By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 97, it is provided that if, on demand any person fail to pay the tolls due in respect of any carriage, &c., it shall be lawful for the Company to detain and sell the carriage, &c., of the party liable to such tolls, and out of the monies arising from such sale to retain the tolls.-Held, that a demand of the sum actually due for tolls is a condition precedent to the right to sell under this section.

A wood adjoining the defendants' railway was burnt by sparks from the locomotives. On several previous occasions it had been set on fire, and the Company had paid for the damage. Evidence was given that the defendants had done everything that was practicable to the locomotives to make them safe, but it was admitted that with these precautions the locomotives had been the means of occasionally setting fire to the wood. The banks of the rail-riages of the Company; and by s. 30, way were covered with inflammable grass. The jury found the Company guilty of negligence.

Held: First, that, assuming the fire to have been caused by lighted coals from the locomotives falling in the plaintiff's wood, the defendants were liable.

Secondly, that they were not excused by the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, 8. 86.

Thirdly, that if the fire broke out on the defendants' land and was communicated to the wood from the banks of the railway, there was evidence to justify the verdict; and that the defendants were not protected by the 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 84. Fourthly, that it was no defence that the plaintiff had allowed his

By the 9 & 10 Vict. c. ccciii., s. 29, a railway Company were empowered to take tolls for the use of their railway in respect of the tonnage of articles conveyed upon the railway certain sums per ton, and a further sum if conveyed in the car

tolls for the use of engines. Section 35 fixed a maximum rate of charge, including the charges for the use of carriages, waggons or trucks, and for locomotive power, and all other charges incident to such conveyance. By section 37, the Company were empowered to take increased charges for the conveyance of goods, by agreement with the owners of goods, by reason of any special service. The Company having for a considerable time carried on their line coals in carriages belonging to the plaintiff, from P. to H., made a demand of a gross sum equal to the amount of the tonnage rates for coals and use of engines; and also of a sum claimed by them for sending back the plaintiff's empty carriages from H. to P. They gave no explanation of the

REGISTRATION OF DESIGNS.

SHERIFF.

943

items making up the gross sum | cells, called the honeycomb pattern, claimed. The plaintiff having omit- and it consisted of a combination of ted to pay the amount claimed, the the large and small honeycomb, so Company sold the plaintiff's car- as to form a large honeycomb stripe riages, &c., to satisfy the amount on a small honeycomb ground. The due.-Held, that the sum claimed large honeycomb was not new and for sending back the return waggons the small honeycomb was not new, was not toll, and that the Company but they had never been used in having demanded a larger sum than combination before the plaintiffs that due for tolls, the sale was un-registered their design. Other fa

for the claimant at the time of the seizure, and prepared and caused to be served on himself as undersheriff a notice of claim on behalf of such claimant, will not disentitle the sheriff to relief under the interpleader Act. Holt v. Frost, 821

(2). Rule to return Writ.

A sheriff having been ruled to return a writ more than six months after the expiration of his office, the London agent of his undersheriff obtained an order for a week's

soned A. under that writ. In an action of trespass by A. against the defendant. Held, first, that the notice to the defendant by the letter of the 2nd of May was notice to the sheriff. Secondly, that the letter was in terms a sufficient notice that the action was settled and the ca. sa. withdrawn. Futcher v. Hinder, 757

(4). Detainer on Ca. Sa. Plaintiff having a

judgment against the defendant lodged a writ of ca. sa. with the sheriff, and afterwards by letter gave directions “not to execute the writ till further

further time to return the writ.-
Held, that obtaining the rule after
six months was merely an irregu-notice."
larity, and that such irregularity was
waived by obtaining the order for
further time to return the writ.
Walker v. Davis,
374

(3). Notice of Settlement of Action. In February 1857, the defendant, a sheriff's officer, received from the undersheriff a warrant to execute a

rested on another writ, the officer The defendant being ardetained him on the plaintiff's writ till he had communicated with the plaintiff, and then, on the plaintiff's instructions, let the defendant go:

Held, that, the defendant not having been legally in custody under the plaintiff's writ, the debt was not satisfied by the detention and subsequent discharge of the defendant. Semple v. Keen,

SLANDER.

753

writ of ca. sa. issued on a judgment recovered against A. the now plaintiff, by B. On the 20th April, B.'s attorney wrote to the defendant to suspend the execution for fourteen days. On the 2nd May, B.'s attor-"Blackleg."-" Cheating Gambler.” ney wrote to the defendant as fol-. lows" This action having been arranged, we have given, Mr. G." (A.'s attorney), "who informs us he has paid your charges, notice of withdrawal of ca. sa.' On the same day B.'s attorney wrote to A.'s attorney acknowledging the receipt of money in settlement of the action. No notice of the withdrawal of the ca. sa. was sent to the sheriff or undersheriff. On the 7th November, the undersheriff wrote to the defendant to execute the ca. sa., and he accordingly arrested and impri

The plaintiff and defendant being present in a public house where there had been a raffle, the defendant said "I am surprised at R. allowing a blackleg in this room." A witness being asked what he understood by "blackleg," said, "a person in the habit of cheating at cards." The question was objected to, but allowed. The Judge told the jury that if the plaintiff meant to charge the defendant with being a gambler simply the action would not lie, but if he meant to impute that he was

SOLICITOR.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 945

cheating gambler they would find for the plaintiff.

Held: (Per Pollock, C. B., and

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

within 17th Section.

Watson, B.) — First, that it is not Acceptance and Receipt of Goods actionable without special damage to call a man a blackleg, because it does not necessarily mean a cheating gambler.

A. agreed verbally to buy of B. all the whalebone he could procure at a Secondly, that the evidence as to certain price, to be sent by a partithe meaning of the word "blackleg "cular railway, A. agreeing to pay

was not admissible.

Per Martin, B., and Bramwell, B. -First, that, under the circumstances, it must be taken that the defendant did make use of the word with intent to convey to the minds of those present that the plaintiff was a cheating gambler, and

the carriage. Some whalebone, to been delivered at the railway station an amount exceeding 107., having by B. consigned to A., and having been duly invoiced to him, was lost in the transit. B. then wrote requesting A. to make a claim against the Company.-Held, that there having been no acceptance and reSecondly, that the evidence was section of the Statute of Frauds, A., ceipt of the goods within the 17th admissible. Barnet v. Allen, the consignee, was not entitled to sue the railway Company for the loss. Coombs v. The Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, 510

that therefore the action was maintainable.

SOLICITOR.

376

Right to sue for Costs before Termina

tion of Suit.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, (3 & 4 WM. 4, c. 27).

Acknowledgment of Title.

In 1818 the plaintiff and the defendant's grandfather became seised as tenants in common of a meadow. The meadow was then in the possession of the defendant's grandfather, who had previously held it under a lease. The plaintiff's father became possessed in 1826, and so continued till his death in 1836. In 1837 Newton, who was proved to be a land agent who received the defendant's rents and managed his property, wrote the following letter to the plaintiff's agent:-"Sir,Mr. P. (the defendant) is now in

ЕХСИ,

possession of his 2-3rds of the | to D. for life, and after D.'s decease

meadow, who will no doubt accept a lease (three lives) for Ley's (the plaintiff's) 1-3rd at a fair rack-rent. You must be aware Mr. P. is not bound to pay rent for Ley's 1-3rd during the time his father held the meadow, but no doubt he will do so in case you agree for a lease. Signed J. Newton. Will you favour me with the terms of a lease for the 1-3rd of the meadow that I may lay it before Mr. P." No answer was shewn to have been given to this letter, but the defendant continued in possession of the land down to 1857, when an action of ejectment was commenced. It was not shewn that either the defendant or his predecessors had paid any rent to the plaintiff since 1818. Newton was in Court, but not called as a witness by the defendant.-Held, that the

letter was not a sufficient acknowledgment of the plaintiff's title within. the 14th section of the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27.

Held, also, by Bramwell, B., Watson, B., and Channell, B.; dissentiente Martin, B.-That the latter, coupled with the other facts, was not evidence from which the creation of a tenancy at will could be presumed.

to his eldest and other sons in tail male: and in default of such issue to H. for life, and after his decease to the eldest son of H. for life, with remainders over. The testator died in June, 1835, leaving D. and H., and the defendant (the eldest son of H.), him surviving. H. died in November, 1849, leaving the defendant him surviving. On the 19th of May, 1853, "The Succession Duty Act, 1853," came into operation. In November, 1856, D. died, whereupon the defendant succeeded to the estate under the testator's will.-Held, that the defendant was chargeable with duty under the 2nd section of" The Succession Duty Act, 1853." The Attorney General v. Lord Middleton,

125

tates.-Relinquishment of Annuity.
(2). Resettlement of Entailed Es-

A testator devised his estates in L. to his brother C. for life, with remainder in tail to his first and other sons. On the 22nd March, 1848, C. and the defendant, his eldest son, executed a disentailing deed, whereby they limited the estate to such uses as they should jointly appoint, and in default of such appointment to the uses declared by the will of the Quare, whether the letter was ad- testator. On the same day C. and missible in evidence against the de- the defendant executed another disfendant. Ley v. Peter, 101 entailing deed of estates devised to them by another testator and also limited them to such uses as they should jointly appoint. On the 23rd March, 1848, C. and the defendant executed a joint appointment, whereby, after reciting the two disentailing deeds, and certain arrangements made in respect of incumbrances with other stipulations, they appointed the estates of L. to the use that the defendant might receive thereout the yearly sum of 1000l. during the

STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.
See COSTS (1).

SUCCESSION DUTY.

(1). Estate Vested in Interest before

Act-in Possession after Act.

A testator devised his real estate