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Where a person permits another to act as his general agent, he is bound by a contract made by the agent, although the latter declares himself as acting "by procuration," and has received special instructions which he exceeds.

The defendant, who formerly carried on the business of a corn merchant at Limerick, came to reside in London, and left his brother M. to conduct his business in Limerick. The defendant's name remained over the door. For the space of three years M. purchased large quantities of oats, and chartered numerous ships on account of the defendant. On these occasions the defendant usually sent him special instructions. In the year 1858, a ship in the port of Limerick being about to proceed to Quebec for a cargo of timber, M. chartered her to carry, on her return from Quebec, a cargo of oats to London. He signed the charterparty "per procuration." In an action against the defendant for not loading a cargo pursuant to the charter-party :-Held, that it was properly left to the jury to say whether the defendant had allowed M. to act as his general agent, and if so he was liable although M. might have exceeded his authority.

In an action against the charterer of a ship for not loading a cargo, the measure of damage is the amount of freight which would have been earned after deducting the expenses, and also any profit which the ship may have earned, during the period over which the charter extended.

Semble, that the shipowner is not bound to take a new cargo for the most he can get, in order to reduce the damages to be paid by the charterer. Smith v. Thomas M'Guire, 554

(2). Discharge of Principal by Conduct.

Where a party who has dealt with an agent, has by his conduct led the principal to believe that he looked to the agent alone for payment, and thereby induced the principal, after the debt has become due, either to pay the agent the amount, or allow him to retain it out of the principal's money in his hands, the party so acting cannot afterwards resort to the principal

The plaintiff, the owner of a ship, applied to a broker to effect an insurance on it; the broker signed a policy on behalf of the defendant, an underwriter. The ship was lost, and the plaintiff having applied to the broker for payment received from him a credit note. It was usual to pay credit notes at a month from their date. Both at the time of signing the policy and of the adjustment, the broker had money of the defendant sufficient to pay the loss. Nearly three months after the credit note was given the broker stopped payment, when the plaintiff applied to the defendant for the amount of the loss.-Held, that there was no injury to the defendant by the conduct of the plaintiff which rendered it unjust to call on him for payment, and therefore the case did not fall within the above rule of law. Macfarlane v. Giannacopulo,

PRINTER.

Compositors' Charge.

860

Disputes having arisen between compositors and master printers as to payment to the former for printing advertisements on wrappers, the following rules were made by a com

entered the defendant's service with knowledge of that decision, and that the defendant had been one of the arbitrators; nothing, however, was said as to the terms of payment; but both parties understood that it was to be made according to the rules.

Held: First, that the decision of the arbitrators was not, at the time of the employment of the plaintiff, binding between the parties as an interpretation of the rule; and that notwithstanding their decision it was competent for the Court to entertain the question of its construction.

Secondly, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the composing; the true construction of the rule being: that the compositor may charge according to the scale when any advertisement not standing is inserted in the same page with a standing advertisement, but that when standing advertisements are printed in the same page so as completely to fill it, the compositor is only entitled to charge for his time in making up.

mittee of each body:-" Wrappers. | favour of the master. The plaintiff The compositor on a magazine or review to be entitled to the first or title page of the wrapper of the magazine or review, but not to the remaining pages of such wrapper or to the advertising sheets which may accompany the magazine or review. Standing advertisements or stereoblocks forming a complete page, or when collected together making one or more complete pages in a wrapper or advertising sheet of a magazine or review, not to be charged. The compositor to charge only for his time in making them up. The remainder of the matter in such wrappers or advertising sheets, including standing advertisements or stereoblocks not forming a complete page, to be charged by the compositor and cast up according to certain articles of the scale referred to, as they may respectively apply." In the November number of a Monthly Magazine there was composed and printed on one page two advertisements which occupied the entire page, and the type of which was left standing. In the December number, the same two advertisements were. . printed, but on different pages: and each Also Held, by the Court of Exoccupied about half a page and the chequer Chamber, (affirming the remainder of the page was filled up judgment of the Court of Excheby other advertisements. The plain- quer); first, that the decision of the tiff, who was a compositor, insisted arbitrators was not, at the time of that, under the latter part of the the employment of the plaintiff, rule, he was entitled to charge for binding between the parties as an the composing; the defendant, who interpretation of the rule; and that was the master printer, contended notwithstanding their decision it that the case was within the first was competent for the Court to part of the rule, and that the plain-entertain the question of its contiff was only entitled to charge "for struction. his time in making up." In the year 1856, a similar dispute arose between a compositor and a master printer, and the matter having been referred to arbitration in pursuance of certain rules which were still in force, three arbitrators awarded in

Secondly, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the composing; the true construction of the rule being: that the compositor may charge according to the scale when any advertisement not standing is inserted in the same page with a

standing advertisement, but that when standing advertisements are printed in the same page so as completely to fill it, the compositor is only entitled to charge for his time in making up. Hill v. Levey and Another, 7, 702

PRISONER.

The subscribers' agreement of a proposed Company stated that it was formed for making a railway to be called "The Galway and Kilkenny Railway," and to commence at Kilkenny and terminate in the town of Galway, the capital to be one million in shares of 251. each. The deed empowered the directors to abandon the undertaking, or any part thereof and also to make

Conduct of his Cause at Trial in application to parliament for an Act

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for any of the purposes aforesaid: also to fix upon, and from time to time to alter or vary the termini, route, course, or line of the railway; and to determine whether and how far, and to what extent the undertaking should be carried into effect and deferred or abandoned: and in case any act should authorize the construction of a part thereof, to make in any subsequent session application for the construction of the remainder. The defendant executed the deed as a subscriber for 150 shares, and paid the deposit of 17. 10s. per share. The directors applied to parliament and an Act passed (9 & 10 Vict. c. ccclx.) which incorporated the Company by the name of "The Kilkenny and Great Southern and Western Railway Company," for making a railway from Kilkenny to Cuddagh, the capital of the Company to be 225,0001, in 11,250 shares of 201. each. After the Act passed the defendant was placed on the register of shareholders as a subscriber for fifty shares of 20/. each :-Held, in the Exchequer Chamber (affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer), that the defendant was a shareholder in the incorporated Company, and liable as such to execution on a judgment recovered by a creditor against the Company.

The 36th section of the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9

Vict. c. 16, which enables execution | to issue "against any of the shareholders," if the execution against the property or effects of the Company proves ineffectual, means share-| holders at the time of the sheriff's return of nulla bona :-So Held, in the Exchequer Chamber, affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer. Nixon v. Brownlow. Nixon v. Green,

686

wood to become peculiarly liable to take fire by neglecting to clear away the dry grass and dead sticks. Vaughan v. The Taff Vale Railway Company,

(3). Sale of Carriages for Toll.

743

By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 97, it is provided that if, on demand any person fail to pay the tolls due in respect of any carriage, &c., it shall

(2). Wood Burnt by Sparks from be lawful for the Company to detain

Locomotive.

A wood adjoining the defendants' railway was burnt by sparks from the locomotives. On several previous occasions it had been set on fire, and the Company had paid for the damage. Evidence was given that the defendants had done everything that was practicable to the locomotives to make them safe, but it was admitted that with these precautions the locomotives had been the means of occasionally setting fire to the wood. The banks of the railway were covered with inflammable grass. The jury found the Company guilty of negligence.

Held: First, that, assuming the fire to have been caused by lighted coals from the locomotives falling in the plaintiff's wood, the defendants were liable.

Secondly, that they were not excused by the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 86.

Thirdly, that if the fire broke out on the defendants' land and was communicated to the wood from the banks of the railway, there was evidence to justify the verdict; and that the defendants were not protected by the 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 84. Fourthly, that it was no defence that the plaintiff had allowed his

and sell the carriage, &c., of the party liable to such tolls, and out of the monies arising from such sale to retain the tolls.-Held, that a demand of the sum actually due for tolls is a condition precedent to the right to sell under this section.

By the 9 & 10 Vict. c. ccciii., s. 29, a railway Company were empowered to take tolls for the use of their railway in respect of the tonnage of articles conveyed upon the railway certain sums per ton, and a further sum if conveyed in the carriages of the Company; and by s. 30, tolls for the use of engines. Section 35 fixed a maximum rate of charge, including the charges for the use of carriages, waggons or trucks, and for locomotive power, and all other charges incident to such conveyance. By section 37, the Company were empowered to take increased charges for the conveyance of goods, by agreement with the owners of goods, by reason of any special service. The Company having for a considerable time carried on their line coals in carriages belonging to the plaintiff, from P. to H., made a demand of a gross sum equal to the amount of the tonnage rates for coals and use of engines; and also of a sum claimed by them for sending back the plaintiff's empty carriages from H. to P. They gave no explanation of the

REGISTRATION OF DESIGNS.

items making up the gross sum claimed. The plaintiff having omitted to pay the amount claimed, the Company sold the plaintiff's carriages, &c., to satisfy the amount due.-Held, that the sum claimed for sending back the return waggons was not toll, and that the Company having demanded a larger sum than that due for tolls, the sale was unlawful.

Semble, that the Company might be entitled to charge for sending back the waggons by agreement as for special services under section 37. Field v. The Newport, Abergavenny and Hereford Railway Company, 409

RAILWAY DEBENTURES.

See MORTGAGE, (1).

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cells, called the honeycomb pattern, and it consisted of a combination of the large and small honeycomb, so as to form a large honeycomb stripe on a small honeycomb ground. The large honeycomb was not new and the small honeycomb was not new, but they had never been used in combination before the plaintiffs registered their design. Other fabrics had been woven with a similar combination of a large and small pattern. In an action against the defendant for infringing the plaintiffs' copyright.-Held, that the design was not new and original within the meaning of the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 100. Harrison and Another v. Taylor, 301

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SALVAGE.

See MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT,

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