under this section, but if the connexion was induced by threats, false pretences, &c., he would be guilty under section 3, sub-sections 1, 2 and 3.

(g) SUB-SECTION 2 (GENERALLY).-R. v. Howell, ubi supra, is an instance of an offence, which would now fall within this subsection.

(h) BROTHEL.-A common bawdy house is a house or room, or set of rooms in any house, kept for purposes of prostitution. And it is immaterial whether indecent or disorderly conduct is or is not perceptible from the outside (Stephen's Dig. Crim. Law, p. 110). As to absence of indecency, &c., perceptible from the outside R. v. Rice, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 21. See section 13, note (b).

(i) USUAL PLACE OF ABODE.-As "place of abode" would exclude a mere temporary dwelling place, the phrase is much emphasized by use of the word "usual."

In the case of Attenborough v. Thompson, 2 H. & N. 559, a decision upon the word "residence" in the Bill of Sale Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 1), many cases are collected upon this subject.

As to dwelling-house for purposes of burglary, R. v. Nutbrown, Foster, p. 76.

A person may have two places of abode concurrently: Kerr v. Haynes, 29 L. J. Q. B. 70, and R. v. Exeter (Mayor of), L. R. 4 Q. B. 110; McDougall v. Paterson, 11 C. B. 755.

For decisions as to the word "residence" used in the statutes relating to "irremovability" under the poor law, see Archbold's Poor Law, 13th ed., p. 605. Compare also cases under the Municipal Corporations Act and the Parliamentary Registration Acts: R. v. Exeter (Mayor of), L. R. 4 Q. B. 110; Durant v. Carter, L. R. 9 C. P. 261; Ford v. Pye, id. 269; Ford v. Hart; id. 273; Powell v. Guest, 18 C. B. (N.S.) 72; Taylor v. Overseers of St. Mary Abbotts, Kensington, L. R. 6 C. P. 309; 40 L. J. C. P. 45; Bond v. Overseers of St George's, Hanover Square, L. R. 6 C. P. 312; 40 L. J. C. P. 47; Whithorn v. Thomas, 8 Scott, N. R. 783. See Fisher's Dig. Election, ed. 1884, vol. 3, cols. 938 and 946; Rogers on Elections, 13th ed., pp. 92 to 95,

(k) SECTION 2, SUB-SECTIONS 2, 3 AND 4 (GENERALLY).— The absence in these sub-sections of any limitation as to age, and of such restrictive words as "not being a common prostitute" or "of known immoral character” renders these sub-sections extremely severe. A person who merely attempts to induce a notorious prostitute to leave her private lodging for a brothel would be liable under sub-sect. 4.

(1) SECTION 2 (GENERALLY).—It has always been an offence for persons to conspire and combine to commit these acts, which now of themselves are by this section made criminal: Wright on Criminal Conspiracies, p. 32.

In R. v. Delaval, 1 Wm. Black, 410 and 439, a criminal information was granted by the King's Bench in the case of a confederacy between a master of a female apprentice, an attorney, and a gentleman to assign her over with her own consent for the purpose of her living with the gentleman as his mistress.

Lord MANSFIELD, C.J., in his judgment, says: "Though there are species of indecency and immorality, particularly in cases of incontinency, which are confined to the Ecclesiastical Courts (and I am very glad they are so); yet the general inspection and superintendence of the morals of the people belong to this court as custos morum of the nation. So laid down in Curl's Case, 2 Stra. 788, and before that in Sir Charles Sedley's Case, Sid. 168; 1 Keb. 620. Especially when the offence is mixed with confederacy and conspiracy as in the present case." See also R. v. Mears, 1 Den. 79.

In R. v. Howell, 4 F. & F. 160, it was held, per BRAMWELL, B., and the Recorder of London, that, although common prostitution was not an indictable offence, it was unlawful, and that an indictment was therefore good which alleged that the defendants had conspired to procure a girl to become a common prostitute, although it did not aver that the prosecutrix was a chaste woman at the time of the conspiracy. As the court is now able to inflict hard labour the punishment will be more adequate, even in those cases which the criminal law could formerly reach.

(m) PROVISO.-There is no guide here as to the course to be pursued by justices or a magistrate, before whom a defendant is

charged under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42. Their duty as to committal is stated in section 25 of that Act. "If, after hearing all the evidence against the accused, the justice then present shall be of opinion that it is not sufficient to put such accused party upon his trial for any indictable offence, he shall order him to be forthwith discharged, but if the evidence is, in the opinion of the justice, sufficient to put the accused party upon his trial, or if it raise a strong or probable presumption of the guilt of the accused, such justice shall by warrant commit him," &c. It seems that if there is no corroborative evidence offered, or any prospect of there ever being such, it would be the duty of the justice to discharge the accused; but if there is a reasonable probability of such testimony being forthcoming at the trial, and the evidence already given of itself raises so strong or probable presumption of guilt as to justify a conviction in an ordinary case where no corroboration is required, then there should be a committal. The words used in the Bastardy Act (35 & 36 Vict. c. 65, s. 4), are "if the mother be corroborated in some material particular by other evidence to the satisfaction of the said justices." "By evidence implicating the accused" are useful words, as showing clearly the intent of the section, but in their absence it would have been necessary that the evidence should refer to the complicity of the accused in the matter and not merely to the perpetration of the offence by some person or other: 1 Phillipps on Evidence, 10th ed., p. 101, as to corroboration of accomplices. R. v. Webb, 6 C. & P. 595; R. v. Wilkes, 7 C. & P. 272; R. v. Farler, 8 C. & P. 106; R. v. Dyke, 8 C. & P. 261; R. v. Birkett, 8 C. & P. 232; R. v. Stubbs, Dear. C. C. 555; R. v. Hastings, 7 C. & P. 152; R. v. Boyes, 5 L. T. Rep. 147; 1 B. & S. 311; R. v. Gallagher, 15 Cox, 291.

The cases decided upon the Bastardy Act are R. v. Pearcey (or Piercey), 32 J. P. 203 (art.); 18 L. T. Rep. 238; 17 Q. B. 902, note; 16 Jur. 193 (Q. B.); R. v. Berry, 23 J. P. 82, 86; 28 L. J. M. C. 86; Hodges v. Bennett, 29 L. J. M. C. 224; and Cole v. Manning, 46 L. J. M. C. 175; 41 J. P. 469; 2 Q. B. D. 611; 35 L. T. Rep. 941.

"The Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869" (32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 2), provides that "no plaintiff in any action for breach of promise of marriage shall recover a verdict unless his or her

testimony shall be corroborated by some other material evidence in support of such promise."

In the case of Bessela v. Stern, 2 C. P. D. 265; 46 L. J. C. P. 467; 42 J. P. 197, the plaintiff, who had been seduced, swore to a promise of marriage on the part of the defendant. The corroboration was that the plaintiff's sister upbraided the defendant with being the cause of her condition, upon which he said: "I will marry her and give her anything, but you must not expose me." And that after the confinement the witness overheard the plaintiff say to the defendant, "You always promised to marry me, and you don't keep you word," when the defendant said he would give her some money to go away. Held by the Court of Appeal that this was sufficient corroborative evidence to satisfy the section.

Under section 20 of this Act the accused is a competent although not a compellable witness. Would it be proper for the prosecution as a last resource to call the defendant as a witness to supply the necessary corroboration, and if so, and if he were then to refuse so to be a witness, would his refusal be sufficient corroboration? See Seagar v. White, 48 J. P. 436; 51 L. T. 261; R. v. Cramp, 14 Cox, 390; McCloney v. Wright, 10 Ir. C. L. Rep. 514; Magee v. Mart, 11 Ir. C. L. Rep. 449.

In determining this question the distinction between a compellable witness and one who is not compellable must be remembered. In perjury it is a general rule that the testimony of a single witness is insufficient to convict the defendant, but if any other material circumstance be proved by other witnesses in confirmation of the witness who gives the direct testimony of perjury a conviction may be supported : "There must be something in the corroboration which makes the fact sworn to not true, if that be true also." See R. v. Boulter, 2 Den. 396; 21 L. J. M. C. 57; R. v. Shaw, L. & C. 579, and ERLE, C. J.'s judgment, 590; and cases collected in 3 Russell on Crimes, 5th ed., pp. 72-80. See Best on Evidence, 4th ed., p. 751.

GENERAL SECTIONS OF THE ACT WHICH RELATE TO THE
OFFENCES UNDER THIS SECTION.

See section 12, post, p. 70.

As to custody of girls under sixteen.

See section 16, post, p. 81.

As to liability of defendant to other criminal proceedings.

See section 17, post, p. 81.

The provisions of the Vexatious Indictments Act apply to offences under this section.

Courts of Quarter Sessions have no jurisdiction to try offences against this Act.

See section 18, post, p. 88.

The Court may allow the costs of the prosecution, as in cases of felony, and the prisoner, if convicted, may be ordered to pay such costs.

See section 20, post, p. 91.

The person charged and the husband or wife of such person may be a witness at each enquiry, except before a grand jury.

3. Procuring defilement of woman by threats or fraud, or administering drugs.] Any person who(1.) By threats or intimidation (a) procures (b) or

attempts (c) to procure any woman or girl (d)

to have any unlawful (e) carnal connexion (ƒ) either within or without the Queen's dominions; or

(2.) (g) By false pretences or false representations (h) procures (b) any woman or girl (d), not being a common prostitute or of known immoral character, to have any unlawful (e) carnal connexion (f) either within or without the Queen's dominions (i); or