1858.

PAUL

v.

JOEL.

another ground. As to the case of Solarte v. Palmer, I
agree that, even supposing the House of Lords could reverse
its own decision, we cannot. But in the case of Bright v.
Hutton (a) the House of Lords considered that they were
not bound by their erroneous decision on a question of fact.
That prevents us being bound by an erroneous decision of
the House of Lords on a question of fact; and I cannot
help thinking that this must be a question of fact. We
cannot inquire into the effect of the instrument on the mind
of any particular individual, but whether it gives to people
in general notice that the bill has been presented and dis-
honoured. Suppose a notice was in these terms:-"I demand
payment of a bill of which A. is the drawer and you are the
acceptor for 1007., and which amount you owe me ;" does
not that convey as strong an intimation of notice of dishonour
as if there had been a demand of 1s. 6d. for noting? I think
it does. Here the notice does not in terms say that the defend-
ant owes the money, but when payment is demanded it is
equivalent to saying "you owe me the money." A “re-
quest" amounts to the same thing: it indicates that the
party, as a matter of right, requests that the money may
be paid. According to Solarte v. Palmer, I should be pre-
pared to hold, if necessary, that in every case where the
request
for payment was made on the proper day, the jury
ought to be asked whether that did not by necessary impli
cation convey to the party requested notice that the bill had
been dishonoured. In my opinion that is the principle
which we had better at once boldly adopt, rather than
attempt to get over that decision from a desire to do sub-
stantial justice. Certainly that is what I should be inclined
to do, but in this particular case we need not go so far. I
agree with Mr. Hannen that the defendant's clerk was not

(a) 3 H. L. 341, 388.

his agent to make any admission; but he was his agent to receive the notice, and if what took place affected the mind of the defendant with notice, that is enough. Now the manager of the bank goes to the defendant's office, writes the notice on a piece of paper and sends it in to the defendant. Instead of the defendant saying, "What does this mean? I do not understand that the bill has been dishonoured:" he says, "It shall be attended to," which means "I will pay it." I hold, therefore, that in this particular case there was evidence for the jury, according to the law as laid down in Solarte v. Palmer, that the notice so given conveyed an intimation that the bill had been presented and was dishonoured. And I am prepared to go further, and say that in every case where a demand of payment is made on a drawer or indorsee by the holder of the bill on the proper day, it ought to be left to the jury to say whether, under the circumstances, there was sufficient notice of dishonour.

1858.

PAUL

v.

JOEL.

Rule discharged.

MARTIN V. THE LEICESTER WATERWORKS COMPANY.

June 4.

compensation

THE declaration stated that, before and at the time of A person the making of the agreement hereinafter mentioned, the claiming defendants were a corporation established and incorporated under a Waterby act of parliament for the purpose of better supplying which incorwith water the inhabitants of the borough of Leicester, Lands Clauses

works Act,

porated the

Consolidation
Act, 1845,

agreed with the Company to appoint as sole arbitrator, for the purpose of settling the amount of such compensation, a person to be nominated by two others. They accordingly nominated an arbitrator who awarded to the claimant a sum exceeding 501-Held, that the claimant was entitled to the costs of the arbitration although no offer had been made by the Company, or the other preliminaries mentioned in the statute complied with.

1858.

MARTIN

v.

LEICESTER

COMPANY.

&c.; and it was by the special act of parliament relating to the said Leicester Waterworks Company enacted (a), "that all persons interested in the water mills situate on the WATERWORKS stream flowing from the reservoir thereby authorized to be made at or near Thornton in such special act mentioned, and lying above the junction of such stream with the river Soar or Leicester navigation, should be entitled to pecuniary compensation for or in respect of any injury they might respectively sustain by the abstraction of water for the purposes of the said undertaking; and that the amount of such compensation should, in case of disagreement between the Company and such persons respectively, or any of them, be settled by arbitration in manner provided by the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845,' in cases of disputed compensation." And the plaintiff, before and at the time of the making of the said agreement, was possessed of a certain water mill, called the Anstey Mill, situate on the said stream flowing from the said reservoir at or near Thornton aforesaid, and lying above the junction of such stream with the said river Soar or Leicester navigation, and interested in such mill, to wit, as owner thereof, and by reason thereof and of the premises was entitled to compensation from the defendants for and in respect of injuries sustained by him by the abstraction of water by the defendants for the purposes of the said undertaking but the defendants, before and at the time of the making of the said agreement, had not made any satisfaction to the plaintiff in respect of such compensation, and a disagreement had arisen between the defendants and the plaintiff respectively as to the amount of such as to the amount of such compensation; and thereupon, to wit, on &c., by a certain agreement made and entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendants, after reciting (inter alia) that the plaintiff claimed (a) 10 & 11 Vict. c. cclxxxii., s. 41.

TRINITY TERM, 21 VICT.

1858.

MARTIN

v.

LEICESTER

COMPANY.

to be a person interested in the said water mill within the meaning of the 41st section of the said Leicester Waterworks Act, 1847, and to be entitled to a sum of money exceeding the sum of 50l. as pecuniary compensation for WATERWORKS and in respect of injury sustained by him by the abstraction of water for the purposes of the undertaking in the said act of parliament mentioned; and also reciting, as the fact was, that a disagreement existed between the plaintiff and the Leicester Waterworks Company as to the amount of such compensation: and also reciting, as the fact was, that the parties thereto had mutually agreed to appoint as sole arbitrator, for the purpose of ascertaining and settling the amount of such compensation, a person to be nominated by K. Macaulay and J. Mellor, and that the said K. Macaulay and J. Mellor had accordingly nominated G. Hayes for that purpose: they, the Leicester Waterworks Company and the plaintiff, did thereby, in performance of the said therein recited agreement and in pursuance of the provisions of the "Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845," and of the Acts above referred to, appoint the said G. Hayes to act as sole arbitrator, on behalf both of the said Company and of the plaintiff, to ascertain and settle the amount of such disputed compensation.-Averments: that the agreement was signed by the plaintiff and J. Loseby, the clerk of the Leicester Waterworks Company and on their behalf, and was duly sealed with the seal of the Company that the said G. Hayes, in pursuance of the powers contained in the said agreement, having taken upon himself the burthen of the said arbitration, did, in due manner and in pursuance of the powers vested in him by the said agreement and other powers enabling him in that behalf, and within three calendar months from the time he was so appointed arbitrator as aforesaid, and in accordance with the provisions of the "Lands Clauses Consolidation Act,

1858.

MARTIN

v.

LEICESTER

1845," to wit, on &c., duly make and publish his award in writing under his hand and seal of and concerning the matters in difference between the plaintiff and the defendWATERWORKS ants so referred to him as aforesaid: and, after reciting the COMPANY. said agreement, did by his said award then award, ascertain, settle and determine that the amount of compensation due and payable from the said Company to the plaintiff for and in respect of the injury sustained by him as owner of the said mill called the Anstey Mill, by reason of the abstraction of water by the Company for the purpose of the said undertaking, was and should be the sum of 4404, which said sum so awarded as aforesaid exceeds the sum of 501., and was and is a much larger sum of money than was ever offered by the defendants to the plaintiff for and in respect of such compensation as aforesaid. And afterwards, to wit, on &c., and before the commencement of this suit, the said G. Hayes, as such arbitrator as aforesaid, had notice of the premises, and afterwards according to and in compliance with the provisions of the "Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845," by writing under his hand, at the request of the plaintiff, settled the costs of the plaintiff of and incident to the said arbitration to amount to, and the same when so settled amounted to, the sum of 1077. 14s. 2d.; of all which the defendants had notice before the commencement of this suit, and have been requested to pay the same. Breach.That although all things have been done and have happened to entitle the plaintiff to have the said costs so settled by the said arbitrator paid to him by the defendants, yet the defendants have not paid the said sum of 1077. 14s. 2d., &c.

Plea.—That the plaintiff did not, at any time before the alleged submission to arbitration, give notice in writing to the defendants of his desire to have the compensation claimed by him settled by arbitration, or state in any such,