apology. Inserting an expression of regret in small type, suitable only to a notice to correspondents, amounts to this, that the defendant did not insert an apology.

BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. Inserting an apology means effectually inserting it; not so that people would not be likely to see it; but in such a manner as to counteract as far as possible the mischief done by the libel. Here the jury found that the type should have been larger, and the apology inserted in a more prominent part of the paper. Now, if this is a question of fact, I am not dissatisfied with the verdict. If it is a question of law, I hold that when an apology, instead of being put in a part of the paper addressed to the public at large, is inserted amongst notices addressed only to particular correspondents, where ordinary readers of news would not see it, it is not sufficient. After such a mistake as that in the present case, it was the duty of the defendants to have inserted the apology in the most conspicuous manner.

WATSON, B.-The apology ought to have been inserted in such a manner as to attract public attention to it. The jury found that it was not put in a proper place. One would think that the right place would be at the head of the local intelligence. In ordinary cases people do not trouble themselves to read notices to correspondents.

CHANNELL, B.-The plaintiff was entitled to damages for the publication of the libel unless his case was answered by the plea. Now the effect of the finding is, that a material allegation in the plea, viz., as to the insertion of an apology, was not proved. The plea being disproved, the plaintiff remains unanswered, and was therefore entitled to have the verdict entered according to the direction of the learned Judge.

Rule refused.

1858.

LAFONE

v.

SMITH.

VOL. III.-N. S

DDD

EXCH.

1858.

Nov. 12.

EASTWOOD and Another v. BAIN and Others.

A bill drawn DECLARATION.-The first count stated that one

on the R. S. G.

Company, Limited, by a shareholder in that Company,

was accepted

J. A. Scott, on the 22nd of July, 1857, by his bill of exchange, now overdue, directed to the defendants under the name, style and description of the Royal Surrey Gardens Company, Limited, required the defendants to pay to his order 500l. two months after date, and the defendants, under the said name, style and description, by one W. Ellis their agent in that behalf, accepted the said bill: that J. A. faet written by Scott indorsed to Pritchard, and Pritchard to the plaintiffs;

"W. Ellis,
secretary,
by order of
the R. S. G.
Company,
Limited."

This accept

ance was in

order of certain

directors of the Company At the time when the bill became due the Company was insolvent. In an action by a second

but that the defendants did not pay the same.-Second count: That the defendants, assuming to be and acting as directors of a Company by them called the Royal Surrey Gardens Company, Limited, falsely pretended that they had authority on behalf of the said Company to accept, indorsee of the and to order the said W. Ellis (assuming to be and acting as secretary of the said Company) to accept, the said bill

bill, (who did

not shew that either be, or the first indorsee had given value

to the drawer,) against the directors, who authorized the acceptance,

alleging in one

on behalf of the said Company; which the said W. Ellis, assuming and acting as aforesaid, then did; whereby the plaintiffs, relying on the said acceptance, were induced to, and did, believe that the same was duly authorized by the said Company, and did then receive and take the said bill count that they so indorsed to them as aforesaid for and in respect of ceraccepted the bill, and in tain value by them to the said Pritchard given; whereas in another charging them fact the defendants had not authority to accept, or to order with falsely representing the said W. Ellis to accept, the said bill on behalf of the said Company, as the defendants at the time of the said order well knew; and the said bill always hath been, and

that they had authority on behalf of the Company to accept it:

Held, first, that the defendants were not liable as acceptors. Secondly, that, assuming there had been a false representation, the plaintiff not having proved that he thereby sustained damage, the defendant was entitled to a verdict.

is, unavailable and not binding on the Company, and the same was accepted without their authority, and the said bill, though indorsed, remains unpaid, &c.

Pleas to the first count.-Traverse of acceptance. To the second count.-First: Not guilty. Secondly: That the plaintiffs did not, in reliance upon the said acceptance and believing that the same was duly authorized by the Company, receive or take the bill so indorsed as in that count mentioned.

At the trial, before Pollock, C. B., at the Sittings in London after Trinity Term, it was proved that one J. A. Scott, having been employed by the Surrey Gardens Company, Limited, to build refreshment rooms, drew upon the Company a bill of exchange, which was accepted, as follows:

The bill was indorsed by Scott to Pritchard and by Pritchard to the plaintiffs. Ellis, the secretary, proved that the bill was accepted by the authority and order of the defendants, who were three of the directors of the Company. The order appeared in the minute book of the Company. The Company was registered, as a Company with limited liability, on the 17th of April, 1856. Scott, the drawer, was a shareholder. The Company was proved to have been insolvent when the bill became due. Neither Pritchard nor the plaintiff were called to prove that they gave value for the bill. By the 90th clause of the

1858.

EASTWOOD

v.

BAIN.

1858.

EASTWOOD

v.

BAIN.

deed of settlement, it was provided "that the directors shall not issue or accept any promissory notes or bills of exchange for or on behalf of the Company; but they may receive promissory notes and bills of exchange for the Company, and such notes and bills may be indorsed in the name of the Company by the secretary and one of the directors for the time being," &c.

The defendants' counsel submitted; first, that the defendants were not liable as acceptors of the bill; secondly, that it was not proved that they had made any representation with respect to the bill, and that Scott the drawer, being a shareholder, must have known that the defendants had no power to accept or authorize Ellis to accept the bill; thirdly, that it was not shewn that the plaintiffs had sustained any damage, the Company having been insolvent when the bill became due. The learned Judge directed a verdict for the plaintiffs with 5001. damages, reserving leave to move to enter the verdict for the defendants.

Edwin James having obtained a rule nisi to enter the verdict for the defendants, or to reduce the damages to a nominal sum,

Overend and Barstow now shewed cause.-The bill is not binding on the Company. The acceptance must be read, "accepted on behalf of the Company by the authority of the Company." That is a false representation on the face of the bill. It may be that both Scott, who was a shareholder, and the defendants knew that the defendants, as directors, had no power to authorize Ellis to accept the bill; but on the principle of Polhill v. Walker (a), the representation appearing on the face of the bill must be considered as made to all who received it in the course of its circulation. The representation need not be made

(a) 3 B. & Ad. 114.

to a particular person, if when made it was intended to circulate in the commercial world: Gerhard v. Bates (a). The plaintiffs are at least entitled to a verdict for nominal damages.

Edwin James, Hale, and R. E. Turner, in support of the rule. In actions for false representation nominal damages do not follow as a matter of course. If damage is not shewn to have resulted from the false representation there is no ground of action. Here it was not proved that the plaintiffs gave value for the bill, and therefore the allegations traversed by the last plea were not proved. They referred to Taylor v. Ashton (b), and 1 Wms. Saund. 230, note 4.

POLLOCK, C. B.-The rule must be absolute to enter the verdict for the defendants. The first count is on the bill of exchange. As to that, the acceptance was not the acceptance of the Company, or of the defendants who were charged as acceptors. No person can accept a bill of exchange except the person to whom it is addressed, unless he accepts for the honour of the drawer. The plaintiffs therefore must fail on that count. The second count is for a false representation. That is a case where an action does not lie, whether the defendants have been guilty of fraud or not, unless the plaintiffs have sustained damage. Here it was consistent with the evidence that the plaintiffs may have been the mere puppets of Scott.

BRAMWELL, B.-It is clear that this was not the acceptance of the defendants. That disposes of the first count. As to the second, the plaintiffs have not proved that they sustained any damage from the wrongful act. This is an action to recover the damage done by the act (a) 2 E. & B. 476. (b) 11 M. & W. 401, 415.