an agreement "not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof," and that the proposal signed by the defendant, having been accepted by parol only, was not sufficient to satisfy the statute, secondly, in not leaving to the jury that the plaintiff was not the first inventor, if her application of wire and composition, &c., to similar purposes was known and in use before the date of the patent,— and, thirdly, in not directing the jury to find a verdict for the defendant on the plea of non concessit. With respect to the first point, we think it may be disposed of, either by reference to the terms of the agreement, by which all that was to be done by the plaintiff constituting one entire consideration for the defendant's promise was capable of being performed within a year, and that it does not appear from its terms, which were undoubtedly agreed to in part, that any part of what the plaintiff was to do constituting such consideration, was intended to be postponed until after a year from the time of making the agreement; so that Donellan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad. 899 (E. C. L. R. vol. 23), and the judgment of Lord Wensleydale in Cherry v. Heming, 4 Exch. 631,† are authorities in favour of the plaintiff;—or, by holding, as we are prepared to do, upon the authority of the opinion expressed by Vice-Chancellor Kindersley in Warner v. Willington, 3 Drewry, 532, that a proposal signed by the person to be bound, and accepted by word of mouth by the person to whom it is made, is a sufficient agreement to satisfy the 4th section of the statute of frauds. *Upon the second question, viz. that of novelty, it is enough to [*89 say that there was evidence on both sides, which the judge seems to have left to the jury, reminding them of what was proved on each side, and pointing out the improbability of the evidence of one witness for the defendant, which no doubt the jury must have disbelieved. This was not misdirection; and, as to this part of the case, there is no complaint against the verdict on any other ground. With respect to the third and last point, viz. whether the judge ought to have directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant upon. the plea of non concessit, on the ground that the invention was not the proper subject-matter of a patent,-it is necessary to consider the effect of this plea as pleaded to the present declaration, which alleges a contract for the assignment by the plaintiff of the letters patent, to be used as therein mentioned by the Guild: and we apprehend that this is a correct expression of the contract, and that such a contract involves no warranty that the invention was new, or was a manufacture within the statute of James, but merely that Her Majesty had granted to the plaintiff the letters patent which she proposed to assign. In short, the defendant in this case, as in Hall v. Conder, antè, p. 22, contracted for the use of the plaintiff's right such as it was, without regard to whether it could be sustained upon litigation or not: and there is nothing N. 8., VOL. II.—6 unreasonable or uncommon in such a bargain. Upon this construction of the declaration, the plea of non concessit would be bad if it put in issue more than the granting of the letters patent: and, where a plea is capable of two constructions, one of which would make it bad and the other good, it ought to be construed so as to make it good. Therefore, non concessit, in this case, only puts in issue the grant by Her Majesty to the plaintiff of the letters patent; and *all the learning *90] introduced by Mr. Norman, in his laborious argument for the defendant, as to what sort of invention is the proper subject of a patent, was foreign to the question actually raised by the plea. The learned judge was right in ruling that proof of the letters patent entitled the plaintiff to a verdict upon this issue. All the points raised for the defendant being thus disposed of, the rule must be discharged. Rule discharged. END OF HILARY VACATION. CASES ARGUED AND DECIDED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, AND IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER, IN Easter Cerm, IN THE TWENTIETH YEAR OF THE REIGN OF VICTORIA. 1857. The Judges who usually sat in Banco in this Term, were,― Endorsement of Notice on Writs on Contract under 201. It is ordered that plaintiffs suing in contract for 201., or less, may, if they claim costs, endorse on the writ of summons the following notice : "Take notice, that, if judgment be signed for default of appearance, the plaintiff will without summons apply to a judge for his costs of suit, unless before such judgment you shall give notice to him or his attorney that you intend to oppose such application." *And it is further ordered, that if the defendant give such notice, the plaintiff shall proceed by summons and order. [*92 But, if the defendant give no such notice, the plaintiff may produce such endorsement to a judge at Chambers, for an order for costs, ex parte, and if the judge shall sign his name to the endorsement, such signature shall be an order for costs, and the master may tax them thereon accordingly. In case of any application for costs without such endorsement, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to more costs than if he had made such endorsement, unless a judge shall otherwise order. Entry of Satisfaction on Judgments. Upon a satisfaction-piece duly signed and attested in accordance with the 80th rule of Hilary Term, 1853, being presented to the clerk of the judgments of the masters in the court in which the judgment has been signed, he shall file the same, and enter satisfaction in the judgmentbook against the entry of the said judgment; and no roll shall be required to be carried in for the purpose of entering satisfaction on a judgment. CAMPBELL. A. E. COCKBurn. W. ERLE. CHARLES CROMPTON. E. V. WILLIAMS. April 23d, 1857. *93] *GOODMAN v. SPENCER. April 20. The Gun-Barrel Proof Act, 1855,-18 & 19 Vict. c. cxlviii.,-does not exempt gun-barrels which have been provisionally proved at Birmingham from the necessity of provisional proof in London, if required to be marked there with the definitive proof-mark of the Gun-Makers' Company. THIS was an action against the proof-master of the Gunmakers' Company for refusing to receive for proof and to prove and mark certain gun-barrels of the plaintiff, in breach of his alleged duty under the Gun-Barrel Proof Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. cxlviii. The first count of the declaration stated that the plaintiff, after the making and coming into operation of the Gun-Barrel Proof Act, 1855, caused to be sent and taken to the proof-house of the Gun Makers' Company, maintained by them for the purposes in the said act mentioned, divers barrels of him the plaintiff constructed for small-arms, and which by the provisions of the said act were required to be proved by definitive as well as by provisional proof, that is to say, one rifled barrel, and two double-barrelled shooting-pieces for firing small-shot, and which said barrels had been theretofore duly proved by provisional proof at the Birmingham proof-house, as required by the said act, and had been duly marked as so proved, and which said barrels were at the time they were so sent and taken in the proper state for proof by definitive proof; and the plaintiff was desirous of having the said barrels proved by definitive proof, and was ready and willing to leave the same at the Gun Makers' Company's said proof-house, and to have the same duly proved by such definitive proof, and marked as so proved, and to do all things necessary to entitle him to have the same so marked and proved; and all things so necessary were then done and happened,— of all which the defendant, then and thence hitherto being the proofmaster of the said last-mentioned company, then had notice, and was then requested by the plaintiff to receive the said barrels so brought to the said proof-house as aforesaid, *and to prove the same thereat by definitive proof according to the said act, and to mark the same as duly proved, if the same should be found of proof: Yet the defendant, contrary to his duty as such proof-master, would not receive the said barrels nor prove the same as aforesaid, and refused so to do; whereby the plaintiff was prevented from having the said barrels so proved, and was put to expenses, and divers other expenses to which he had been put were rendered useless: And the plaintiff claimed 501. [*94 Second count,-And the plaintiff also said that the averments and allegations in the first count mentioned were true, and that he was and is personally interested in having the said barrels so received, proved, and marked as in the first count mentioned, and in having the same re-delivered to him, and that he had sustained, or might sustain, damage by the non-performance by the defendant of his duty as such proofmaster in that behalf as aforesaid, and that performance of such duty had been demanded by the plaintiff of the defendant, and been refused by him: And the plaintiff claimed a writ of mandamus commanding the defendant to receive the said barrels at the said proof-house of the said Gun-Makers' Company, and duly prove the same thereat by definitive proof, according to the scale in force under the said act, and to duly mark such barrels when proved (if found of proof) as duly proved as aforesaid, according to such scale, and, upon repayment of all sums actually paid by such company in respect of the carriage of such barrels and their delivery at such proof-house, and their re-delivery when proved, and on payment of the charges for proving and marking as proved, by the said act authorized, to deliver the said barrels so proved and marked as proved to the plaintiff. Second plea, that the plaintiff was not at the time of the said barrels being so sent and taken as in the *declaration alleged, [*95 ready or willing to allow the said Gun-Makers' Company to prove the said barrels by the provisional proof in the said act mentioned, and that the said barrels were never proved by the said Gun-Makers' Company by the provisional proof in the said act directed; and that the said Gun-Makers' Company were always ready and willing to prove the said barrels by the provisional proof in the said act directed,—of all which premises the plaintiff always had notice, and the plaintiff always refused to allow the said Gun-Makers' Company to prove the said barrels by the provisional proof in the said act directed; where |