"killed six children in one year:"1 "Thou art a drunken fool and an ass :" "Thou wert never a scholar, and are not worthy to speak to a scholar, and that I will prove and justify;"" or of a surgeon and accoucher, "I wonder you had him to attend you. Do you know him? He is not an apothecary; he has not passed any examination; he's a bad character; none of the medical men here meet him. Several have died that he has attended, and there have been inquests held on them;" or of an apothecary, "It is a world of blood he has to answer for in this town, through his ignorance; he did kill a woman and two children at ; he did kill ; he has killed his patient with his physic;" or, of a midwife," She is an ignorant woman and of small practice, and very unfortunate in her way; there are few that she goes to but lie desperately ill, or die under her hands;" or, that "many have perished for her want of skill.""

at

; he was the death of

4

"3

There is no law, however, against calling an innkeeper "a caterpillar;" neither is it actionable to say of a justice, "He is a logger-headed, a slouch-headed and a bursen-bellied hound;" or, "He is a fool, an ass, a beetle-headed justice," or, "He is a debauched man,

2

3

8

1 Carrol v. White, 33 Barb. 615.

Cawdrey v. Highley, Cro. Car. 270; 1 Roll. Abr. 54.

* Southee v. Denny, 1 Exch. 196. But it was held to be no libel to publish in a medical journal of a physician that he had met homœopathists in consultation, though it was alleged that, in the opinion of the profession, meeting homoeopathists in consultation was improper, and against etiquette (Clay v. Roberts, 8 L. T. N. S. 397; 9 Jur. N. S. 580; 11 W. R. 649). 4 Tulty v. Alewin, 11 Mod. 221. Vid. also Edsall v. Russel, 4 M. & W. 1090.

6

" Wharton v. Brook, I Vent. 21.

• Flower's Case, Cro. Car. 211.

▾ Vin. Abr. Act. for Words, V. a. 34.

• I Keb. 629.

9 Bill v. Neal, 1 Lev. 52.

1

3

and unfit to be a justice;" or, "He is a base, rascally villain, and is neither nobleman, knight, nor gentleman, but a most villainous rascal, and by unjust means doth most villainously take other men's rights from them, and keeps a company of thieves and traitors to do mischief, and giveth them nothing for their labor, but base blue liveries;"" or," He is half-eared;" or, “He is a blackguard;" "There is a combined company here to cheat strangers, and Squire Van Tassel has a hand in it. I don't see why he did not tell me the execution had not been returned in time, so that I could sue the constable;" or, "Squire Oakley is a damned rogue;"5 so, to publish orally of a justice "He is a blood-sucker and seeketh after blood; if a man will give him a couple of capons he will take them;" or, 'You robbed the poor and are worse than a highwayman;" is not actionable. It does not follow, however that one might write down all this, even of a justice, with impunity from an action for libel.

4

"Because," said Lord Holt, "it is not a slander to call a justice of the peace blockhead, ass, &c., for

1 Hammond v. Kingsmill, 7 Jac. 1.

2 Hollis v. Briscow, Cro. Jac. 58.

1

* Markham v. Bridges, Cro. Car. 223. The justices, however, have some decisions in their favor: e. g., it is actionable to say of a justice that he was a "Jacobite" (How v. Prin, Holt, 652; 3 Poulk, 694). "He is a rascal, a villain, and a liar" (Kerler v. Osgood, I Vent. 50). "He is not fit to be a justice of the peace" (Ib.). "When thou wert justice thou wert a bribing justice" (Aston v. Blagrave, Str. 617; Prudham v. Tucker, Yelv. 153; Herle v. Osgood, 1 Vent. 50). 'He covereth and hideth felonies, and is not worthy to be a justice of the peace" (Stuckley v. Bulhead, 4 Rep. 16).

* Van Tassel v. Capron, 1 Den. 250.

6

Oakley v. Farrington, 1 Johns. 129.

Palmer v. Edwards, Rep. Cas. Prac. in C. B, 160.

'Hillard v. Constable, Mo. 418.

How v Prin, Holt, 652.

which action lies, since he is not thereby accused of any corruption in his employment, nor any ill design or principle; and it was not his fault that he was a blockhead, for he cannot be otherwise than his Maker made him; but if he had been a wise man, and wicked principles were charged on him when he had them not, an action would have lain, for, though a man cannot be wiser, he may be honester than he is." "If a person," he continues, "be in a place of profit, and he is accused of insufficiency, he shall have remedy by action; 'tis otherwise if he be only in a place of honor; though, even there, if he is charged with ill principles, and as disaffected to the government, he shall have an action for such scandal to his reputation." To say of a judge that he was a corrupt judge, or that a particular sentence delivered by him was corrupt, is actionable. In Waldin v. Mitchell, it was said that, where a man had been in an office of trust, to say that he behaved himself corruptly in it, as it imported great scandal, so it might prevent his coming into that or the like office again, and therefore was actionable. But the authority of the two latter cases is much weakened by what DeGray, C. J., says in Onslow v. Horne, “I know of no case where ever an action for words was grounded upon eventual damages which may possibly happen to a man in a future situation, notwithstanding what the Chief Justice throws out in 2 Vent. 266. I think the Chief Justice went too far." There

4

* Cramer v. Riggs, 17 Wend. 209; and see 7 Id. 204; Wilson v. Noonan, 23 Wis. 231; Littlejohn v. Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. 41; Walden v. Mitchell, 2 Vent. 266.

5

3 Wils. 188; and see Hellard v. Constable, Mo. 418; 2 Palmer v. Edwards, Rep. Cas. Prac. in C. B. 160.

is no doubt, however, that an action of libel would lie, if such an imputation as the above were written or printed and published.

3

73. Language falsely imputing to one in office any malfeasance or want of integrity-such as would impair public confidence in him, or with want of capacity for the duties of the office he holds, or with having committed a breach of the public trust is actionable 3the language must clearly appear to affect him in his office. In the cases just cited, however much the personal character of the justice was aspersed, nothing was alluded to which would make him less useful as a justice; neither would it be actionable to declare that he had tried a case that was not within his jurisdiction.*

But if the charge be that he made the office of clerk of his court a matter of private negotiation, or that he procured one to take false oaths; or if it consist of words that necessarily imply corruption generally, it would be actionable per se. Charges that a judge took a bribe, or is false,10 or is forsworn, and not fit to sit upon a bench;" that he has acted unjustly in

1

1 Lansing v. Carpenter, 9 Wis. 340.

2 Townshend on Slander and Libel, § 196; Robbins v. Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540.

3

Kinney v. Nash, 3 N. Y. 177, and cases cited.

* Oram v. Franklin, 6 Blackf. 42; but see Carter v. Andrews,

16 Pick. 1; Stone v. Clark, 21 Pick. 51.

5 Robbins v. Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540.

Chetwind v. Meeston, Cro. Jac. 308.

'Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 253; Chipman v. Cook, 2 Tyler, 456; Aston v. Blagrave, 1 Strange, 617; 2 Ld. Raym. 1369; Kent v. Pocock, 2 Str. 1168.

8 Townshend on Slander and Libel, § 196.

9

Lindsey v. Smith, 7 Johns. 360; Colton's Case, Mc. 695. 10 Wright v. Moorhouse, Cro. Eliz. 358.

11 Carn v. Osgood, 1 Levinz, 280; S. C., Kerle v. Osgood, I Vent. 50; and see Pepper v. Gay, 2 Lutw. 1288; Stuckley v. Bulhead, 4 Rep. 16 a, 19 a; Lassels v. Lassels, Mo. 401; Hollis

3

his office, or that he is partial,2 or half-eared, and will hear but one side, or that he cannot hear of one ear, or that he perverted justice, or made use of his office to worry one out of his estate, or to say that "he did seek my life, and offered ten shillings to the undersheriff to impanel a jury that might find me guilty," would be actionable.

74. Words imputing an attempt to commit a felony, as " He sought to murder me, and I can prove it;"" or a hiring or solicitation of another to commit a crime, are actionable.s

The charge of a crime, in the vulgar language, is sufficient to ground an action. It is not necessary that the words should impute the crime in the technical terms known to the law; all that is requisite being, that the intention to charge the plaintiff with its commission, should plainly appear."

Whether defamatory words are uttered or printed, the ordinary sense of them is to be taken to be the meaning of the person who uses them. However, if anything can be shown to have taken place which

v. Briscoe, Cro. Jac. 58; Burton v. Tokin, Cro. Jac. 143; Beamond v. Hastings, Cro. Jac. 240.

1 Isham v. York, Cro. Car. 14.

'Kemp v. Housgoe, Cro. Jac. 90.

3 Masham v. Bridges, Cro. Car. 223, and Alleston v. Moor,

Het. 167.

6

Bleverhassett v. Baspoole, Cro. Eliz. 313.

"Cro. Eliz. 308; Lewknor v. Cruchley, Cro. Car. 140.

Tibbott v. Haynes, Cro. Eliz. 191; 4 Coke, 16; Cro. Eliz. 747; Lady Cockaine's Case, Cro. Eliz. 49; Id. 710.

9 See Coleman v. Goodwin, 2 B. & Cr. 285, note; and Francis v. Roose, 3 M. & W. 191 See also Hankinson v. Bilby, 16 M. & W. 442; Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East, 463; Cf. Sweetapple v. Jesse, 5 B. & Ald. 31; see also Hob. 126; Cro. Eliz. 250, 496; 1 Roll. Abr. 74; and 4 Rep. 13.