Sewers and Drains---continued. notice to the council of a neighbouring urban district that he preposed to connect a sewer to be constructed for the drainage of the estate with a sewer of the council. Objection to such connection was raised by the urban district council and the owner brought an action for a declaration that he was entitled in pursuance of section 22 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), to make the connection. No steps had been taken to construct the proposed sewers. Held that under the circumstances, it would not be proper to make a declaration in the exercise of the jurisdiction given by Order XXV., r. 5. Faber v. Gosworth Urban District Council (Ch. D., 1 May, 1903), 88 L. T. 549; 67 J. P. 197: I L. G. R. 579: 19 T. L. R. 435. Intercepting Sewers--Sewers Board—Admission of Areas which became Urban into District-Extension of Urban District—Local Acts; Local Government Act, 1888, s. 57. By a local Act intercepting and outfall sewers for a district were authorised to be made and vested in a sewers board constituted by representatives of then existing local authorities. It was provided that if after the passing of the Act any local board or body of commissioners were constituted for any district in which any part of the sewers was situated they should be at liberty to participate in the liabilities and benefits of the Act and to be represented on the sewers board. By an order of the county council under section 57 of the Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41) a rural parish was added to an urban district forming part of the district of the sewers board. The council of the urban district claimed the right to send the sewage of the added parish either directly, or indirectly through their own existing system of sewers, into the sewers under the jurisdiction of the sewers board. Held that the council were entitled to a declaration that they had such a right with liberty to apply for an injunction, notwithstanding any alleged insufficency in the existing sewers of the sewer board to take the additional sewage in question. Decision of Chancery Division reversed. Hove Corpo ration v. Brighton Intercepting and Outfall Sewers Board (C. A., 6 March, 1903) 67 J. P. 335; 1 L. G. R. 355; 19 T. L. R. 306. Sewers Pollution of Stream Injunction Disobedience A perpetual injunction had been granted restraining the defendants from permitting sewage to pass through their sewers or outfall into a certain stream. Notice of motion had been served for liberty to sue out a writ of sequestration in respect of the goods, &c., of the defendants in wilfully disobeying the injunction. On the hearing of the motion the court directed an engineer to "inquire and report to the court whether anything, and if anything what, ought to be done to increase the capacity of the defendants' works so that they may be sufficient to deal efficiently with the whole amount of sewage which may be reasonably expected at any time to require treatment in the defendants' works." The engineer having made his report and recommended certain works, the court issued an order of sequestration but the writ was to lie in the office for six months on the defendants' undertaking to carry out the works recommended under the engineer's supervision with such modifications (if any) as the defendants might suggest and the engineer, after hearing the plaintiff might approve. The defendants were to pay costs of the motion and the engineer's fees. Lee v. Aylesbury Urban District Council (Ch. D., 8 Dec. 1902), 19 T. L. R. 106. Stock-see" Corporation Stock." Streets:--(1) Building Line. Building Beyond Front Main Wall of Neighbouring Buildings Special Damage to Adjoining Owner-Injunction-Public Section 3 of the Public Health (Buildings in Streets) Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 52) enacts that "it shall not be lawful in any urban district without the written consent of the urban authority to erect or bring forward any house or building in any street beyond the front main wall of the house or building on either side thereof "; and "any person offending against this enactment shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 40s. for every day during which the offence is continued after written notice in this behalf from the urban authority." Defendant deposited plans which showed that a proposed building would project beyond the front main wall of a house belonging to the plaintiff, which was in the same street and adjoined the proposed building. The plans were considered and passed by a committee of the urban authority, and then stamped "Approved" by the chairman of the committee. At a subsequent meeting of the urban authority a resolution was passed by which various acts and proceedings of the committee, including the passing of the said plans, were approved and adopted; and at the next general meeting of the council the minutes of the previous meeting were read and confirmed, and then signed by the mayor of the council. On an application by the neighbouring owner for an injunction to require the offending building to be pulled down, held that a private individual to whom special damage was occasioned had no cause of action, as the legislature intended not to create rights in individuals, but general rights for the benefit of the inhabitants of a particular district. RUMBALL V. SCHMIDT (1882) (8 Q. B. D. 603) discussed. Streets: (1) Building Line-continued. Semble, that the proceedings of the urban authority were a sufficient "written consent" for the purposes of the enactment. Mullis v. Hubbard (Ch. D., 9 May, 1903), [1903] 2 Ch. 431; 72 L. J. Ch. 593; 88 L. T. 661; 51 W. R. 571; 67 J. P. 281; 1 L. G. R. 769. Streets :-(2) Paving and Private Street Works. Work done for Particular Frontagers-Indemnity against Future A local board in 1878 made part of a causeway in a private street for some frontagers who paid a portion of the expenses and passed a resolution in 1879 that an indemnity be given to the frontagers against liability on account of other expenses that may be occasioned in connection with the street. In August, 1901, the urban district council who had succeeded to the local board resolved under and in pursuance of section 6 (1) of the Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), to do private street works, namely to level, pave, metal, flag, channel, &c., the street, and included in the provisional apportionment charges upon the premises in respect of which expenses had been incurred and paid in 1878, Held that the premises were rightly included in the apportionment as the resolution passed in 1879 probably related to work then proposed to be done and there was no evidence of an indemnity to operate for all time. Dodworth Urban District Council v. Ibbotson (K. B. D., 25 March, 1903), 67 J. P. 132. Objections by Frontagers-Previous decision that road is highway repairable by inhabitants at large-Jurisdiction of JusticesWakefield Corporation Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. lxxi.) ss. 29-31; Public Health Act, 1875, s. 150; Private Street Works Act, 1892, ss. 6, 7, 8. A local Act contained provisions analogous to those in section 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), and practically identical with sections 6 to 8 of the Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57). The corporation passed a resolution with respect to a certain street to do certain private street works of paving, &c. Specifications were approved, provisional apportionments made upon the frontagers, and other preliminary steps taken. Objection was raised by frontagers that the street was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large and the objection was upheld by the justices as a good and valid one. Three years afterwards the corporation took the same preliminary steps in respect of the same street with some additional length included. Held that the matter was res judicata and that the previous determination that the street was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large was a bar to subsequent proceedings. REG. v. HUTCHINS (1881) (6 Q. B. D. 300) distinguished. Decision of King's Bench Division' ([1902] 1 K. B 188) reversed. Wakefield Corporation v. Cooke (C. A., 3 Feb., 1903), [1903] 1 K. B. 417; 72 L. J. K. B. 345; 88 L. T. 225; 51 W. R. 305; 67 J. P. 121; I L. G. R. 337; 19 T. L. R. 214. Provisional Apportionment Memorial by Frontagers -- New An urban authority resolved to sewer, level, pave, &c., a certain street and the necessary proceedings were taken under the Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57). A provisional apportionment of expenses was made by the surveyor and approved by the authority. Some of the frontagers memorialised the authority that they had no desire that the road should be taken over and become a public road, and that the proposed works were unreasonable and unnecessary, and that inquiry should be made before any further steps were taken. The urban authority modified their proposals and withdrew the original scheme. A new scheme was adopted and all proceedings under the Act started afresh. Held that the memorial was not an objection within the meaning of section 7 of the Act and no duty was cast upon the urban authority to take the proceedings prescribed by section 8 (1) of the Act. Semble (per Mathew, L. J.) that the urban authority could abandon proceedings, and that had the terms of the memorial been such as to constitute an effective objection, it was no objection to the modified scheme in respect of which new proceedings were taken. Southampton Corporation v. Lord (C. A 28 Feb., 1903) 67 J. P. 189; 1 L. G. R. 324. Paving Expenses "Owner" - Building Agreement - New Street-Metropolis Management Act, 1855, ss. 105, 250; Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862, s. 77. Section 250 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120) defines owner to mean "the person for the time being receiving the rack-rent of the lands or premises in connection with which the said word is used, whether on his own account or as agent or trustee for any other person, or who would so receive the same if such lands or premises were let at a rack-rent. A freeholder made an agreement with a builder that the builder might enter upon certain land and should build houses thereon, and that a lease should be granted of each house when erected, and that the builder should in the meantime pay £200 a year (which was not a rack-rent) 1See Law and Legislation, 1902, p. 197. 2 Decision of Court of Appeal affirmed (H. L., 15 Dec., 1903), [1904] A. C. 31; 73 L. J. K. B. 88; 20 T, L, R, 115, 02 Streets :-(2) Private Street Works-continued. until the leases were granted, and that "this agreement is intended to operate as an agreement only and not as an actual demise of the premises, or to give the intended lessee any legal interest therein until the leases hereinbefore agreed to be granted shall have been executed." The land had not been used and no houses had been erected by the builder. Held that the freeholder, and not the builder, was the "owner" of the land within the meaning of section 250 of the Act of 1855, and therefore liable to pay the sum apportioned in respect of the land towards the expenses of paving a new street on which it abutted. HOLLAND V. KENSINGTON VESTRY (1867) (2 C. P. 565) followed. Driscoll v. Battersea Borough Council (K. B. D., 8 April, 1903), [1903] 1 K. B. 881; 72 L. J. K. B. 564 ; 88 L. T. 795; 67 J. P. 264; 1 L. G. R 511; 19 T. L. R. 403. Paving Expenses-Common Managed by Local Authority as Recreation Ground-"Owner"-Rack-rent-Metropolis Management Act, 1855, ss. 105, 250; Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862, s. 77. Under a scheme made pursuant to the Metropolitan Commons Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 122), and confirmed by Parliament, the London County Council were the authority for the maintenance and management of a common as a recreation ground. The county council derived small annual sums from the herbage and certain buildings erected on the common for purposes subsidiary to its use as a public recreation ground, but the annual expenses incurred in the management and regulation of the common far exceeded the total sums so received by them. Held that the London County Council were not owners" of the common within the definition of the word "owner" contained in section 250 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), and therefore they were not liable to pay under section 105 of the Act of 1855 and section 77 of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102) any proportion of the estimated expenses of paving a new street, on which the common abutted. FULHAM VESTRY 7. MINTER' ([1901] 1 K. B. 501) overruled. London County Council v. Wandsworth Borough Council (C. A., 31 March, 1903), [1903] 1 K. B. 797; 72 L. J. K. B. 399; 88 L. T. 783; 51 W. R. 499; 67 J. P. 215; 1 L. G. R. 462; 19 T. L. R. 372. Paving Expenses-Demand--Successive Owners-New Street- Under section 105 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855. 1 See Law and Legislation, 1901, p. 153. |