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SEEING THINGS INVISIBLE.

BY

J. H. JONES, D. D.

PASTOR OF THE SIXTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, PHILADELPHIA.

We look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen.-2 COR. iv. 18.

AND this furnishes a key to the changed conduct and life of Paul after his conversion. His sundering of personal, social, and domestic ties; his voluntary renunciation of so many things that were gain to him-wealth, distinction, and honour-for the sake of Christ. However appalling to others the prospect before him-disgrace, poverty, extreme bodily peril, and probable martyrdom-yet none of these things moved him. There were other things, and greater far than these, by which he was influenced, and which had a substantial presence, though invisible to the eye of sense. Those grand and awful realities of the unseen world that were hidden from others were visible to him. Hence the apostle acted as if the Judge of quick and dead, to whom he was to give account, was ever present to counsel, direct, and overawe him. But what is here asserted by the

author of our text concerning himself, is verified in the life of all who are governed by his principles. While the things that present the predominant motives of their conduct are not seen, they act as if they were habitually before them, as really as are the objects of sense, which so much affect the conduct of others. This is the truth on which it is proposed to enlarge in this discourse, and use for our practical advantage.

The thought here is complex, and may be expressed in the two following propositions:

I. That the things which furnish the most cogent motives to a religious life are invisible, but

II. That the consistent believer lives habitually as if he saw them.

The former of these propositions, it is well known, has been urged by the sceptical as a serious objection to our religion, viz: that its motives are, to such an extent, derived from things unseen, and not from objects best suited to affect us in our present condition; that its rewards and punishments are, in the main, prospective, and look to a future state, and not the present. The same has been said of its doctrines generally, that they are abstruse and incomprehensible. What a dense and impenetrable mist of darkness hangs over the grave! Death, we are taught, is but the beginning of an endless life; that it is not the end of consciousness, but a physical change merely a separation of the mortal from the immortal part of man for a season only, when they are to be reunited in a state of eternal retribution. But how little of this is warranted by what we see? Even the Saviour, who is represented as the only

hope of the guilty, is also concealed; and God no man hath seen nor can see. He dwelleth in light which no man can approach unto, and why is this? Why should that sort of truth, on whose practical influence depends the eternal welfare of the soul, be so hidden from our senses? Why not indulge us occasionally with the sight of a resurrection-a favour which it is so easy for God to grant? Why not permit the reappearing of a departed acquaintance or relative, to tell us about the invisible world? Why could not Paul, or Augustine, Luther, Baxter, Watts, or some other distinguished saint, come back to the earth for a time, as Moses and Elias did for the special instruction of Peter and John? What a confirmation of our faith if we might be permitted to see them!

The objection implied in these and similar queries would be reasonable, if the evidence of sense were the only sort that is satisfactory and conclusive; or were the main obstacles to a practical belief of the truth to be found in the mind, and capable of being dislodged by argument, and not in the heart beyond the reach of any appeals merely to the reason; or had not the impotency of ocular demonstration been exposed by repeated cases of restoration to life, and in none more signal than the example of Lazarus. But the influence of vision was tried, and its inefficiency shown, under both the Old Testament and the New. The Saviour tested its power in the case to which I have just referred, and had he opened the door of the unseen world a hundred times, and evoked Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and scores of departed Hebrews from the unseen world, it could have

proved no more concerning a future state of existence than was witnessed in thus recalling the spirit of one of the family at Bethany. The Jews, who saw this resurrection, were just as sceptical afterwards as they had been before. Nor would your heart, reader, nor mine, be more impressed by the sight of apparitions from the other world than theirs were. It is equally true concerning us, that if we hear not Moses, the prophets and apostles, neither will we be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.

It is a mistake, therefore, to assert that the motives of religion are so inoperative, because they are drawn from things not seen or remote. On the other hand, it could easily be shown that our knowledge, even of sensible objects, is rather presumptive than real, and that our senses are continually leading us into error. Indeed, the terms of what we call science are rather symbols of what we do not know, than exponents of what we do know. There is much that is mysterious and inexplicable in matter, motion, electricity, life, &c., as well as in original sin, the Trinity, or regeneration. The technical definitions of philosophy would seem to be invented to conceal her ignorance; and we are just as unacquainted with the real nature or essence of things that we see, taste and feel, as we are with the invisible things of God. It is well known that Dr. Berkeley, bishop of Cloyne, disproved the existence of matter in opposition to the testimony of the senses, and not by quibble and sophistical reasoning, but, as Reid says, by taking up the principles laid down by Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke, and carrying them out to their legitimate conclusions.

It is the boast of those who reject the supernatural and unseen in religion, that we have a competent guide and instructor in reason; but the history of the inquiries which philosophers have instituted into the powers and laws of the mind, is suited to impress us far more deeply with the imperfection of our faculties than their greatness.

It is now the nineteenth century of progress in human philosophy since the advent; ample time, we should say, for arriving at definite conclusions on the most familiar subjects, as, for example, the problem of our own nature, the number, the office, and the laws of our several faculties. We should naturally suppose it to be easier to gain a knowledge of these than of the elements and laws of the material world.

And yet there is no question, among the metaphysicians of the day, more absolutely unsettled than this. Some of them tell us that "God is the only cause in the universe, and that we are but the subjects or organs of effects which he immediately produces. Others, that we are real and responsible agents. Some teach that creatures are a part of God; others, that God is but the aggregate of his creatures; and others again, that we are wholly material, mind, soul, and body, and that we perish at death; most, however, that we have a spiritual and immaterial, as well as corporeal nature. Some maintain that none of our perceptions and thoughts are any thing more than sensations; others that we have ideas of immaterial things, as well as of those that are discerned by the senses. Some that we indeed have conceptions of God, but are without any proofs of their truth; others that we are capable of a real

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