contempt on which the Court acts must be in the face of the Court. It is true that these statutes are not shown by affidavit; but there is no affidavit negativing the existence of the statutes, or alleging that they contain nothing applicable.

As to the general jurisdiction, the writ will run where the Crown has authority, that is to say, where the inhabitants are subjects of the Crown. (a) It is unimportant whether the island be part of the dominions or part of the realm; but, as it is inalienably attached to the Crown, it appears to be part of the realm.

PATTESON, J. As at present advised, I am inclined to think that a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum will run into the Isle of Man, since 5 Geo. 3. c. 26., whatever might have been the law before that Act. The passage cited from Com. Dig. Navigation, F. 2, refers to the state of things prior to the statute. In Bishop of Sodor and Man v. Earl of Derby (b) it was said that, although at the time, namely 1751, the Isle of Man was not part of the realm, it was part of the king's dominions, being à feudatory of the king, and held by liege homage. It had been granted by James I. to the Earl of Derby, yet not as independent of the king, for the king was in some way the superior lord; and it was therefore considered that the question which had arisen there, between the Duke of Athol and the Earl of Derby, might be discussed in the English Court of Chancery, if no other jurisdiction were affirmatively shown. Then 5 Geo. 3. c. 26. transfers the island to the king, his heirs and successors, inalienably; so that the king would hold it, not in his individual right, but in courts of justice and magistrates doing the duty of their offices shall have and continue the power of committing and fining any person or persons for contemptuous behaviour, insulting or abusing them, or any of them, in the execution of their duty, according as the nature of the offence shall demerit": pp. 235, 236. A subsequent clause enacts that "during the time" the Keys of the island are hearing causes none shall presume to insuit or abuse them, on pain of being confined by order from the Governor, upon application by them made for that purpose, till the offender" give bail, &c.; and that he be then fined, &c.: p. 244. A later clause prohibits the Spiritual Courts of the island from imprisoning on contempt for non-appearance to process, but enacts that, on application to the Governor, and certificate of the contempt, "a soldier shall be granted to take such contemner before the said Court," &c., on a day appointed, and to have a reasonable fine set upon them for the contempt, as accustomed in such cases in the temporal Court": p. 246. Note in 7 Q.B.

(a) But see now, 25 Vict. c. 20. s. 1. (b) 2 Ves. Sen. 337, 351,

right of the Crown. Therefore I cannot help thinking that, at least since this statute, the island forins a part of the dominions of the Crown, so that a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum would run to it at common law. I do not say that it would do so under 31 Cha. 2. c. 2. ; for the island is not named in section 11: nor, though the island is named in 56 Geo. 3. c. 100. s. 1, is that statute applicable to a case like the present.

Then, assuming that the writ will now run to the Isle of Man, is this a case in which the Court is bound to issue it? The form in which this question arises is not material; I take the case as if cause had now been shown against our issuing the writ.

The first objection urged to the commitment is, that it does not, on the face of it, appear to have been made by the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man, inasmuch as it is signed only by the Lieutenant-Governor of the island, and it does not appear that he is the judge of that Court. I think, however, that we have before us materials from which, when I was applied to at chambers, I might have collected that the commitment was the act of the Court; though certainly I did not do so, perhaps from want of sufficient attention. It does appear that proceedings had taken place in that Court; then that a libel had been published reflecting intemperately on those proceedings; that an order had been made on the publisher to come before the Court; and that the holding of the Court had been postponed in consequence of the illness of the LieutenantGovernor. From this I might have collected that he was a constituent part of the Court. The newspaper editor comes into Court and makes an apology, but he is committed. Then Mr. Crawford comes before the Court and says that he is the author of the publication, and desires that he may be dealt with, instead of the editor. The Court, however, say to him, without letting off the publisher, that he is in contempt; and he is committed also. Certainly that appears to be the act of the Court; for he is not suffered to go at large at all. He remains in prison for three hours, and then he sends a letter of remonstrance to the Lieutenant-Governor, saying that he has been committed by the authority "of the verbal order of committal of your Excellency." From this I might have collected

that the Lieutenant Governor is the

Court. Then a written warrant is made out. That does not purport expressly to be made by the Court. But all takes place on the same day: the avowal of the authorship, the act of the Court, and the

written warrant, which states that "it is therefore hereby ordered that the said John Crawford be, for such his contempt, committed a prisoner," &c., "there to remain until further order." It does not, indeed, appear whether the original verbal commitment was "till further order,' or how it was framed. Still, taking these facts as they appear before us, I think that, if I had been more attentive, I should have perceived that this is a commitment, by the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man, of the avowed author of what the Court adjudge to be a contemptuous libel.

It is then objected that the Court could have no general power of commitment for a libel published out of Court some time before. This point has not been expressly decided upon. In Van Sandau's case (a) the libel appears to have been published both in Court and out of it. În Rex v. Almon (b) there was a very learned judgment by Chief Justice Wilmot, which he intended to deliver, though it was not delivered in fact, the case having been dropped. He satisfactorily shows that a Court of Record has power to punish, by commitment for contempt, a libel published while the Court is not sitting.(c) There must be a choice as to the mode of proceeding; for he says that the punishment may be by indictment or by committal for contempt. He treats it throughout as a matter of election. That may be an answer to the difficulty suggested by my brother Coleridge to Mr. Peacock; we need not, how ever, determine as to this, it is enough for us to see that the Court has the power, and that is clear law. If that be so, the question whether the particular publication be libellous or contemptuous is clearly, as has been said in many instances, a question for the Court which commits. We have not to inquire into this matter, which has been adjudicated upon by a Court of competent jurisdiction. But it is said that this should go to a jury. The fact of authorship is admitted by Mr. Crawford, who comes forward to avow it, openly and very properly. The construction of the publication was for the Court. We therefore cannot interfere, unless there has been some error in the manner and form of the proceeding.

There is no material question as to the form of the warrant till we come to the

(a) Van Sandau v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773; Ex parte Van Sandau, 1 FL. 445, 605.

(b) Wilm., 243, 252-271; 19 St. Tr. 1082 n. (c) See Reg. v. Lefroy L. R. 8 Q. B. 134, and McDermott ▼. Judges of British Guiana, L. R. & P. C. 341.

end. It there appears that the party is committed "until further order." Now I cannot help thinking that this is in the nature of punishment, the offence being visited in this way by the Court; and that it is not like a committal of a party till he answer, which is rather in the nature of process. Then, being a punishment, it ought to be as certain as a sentence. That was held in Rex v. James, (a) where magistrates committed a party, for contempt of them in the execution of their office, till "discharged by due course of law," there being no course of law for discharging him; and this Court said that the commitment should have been for a time certain. Mr. Peacock argues that this rule does not apply to superior courts; and he distinguishes the present case from cases where, as in the instance of magistrates, the proceedings might be brought up by certiorari. I do not know how far that distinction is good, but I think that no English Court, if their attention were called to the point, would commit by way of punishment, except for a time certain. The point was not discussed, either in this Court or in Chancery, in Van Sandau's case, (b) where the commitment was not for a time certain. But then, if I understand the affidavits correctly, this is the ordinary form in which commitments take place in the Isle of Man; and we know that the law of the Isle of Man is not the law of England, but differs from it in some respects. must leave this to the local law, as we did in Carus Wilson's case (c) and Brenan's case (d); we cannot disturb what has been done in conformity with the law of the island; we are not a Court of Appeal. Before this writ goes we must see that the commitment is bad; and I cannot come to the conclusion that it is contrary to the law of the place. The rule must, therefore, be absolute.

We

ERLE, J.: As at present advised, I agree that the writ would run to the Isle of Man. I would merely, in addition to what has been said, refer to the language of Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Cowle(e):

:

"To foreign dominions, which belong to a prince who succeeds to the throne of England, this Court has no power to send any writ of any kind. We cannot send a habeas corpus to Scotland, or to the Electorate; but to Ïreland, the Isle of Man, the plantations, and (as since the loss of the Duchy of Normandy they have been considered as annexed to the Crown,

(a) 5 B. & Ald. 894.

(b) Van Sandau v. Turner, 6 Q. B. 773; Ex parte Van Sandau, 1 Ph. 445, 605. (c) 7 Q. B. 984; 6 St. Tr. N.S. 193. (d) 10 Q. B. 499.

(e) 2 Burr. 884, 856 (A.D. 1759).

in some respects), to Guernsey and Jersey we may; and formerly it lay to Calais, which was a conquest, and yielded to the Crown of England by the treaty of Bretigny."

He seems, therefore, to have had no doubt on the subject.

Taking this, then, as an ordinary case of an application for a habeas corpus, we are to see whether there has been a lawful order of a competent tribunal. We have nothing to do with questions as to the propriety of the law of the Isle of Man, or as to the propriety of the application of it by the Court there. It is clear, on these affidavits, that the committal is by the Court of Chancery of the Isle of Man, and that the Court is competent to commit for a contempt.

Then is there here a lawful ground for committal?. The power of Courts to commit for contempt, in this country, has been discussed; and it has been established, on good reason, that a tribunal has power to protect itself by committing for a contempt relating to the exercise of its powers. The commitment here was for a contempt in publishing, while the Court was not sitting, and perhaps at some distance of time and place, a libel on the proceedings of the Court. In the elaborate judgment to which my brother Patteson has referred, it is shown that such a publication may have a strong and immediate tendency to paralyse the proceedings of the Court. Such cases may easily be conceived; the propriety of the decision in the particular case is a question for the Court itself.

Then, is the power exercised in a form which makes the act clearly void? Gosset v. Howard (a) establishes the competency of the superior courts in England to settle the forms of their own writs. But, withont at present insisting on that principle, the affidavits show that this form has constantly prevailed in the Isle of Man; the power, therefore, was lawfully exercised there. If the form be good according to the law of the island, it cannot be contended before us, sitting here, that it is wrong. Whether, in general, the proper mode be to commit for a short interval, or until further order, or till the party be brought up, may be settled hereafter on future discussion; but we must take the form to be lawful here.

Then, the question here being, in effect, whether the writ, if it had never issued, ought to go, we must make the rule absolute for setting aside the writ.

PATTESON, J.: I should have stated that my brother Coleridge, who was obliged to leave the Court during the argument, quite agrees in our view of the case. (b) Rule absolute.

MATERIALS MADE USE OF.-The above report is taken from the 13 Q. B.; the report in 18 L. J. Q. B. 225 has also been referred to.

(a) 6 St. Tr. N.S. 354; 10 Q. B. 411, 453. (b) Lord Denman, L.C.J., was absent, on account of illness.

Prerogative-Grant of Precedence.

Mr. Justice Elzéar Bedard, one of the paisne judges for the Court of Queen's Bench for the district of Montreal in the province of Lower Canada, presented a petition to Her Majesty complaining of a rule, determination or order of the other judges of that Court, refusing him the right of precedence over Mr. Justice Day and Mr. Justice Smith, the other puisne judges of that Court, as granted by the

terms of his commission.

The petition set forth that the petitioner was appointed, on the 22nd of February, 1836, one of the justices of the Court of King's Bench for the district of Quebec, in the province of Lower Canada, by letters patent and commission under the Great Seal of the province, subsequently sanctioned by warrant under the royal sign manual and seal of his late Majesty William the Fourth; that, under local etatutes, the province of Lower Canada was divided into five districts, having each its Court of King's Bench; that when sitting temporarily under local statutes in the Courts of other districts, and also in the Court of Appeals for Lower Canada, the petitioner had taken precedence among the judges of the province according to the date of his commission.

That on the 26th of April 1848, at the city of Montreal, letters patent and a commission under the Great Seal of the province were issued, appointing the petitioner one of the justices of the Court of Queen's Bench for the district of Montreal in the same province; the letters patent contained among others the following clause, giving him precedence according to the date of his original commission.

"And whereas, on the 22nd of February 1836, our royal uncle and predecessor, the late King William the Fourth, did by certain letters patent and commission under the Great Seal of our late province of Lower Canada aforesaid, appoint you, the said Elzéar Bedard, one of the justices of the Court of King's Bench for our district of Quebec, in our said province, which office you held and enjoyed up to this day, with all its rights and privileges, it is our royal will and pleasure, and we do hereby grant and

declare, that you, the said Elzéar Bedard, shall have and take rank and precedence in our said Court of Queen's Bench for our district of Montreal, next after our Chief Justice thereof, and before the Honourable Charles Dewey Day, one of the justices of the same, and in all and every our other Courts within the said part of of our province of Canada which formerly constituted our province of Lower Canada aforesaid, where, by law, you may be entitled to sit as a member thereof, next after the Honourable Philippe Panet, one of the Justices of our Court of Queen's Bench for our district of Quebec aforesaid, and before the Honourable Dominique Mondelet, Resident Judge of our district of Three Rivers, in our province of Canada aforesaid."

The petitioner further stated that on the 1st of July, the first day fixed by law for the sitting in Banco of the Court of Queen's Bench for the district of Montreal, the petitioner laid before the judges thereof his last mentioned commission, which had been previously enregistered in the register of the Court, and claimed to take rank and precedence in the Court of Queen's Bench for the district of Montreal next after the Chief Justice thereof, and before the Honourable Charles Dewey Day, one of the