By and against whom.] The party by whom the appeal is to be brought, is always designated by the appeal clause, either specifically, or in general terms as the party grieved, It sometimes, however, becomes a question of difficulty, whether the party appealing be a party grieved, within the meaning of the statute. Where a licensed publican appealed, as a party grieved within the licensing act (9 G. 4, c. 61, s. 27), because the magistrates granted a licence to another person, who had set up a public house within a few yards of his house the court held that he was not a party grieved within the meaning of the statute; those only who were immediately aggrieved by the act done, and not those who were consequentially injured, were within the meaning of this appeal clause. R. v. JJ. of Middlesex, 3 B. & Ad. 938.

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The appeal is deemed to be brought against those to whom notice of appeal is directed by the statute to be given. In many cases, however, when an appeal is given, it is not mentioned to whom the notice of appeal is to be given in such a case, if the proceeding appealed against, be the act of a justice of the peace, at the instance of some party who has an interest to support it, the notice of appeal may be directed to the party, or perhaps to both the party and the justice; but if it be the act of the justice, and not at the instance of a party, then it should seem that the notice of appeal must be given to the justice only, even although a party be really interested in the event, and the justice will be the only respondent.

To what court.] The statute giving the appeal, specifies the court to which the appeal must be made, usually the court of quarter sessions, holden for the county or borough within which, or by the justices of which, the act complained of was done. See R. v. JJ. of Sussex, 7 T. R. 107. R. v. Coyston, 1 Sid. 149. Where a statute gave the appeal to the next general or quarter sessions, and in London, where there are four intermediate sessions between the quarter sessions, the court refused to try an appeal which had been entered at the quarter sessions, there having been sufficient time to enter it at the previous intermediate sessions; the court of King's Bench held that these intermediate sessions were not "general sessions" within the meaning of the statute; the quarter sessions being general sessions, and the term "general sessions" was used in the act to indicate the quarter sessions, in contradistinction to special sessions. R. v. JJ. of London, 15 East, 632. On the other hand, where in the borough of Carmarthen the sessions were holden, not quarterly, but merely twice in the year, the court held that an appeal might be entered at the next sessions, though not quarter sessions,

under the same statute. R. v JJ. of Carmarthen, 4 B. & A. 291. Formerly, against orders of removal, made by the justices of a borough which was not a county of itself, the appeal must have been to the sessions of the county within which the removing parish was situate. 8 & 9 W. 3, c. 30, 8. 6, and see Id. s. 8. 9 G. 1, c. 7, s. 7. R. v. Wendover, 2 Salk. 490. R. v. Malden, Set. & Rem. 10. So in corporations or franchises not having four justices, all appeals against rates, and against overseers' accounts, might be brought to the sessions of the county. 17 G. 2, c. 38, s. 5. And the same, in corporations or franchises not having more than six justices, nor having jurisdiction or authority over two or more whole parishes or wards. 1 G. 4, c. 36. But by the recent municipal corporation act, 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, s. 105; in all corporations within that act, to which His Majesty shall grant a separate court of quarter sessions, such court "shall be a court of record, and shall have cognizance of all crimes, offences and matters whatsoever cognizable by any court of quarter sessions for counties in England, and the recorder shall have power to do all things necessary for exercising such jurisdiction, notwithstanding his being sole judge, as fully as any such last mentioned court:" and this seems to me to be a virtual repeal of the above statutes, and that the appeals above-mentioned must now in all cases be to the borough sessions, and not to the sessions of the county.

Within what time.] The statute giving an appeal, usually states within what time the appeal must be brought: if it direct the appeal to be to the next sessions, this is construed to mean the next practicable sessions, allowing a sufficient time for giving notice of appeal, R. v. JJ. of Flintshire, 7 T. R. 200. R. v. JJ. of East Riding of Yorkshire, Doug. 192. R. v. JJ. of Sussex, 15 East, 206, for making the necessary enquiries, R. v. JJ. of Essex, 1 B. & Ald. 210, and for other necessary preliminary steps; and if there be not a sufficient time before the first day of the sessions, the party is not bound to appeal to any adjournment of those sessions, although he may have time to do so, but he shall have until the next sessions to appeal. R. v. JJ. of Surrey, 1 M. & S. 479. If the appeal is to be brought within a certain limited time, the party is deemed to have the whole of that time within which to appeal, and until the next immediate sessions; R. v. JJ. of Middlesex, 6 M. & S. 279; if within a reasonable time, the question what is a reasonable time is for the sessions to determine, taking into consideration the circumstances of the particular case.

Notice of appeal.] Of the statutes which give an appeal, some expressly require that notice of appeal shall be given;

others not. Those which make no mention of notice, usually require that the party intending to appeal, shall previously enter into a recognizance to enter his appeal and prosecute it with effect within a certain time; and his doing so, is a good substitute for notice; for the parties interested in knowing whether an appeal is intended, can readily ascertain that fact, by enquiring of the justice whether the party has entered into the necessary recognizance. R. v JJ. of Kent, 6 M. & S. 258. R. v. JJ. of Essex, 4 B. & Ald. 276 In some cases, the statute requires both notice and recognizance. But where the statute requires notice or recognizance, such notice or recognizance is a condition precedent to the parties appealing, and nothing can dispense with it, but the consent of the opposite party to waive the objection; indeed the sessions have no authority to hear the appeal, unless the notice have been given or recognizance entered into, or unless both be given if both be required by the statute. R. v. JJ. of Oxfordshire, 1 M. & S. 446. R. v. JJ. of Lincolnshire, 3 B. & C. 548. As the necessity of giving notice, or entering into recognizance, previously to appealing, is often not very well understood by the party appealing, if the appeal be against a conviction or order of justices, it is the duty of the justice making the conviction or order, to inform the party, not only of his right of appeal, but of the necessity of his previously giving notice or entering into a recognizance, where that is required. See R. v. JJ. of Leeds, 4 T. R. 583. R. v. JJ. of W. R. Yorkshire, 3 M. & S. 493.

Sometimes the statute, giving the appeal, requires the sessions to receive and enter it, although no notice or an insufficient one have been given, and to adjourn the appeal to the next quarter sessions, and then finally to determine the same. There is a clause to that effect in stat. 9 G. 1, c. 7, s. 8, relative to appeals against orders of removal; and hence the ordinary practice at sessions of moving to enter and respite such appeals. Afterwards and within due time before the trial of the appeal, the notice required must be given.

The length of notice to be given, depends upon the statute giving the appeal, or on the practice of the court to which the appeal is given. If the statute give directions upon the subject, those directions must be pursued: a shorter notice would be bad, and a longer notice shall not be exacted by the practice of the court. If the statute merely require reason. able notice, it will be for the court to decide whether the notice given, be, in point of time, reasonable or not. So, if the statute require notice, without stating that it shall be a reasonable notice, or indicating what length of notice shall be given, the notice must be given a reasonable time before the trial of the appeal; and the justices at sessions, in this case also, are to judge whether the notice given be reasonable or

hot. Each court of quarter sessions usually lays down a general rule upon this subject. If the statute require the notice to be in writing, it must be so, unless the respondents dispense with it; see R. v. JJ. of Leeds, 4 T. R. 583; but, if it do not require it to be in writing, a parol notice is in all cases sufficient, and the sessions cannot, by any rule or adjudication of theirs, require it to be otherwise. R. v. JJ. of Salop, 4 B. & Ald. 626.

In many cases the statute requiring the notice of appeal, requires that the notice shall also state the grounds upon which the appellant intends to support his appeal. This is required in different terms by different statutes; but they usually require the same thing in substance, namely, that he shall state in his notice the objections he has to the order or conviction, &c. against which he intends to appeal. If in such a case the grounds be not stated, or insufficiently stated, the court, unless the respondents waive the objection, are not bound to hear the appeal, but on the contrary should treat the case as if no notice of appeal had been given, and confirm the order or conviction. And if the grounds be stated, and sufficiently, the appellant, at the trial of the appeal, will be precluded from giving evidence of, or going into, and the sessions from examining or enquiring into, any other cause or ground of appeal, either extrinsic of the proceedings, or apparent on the face of them (R. v. Bromyard, 8 B. & C. 240. R. v. Withernwick, 6 Ad. & El. 273), than what has been stated in the notice; and this, whether it be expressly so enacted by the statute requiring the grounds to be stated or not. If, on the other hand, the grounds of appeal be stated, where the statute giving the appeal does not require it, any defect in stating them, cannot be objected to by the respondents, R. v. JJ. of Westmoreland, 10 B. & C. 226, nor can they object to the appellants going into other grounds of appeal than those stated in the notice; but if they be misled by the notice in these respects, the court may adjourn the appeal.

Entry and adjournment.] Where the appeal, as is usual, is to the court of quarter sessions, it is in all cases entered with the clerk of the peace; but at what time it is to be entered, depends upon the practice of each particular court of quarter sessions. Where the statute giving the appeal makes certain acts conditions precedent to the party's appealing, such as giving notice of appeal, entering into recognizance, &c. the appeal cannot legally be entered until after those conditions have been complied with. In appeals against orders of removal it is enacted by stat. 9 G. 1, c. 7, s. 8, that if it shall appear to the justices that reasonable time of notice was not given, then they shall adjourn the said appeal to the next quarter sessions. But unless the statute thus specially provide

for the respiting of an appeal to a subsequent sessions, the sessions are not bound to respite or adjourn the hearing of it, nor is it by any means a matter of course for them to do so; they may do so in all cases if they will, R. v. JJ. of Wilts, 13 East, 352, and they usually do so where it appears to them necessary for ends of justice.

Trial of appeal.] Usually the respondent begins: he it is who makes the charge, against which the appellant appeals, and he must prove it; it is not for the appellant to prove his innocence, until the charge against him has first been substantiated by the other party. In appeals against convictions this is universally true; but in some of the other appeals it is not always the case. In appeals against poor rates, for instance, where the defendant objects to his being rated at all, the respondent begins; R. v. Newbury, 4 T. R. 475; where he objects to the sum at which he is rated only, as that he is overrated, or that other persons on the rate are underrated, the appellant begins; Id. R. v. J.J. of Suffolk, 6 M. & S. 57; and where he appeals upon both grounds, the respondents begin. R. v. Topham, 12 East, 546. So in appeals against orders of removal, as it is now decided that if the appellants, in their grounds of appeal, do not deny the settlement set up by respondents in the pauper's examination, they thereby admit it, and the respondents are not bound to prove it, R. v. Hockworthy, M. 1837, MS., it follows that in such a case the appellants must begin, and must prove any new settlement they may have set up in their grounds of appeal; but if the appellants have denied the settlement set up by the respondents in the examination, whether they set up any new settlement or not, the respondents begin. There must also necessarily be many other exceptions to the above general rule, arising out of the particular circumstances of each case, which must in a great measure be left to the good sense and discretion of the justices at sessions to regulate.

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But whether the respondent or appellant begins, the respondent in most cases may, if he wish, call upon the appellant to prove his service of notice of appeal before the case is at all gone into in some cases the statute giving the appeal expressly requires this proof before the court proceed to hear and determine the appeal; and in most other cases the statute makes the notice of appeal a condition precedent to the party's appealing, and the appellant in such cases must, if required, prove his notice of appeal, to show that he is in a situation to appeal, within the meaning of the statute.

Upon notice of appeal being proved, or proof of it not being required, the counsel for the respondent, supposing him to have a right to begin, states his case to the court, and adduces