1858. MEMORANDA. In last Trinity Term, the Hon. Sir John Taylor Coleridge, Knight, resigned his office of a Judge of the Court of Queen's Bench. He was succeeded by Hugh Hill, Esquire, one of Her Majesty's counsel, who was first called to the degree of the coif, and gave rings with the motto " Nil nisi cruce." He afterwards received the honour of knighthood. In the Vacation preceding Hilary Term 1858, Jesse Addams, Esquire, D.C.L., Robert Joseph Phillimore, Esquire, D.C.L., James Parker Deane, Esquire, D.C.L., and Travers Twiss, Esquire, D.C.L., were appointed her Majesty's counsel. AN INDEX TO THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS. ACCOUNT. See COMMON LAW PROCEDURE AFFIDAVIT. See BILL OF SALE, (1), (2). AGENT. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. AGREEMENT. AMENDMENT. See DISTRESS, (1). ANNUITY. See INCOME TAX, (1). SUCCESSION DUTY, (2). ARBITRATION. See COMMON LAW PROCEDURE Authority to refer—Partner. A. and B. partners, dissolved the binding on B. Hatton and Cookson | authority of that other. 500 Tilbury and others, v. Royle, Thorne v. 534 BANKING COMPANY. See PLEADING, (1). BANKRUPT. See BILL OF SALE, (5). (1). Deed of Arrangement. A deed of arrangement, under the 224th section of "The Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849," must provide for the distribution of all the debtor's estate and effects, and amongst all his creditors. But a deed providing for the distribution of all the debtor's estate amongst all the creditors, who would have been creditors under an adjudication of bankruptcy on the day of the meeting of creditors, treating such cre Right of Bailee to set up title of ditors as creditors for the sums they third person. To an action of trover for goods the defendants pleaded that the goods were delivered by the plaintiff to the defendants to be by them warehoused and taken care of; that before the delivery the goods had been the property of one T. deceased, and that there was not at the time of the delivery any legal representative of the estate of T.; and that this fact was concealed from the defendants; that afterwards H. obtained letters of administration to the effects of T. and claimed the goods, and forbad the defendants to deliver them to the plaintiff.-Held a good plea. Semble, thata warehouseman being a bailee of goods is not estopped from disputing the title of his bailor; but that, if the goods are the property of another, he may refuse to redeliver them, if he does so relying upon the right and title and by the would on that day be entitled to prove for in bankruptcy, is not invalid, because: First, it does not contain an express assignment by the debtor of his estate, but only a covenant to assign it when required by the inspectors: Secondly, because it makes no provision for creditors who may have became so between the day of the meeting and the date of the deed, it not appearing that there were any creditors who became so between those times: Thirdly, because it contains a letter of license which is absolute and not conditional: Fourthly, because it does not contain a provision rendering it absolutely void if the debtor does not perform the covenants contained in it. A deed of arrangement under the 224th section is not invalidated by reason of its containing the following provisions.-First: A power to employ the debtor in winding up his affairs under the direction of inspectors, and for the debtor to employ persons under him with the sanction of the inspectors, and to pay those persons such reasonable remuneration as the inspectors shall think fit. Secondly: An authority to the inspectors to make advances to the debtor, in respect of any mercantile operations which may have been undertaken by the debtor. Thirdly: A provision for the payment of the costs and expenses of and attending the preparation of the deed and perusal thereof, and the management of the debtors' affairs between the meeting of the creditors and the execution of the deed, or relating, or preparatory to the meeting of creditors, and incident thereto, and to the investigation of affairs since the debtor stopped payment. Fourthly a discretionary power in the inspectors to retain the dividend which would be payable to a creditor, who at the declaration of the dividend, had not acceded to the deed, such creditor being at liberty to prove, so as to have a dividend out of existing or future funds, but so as not to disturb the former dividend. Fifthly: A power, in case the debtor should commit an act of bankruptcy, for the inspectors to retain 5007. for a certain period, as an indemnity against losses, costs, and expenses. Sixthly: A power to the inspectors to avoid the deed in certain events, at the expiration of three months from its date, excepting from the avoidance all acts, proceedings, conveyances, assignments, assurances, matters and things done under and by virtue of it; there being also a power to the inspectors, at any time after the date of the deed, to grant a certificate of conformity, as in bankruptcy, to all or either of several debtors. Semble, that the avoidance of the deed, under the provision in question, would avoid the effect of such a certificate if previously granted to any such debtor. In order to prove a deed of arrangement, the defendants produced from the Court of Bankruptcy a certificate of the inspectors, filed there in conformity with the 226th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, and an account and affidavit of the defendant in conformity with the 227th section. The account included the debts and names of the creditors mentioned in the schedule to the deed. The certificate and other documents were not filed until after action brought. The defendants also proved that the deed was, for some time before the commencement of the action, in the same state as to the execution thereof by the several parties as when produced at the trial, with the exception of two creditors, without whom 6-7ths in number and value appeared to have executed.-Held, sufficient evidence of the due execution of the deed. Irving and Another v. Gray, Hutton and Others, (2). Order for Protection. 34 The plaintiff, a bankrupt, who had obtained an order for protection to complete his examination, under the 112th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, at the time of his bankruptcy owed two poor rates, and had been assessed to a third, but such third rate was not allowed or published until after his bankruptcy. The defendants, overseers of the poor, during the continuance of such protection, summoned the plaintiff for the nonpayment of the three rates. The plaintiff did not attend before the justices. It did not appear what took place at the hearing, but it was shewn that but not published or allowed by the the plaintiff had returned the sum-justices till after the bankruptcy. mons served on him to one of the Quære, whether bankruptcy, bedefendants, who was the assistant fore certificate, has any operation overseer, with the facts respecting upon a demand for poor rates. Philhis protection written upon it. The lips v. Naylor, Moody and Others, 14 justices issued a distress warrant for the three rates, which proving ineffectual, a warrant of commitment issued upon which the plaintiff was taken, carried to prison and kept there during the period of protection granted to him. Semble, that under such circumstances no action could be maintained by the plaintiff against the defendants. But Held: First, that there was no absence of reasonable and probable cause for supposing that the Court of Bankruptcy had not power to protect the plaintiff from arrest in respect of the rates made before, but not allowed till after the bankruptcy. Secondly, that there was no absence of reasonable and probable cause for supposing that the protection granted to the plaintiff did not avail against the warrant for arrears of all the rates. Thirdly, that in the absence of any evidence that the defendants had concealed anything or done anything but speak the whole truth before the justices, there was no evidence of malice. Fourthly, that trespass would not lie against the defendants for causing the plaintiff to be arrested under the warrant. Held, also, that the remedy given by the 113th section does not affect the right of action of a bankrupt wrongfully arrested in violation of the privilege given by the 112th section. Semble, that the protection under the 112th section does not extend to a warrant of commitment for nonpayment of poor rates made before The defendant being indebted to the plaintiff on a bill for 251., accepted by him for the accommodation of one B., was served with a writ of summons on the 23rd of July, and judgment was signed on the 31st for 297. 158. debt and costs. On the 24th the defendant petitioned the Court of Bankruptcy for protection, under the 211th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849; and in the account of his debts, filed under the 214th section, on the 17th of August, inserted the plaintiff as a creditor for the bill, saying nothing as to the consideration or as to the costs. His proposal for the compromise of his debts was duly assented to at two private sittings by majorities consisting of 3-5ths of his creditors, who had proved debts amounting to 107. The Court approved and confirmed the proposal, and granted to the defendant a certificate of the filing and entering of record of such approval, &c., and endorsed on such certificate a protection from arrest, under the 216th section, until 25th of March, 1859. The defendant's goods having been seized under a fi. fa. in the action at the suit of the plaintiff, and a Judge at Chambers having set aside the execution on motion to set aside this order, on the grounds; first, that the defendant's property was not protected by the order under section 216; secondly, that the protection was void against the plaintiff, on the ground that his debt was not truly specified; thirdly, that the order should not have been to set aside the execution, but simply that the sheriff should withdraw:- Held, that : |