At that time it wanted one minute and a half to 10 by the town clock. The clock in Court was regulated by Greenwich time, which was some minutes before the true time at Dorchester. The learned Judge having refused the application, Cole had obtained a rule nisi for a new trial upon affidavits of the above facts, against which Slade and Kingdon shewed cause.-The sitting of the Court was properly regulated by Greenwich time. [Pollock, C. B.-When it is stated that a Court will sit at a particular hour, that is understood by all persons as the time at the place where the Court sits. We are as much bound to take judicial notice that a particular place lies east or west of Greenwich, and consequently has a different time from it, as we are to know the days of the year.] A Judge may appoint the sittings of the Court by Greenwich time. [Pollock, C. B.-No doubt; but that was not done in this case. Suppose a question arises as to whether a person died at 12 o'clock on a particular day, is that to be determined by the time of the place or Greenwich time ?] The time to be observed at any place is determined by a resolution of the authorities or general course of the parties at that place. Greenwich time is observed at most places in England through which railways pass, and in some the clocks have two sets of hands, the one shewing Greenwich time the other the time of the place. H. T. Cole appeared to support the rule, but was not called upon. POLLOCK, C. B.—We are all of opinion that the defendant ought to have an opportunity of trying the cause. The rule will therefore be absolute without costs. It seems to me doubtful whether this application is in consequence 1858. CURTIS v. MARCH. 1858. CURTIS v. MARCH. of any mistake on the part of the defendant or his counse for it may be that the Dorchester town clock pointed to Dorchester time, although that in Court was regulated by Greenwich time, and that this circumstance was not generally known in Dorchester. I cannot assent to the argument that the town council of any place may by their resolution declare that Greenwich, or any other time, shall be the time of the place; for I cannot help seeing the consequences. The difference between Greenwich time and the real time at Carlisle is several minutes, and therefore if a town council might determine the time, they might make a man born on a different day from that on which he was really born. Or suppose that by act of parliament a person was bound to go out of office on a particular day, the town council by altering the time might put him out of office to-day instead of to-morrow. So, if a person is entitled to a bonus from an insurance office in the event of his living to a certain period, that must be decided, not by the town council adopting Greenwich time, but by the mean time of the place. Ten o'clock is 10 o'clock according to the time of the place, and the town council cannot say that it is not, but that it is 10 o'clock by Greenwich time. Neither can the time be altered by a railway company whose railway passes through the place, nor by any person who regulates the clock in the town-hall. A person hearing that the Court would sit at 10 o'clock would naturally understand that to mean 10 o'clock by the time of the place, unless the contrary was expressed. In this case, looking to the difference of time (of which we are bound to take judicial notice), the defendant was in Court before 10 o'clock. WATSON, B.-On the day when the cause was tried, I came into Court punctually at 10 by the clock in the Judges' room, which was set at Greenwich time. I pro ceeded at once with the business. A few minutes afterwards Mr. Cole came in and stated that it was not yet 10, but I did not hear whether he meant by the mean time of the place or by Greenwich time. That is now explained by the affidavits, from which it appears that two times are kept, the clock in the Court being regulated by Greenwich time. CHANNELL, B., concurred. Rule absolute. 1858. CURTIS v. MARCH. WILLIAMS v. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY. THIS was an action for the value of a bull killed on the defendants' railway. The cause was tried before Byles, J., at the last Worcester Assizes, when a verdict was found for the defendants on the first count, which charged a defect of fences, and for the plaintiff on the second count, which charged negligence on the part of the Company. Pigott, Serjt., moved for a new trial (a), on the ground that one of the jurymen was a shareholder in the Company. [Bramwell, B.-Is there any authority for such an application?] The case falls within the general principle that a judge is disqualified from deciding a cause in which he is personally interested: Dimes v. The Grand Junction Canal Company (b). [Bramwell, B.-That principle does not apply here: a judge cannot be challenged, a juryman may. The objection not having been taken at the time when it might have been cured, we ought not to grant a (a) Nov. 4. Before Pollock, C. B., Bramwell, B., Watson, B., and Channell, B. Nov. 12. Where a public Com pany is a party to an action, the mere fact that one of the jurymen was a shareholder in the Company 1858. WILLIAMS บ. GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY Co. new trial; otherwise any person suing a public company might lie by and take his chance of a verdict, and if it was against him apply for a new trial because one of the jurymen was a shareholder in the company.] At the time of the trial the plaintiff was not aware that the juror was interested. There is no opportunity of searching the register at the time the jury are struck. [Bramwell, B.— Assuming that a suitor has no means of knowing whether a juryman is interested, still, if the juryman has not conducted himself improperly, the suitor has sustained no damage. Here it does not appear that any injustice has been done.] Cur, adv. vult. POLLOCK, C. B., now said:-This was a motion for a new trial, on the ground of one of the jurymen being a shareholder in the railway Company, and consequently open to a challenge if the fact had been known. Generally speaking, where there is ground of challenge, but no objection is taken to a juror who might be challenged, that is certainly no reason for granting a new trial. We cannot say that there are no circumstances which would induce the Court to interfere. For instance, if there had been any arrangement to procure a shareholder to be on the jury, for the purpose of influencing the other jurymen, or if there had been any collusion, the Court might interfere. So, even in a case where there had been no previous arrangement, the Court might interfere if they perceived that injustice had been done. But here we cannot say that any injustice has been done, and we think that, in general, it may be laid down that the fact of a juryman who is open to challenge having served on the jury is not per se a ground for disturbing the verdict. Therefore in this case there will be no rule. Rule refused. 1858. COLMAN, PALMER and CLARK v. TRUEMAN and ROUSE. Νου. 23. THIS was an action for an alleged breach of contract Drake represented to him that all the sugar was native Madras sugar of the usual run of such sugar, and that the ship was to have sailed about the end of April, 1857. That on the 10th June, 1857, six sale notes for six several parcels of bags of sugar, forming in the whole 5294 bags, were sent to the defendants by Drake. Five of these contract notes were expressed to be for the sale of bags of native Madras sugar expected to arrive, with a stipulation that, should the quality prove inferior to fair average, an allowance should be made. The sixth, which was the contract note on which this action was brought, was expressed to be for the sale of bags of sugar expected to arrive, with a stipulation that, should the quality prove inferior to fair average native Madras, a fair allowance was to be made in the price. On the 25th October, 1857, the "Indian Chief" arrived in London, having sailed on the 5th June, 1857. In an action for a breach of contract in not accepting goods, to which the defendant pleaded fraud, Judge having a made an order for the inspection of cor respondence between the plaintiffs and the consignors of the goods and the plaintiffs and their broker, after the contract breach. Held, that the order was properly made in the and alleged exercise of the discretion of the Judge. |