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in the statute under which the proceeding takes place. "When "property or title is in question, the jurisdiction of Justices to "hear and determine in a summary manner is at an end, and "their hands tied from interfering, though the facts be such "that they have otherwise authority to take cognizance "— (Paley on Convictions). But the Justices must judge from all the circumstances whether or not the act was so done, and they are not to take the mere statement of the defendant; and it was held to be no proof of a bona fide claim subsisting,. that several persons other than the individual charged had committed similar trespasses, using the same color of right, and that the plaintiff had obtained injunctions from the Court of Chancery against such parties (R. v. Dodson, 9 A. & E. 704; R. v. Wrottesley, 1 B. & Ad. 648). The jurisdiction of the Justices is not to be avoided by a mere fictitious pretence of title, and an assertion of right need not be regarded where the party's own showing or other manifest circumstances satisfy the Justices that the claim is wholly groundless (Paley's Convictions). The Justices must determine whether or not, upon the evidence before them, a bona fide question of title is raised. But if the matter be doubtful, it is enough to stay the jurisdiction, and Justices cannot give themselves jurisdiction by an erroneous and capricious decision.

JUSTICES INTERESTED.-A Justice should refrain from taking part in any matter in which he is individually interested, or where he is related to either party, or where he has advised upon the matter. The administration of justice should be free from suspicion; and where the Justice has the smallest interest, as being a member of a company making a charge, he should withdraw from the bench during the hearing. However small the interest, it is enough to disqualify him from acting judicially.

REFUSAL TO ADJUDICATE.-If a Justice or Justices, from a mistaken opinion as to their jurisdiction, refuse to adjudicate, the Queen's Bench will interfere and compel them to shew cause why they should not hear and adjudicate.

CONVICTION.-This should be drawn up according to the rules under article "Conviction."

When the Justice or Justices convict, or make an order against the defendant, the Statute requires that a minute or memorandum thereof shall then be made, for which no fee shall be paid; and the conviction or order shall afterwards be drawn up by the said Justice or Justices in proper form, under his or their hand and seal or hands and seals; and he or they shall cause the same to be lodged with the Clerk of the Peace, to be by him filed among the records of the General or Quarter Sessions of the Peace. (Con. Stat. C. c. 103, s. 42.)

Time is thus given the Justice to draw up his conviction or order in legal form. If by mistake the Justice does not draw up a correct conviction, he may draw up and file a new or amended conviction at any time before the appeal is entered with the Clerk of the Peace at the Sessions, and before the return of a certiorari, although after a commitment, or after the penalty has been levied by distress, or after action brought against the magistrates.

ORDER.-It is a summary award which Justices of the Peace by various statutes are empowered to make in a variety of cases that come before them. Such as under the Master and Servants' Act, where the Justice makes an order on the master for payment of wages due to the servant. It is less formal and precise than a conviction. If an order be substantially right it is sufficient; whereas in a conviction certainty, even technical precision is necessary. But there is this important distinction between a conviction and an order, with respect to the power of correcting one that is discovered to be informal. When the Justice makes an order and delivers it out he cannot afterwards draw up another in a more formal shape in substitution for one that is defective-a conviction being the record of a judgment, and not existing until it is made up; but an order, being a direction to the party, which is complete as soon as it is drawn up and delivered (R. v. Justices of Cheshire, 8. B. & A. 439). An order for the payment of money may be bad in part and good for the residue. The maxim of the law-the correct not made void by the incorrect-applies to orders. And where

the line of demarcation can be clearly pointed out (to use the words of Justice Erle) the order may be supported as to the good part. But there is no distinction between a conviction and an order with respect to the necessity of shewing jurisdic tion on the face of them; for it is of equal importance in both.

MINUTE OF DECISION.A minute of the decision should be made at the time by the Justice or Justices, but the written order may be drawn up and signed by the Justice or Justices on a subsequent day to the hearing, and it will relate back to the time of pronouncing the verbal order. A copy of the minute of an order must be served on the defendant before any warrant of commitment or distress is granted. (Con. Stat. C.

c. 103, s. 52).

COMMITMENT.-The offence for which the defendant is committed should be stated in a warrant of commitment with the same clearness and precision as in a conviction. It should shew that the defendant has been convicted of an offence over which the Justice has jurisdiction. It was till lately a matter of doubt whether a Justice could substitute a good warrant for a defective one, and thereby justify the gaoler in detaining the defendant in prison; but in the recent case of Ex parte Cross, 4 J. P. 407, this doubt has been removed. In this case the first commitment of the defendant under the Vagrant Act was bad on the face of it; but the court held, after argument, that the prisoner might be lawfully detained under a second warrant for the same offence, bearing date the same day as the first warrant, and lodged with the gaoler several days after; having an endorsement requiring the gaoler to substitute the same for the first warrant. The court considered the decision in R. v. Richards, 5 A. & E. 926, as an express authority in support of their judgment, and that it was good sense and good law.

CONSECUTIVE IMPRISONMENTS.-When an offender is convicted at the same time of two or more separate offences in succession, and sentenced to imprisonment in each case, the practice to be adopted is to make out immediately separate warrants on each conviction-the second warrant stating that the imprisonment thereunder is to commence and take effect upon the expiration of the first. (Con. Stat. C. 103, s. 63.)

There is another course that may be adopted, and that is-to direct (where the statute will sanction such an adjudication) the payment of the fine for the first offence immediately, and for the second offence within the time adjudged as the period of imprisonment for the first offence, with imprisonment in default of payment for a prescribed term. There is no legal objection to this course, but it allows the possibility of the offender paying the first fine and absconding before the time limited for payment of the second, and thereby escaping a continuous unbroken imprisonment.

APPEAL. The right of appeal lies against any order, decision, or conviction of any Justice or Justices of the Peace, in any matter not being a crime by Con. Stat. U. C. c. 114, and against any summary conviction under the criminal acts (Con. Stat. C. c. 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, by Con. Stat. C. c. 99 s. 117). Summary convictions for crimes not included in these statutes, and wherein the statute creating the offence does not give the right to appeal, it is conceived that no appeal lies; but a certiorari lies unless expressly taken away. It is to be noted, that the mode of initiating an appeal against a summary conviction or decision under the criminal acts above mentioned, is different to that against an order, decision or conviction in any matter not being a crime.

LIABILITY OF JUSTICES.-When Justices of the Peace are guilty of any gross act of oppression committed by them in the exercise or alleged exercise of their magisterial duties, or are actuated by any vindictive or corrupt motive, they are liable to be punished by indictment or criminal information in the Court of Queen's Bench.

NOT PUNISHABLE FOR ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.-But the Judges have uniformly refused to punish or interfere with Justices for mere errors in judgment; and Lord Mansfield, C.J., declared that the court would never interpose its authority to punish a magistrate unless it was clearly shewn that he had acted partially, maliciously, or corruptly, and had consequently abused the trust reposed in him.

JUSTICES LIABLE TO ACTIONS.-Justices are liable to actions at law, in respect of proceedings by them which appear to be bad on the face of them, because they cannot justify under such proceedings.

PROTECTION OF JUSTICES.-The legislature, in addition to several protective clauses, inserted in acts giving summary jurisdiction, has by Con. Stat. U. C. c. 126 provided a sufficient protection to Justices to cover all errors of judgment in the performance of their duties, in respect to any matter within their jurisdiction. It must be alleged and proved that the act complained of was done maliciously, and without reasonable and probable cause. But by sec. 2, where the act complained of has been done by the Justice in a matter where he had no jurisdiction, or in which he exceeded his jurisdiction, such allegation and proof are not necessary-any such action will not lie for any act done under any conviction or order until the conviction or order has been quashed, nor for any act done under a warrant to procure the appearance of the party, which shall be followed by a conviction or order in the same matter, until the conviction or order has been quashed.

In concluding these prefatory remarks, and especially in connexion with the liability and protection of Justices, the judgment of Chief Justice Abbot in the case of R. v. Borrow, in the year 1820, contains much that should be gravely considered and duly appreciated by every Canadian Justice :"The application to this court is made against a gentleman "who is one of that class of persons to whom this country is "under as great obligation as this or any other nation is, or "ever was to any members of its community. I speak of the "gentlemen resident in. the different counties of England, who "act in the execution of His Majesty's Commission of the "Peace, and who gratuitously devote a great portion of their "time, and bestow much valuable, but often thankless labour "in the administration of many branches of the law; and among others in most of the early, and in many of the mature 66 stages of our criminal jurisprudence. In this most valuable "class many persons are found who possess a sound knowledge

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