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to the Treasury (g). Nor can the half-pay of an officer in the army or navy (h); for, further, an officer has no certain interest in his half-pay; for the king may at any time strike him off the list (i). Much less can an officer in the army assign his full pay; for military pay is not assignable (). The pension allowed to a retired clerk under the Incumbents' Resignation Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 44), s. 10, is not assignable (k); for it is made a charge upon the revenues of the benefice. and "shall not be transferable at law or in equity" (7).

Formerly, none of these choses in action passed on bankruptcy to the bankrupt's assignees in bankruptcy but the law has since been altered in this respect, and, generally speaking, the trustee in bankruptcy takes the pension or other similar income, and must thereout set aside so much for the bankrupt's support (m). But it was held that an annuity awarded to a country commissioner on the abolition of the office was assignable and passed to the assignees of the bankruptcy of the party to whom it had been awarded (n). So the profits of a college fellowship were held assignable in equity (0).

It has been held that a clergyman having the cure

(g) Cooper v. Reilly, 2 Sim. 560. (h) Stone v. Lidderdale, 2 Anstr. 533; 3 R. R. 622; Flarty v. Odlum, 3 T. R. 681; 1 R. R. 791; Lidderdale v. Duke of Montrose, 4 T. R. 248; 2 R. R. 375; Barwick v. Read, 1 H. Bl. 627; 2 R. R. 808; McCarthy v. Goold, 1 Bal. & B. 389; Price v. Lovett, 20 L. J. Ch. 270.

(i) Flarty v. Odlum, supra.

(j) Collyer v. Fallon, 1 Turn. & R. 459, 474. See, also, Crouch v. Martin, 2 Vern. 595; Law v. Law, Cas. temp. Talbot, 140; Stuart v. Tucker, 2 W. Bl. 1137; Mouys v. Leake, 8 T. R. 414; Davis v. Edgar, 4 Taunt. 63; 1 Geo. II. st. 2, c. 14; and 1 Geo. IV. c. 119, 8. 38; Priddy v. Rose, 3 Mer. 86; 17 R. R. 24; Cathcart v. Black

wood, Cooke's B. L. (8th ed.) 318; Ex parte Hawker, Re Keeley, L. R. 7 Ch. 214.

(k) Gathercole v. Smith, 17 Ch. D. 1.

(1) 34 & 35 Viet. c. 44, s. 10. But see Bkcy. Act, 1883, s. 52 (2); Re Saunders, (1895) 2 Q. B. 117; Lucas v. Harris, 18 Q. B. D. 127; Ex parte Chick, 11 Ch. D. 738.

(m) Bkey. Act, 1883, ss. 44, 52, 53. See, also, (n).

(n) Ex parte Corser, 11 Jur. 212; Spooner v. Payne, 11 Jur. 963; 21 L. J. Ch. 791; Willcock v. Terrell, 3 Ex. Div. 323.

(0) Feistel v. King's Coll., 10 Beav. 491. But see Berkeley v. King's Coll., 10 Beav. 602.

of souls is not a public officer, and there has been no decision against the assignment of his interest (p). At common law a beneficed clergyman can charge his benefice; and, although this was made unlawful by 13 Eliz. c. 20, yet when that Act was repealed in 1803 by 43 Geo. III. c. 84, a charge given between 1803 and 1817 (when 43 Geo. III. c. 84, was repealed and 13 Eliz. c. 20, was revised by 57 Geo. III. c. 99) was held valid (g).

And it was held in the recent case above quoted, that the assignment of the salary of the chaplain to a workhouse payable out of the poor rate is valid (p).

A distinction has been made between half-pay and a retiring pension; the former, as we have seen, is inalienable, but the latter has been held to be assignable unless such assignment be forbidden by statute (). The Army Act, 1881, for example, and the Indian Pensions Act, 1871, render all pensions to which those Acts refer non-assignable (s).

The salary of a judge is not assignable (†); but the pension of a county court judge is assignable (u). It was said: Where a pension is granted by the Crown to one who, though not for the time engaged in any active duties, is still liable to be called to active service, is therefore to be considered in the service of the Crown, the pension is to be considered as to some extent granted in order to maintain the grantee, until he is called on to serve again (u). But, as stated by Parke, B.: A man may assign a pension given to him entirely for past

(p) In re Mirams, (1891) 1 Q. B. 596.

(a) Metcalfe v. Archbp. of York, 1 My. & Cr. 547.

(r) Dent v. Dent, L. R. 1 P. & D. 366; 1 Wh. & T. [1897], 142. But see Birch v. Birch, 8 P. D. 163; and the Army Act, 1881, s. 141; Lucas v. Harris, 18 Q. B. D. 135, 136; Crowe v. Price, 22 Q. B. D. 429.

(s) But see Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 53 (2); and Re Saunders, (1895) 2 Q. B. 424.

(t) Arbuthnotv. Norton, 5 Moore, P. C. C. 219; Flarty v. Odlum, 3 T. R. 681; 1 R. R. 791; Tunstall v. Boothby, 10 Sim. 540; Grenfell v. Duke of Marlborough,

supra.

(u) Willcock v. Terrell, 3 Ex. D. 323.

services, whether granted to him for life or during pleasure (r).

And so a pension which has been awarded to a person for services in the legal department of the government is attachable, and consequently assignable (w). And, in like manner, the pension of a retired judge of a Crown colony, granted by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and voted annually by the legislature of the colony, vests in the creditor's trustee upon his becoming bankrupt (x). And the right to the annuity awarded as compensation to a commissioner of bankruptcy, whose duties were abolished by law, passes to his assignee in insolvency, although the annuity depends upon the annuitant's making an affidavit of certain facts before each payment (y).

Thus, it will be seen that there is no sound and invariable principle upon which the assignability or nonassignability of pensions is based. And, further, it is doubted whether a pension or reward, granted during pleasure and not for any certain period, and in its very nature revocable at any time, is properly assignable (≈). But military prize-money, although resting in the mere bounty of the Crown, is held to be different in its nature and objects from military pay (a).

But the profits of a public office, it seems, are not assignable (b).

Moreover, arrearages of half-pay or full-pay are assignable, since the right thereto has become, so to speak, absolute (c).

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stall v. Boothby, supra; Wells v. Foster, supra.

(a) Alexander v. Duke of Wellington, 2 Rus. & Myl. 35; 34 R. R. 1; Stevens v. Bagwell, 15 Ves. Jun. 139, 152; 10 R. R. 46.

(b) Hill v. Paul, 8 Cl. & F. 295, 307; Palmer v. Bate, 2 Bro. & B. 673; 23 R. R. 535. See also Nichols v. Davis, L. R. 4 C. P. 80; but note Arbuthnot v. Norton, supra.

(c) Ellis v. E. of Grey, 6 Sim.

And, generally, it appears that the pension of a retired officer, whether naval, military, or civil, is assignable, unless made not so by statute (d). The following are non-assignable (subject to certain exceptions): deferred pay, or military reward payable to any officer or soldier of the army, Royal Marines, and Her Majesty's Indian forces, and the Royal Malta Fencible Artillery, or any pension, allowance, or relief payable to any such officer or soldier, or his widow, child, or other relative, or to any person in respect of military service (e); naval pensions payable to an officer in the navy, seaman, or marine, or to an officer's widow, allowances from the compassionate fund, marine halfpay, payments, &c. in respect of services in the navy and marines to a subordinate officer, seaman, or marine (f).

But while, as we have seen, an assignment of a pension under the Incumbents Resignation Act, 1871, is invalid (g), an annuity granted to a retiring incumbent under the Union of Benefices Act, 1860, is valid (h).

Alimony granted to a wife is not assignable. Alimony is an allowance which, having regard to the means of the husband and wife, the Court thinks right to be paid for her maintenance from time to time, and the Court may alter it or take it away whenever it pleases. It is not in the nature of property, but only money paid by the order of the Court from time to time to provide for the maintenance of the wife, and therefore it is not assignable by her (i).

214. See also Tunstall v. Boothby, supra; Grenfell v. D. of Windsor,

supra.

(d) Goodeve, Pers. Pro. [1887], 95; 1 Wh. & T. [1897], 142; sed.

quære.

(e) The Army Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58), ss. 141, 190; Lucas v. Harris, 18 Q. B. D. 127; Crowe v. Price, 22 Q. B. D. 429.

(f) The Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 73), s. 4.

(g) 34 & 35 Vict. c. 44; Gathercole v. Smith, supra.

(h) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 142; Mc Bean v. Deane, 30 Ch. D. 520; Goodeve, Pers. Pro. [1892], 149 et seq.

(i) In re Robinson, 27 Ch. D. 164. See Vandergucht v. De Blaquière, 5 My. & Cr. 243.

So, where a contract involves personal skill or confidence, such as a contract between an author and publisher that the one shall write and the other publish a book, it is not assignable (). But an agreement by the vendor of a patent to assign to the purchaser of future patents rights which the vendor might thereafter acquire of a like nature to the patent sold, is not contrary to public policy (k), for nothing is more common in intellectual pursuits than for men to sell beforehand the future intellectual product before it is made or even conceived, and such an assignment is valid (k). But a personal licence, e.g., a licence to enter a house and seize goods, is not assignable (7).

Again, policies of fire assurance are not, in the nature of them, assignable, nor intended to be assigned from one person to another, without the consent of the office (m), nor have they been made assignable by statute (n).

It has been held that a bare right to bring an action for fraud committed upon the assignor is not assignable, as being contrary to public policy (o); and that a mere right of action for a tort is also not assignable (p). And the principle upon which this is said to be based is that the party assigning the right must have some substantial possession-some capability of personal enjoyment, and not a mere naked right to overset a legal instrument or to maintain a suit; and that the mere right to purchase does not give a man a right to legal remedies (q). In fact, it has been thought the reason

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