cal title; the nobleness of extraction, a kind of candidateship, and not a power.

When it is said that an hereditary nobility exists in a country, we figure to ourselves privileged families, ruling over those of the plebeian and the slaves. But how could this kind of nobility establish themselves in a nation where all the lands were in common,* all the dignities elective, all the citizens so jealous of their independence that they piqued themselves on not attending punctually at the meeting of the general assemblies, convened to pass laws to protect liberty? Such people know nothing of nobility as we understand it. They have illustrious and powerful families, they have noble personages, but no hereditary nobility. Things continued in this state among the primitive race, until privileges becoming attached to the titles of property in certain families, custom introduced hereditary advantages granted to the faithful followers of the king.

Mr. Meyer appears to me to make an unfounded criticism upon a passage of Montesquieu, and to give an unlikely explanation to the subject of the title of liegemen and of noble. He supposes subjects to have been the common name of all the vassals of the great, and that the nobles were those whom he calls the criniti. But if he had more attentively considered the authorities which he cites in support of his opinion, he would have seen how opposite they were; that in all barbarous kingdoms the ligermen or antrustions were free men, whom the king had elevated to rank for their fidelity, and the criniti, crinosi, the free men, the citizens, and the people.§

I perceive that this digression is already too long, and that I have not yet given the necessary development to this discussion, nor alleged proofs which it would be easy to accumulate. This reflection convinces me, besides, that it is impossible to give a complete account of this important work within the space to which I am confined. I shall again make some observations on other assertions, which appear to me not exempt from error, relative to the exclusion of the Romans from military service, to the election of counts from the nobility, to the etymology of the name Rachimburgi, and the transition of royal justice, to the assistant judges of the counties.

I am surprised that the author has not made mention of a particular right of the royal power in the administration of justice at this epoch: I speak of the præceptio, by which the king could remove any man, be he who he might, from his ordinary judges, and suspend or invalidate all sentences, and the laws themselves, at his will.

*Tacit. Germ.--Cæs. Bell. Gall. lib. 6. Pag. 101-133.

† Pag. 99-107, 140, etc.

See Ducang.-Decret. Childeb. Sen. apud Bouq. Hist. fr., tom. 4., etc. etc.

M. Meyer has declared, with a very laudable sincerity, that the extent of his researches has not permitted him to verify the whole, and that he has found himself constrained sometimes to rely on those which have been maintained by others. He has derived considerable assistance from the writings of the Germans; but, he has also met with contrary opinions. He evinces a judicious mind, which knows how to keep itself on its guard against systems. But, whatever may be the wisdom and perspicuity of an historian, it is indispensible to refer to sources, and to consult both the text and the original. We perceive that M. Meyer has read the codes of barbarous laws, and other documents of the legislation of the middle ages. But at a time when customs had so much importance, the municipal code is to be looked for in the habits of the people, and it is then above all, that, as M. Meyer has justly observed, laws must be expounded by history. Perhaps he has not sufficiently profited by the resources which could be furnished him in Gregory of Tours, Frédegaire, and all our old chroniclers.

If a rigorous justice has compelled me not to pass over what I have found reprehensible, justice also commands me to praise the extensive knowledge, the honourable sentiments, the profound and elevated views which recommend this book to all those who are interested in the history of the middle ages, and the history of civilization in general.

We propose to comment on many historical questions that have suggested themselves to us, in reviewing the other volumes of the

same work.

J. NAUDET, de l'Institut.

ART. III. MARSHAL GROUCHY.

IN the June number of this journal was inserted an abstract of the Observations' then recently published by this officer, upon the Relation of the campaign of 1815, by general Gourgaud, and an opinion was then expressed that the justification of the Field Marshal was complete and conclusive.

་

His son Col: Grouchy, it appears, has republished the Observations' in France, and obtained access to the book containing a registry of all the orders given by Marshal Soult, (duke of Dalmatia,) the chief of the staff, during that campaign, and all his official correspondence. This important document furnishes strong corroboration to Marshal Grouchy's assertions, and entirely confutes general Gourgaud, as to the proceedings and views of the Emperor on the 17th and 18th June.

There is no entry of any order to Marshal Grouchy on the 17th, but a letter of that date, addressed to the minister of war, contains the following post-script.

'The army is formed on the great road from Namur, to Brussels, where the emperor is this moment going. The last report from gen. Pajol, is dated at Mazi, (on the road to Namur) and the left wing is in the direction of Trois-bras.'

Napoleon therefore did not anticipate at this time, the battle of Waterloo, but expected to proceed without opposition to Brussels. The following day, at ten o'clock in the morning, it appears by the registry, the following despatch was forwarded to marshall Grouchy.

'In advance of the farm of Caillou the 18th June, ten o'clock in the morning.

'Monsieur le Marechal.

'The emperor has received your last report, dated at Gembloux; you speak to his majesty of but two Prussian columns which have passed Sauvenieres, and Sart-a-valain, but reports mention a third, very strong, which has passed through Gery and Gentenis, in the direction towards Wavres.

'The emperor commands me to apprize you that at this moment his majesty is going to attack the English army which has taken a position at Waterloo near the forest of Soignes; therefore his majesty desires that you direct your movements upon Wavres, so as to bring yourself nearer to us, where you should arrive as soon as possible. You will cause the columns of the enemy upon your right to be followed by some light corps, in order to observe their motions and cut off their stragglers. Inform me immediately of your dispositions and the order of your march, and also what intelligence you have of the enemy, and do not neglect to strengthen your communications with us; the emperor desires to hear often from you.

'Signed the chief of the staff, &c. Duc de Dalmatia.' It is very remarkable, that although this despatch never reached the right wing, the marshall did direct his movements upon Wavres, and thus acted in precise conformity with the directions of the emperor, as pronounced by the chief of his staff. The following translated extracts from various French Journals will show that the opinions we have advanced coincide with those of writers whose situation gives them the best possible opportunity of forming a judgment upon this subject.

[From the Courier Ministeriel.]

• Observations upon the Campaign of 1815, by Count Grouchy.'"

'Much has already been written upon the campaign of 1815, or Father upon the battle of Waterloo, which comprises the whole of it. Those great events which influence the fate of nations, almost always constitute, after the result, historical questions upon

which the parties interested reason blindly. The world will long continue to inquire why Bonaparte could not have gained the last battle, after having gained so many others; and some persons will verily believe that his former success was entirely a matter of chance, of accident, and that the denouement which has taken place, involving the extreme danger of Europe, was to happen sooner or later, by a kind of fatalism in political events. The honor of France is not concerned in this discussion. She was not conquered at Waterloo, since the battle was not fought with her good will; she mourns and weeps for the brave Frenchmen who perished in the duel between Bonaparte and Europe; it becomes her to mourn for them. As for Bonaparte, it is natural, that in the obscurity of exile, he should be anxious that his reputation in Europe be not injured by this defeat. In the day of his power, it was his policy to impute the disasters he experienced to his generals; and he has more than once, ungratefully cast an odious stain upon their courage and devotion, in order to screen his own errors. At this day when nothing remains to him but the recollection of his battles, when it is no longer in his power to gratify his revenge, he is so much the more interested to sustain his glory in past events, and to preserve that great military reputation, by which it was his misfortune to bound his ambition; but he cannot effect this object without casting censure and reproach upon unfortunate, expatriated men. Can a situation more painful be imagined, than that of these very men, assailed in their character as soldiers by him on whose account they are now suffering banishment, and compelled in defence of their honor, to prove that they have faithfully served a cause in which they have become martyrs? These reflections at once present themselves in perusing the answer of count Grouchy to the account published by general Gourgaud. This answer proves by fair reasoning and official documents, that the faults of the campaign, if there were faults, are to be placed to the account of Bonaparte; that general Grouchy neither disobeyed his orders, nor made the mistaken movements, nor in any way occasioned the loss of the battle. We shall not examine the detail of manœuvres which he has given upon this subject, nor discuss the errors which he attributes to Bonaparte. It would be somewhat ridiculous for a newspaper editor to sit in judgment upon the talents of a vanquished conqueror. It is for military men to read this new account, and inquire whether Bonaparte did actually commit a decisive fault in remaining idle upon the field of battle of Ligny, during the morning of the 17th, or whether he was only conquered by the greatness of his own genius, because he attributed to his adversaries plans too vast, and tactics too bold and daring. The measure of the talents of Napoleon, whether more or less extensive, the perfection of his coup d'œil for war, whether more or less admirable, is a question of no importance. He never took a false

step, nor committed an error in tactics, which was in itself less to be regretted.

'The work of count Grouchy is distinguished by a tone of frankness and elevation, plain truth without severity, which is yet careful of the glory of the celebrated chief, whose reproaches he is obliged to repel, and whom he charges with errors. This work, first published in America, is preceded in the French edition, by a note from count Grouchy's son. Equally distinguished by his noble character and filial piety, as by his military talents, Col. Grouchy, solely occupied, for three years, by the hope of restoring his father to the country which he has so long served with honor, appears to have yielded only to an imperious sense of duty in recalling the memory of an epoch so fatal to his family: he is honored by the intercession of an August Prince, who will render doubly worthy of historic record, the noble courage he displayed in the crisis of the 20th March, by associating with it, the recollection of a conciliating generosity. This is a sentiment which no one can understand without participating in, and also extending to others who have been driven into exile by a law, to which the royal bounty has already made so many exceptions. Among the Frenchmen, objects of this rigorous measure, some are recommended to our clemency, by their youth and experience of misfortunes, in a career thus early interrupted; others by the maturity of their talents, and their former literary pursuits, which it would seem ought to excuse them for faults committed in a revolutionary storm.

'More than one exiled general has been restored to his country! We earnestly desire that it may be even so with general Grouchy: But does a poet, and a literary man, appear more dangerous, or less worthy of interest? An inviolable attachment to the throne, a distinguished zeal in its cause, is perfectly in accordance with the desire to see an end to all unnecessary rigor. It is no complaisance to a party to deprive them of all cause of complaint: It is precisely because the differences of opinion are clearly exposed, because the constitutionels, friendly to royalty, withstand every attack and reject all corrupt alliances, that they should wish every thing to be placed upon that legal ground, which constitutes their strength and security.'

Extract from La Renommée,' a Journal conducted by Messrs. Joui, and Benjamin Constant.

'No event has ever taken place, productive of more important results than the disaster of Waterloo. The political consequences of this battle have been such to France and to all Europe, that it has become one of the most remarkable eras in history. After the ruin of this dreadful day, when the French army lost every thing but its honor, each one strives to be exempt from the responsibility. Napoleon himself, who at the same time lost both his sword and