J., a person in the habit of attending fairs, stopped the cart and said to the defendant, a constable, "these are my traces which were stolen at the peace rejoicing in 1856." The defendant sent for the plaintiff, who immediately attended, and asked him how he accounted for the possession of the traces. The plaintiff said that he had seen a stranger pick them up in the road and he had bought them of him for a shilling. The defendant then took the plaintiff into custody and brought him before a magistrate, by whom he was discharged. Held, that under these circumstances there was no reasonable charge, and that the defendant was liable in an action for arresting the plaintiff. Quare, whether the question of reasonable charge is one for the Court or the jury. Hogg v. Ward, 417 CORPORATION. (1.) Validity of Contracts. Generally speaking corporations are as much bound by their contracts as individuals, where the seal is affixed in a manner binding on them; and where a corporation is created by act of parliament for particular purposes, with special powers, their contract will bind them unless it appears by the express provisions of the statute creating the corporation, or by necessary and reasonable inference from its enactments that the contract was ultra vires; or that the legislature meant that such a contract should not be made. Per totam curiam. A Company was incorporated by act of parliament for the supply of a certain district with water from certain sources within that district; and empowered to break up highways and place pipes within the district, and to do all other acts which the Company should deem necessary for supplying water to the inhabitants according to the true intent of the Act, and penalties were imposed on the Company not supplying water to the inhabitants of dwelling-houses within the district. The members of the Company were entitled to the net profits to be divided amongst them, except the surplus above 7 per cent., which was to go in the reduc tion of the water rents. In consequence of the increase of population the supply of water within the district became insufficient both in quantity and quality. The Company employed an engineer, who reported that a sufficient supply could not be obtained from existing sources, and recommended that a supply should be obtained from a brook beyond the district, which would be sufficient ceedings on Payment of a Certain Sum and Costs. Upon a summons to stay proceedings on payment of a certain sum and costs, if the plaintiff refuses to take the amount offered in discharge of his claim, but afterwards accepts it, there is no absolute rule which entitles the defendant to his costs incurred subsequently to the summons. not only for the district but also for, (1.) On Application to Stay Prosome adjoining populous villages. The Company then determined to apply to parliament for powers to enlarge their works so as to make the brook available for the entire district which it was capable of supplying, and to increase their capital from 15,000l. to 90,000l.-Held, that the Company might lawfully take steps to apply to parliament for such extension of the undertaking, it being for the benefit of the corporate body; and that the contracts made by the Company for the supply of plans, &c., essential to the application to parliament, were not necessarily illegal or void, or otherwise incapable of being enforced against the Company in a Court of law. Dissentiente Bramwell, B. Bateman v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of the Borough of Ashton-under-Lyne, 323 (2.) Covenant by Municipal Corporation to repay Money borrowed after 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76. A covenant by a municipal corporation to repay money borrowed by them after the passing of the 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, is valid, although the money was not borrowed for any of the purposes to which the borough fund is applicable by the 92nd section of that Act; and although the covenant is contained in a mortgage deed made without the approbation of the Lords of the Treasury, as required by the 94th section. Payne v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of Brecon, 572 COSTS. See LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDA- Semble, that in such case if the defendant's answer to the plaintiff's claim consists partly of a set-off, the plaintiff is entitled to his costs to the time of pleading, unless the defendant has offered to allow the set-off. Walton and Others v. Brown, 879 (2.) Stay of Proceedings in Second Action. put in the list for the 15th, was called on in its turn, and the wit nesses not being in attendance was referred. The witnesses arrived in the evening after the Court had risen. The arbitrator having awarded in favour of the plaintiff:-Held, that, on taxation, the Master was at liberty to allow the plaintiff the costs of his witnesses as costs in the cause. Standeven v. Murgatroyd, 570 (4.) Judgment for 201. on Bond Conditioned for Payment of 121. Judgment having been given for the plaintiff in an action on a bond in the penal sum of 20%., conditioned for the payment of 121.:-Held, that the plaintiff was deprived of costs by the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 11, on the ground, first, that the nominal damages did not make the sum reco vered exceed 201.; and secondly, per Pollock, C. B., and Watson, B., that the sum recovered within the meaning of that section was 127. only. Gowens v. Moore, 540 COUNTY COURT. See COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1854, (5). (1). Refusal of Judge to hear Interpleader Summons. A County Court Judge having refused to hear an interpleader summons, and ordered money to be paid out of court, with costs to be paid by the claimant, on the ground of the insufficiency of the particulars, a rule was obtained, under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, s. 43, calling on the County Court judge to hear the summons. No cause being shewn the Court made the rule absolute; ordering the costs of the rule to abide the event of the interpleader issue, and discharging the claimant from the costs in the Court below. In the matter of an Interpleader issue in the County Court of Yorkshire at Great Driffield, in a Plaint between J. Whitehead and J. A. Procter, and T. Sleight, Claimant, 532 (2). Refusal of Judge to sign Appeal. Judgment having been given in a County Court the plaintiff proposed to appeal. In consequence of delays in settling it, the case on appeal as agreed to by both parties, was not presented to the judge for his signature till nearly six months after the day when judgment was given. No security for costs of the appeal had been given. The judge refused to sign the appeal case. Thereupon a summons was issued by a Judge at Chambers, in pursuance of 19 & 20 do so; but no affidavit of the facts Vict. c. 108, s. 43, to compel him to was sworn till two days after the summons issued. On the hearing of the summons the County Court judge did not attend, and an order was made that he should sign the case. The order having been served first, that, assuming that the sumupon him and disobeyed:-Held, mons ought not to have issued except on an affidavit, the want of such affidavit was an irregularity only. Secondly, that after the order had been served and disobeyed and the rule for an attachment obtained, it was too late for the County Court judge to object that the case was incorrectly stated, or that the summons had issued improperly, and a rule obtained by the County Court judge to set aside the Judge's order on these grounds was discharged with costs. Also, that, upon the facts, the order that the County Court judge should sign the case was rightly (3). Thing done in pursuance of Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95-Protection of Bailiff. The Bailiff of a County Court who, acting bonâ fide, has by mistake seized the goods of one person under a County Court execution against another, is entitled to the protection of the 138th section of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, as in respect of a thing "done in pursuance of the Act." Dissentiente Martin, B. William Burling v. Harley and Plater, 271 COVENANT. See CORPORATION, (2). INCOME TAX, (2). Condition Precedent. By indenture the plaintiff covenanted with the defendant to deliver up a farm on a certain day, and in the mean time to cultivate it on the four-course system, and that on the surrender he would deliver up an agreement to be cancelled, and would surrender all his unexpired term and interest in the farm, and if the defendant required he would at any time afterwards execute any deed for further assurance. And the defendant covenanted that if the plaintiff did deliver up the farm, and in the mean time cultivate the farm on the four-course system, and perform and keep all and singular other covenants, the defendant would upon the delivering up of the farm pay for the manure, &c.:- Held, that the In Action on 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93. In an action on the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, for injury resulting from death, the damages should be calculated in reference to a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, as of right or otherwise, from the continuance of the life. In an action by a father for injury resulting from the death of his son, it appeared that the father was old and infirm, that the son, who was young and earning good wages, assisted his father in some work for which the father was paid 38. 6d. a week. The jury having found that the father had a reasonable expectation of benefit from the continuance of his son's life:-Held, that the action was maintainable. George Franklin, Administrator of Thomas Franklin, deceased, v. The South Eastern Railway Company, 211 DEAN AND CHAPTER. See LEASE. DECLARATION. See LIBEL, (1), DEED OF ARRANGEMENT. See BANKRUPT, (1). DILAPIDATIONS. applied to amend by adding a count for distraining and selling goods to satisfy more rent than was due. The Judge refused to allow the amendment on the ground that it was not a matter in dispute at the time of See COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT the commencement of the action. 1854, (5). DEMURRAGE. See CHARTER PARTY, (2). DETAINER. See SHERIFF, (4). DETINUE. See MORTGAGE, (2). DEVISE. See LEGACY DUTY. DISCLAIMER. See LEGACY DUTY, (1). DISTRESS. (1). Selling goods distrained before the expiration of five days-Excessive Distress-Amendment. In an action for selling goods distrained before the expiration of five days, the plaintiff is not entitled to a verdict unless he proves actual damage. Quare, whether under a count for taking an excessive distress under the statute of Marlbridge, the plaintiff can shew that the amount of rent due was less than that distrained for. In an action for an excessive distress not averring that the sum distrained for was not due, with a count for selling before the expiration of five days, the plaintiff at the trial (2). Second Distress, when distrainee has by his misconduct prevented the first from being realized. The defendants, Commissioners for draining certain lands, distrained a bean stack of the plaintiff for a rate due from him, and sold the stack by auction, one of the condition of sale being that the purchaser was to take possession and pay for the same at the fall of the hammer. At the time of the sale the plaintiff said that "it would be one thing to buy the stack and another to take it away," and when the purchaser attempted to remove the stack from the plaintiff's premises, he was forcibly prevented by the plaintiff. The purchaser did not pay for the stack, and the Commissioners levied a second distress for the same rate.-Held, in the Exchequer Chamber (affirming the decision of the Court of Exchequer), that as the plaintiff by his own misconduct had prevented the Commissioners from realizing the first distress, the second was not 203 unlawful. Lee v. Cooke, DOMICILE. See INSURANCE. Declaration of Intention. A testator, a British born subject, resided for many years at Hamburgh under circumstances which afforded evidence of a domicile there. He |