TRINITY TERM, 21 VICT. was a demurrer on which judgment had been given for the plaintiff. Upon this the Master had taxed and allowed the costs of the action to the plaintiff. Prentice now shewed cause.-The action being upon a bond, the penalty is the debt: 1 Saund. 58 b. The judgment is entered up for the sum of 20%. and 1s. damages. [Pollock, C. B.-Is the plaintiff entitled to damages as of course? Beaumont v. Greathead (a) seems to shew that he is not.] The practice has always been to enter up judgment in that way. The plaintiff has recovered a sum exceeding 201., and is therefore not deprived of costs by the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 11. Keane, in support of the rule, was not called upon. POLLOCK, C. B.-We cannot put a technical interpretation on the words of this statute, but must construe it according to the ordinary meaning of the words as commonly understood. What the legislature meant by the word recover was what the plaintiff is to get and put into his pocket. Here he will only get 127. BRAMWELL, B.-I am also of opinion that the rule must be absolute. I am not satisfied that Mr. Prentice is not right in his contention that the penalty is the sum due. If the penalty of this bond had been 301., I am not sure that the defendant might not have been arrested. But from Beaumont v. Greathead (a) it appears that nominal damages are something which has no existence in point of quantity. When you give expression to them you mention some coin. But they will not make 201. more than 207. by being added to it. Under the old practice, judgment was signed for the (a) 2 C. B. 494. 1858. GOWENS v. MOORE. 1858. GOWENS v. MOORE. debt and something more, because there was a technical necessity for putting down some coin beyond the debt. The origin of the 95th section of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, which abolished the distinction between debt and damages for this purpose, was a case like the present, where a person paying money into Court doubted whether he was not bound to pay in something more for damages. The object was to ascertain the legal amount due, and that judgment should in all cases be given according to that. I decide the case on the ground that the proper judgment is that the plaintiff was entitled to recover 201 WATSON, B.-I think the rule must be made absolute for two reasons. First, damages are given on the ground of the supposed detention of the debt. The 1s. nominal damages are not a reality. Such nominal damages are never recovered; they are merely put on the record for the purpose of giving costs. Therefore, on that view of the case, the plaintiff has only recovered 202. But, in fact, he only recovered 127., though there is a formal entry on the record of a judgment for 20%.; and I think that, for the purposes of this statute, we must look at the substance and not merely at the entry on the record. (a) See Johnson v. Harris, 15 C. B. 357; Blew v. Steinau, 11 Rule absolute (a). Exch. 440; Hodges v. Callaghan, 2 C. B., N. S., 306. 1858. THE LONDON MONETARY ADVANCE AND LIFE ASSURANCE May 31. section of THE declaration commenced by stating that "The Lon- The 27th Plea. That the alleged causes of action accrued, and Stock Com1857," which requires every Company registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. panies Act, c. 110, "but excluding any Company purpose of The Joint Stock Com1856, 1857, on panies Acts, or before the this action was commenced, after the 2nd day of November, 1857, and not before; and that the said Company was and formed for the is a Company formed, constituted, and completely regis- insurance," to tered under the act of parliament passed in the session register under holden in the 7th and 8th years of the reign of her present Majesty for the registration, incorporation and regulation of Joint Stock Companies; and the said Company did not on or before the 2nd day of November, 1857, nor at any time before the commencement of this action, nor any time since, register nor become nor is it registered, under the Joint Stock Companies Acts, 1856, 1857, or either of them, pursuant to the said last mentioned Acts or either of them, but has always made default in so doing. And the defendant completely further says that the said Company was and is formed and constituted and carries on business for divers other purposes than the purpose of banking or insurance, to wit, for the purpose of lending and advancing money. And that the 2nd November, 1857, only exempts from such registration Companies formed for Therefore registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, formed for the purpose and carrying on the business of insurance lending of said claim does not arise out of or relate to any matter and also the of banking or insurance, but the same arises wholly out of money, made default in registering under those Acts:-Held, that by the 28th section of The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1857, such Company was incapable of suing at law or in equity. 1858. LONDON ADVANCE, &c., and relates wholly to an assignment of the goods in the declaration mentioned, made by one A. Peck to the said MONETARY Company solely and exclusively in their character of money lenders, that is to say, solely to secure the repayment to them by the said A. Peck of certain monies lent and advanced by them to the said A. Peck, and the interest and expenses in respect thereof. v. SMITH. Replication. That the plaintiffs were and are a Company formed for the purpose of insurance. Rejoinder. That the said Company was and is formed and constituted and carries on business for divers purposes other than and besides and in addition to the purpose of or of carrying on the business of insurance, that is to say, for the said other purposes in the plea mentioned; and that the plaintiffs' said claim does not nor did arise out of or relate to any matter of banking or insurance, but the same has arisen wholly out of and relates wholly to the said matter in the said plea in that behalf mentioned. Demurrer and joinder therein. The question raised by the pleading is, whether a Joint Stock Company formed for the purpose of insurance and also for another purpose, and registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, is bound to register under "The Joint Stock Companies Acts, 1856, 1857." - Wordsworth, in support of the demurrer (a). It is admitted on the record that the plaintiffs are an insurance Company constituted under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110. By the 27th section of the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 14, "Every Company completely registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, including any Company that has obtained a certificate of complete registration under "The (a) Before Martin, B., Bramwell, B., and Watson, B. Limited Liability Act, 1855,' but excluding any Company formed for the purpose of insurance, shall, if it has not already registered under the principal Act, register under the Joint Stock Companies Acts, 1856, 1857, on or before the 2nd day of November, 1857, or incur such penalty as is hereinafter mentioned." The 28th section imposes the penalty, and declares that, on default in registering, "the Company shall be incapable of suing either at law or in equity." The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, s. 2, declares that "This Act shall not apply to persons associated together for the purpose of banking or insurance." The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. c. 14, s. 2, declares that "The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, and this Act, shall, so far as is consistent with the context and objects of such Acts, be construed as one Act." By the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 80, s. 1, "The Joint Stock Companies Acts, 1856, 1857, shall not, nor shall either of them, be deemed to have repealed, as respects Companies already formed for the purpose of carrying on the business of insurance under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, &c., the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, or any other Act, amending the same or relating to such Companies." The obvious intention of the legislature was that insurance Companies should continue to be regulated by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110. Two classes of Companies are contemplated, viz., Companies formed for commercial purposes, and Companies formed for the purpose of insurance. This Company is within the latter class. Moreover, the plea does not allege that this is a Company required to be registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, and, if so, the 27th section of the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1857, does not apply to it. Norman appeared in support of the plea, but was not called upon to argue. 1858. LONDON MONETARY ADVANCE, &c., COMPANY v. SMITH. |