1858. LOBBAN v. COOK. EXCHEQUER REPORTS. any one of the persons occupying any of the several apartments, and may call on any person occupying any of the apartments, whether in the rate-book or not, to pay. [Martin, B.—If the rate is made on the owner, it would appear that the officer may go upon the premises and insist on payment from any occupier.]-He referred to Peppercorn v. Hofman (a). POLLOCK, C. B.-We are of opinion that this rule must be discharged. My brothers all think that the construction of the statute is not doubtful, and if a practice has prevailed which is contrary to its provisions it is illegal and ought to be corrected. I think I was right at the trial. The title of the plaintiff to his rent is clear. The defendant seeks to cut down the claim by establishing his right to avail himself of the sums paid by him for rates; but he has not succeeded in satisfying us of his right to do so. His proposition is clear and intelligible, viz., that in the case of houses occupied in separate apartments the parish officers are entitled to rate any person occupying an apartment in respect of the entire premises; that they may then go upon the premises and distrain upon any occupier whether his name is on the rate-book or not, and that such occupier may then deduct the amount from the next rent. But the clauses of the Act do not bear that out. Here a former occupier, not the present landlord nor any person actually occupying, was rated. The present landlord is not liable to a rate not assessed on himself or any tenant of his. MARTIN, B., BRAMWELL, B., and CHANNELL, B., concurred. Rule discharged. (a) 9 M. & W. 618. 1858. HAWKES v. COTTRELL. May 7. ASSUMPSIT indebted. on an attorney's bill.- Plea: Never Plaintiff, a in in solicitor, employed by the defendant a prochein ami in a suit in Chancery, sent in his bill before the termination of the suit. The defendant contended that At the trial, before Watson, B., at the Middlesex sittings in this Term, it was proved that the defendant, Hilary Term, 1854, as next friend for some infants, had given an authority to the plaintiff to institute a suit Chancery praying that the trusts of a certain settlement might be carried into execution. The suit was for the benefit of the trustees of the settlement, of whom the defendant's brother was one. The defendant had never actually interfered, except by signing the retainer, and on if a certain contended that, being only nominally a party, the plaintiff he was not responsible. The solicitor offering to go then wrote sum was paid him, and if would admit the defendant that he was suit personally responsible. and The defendant not consenting to to this:- Held, that the solici to tor was entitled to sue for his costs without waiting for the termination of the suit. Per Martin, B., and Channell, B.-The rule, that a was not to look to him for payment. It appeared further, that in August, 1854, an order was made in the that the trusts should be carried into execution; in March, 1855, it was referred to the taxing Master tax all parties their costs, and directions were given as the mode in which the income was to be disposed of until the further order of the Court. The plaintiff took no other steps in the suit, and made no application to the Court for the payment of his costs out of the estate, but in November, 1857, he sent in his bill of costs to the defendant, and subsequently wrote several letters applying for payment. On the 14th of January, 1857, the plaintiff's agent wrote to the defendant's brother, who was acting for he is employed, him, as follows:—" Mr. Hawkes is quite willing to pro- an exception secute this suit on being paid costs out of pocket, and upon where the the clear understanding that both the plaintiff and yourself consider it right that this suit should be proceeded with, and that the plaintiff is fully aware that he is personally solicitor cannot sue for his costs till the termi nation of the suit in which is subject to client comes forward and disclaims his liability. 1858. HAWKES v. COTTRELL. responsible for all the costs, &c." On the 22nd he wrote: "If you will let Mr. Hawkes have 80%. or 1002., he will proceed with the suit at once." After some further correspondence, the defendant's brother wrote:-" Why will not Mr. Hawkes prosecute the suit, and get his costs in the usual way? *** I will provide funds, so far as monies out of pocket are concerned, which may hereafter be required." The defendant's counsel contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, on the ground that the suit was not at an end. The learned Judge asked the jury whether they thought the plaintiff's demand of 807. or 100l. to go on, was reasonable; and, the jury having found in the affirmative, he directed a verdict for the plaintiff. Mellor now moved for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. The learned Judge should have told the jury that the plaintiff was bound to wait till the suit was at an end before commencing his action. [Martin, B.-Must an attorney, retained in a Chancery suit which may last many years, wait till it is finally wound up before he can recover his charges? Is it not rather a question of fact what is the understanding of the parties?] In Stokes v. Trumper (a), Page Wood, V. C., referring to Whitehead v. Lord (b), said, that "a solicitor cannot bring his action for a bill of costs till the whole of the business is done, except in a case where there has been a stipulation that, until the client furnishes him with money, he cannot go on with his case." [Channell, B.-The word "stipulation means "notice."] It was not enough to give notice after the delivery of the bill. [Martin, B.-The defendant contended that he was not liable.] POLLOCK, C. B.-We are all of opinion that the learned (b) 7 Exch. 691. (a) 2 K. & J. 232. Judge was right, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. MARTIN, B.-It would be extraordinary if a solicitor were bound to go on with an expensive suit for a client who denies his liability. I think therefore that the rule referred to is subject to another exception, viz., that in case the liability be denied the solicitor may sue his client before he has carried the suit to its termination; and, however reasonable the rule is in ordinary cases, I think it should not be applied where a solicitor is employed in a case which may go on for years in the Court of Chancery. BRAMWELL, B.-To the rule that a solicitor cannot bring his action before the work upon which he is employed is complete, an exception has very properly been introduced, viz., that if the solicitor asks for funds which are not supplied to him, he may put an end to the retainer and sue. The plaintiff did so in the present case. CHANNELL, B.-The objection to the plaintiff's right to recover assumes two points, first, that the defendant is liable; secondly, that a suit is pending. If a solicitor conducts a suit to a certain point and then withdraws from it, he is not necessarily entitled to sue. If he wants money, he must ask for funds to carry on the suit, and if they are improperly withheld he may then sue for his bill. But when the client comes forward and says that he is not liable, that is a revocation of the solicitor's authority. The client in effect says: "the suit must no longer be carried on as my suit-you are not my solicitor." If that were not so, I should not be quite satisfied that the suit was at an end. But the defendant says: "as regards future proceedings the suit is at an end.” Rule refused. 1858. May 5. MALPASS v. Mudd. Twelve months JOYCE had obtained a rule calling on the plaintiff's after issue joined in an action, a Judge made an order that the plaintiff's attorney should "declare in writing to attorney to shew cause why, unless a non pros was entered and the defendant's costs in the cause and of the application were paid by the plaintiff or his attorney, an attachment should not issue against the plaintiff's attorney for contempt the defendant's in not declaring to the defendant's attorney the profession, occupation or quality and place of abode of the plaintiff, pursuant to an order of Wightman, J., dated the 29th of July, 1857. the plaintiff's occupation, &c., and that after five days all further proceedings should be stayed until The order was as follows:-" Upon hearing the attorneys such delivery." or agents on both sides, I do order that the plaintiff's The order having been duly served -Held, that attorney do forthwith declare in writing to the defendant's and disobeyed; attorney or agent the profession or occupation or quality and place of abode of the plaintiff in this action, and that after five days all further proceedings be stayed until such delivery." the order was not within the 7th section of The Common Law Procedure and that an The order was duly served on the plaintiff's attorney, but was not obeyed. The affidavits on the part of the against the at- plaintiff's attorney shewed that the cause was at issue on the 7th of July, 1856, and that notice of trial was given for the then next assizes on the 15th of July, 1857. torney for such disobedience. Keane now shewed cause.-First, as this is a penal proceeding, the affidavits should shew that all the preliminary steps have been taken in order to induce the Court to make an order for an attachment. But it does not appear that a demand in writing was made calling on the plaintiff's attorney to declare whether the writ was issued with his privity, as required by the 7th section of the Common Law Procedure |