Scott v. Jack, [1912] S. C. (J.) 87-Ct. of Just.

Milk Deficient in Fat-Proof of Genuineness—Onus.]—The Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901, provide that where a sample of milk contains less than 3 per cent. of milk fat it shall be presumed " until the contrary is proved, that the milk is not genuine, by reason of the abstraction therefrom of milk fat, or the addition thereto of water":-Held, that the onus of proof so imposed upon a seller of milk was sufficiently discharged by the evidence of the accused himself and his mother and servants

(which was not disbelieved) that the milk had not been tampered with, and that it was not necessary for him to have the corroboration of a neutral witness or witnesses. Lamont v.

Rodger, [1911] S. C. (J.) 24-Ct. of Just.

Deficiency in Milk Solids-12 per cent. of Added Water Contents of Churn not Stirred Prior to Purchase Offence of Trivial Nature.]-The respondent was charged with selling milk not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded by the appellant. The milk purchased was analysed, and the analyst stated in his certificate that in his opinion the sample contained 12 per cent.

of added water. The churn from which the milk was taken was not stirred prior to the quantity purchased by the appellant being taken therefrom. No evidence was given, or called, by the respondent, nor did he require the public analyst to be called. The justices stated that they were of opinion from their own knowledge that the sample taken by the appellant did not fairly represent the whole contents of the churn, and that the slight deficiency in the standard prescribed by the Sale of Milk Regula tions, 1901, might be due to causes other than abstraction of solids or the addition of water, and they did not feel justified in convicting the respondent on so small a percentage of water in excess of the regulations, having regard to the fact that the milk supplied was of good quality; they were further of opinion that, in any event, the offence was of so trivial a nature that they were justified in dismissing the information:-Held, that in view of the findings of the justices the court could not say that they were not entitled to come to the conclusion at which they arrived. Preston v. Redfern, 107 L. T. 410; 76 J. P. 359; 10 L. G. R. 717; 23 Cox C. C. 166; 28 T. L. R. 435-D. Milk-Consignment in Transit-Several Churns-Proper Method of Sampling.]—The appellant, an inspector, sampled a consignment of milk in transit from the respondent to a customer. The consignment consisted of three churns each containing different quantities of milk. The appellant took a sample from each churn separately and a separate analysis was made of each sample. The analysis in each case showed an excess of non-fatty solids or dirt, and then, by a mathematical calculation an average of the excess was arrived at on which one information was laid:-Held, that the method of sampling adopted in this case was correct, and that it was not necessary either to mix the contents of the three churns before

sampling, or to mix the separate samples before analysis. Wildridge v. Ashton, 93 L. J., K. B. 30; [1924] 1 K. B. 92; 130 L. T. 205; 27 Cox, C. C. 545; 87 J. P. 197; 21 L. G. R. 702; 68 S. J. 165; 40 T. L. R. 28-D.

Milk-Deficiency in Milk Fat-Feeding of Cows-Control of Milk-Evidence.]-B. was charged under s. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, with selling milk which was deficient in milk fat. She contended that the deficiency was due to the feeding of the cows, and not to interference with the milk. Control of the milk during the whole period from the time of the milking till the sale of the milk was not proved by her witnesses. The justices did not find that the deficiency was due to the feeding of the cows:-Held, that the justices were entitled on the evidence to convict B. of the offence charged against her. Hunt v. Richardson (85 L. J., K. B. 1360; [1916] 2 K. B. 446) distinguished. Bowen v. Jones, 86 L. J., K. B. 802; 117 L. T. 125; 81 J. P. 178; 15 L. G. R. 517; 25 Cox, C. C. 757-D. Sale of Milk - Deficiency of FatMethod of Feeding Cows - Increase of Quantity without Regard to Quality of Milk-Genuine Milk.]-Section 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, provides that no

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person shall sell to the prejudice of the purchaser any article of food which is not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by such purchaser, under a penalty, and regulation 1 of the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901, issued by the Board of Agriculture under s. 4 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899, provides that where a sample of milk contains less than 3 per cent. of milk fat, it shall be presumed, for the purposes of the Food and Drugs Acts, 1875 to 1899, until the contrary is proved, that the milk is not genuine, by reason of the abstraction therefrom of milk fat, or the addition thereto of water. Hunt v. Richardson, 85 L. J., K. B. 1360; [1916] 2 K. B. 446; 115 L. T. 114; 80 J. P. 305; 14 L. G. R. 854; 25 Cox, C. C. 441; 60 S. J. 588; 32 T. L. R. 560-D.

The appellant was charged with selling to the prejudice of the purchaser milk not of the nature, substance and quality demanded, contrary to the provision of the above section, and the analyst's certificate showed that the

milk was deficient in milk fat to the extent of 9 per cent. The appellant's cows were milked twice daily, at 5 a.m. and I p.m.-the usual hours in the district-and nothing was added to or abstracted from the milk beyond the abstraction of impurities by straining in the ordinary way. Owing to heavy rains the grass on which the cows were fed was in a watery condition, and for the purpose of keeping up the quantity of milk they were also fed on green maize, which was even more watery, with the result that the quantity of the milk was increased at the expense of its quality. The purchaser asked for "new morning milk," and was supplied with milk as it came from the cow, subject to the aforesaid straining. The justices found that the deficiency of 9 per cent. in milk fat was due to the manner in which the appellant had fed his cows with the object of obtaining a large supply of milk without regard to quality, and they held that the milk was not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded by the purchaser, and convicted the appellant:Held (Darling, J., Lawrence, J., and Âvory, J. ; Bray, J., and Scrutton, J., dissenting), that, as the milk was milk as it came from the cow, and therefore genuine milk, it was of the nature, substance, and quality demanded by the purchaser, and that the conviction must be quashed. Held, also, by Bray, J., and Scrutton, J., that

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new morning milk" meant milk of a merchantable quality, and that the case should be remitted to the justices to state their finding on that question of fact. Smithies v. Bridge (71 L. J., K. B. 555; [1902] 2 K. B. 13) and Scott v. Jack ([1912] S. C. (J.) 87; 49 Sc. L. R. 989) considered. Ib.

Milk-Sale as it comes from the CowCow not Fully Milked-Deficiency in Milk Fat.]-When milk has been sold as it comes from the cow, the fact that, by reason of the cow not having been fully milked, the milk is deficient in milk fat does not make the sale an offence against s. 6 of the Food and Drugs Act, 1875. Grigg v. Smith, 87 L. J., K. B. 488; 117 L. T. 477; 82 J. P. 2; 15 L. G. R. 769 ; 61 S. J. 677 ; 33 T. L. R. 541; 26 Cox, C. C. 179-D.

The respondent was the owner of one cow which had recently calved, and he sold to the appellant a half-pint of milk taken from the morning's milking. The cow was not fully milked, some being left for the calf. There was no addition to or abstraction from the milk sold except for the necessary purposes of straining impurities, but the milk was found deficient in milk fat to the extent of 13 per cent. On a charge of supplying milk not of the nature, substance, and quality demanded by the purchaser, contrary to s. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, the justices found that the deficiency was due to the manner in which the cow had been milked, but that, as it had been sold as it came from the cow without abstraction or addition, it was of the nature, substance, and quality demanded by the purchaser, and they dismissed the charge:-Held, that the decision of the justices was right. Hunt v. Richardson (85 L. J., K. B. 1360; [1916] 2 K. B. 446) followed. Ib.

A vendor, who had contracted to provide a purchaser with milk containing not less than 3.5 per cent. by weight of milk fat, delivered a churn containing only 2.9 per cent. of fat. It was proved that the milk was in the same condition as it was in when it came from the cow :Held, that no offence had been committed under s. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, as the milk had not been adulterated either by the addition of some foreign substance or by the abstraction of one of its constituent elements. Where milk is not adulterated, but is in the same condition as that in which it came from the cow, the fact that it is of a lower quality than that stipulated for does not make the delivery of it an offence under s. 6 of the Act of 1875, or s. 3 of the Act of 1879.

Per Lawrence, C.J.: It is better that the civil rights of the contracting parties should be kept distinct from their criminal remedies under the statute. Ib.

Per Sankey, J.: A mere breach of contract as to quality does not necessarily create an offence within s. 6. Ib.

Few v. Robinson, 91 L. J,. K. B. 42; [1921] 2 K. B. 504; 85 J. P. 257; 19 L. G. R. 708; 66 S. J. 50 (15); 126 L. T. 94; 27 Cox, C. C. 113-D.

Deficiency of Non-fatty solids Presumption that Milk not Genuine.]-By the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901, where a sample of milk contains less than 3 per cent. of milk fat, or where it contains less than 8.5 per cent. of milk solids other than milk fat, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the milk is not genuine. The appellant purchased from the respondent, a retail milk dealer, a pint of milk for the purpose of having it analysed. The county analyst certified that the sample contained: Fat 3.60 parts; nonfatty solids 7.95 parts; water 88.45 parts; and was deficient in non-fatty solids to the extent of 6.4 per cent. He based his opinion upon the fact that the sample contained 7.95 per cent. of non-fatty solids, whereas genuine milk should contain not less than 8.5 per cent. The respondent gave no evidence that the milk was

in the same condition when sold as it was when it came from the cows, but called a pharmaceutical chemist, who stated that milk varies considerably without being interfered with, that there were a dozen causes for creating variability in milk; that the district was a manufacturing one, and the pasture affected by chemicals and would not produce a high class milk; that accepting the county analyst's certificate as it stood, there was nothing to show that the milk was not genuine. The justices were of opinion that the milk was deficient in non-fatty solids to the extent of .55, but that it had an excess of fatty solids to the extent of .60; that the deficiency in non-fatty solids was infinitesimal, and that the milk was better than it might have been by reason of the excess of fatty solids; that on the evidence the milk was genuine and no offence had been committed:-Held, that where there was evidence of a deficiency in the percentage required by the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901, of non-fatty solids, the presumption created by those regulations came into operation, and, unless rebutted, there must be a conviction. To rebut the presumption the respondent must show that the milk sold to the appellant was in the same condition as it was when it came from the cows, that is, that he had neither added anything to it nor abstracted anything from it. The evidence of the chemist called for the respondent did not rebut the presumption that the milk sold was not genuine. In the circumstances the case would be remitted to the justices for further hearing. Kings v. Merris, 90 L. J., K. B. 161; [1920] 3 K. B. 566; 124 L. T. 150; 85 J. P. 68; 18 L. G. R. 775; 26 Cox, C. C. 649-D.

Hot Milk-Adulteration Previous to Heating.] Where a purchaser asks for "hot milk" at a restaurant and is supplied with adulterated milk which has been heated, the fact that it was "hot milk" and not merely "milk," that was asked for will not save the of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, of vendor from committing the offence against s. 6 selling an article of food not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded. Herrington v. Slater, 90 L. J., K. B. 265; 124 L. T. 272; 85 J. P. 83; 18 L. G. R. 840; 26 Cox, C. C. 670; 37 T. L. R. 51-D.

Hot Milk · Adulteration Previous to

On an

Poor Pasturage for Cow "Not of merchantable quality Liability of Seller. The agent of the respondent, when asked for a pint of new milk, sold to the purchaser milk which was 28 per cent. deficient in butter fat. The milk was sold as it came from the cow, its inferior quality being due to the fact that the animal had only had some exceptionally poor pasture on which to graze. information under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, the magistrate found that the milk sold was not of merchantable quality, but that, as it was sold as it came from the cow, he was bound by the decisions in Hunt v. Richardson (85 L. J., K. B. 1360; [1916] 2 K. B. 446), and Grigg v. Smith (87 L. J., K. B. 488; 477) to dismiss the case :-Held, decision of the magistrate was right.

117 L. T that the Williams

v. Rees, 87 L. J., K. B. 639; 118 L. T. 356; 82 J. P. 97; 16 L. G. R. 159; 26 Cox, C. C. 173-D.

Agreement in Writing for sale of "new milk " Label Written Warranty Attached to Churn.] Where, in proceedings under s. 9 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, for selling milk from which fat has been abstracted, the defendant relies on the defence of written warranty under s. 25 of that Act, a warranty that milk is "new milk" is not sufficient to satisfy the section. To succeed, the defendant must prove that he purchased the milk with a written warranty and that the warranty accompanied the milk when he took delivery of it. A statement on the label attached to a particular consignment of milk is not a warranty within the meaning of that section, unless the contract of purchase of the milk contains a written warranty within the Act, together with a term that such a written warranty should accompany the milk. Where no warranty is contained in the contract of purchase and there is nothing to connect the stipulations contained in that contract with the label attached to the milk churn, the contract of purchase and the label taken together will not constitute a warranty to satisfy the section. Dewey v. Faulkner, 92 L. J., K. B. 318; [1923] 1 K. B. 315; 128 L. T. 602; 87 J. P. 45; 21 L. G. R. 96; 27 Cox, C. C. 388; 67 S. J. 316; 39 T. L. R. 130-D.

а

Delivery Sample Taken "in course of "" delivery Completion of Delivery.]-The appellant was milk vendor, who supplied milk under a written contract to one C., a dairyman at B. It was a term of the contract that the milk should be

delivered to the purchaser at B. railway station,

The

and that arrival of the milk at that station should constitute delivery by the vendor to the purchaser. The appellant consigned a churn of milk to C. at B. station; and on its arrival at B. station it was seized by an inspector and sergeant of police, who retained it in their possession, and prevented the consignee from touching it, until the respondent, an inspector under the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts, arrived at the station about 20 minutes later. respondent then took a sample of milk from the churn; and, as the result of an analysis of the same, an information was laid against the appellant by the respondent, alleging that the respondent had procured at the place of delivery a sample of milk then in course of delivery, and it was not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by the purchaser. The justices who heard the information found that the sample was procured at the place of delivery and in course of delivery to the purchaser or consignee in pursuance of the contract for the sale to such purchaser or consignee of such milk as provided by s. 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879, and they convicted the appellant:Held, that the question was one of fact for the justices, and that there was evidence to support the finding of the justices, and the court would not interfere with their finding. Held, also, that, even if the question was one of mixed

·-

law and fact, the justices had come to a right conclusion, and the conviction must be affirmed. Cox v. Evans, 86 L. J., K. B. 539; [1917]1 K. B. 275; 115 L. T. 779; 81 J. P. 53; 14 L. G. R. 1178; 25 Cox, C. C. 564-D.

Sale by Contractor of New Milk Deficient in Quantity of Milk Fat Contracted for-Article not of "nature, substance and quality "" Demanded.]-The effect of s. 2 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Amendment Act, 1899, is that in s. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, the words "nature, substance and quality are to be

read distributively, and a penalty is incurred under that section if the article sold, although unadulterated, is not of the quality demanded. Belfast Guardians v. Jones, [1916] 2 Ir. R. 269K. B. D.

The respondent had contracted to sell to the appellants new milk containing not less than 3 per cent. of milk fat. Some of the milk supplied contained less than this proportion :Held, that the respondent was liable to a penalty, although the milk was supplied in the same state as that in which it came from the Cow. Ib.

Deficiency in Fat-Milk drawn from Bottom of Can after Cream had Risen.]The defendant was charged with selling milk which was not genuine in respect that it was deficient in milk fat. It was proved that the milk contained less than 3 per cent. milk fat, but that it had not been tampered with in any way, the deficiency being due to the milk having stood for some hours in a can and to the sample having been drawn from a tap at the bottom, after the cream had risen :-Held, that while the failure to restore milk to its

an

original condition by redistribution of the milk fat might in some circumstances constitute "abstraction of milk fat" within the meaning of the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901, the offence charged had not been proved in this case, there being no finding to the effect that there was some well-known method of redistribution, which the defendant had failed to adopt. Knowles v. Scott, [1918] S. C. (J.) 32— Ct. of Just.

A farmer was charged with contravening s. of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, by selling sweet milk which was not genuine in respect that it contained less than 3 per cent. of milk fat. The alleged deficiency in fat was established, but it was also proved that the milk had not been tampered with in any way, the deficiency being due to the milk having stood for some time in the cans and to the samples having been drawn from the tap at the bottom after the cream had risen. It was further proved that sellers of milk recognised the necessity of redistributing the milk fat, and that the method which the accused instructed his servant to follow, but which his servant omitted on the occasion libelled, was to draw off a quantity of milk from the bottom of the can and to pour it in at the top before proceeding to sell the milk:-Held, that the offence had been proved. Knowles v. Scott ([1918] S. C. (J.) 32) distinguished. Question whether the prosecutor ought not to have libelled article 1 of

the Sale of Milk Regulations, 1901, in the complaint, in addition to s. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875. Penrice v. Brander, [1921] S. C. (J.) 63-Ct. of Just.

Dairies, Cow-sheds, and Milk Shops Order of 1885-Purveyor of Milk.]-An ice cream manufacturer is not a purveyor of milk within the meaning of s. 6, sub-s. 1, of the Dairies, Cowsheds, and Milkshops Order of 1885. Pianta v. Lang, [1894] 31 S. L. R. 335.

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Label "not guaranteed three per cent."-Notice to Purchaser.]-A_ dairyman sold milk to a purchaser, who asked for sweet milk, from a can on which the following words were embossed: "Not guaranteed three per cent." These words were seen by the purchaser and "understood by him to mean that the milk in the can was not guaranteed to contain three per cent. of milk fat." The analysis showed that the milk sold was not of the nature, substance and quality of sweet milk, but was sweet milk with some admixture of skimmed milk":-Held (Lord Moncrieff dissenting), that the dairyman had been guilty of an offence under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, in respect that the label on the milk-can gave no notice that the milk was not pure sweet milk, but merely that that milk was not guaranteed to be of a certain quality. Souter v. Lean, 6 F. (J.) 20-Ct. of Just.

Hops.]-It is an offence within 7 Geo. 2, c. 19, to mix the vapour of sulphur and brimstone with hops. R. v. Pack, 6 Term Rep. 374. Seeds-Dyeing.]-Under 32 & 33 Vict. c. c. 112 (The Adulteration of Seeds Act, 1869), which by s. 2 defines the term "to dye seeds as giving to seeds by any process of colouring, dyeing, sulphur smoking, or other artificial means, the appearance of seeds of another kind, and by s. 3 imposes a penalty upon any person, who with intent to defraud, "dyes any seeds, or sells any dyed seed," no offence is committed by subjecting seeds to a process by sulphur smoking, so as to improve them in appearance, and to make old and inferior seed appear to be new seed, so long as such seed is not made to appear of a different species or description from that to which it actually belongs. Francis v. Maas, 47 L. J., M. C. 83; 3 Q. B. D. 341; 38 L. T. 100; 26 W. R. 422.

2. PREJUDICE OF PURCHASER. (And see under "OFFENCES GENERALLY" ante).

Purchaser.] Where an article of food, which was not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded, was sold to an inspector of nuisances, who purchased for the purpose of analysis under s. 13 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c 63), with money belonging to the authority by whom he was employed :--Held, that such sale was "to the prejudice of the purchaser" within the meaning of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, s. 6. Hoyle v. Hitchman, 48 L. J., M. C. 97; 4 Q. B. D. 233; 40 L. T. 252; 27 W. R. 487.

Purchase of Adulterated Article by Deputy Inspector.]-The respondent was summoned upon an information laid by the

appellant, the inspector appointed under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), for having sold to the prejudice of one Toy, certain coffee which was not of the nature and quality of the article demanded by such purchaser, contrary to the provisions of s. 6. It appeared that Toy went as the appellant's assistant, and asked for some best coffee, for which he paid. On being analysed, the coffee purchased was found to contain a large proportion of chicory. The justices dismissed the information on the ground, amongst others, that the proceeding having been instituted by the appellant in his official capacity, he and not Toy should have personally purchased the article, and dealt with the same:-Held, upon the above facts, that Toy might be treated as an ordinary purchaser, and that the justices had acted wrongly in entertaining the objection. Horder v. Scott, 49 L. J., M. C. 78; 5 Q. B. D. 552; 42 L. T. 660; 28 W. R. 918; 44 J. P. 520. S. P., Smith v. Stace, 44 J. P. 796.

An inspector gave his servant some money and sent him to a public-house to purchase a bottle of spirits; after the servant had been in the house a minute, and had paid for the bottle, the inspector entered:-Held, that the inspector was the purchaser and was himself prejudiced. Garforth v. Esam, 56 J. P. 521.

Notice to Purchaser.] — When a seller of an article brings to the purchaser's knowledge the fact that the article sold to him is not of the

nature, substance, or quality of the article he demands, the sale is not "to the prejudice of the purchaser" within s. 6 of 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, and consequently no offence is committed within that section. Sandys v. Small, 47 L. J., M. C. 115; 3 Q. B. D. 449; 39 L. T. 118; 26 W. R. 814.

Section 8 points out a mode of giving notice to the purchaser that is made by the statute sufficient, but it is not intended by that section that, whenever the mode therein specified is not adopted, there shall necessarily be an offence against s. 6. Ib.

By s. 6 of 42 & 43 Vict. c. 30, it is provided that "in determining whether an offence has been committed under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, s. 6, by selling to the prejudice of the purchaser spirits not adulterated otherwise than by the admixture of water, it shall be a good defence to prove that such admixture has not reduced the spirit more than . . . 35 degrees under proof for gin." The appellant sold to the respondent gin more than 35 degrees under proof, but, at the time of sale, brought to his knowledge a printed notice hanging up in the room to the effect that all spirits were sold "as diluted spirits, no alcoholic strength guaranteed"-Held, that, although the appellant had not a good defence under 42 & 43 Vict. c. 30, s. 6, he was not by that section deprived of any defence which he would have had under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, and that the sale not having been to been committed under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63, the prejudice of the purchaser, no offence had s. 6. Gage v. Elsey, 52 L. J., M. C. 44; 10 Q. B. D. 518; 48 L. T. 226; 31 W. R. 500; 47 J. P. 391.

An agent of, and acting at the instance of, an inspector under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act,