INTERPLEADER. it was conclusive evidence on the plea that the goods were not the goods of the plaintiffs. Seventhly, assuming the judgment not to be in rem, that because the plaintiffs had sought their remedy in a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, they were conclusively bound by the judgment of such court. Eighthly that such judgment could only be impeached on the ground of fraud in the Court or in the procuring of the judgment, and not on the ground of any fraud of the defendants in that suit. Lastly, that it was not material that the judgment was given after the conversion. Quare, whether the validity of the sale should have been decided according to the law of Norway or the law of the domicile of the owner of the goods. Campbell and Others V. Sewell and others, 617 INTEREST. See BOND. INTERROGATORIES. See COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACT, 1854, (1). INTERPLEADER. See COUNTY COURT, (1). JOINT STOCK COMPANY. See BILL OF EXCHANGE, (2). CORPORATION, (1). GUARANTEE. JURY. (1.) Memorandum of Association Articles of Association. Under "The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856," a printed copy of the memorandum of association or JOINT STOCK COMPANY. 927 articles of association may be signed by a subscriber before the original is signed or registered in pursuance of the 3rd section of that Act; and such signature of the subscriber is an authority for placing his name on the register of shareholders. Therefore where a defendant, having applied for shares in a proposed Company and paid the deposit, signed a printed form of memorandum of association, and by the articles of association agreed to accept certain shares allotted to him; and some weeks afterwards the original memorandum of association and articles of association were signed and registered, and the defendant's name was placed on the register of shareholders.-Held, that the defendant was a shareholder in the Company and liable for calls. The New Brunswick and Canada Railway and Land Company (Limited) v. Boore, (2). Default in Registering. 249 The 27th section of "The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1857," which requires every Company registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, "but excluding any Company formed for the purpose of insurance," to register under the Joint Stock Companies Acts, 1856, 1857, on or before the 2nd November, 1857, only exempts from such registration Companies formed for the purpose of insurance only. Therefore where a Company completely registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, formed for the purpose and carrying on the business of insurance and also the lending of money, made default in registering under those Acts:-Held, that by the 27th section of The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1857, such Company was incapable of suing at law or in equity. The London Mone tary Advance and Life Assurance (3). Acceptance of Bills of Exchange. ceptance was in fact written by order of certain directors of the Company. At the time when the bill became due the Company was insolvent. In an action by a second indorsee of the bill, (who did not shew that either he or the first indorsee had given value to the drawer,) against the directors, who authorized the acceptance, alleging in one count that they accepted the bill, and in another charging them with falsely representing that they had authority on behalf of the Company to accept it: Held, first, that the defendants were not liable as acceptors. Secondly, that, assuming there had been a false representation, the plaintiff not having proved that he thereby sustained damage, the defendant was entitled to a verdict. Eastwood and Another v. Bain and Others, 738 (4). Promissory Note signed by three Directors. The following promissory note was signed by three persons describing themselves as 66 directors" of a Joint Stock Company, incorporated with limited liability, under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, and was countersigned by one G., who described himself as secretary of the Company. "London, Dec. 31, 1856. Three months after date we jointly promise to pay S. or order six hundred pounds for value received in stock on account of the L and B. Company, Limited."Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, (affirming the judgment of the Court (5). Policies of Marine Insurance "The Hull and London Fire Insurance Company" was a Company completely registered under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110. The deed of settlement gave the Company power (inter alia) to transact all the branches of business usually appertaining to marine insurance, and required that in every policy the funds of the Company should alone be made liable. The Company had a seal with their name of incorporation on it. For marine insurances the directors appointed an agent to issue policies. The marine policies were headed "Hull and London Marine Assurance Company," and were signed by the agent, by order of the Board of directors of the said Company, and had a stamp upon them with the words "Hull and London Marine Assurance Company." They contained no stipulation that the funds of the Company should alone be liable :-Held, first, that the "Hull and London Fire Insurance Company" were not liable on such policies, because neither the directors, nor any one else, had authority to enter into such engagements on behalf of the Company, as these policies purported to create; and there neither was nor could be any evidence that the signing of such policies by an agent in a name not that of the Company was in accordance with the usual mode of conducting the business of partnerships such as the defendants; or within the scope of the ordinary authority of the directors or agents of such Companies. Secondly, that no action lay against "The Hull and London Fire Insurance Company" on an adjustment of losses on such policies by the directors. Hambro' and Others v. the Official Manager of the Hull and London Fire Insurance Company, 789 JUDGMENT. See INFORMATION. JURY. Where a public Company is a party to an action, the mere fact that one of the jurymen was a shareholder in the Company is no ground for granting a new trial. Williams v. The Great Western Railway Company, 869 LANDLORD AND TENANT. See DISTRESS. Right of Tenant to Deduct Rates. The 35 Geo. 3, c. 73, s. 179, empowers the vestrymen of Marylebone to make rates, &c., upon persons who shall occupy, &c., any land, &c., according to the yearly rent, &c., to be entered in a book in which there are to be separate columns, one for the arrears and another for the names of the persons charged. By s. 187, where houses are let in parts, &c., the lessor or lessee shall respectively be deemed the occupier, and liable to the payment of rates according to such proportion of the yearly rent. By s. 188, every person occupying any such part shall be liable to the payment of the said rates, and the occupiers who shall pay such rates shall deduct the same out of the next rent. A tenant of part of a house in the parish of Marylebone, having paid rates which had been made on the occupier of another part who had quitted the premises :-Held, that he was not entitled to deduct them as against a landlord whose title had not accrued until after the person rated had quitted the premises. Semble, that by the Act in question, in the case of houses let in apartments, the rate must be made either on the landlord in respect of his entire interest, or upon each tenant in respect of such portion of the premises as he occupies. Lobban V. Cook, 238 LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845. Costs of Arbitration to settle Compensation. A person claiming compensation under a Water-works Act, which incorporated the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, agreed with the Company to appoint as sole arbitrator, for the purpose of settling the amount of such compensation, a person to be nominated by two others. They accordingly nominated an arbitrator who awarded to the claimant a sum exceeding 501.-Held, that the claimant was entitled to the costs of the arbitration although no offer had been made by the Company, or the other preliminaries mentioned in the statute complied with. Martin v. the Leicester Waterworks Com463 pany, LEASE. See POWER, (1). By Dean and Chapter. Leases granted by deans and chapters for long terms of years, not in conformity with the disabling and restraining statutes, are not void but voidable only. EXCH. P., a lessee, being in possession, of 7,4877. upon trust for D.'s and the dean and chapter of C. being daughter, the wife of B., during her possessed of the reversion expectant life, and provided she died without upon his term, of the manor of W., issue, he bequeathed the same to B., in June 1786 granted certain build- his heirs and assigns. B. by his will ing leases for 99 years, from Mich- bequeathed the said and all his other aelmas 1786, of certain premises, part personal estate to S. and the defendof the manor, at several yearly rents ant, upon trust to pay debts and of 147., payable to the dean and legacies, and as to the residue in chapter and P. respectively. Rent trust for such purposes as his wife was regularly paid to and accepted should by her will appoint, and in by successive deans down to 1856. default of such appointment, in trust In 1849, on the surrender by the for her executors and administrators. plaintiffs of the existing lease of the B. appointed S. and the defendant manor, the dean and chapter re-de- executors of his will, and died, leavmised the manor for 21 years to the ing his wife him surviving. After plaintiffs, "except and reserved out the death of B. his wife appointed of this demise unto the said dean and the defendant with two other persons chapter and their successors, all such trustees of the will of D. in the place rents and sums of money and other of W., and all the personal estate of right and interest, benefit and ad- D. was assigned by D. to them. The vantage, which hath been or are, or wife of B. appointed the defendant, shall be reserved to them in and by with the two last mentioned persons, any building leases for long terms of executors of her will, and bequeathed years of any part of the several lands to them the whole of her personal and tenements hereby demised, "&c., property on certain trusts. "to have, hold, occupy and enjoy the died without ever having had issue, site and courtlodge and all other the and more than two years after her premises with the appurtenances, ex- death S. and the defendant, on becept as before excepted, and subject ing applied to for payment of legacy to the building leases."-Held, that duty on the above sum of 7,4871, the demise to plaintiffs was subject by a certain writing, signed by them, to all leases de facto granted, and reciting the bequest by D. to B., that the plaintiffs did not acquire professed to disclaim and renounce any right to avoid the building lease such bequest.-Held, that it was not competent for the defendant to disclaim the bequest after B. had accepted and bequeathed it, and that the defendant was liable as executor of B. to pay a legacy duty of 107. per cent. The Attorney General v. Munby, 826 of 1786. Semble, that the premises comprised in the building lease of 1786 were excepted out of the lease of 1849. Pennington and Others v. Cardale and Others, LEGACY DUTY. (1). Disclaimer. 656 D. by his will bequeathed to W. certain personal estate of the value She (2). Words of Reference in Will incorporating Trusts of Settlement. A. P., on the marriage of his daughter I. B., covenanted to pay to the trustees of the settlement then made, as a provision for his daughter on her marriage, 2000l. The trusts were to pay the income to I. B. for life, and after her death to her husband for life, and after the decease of the survivor to the children, and if there should be no child then to such person as she should appoint, and in default of appointment then to her next of kin; and in the same settlement he covenanted that his executors should pay the further sum of 20007. to the trustees, to be held upon the same trusts, within six months after his decease. On the marriage of his daughter, E. B., he covenanted to pay to the trustees of the settlement then made 20007. within one month after the marriage. The trusts of this sum were to pay the income to G. B., the husband of E. B., for his life, and after his death of my daughter E. B. and her children and grandchildren, as thereby declared as to the property thereby settled.-Held, that the words "to be held, &c., upon the same trusts in all respects for the benefit of my daughter and her children and grandchildren, as thereby declared as to the property thereby settled," were to be construed as words of reference, incorporating the trusts of the settlements in the will; that the trusts for the husbands were not excluded, and therefore that legacy duty was payable upon that principle. In re Arthur Palmer, LIBEL. See SLANDER. 26 to E. B. for her life, and after the (1). Refusal of Music and Dancing death of the survivor to the children, and if there should be no child then to such person as E. B. should appoint, and in default of appointment to her next of kin. By his will the testator directed "that the covenants on his part contained in the settlements made on the marriage of his daughters, for the payment of monies and annuities for the benefit of themselves and their respective children and grandchildren as therein stated, should be performed;" and proceeded as follows:-" In addition to the property settled by my daughter I. B.'s marriage settlement, I give the further sum of 8000l. to the trustees, &c., to be held, &c., upon the same trusts in all respects, for the benefit of my daughter Î. B. and her children, as thereby declared as to the property thereby settled; and in addition to the property settled by my daughter E. B.'s marriage settlement I give the further sum of 8000l. to the trustees of such settlement, to be held upon the same trusts in all respects, for the benefit ૨૨૨ 2 Licence. The declaration alleged that, the plaintiff being the proprietor of certain rooms adapted for a dancing academy, the defendant falsely and maliciously published of the building and rooms, and of the plaintiff as proprietor thereof, that "the magistrates in quarter sessions having refused to renew a music and dancing licence to the proprietor, all such entertainments there carried on are illegal, and the proprietor renders himself thereby indictable for keeping a disorderly house, and every person found on the premises will be apprehended and dealt with according to law," by means of which premises the plaintiff was prevented from letting the rooms.-Held, on demurrer, that the declaration was good. Bignell v. Buzzard, 217 (2). Apology. To an action for libel in a newspaper, the defendant pleaded, under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 2, that the |