help the bonâ fide purchaser of an estate to recover for rent due or injuries done to such estate previously to his purchase thereof (i).

Moreover, it is maintenance to purchase shares in a company for the purpose of instituting a suit at the purchaser's risk to restrain the governing body of the company from performing acts unwarranted by its constitution (). The sale of a contingent right or a mere expectancy, not being in the nature of a claim adverse to any existing possession is not contrary to the statute 32 Hen. VIII. c. 9.

And the sale of a man's possible interest as devisee of a living owner, on the terms that he shall return the purchase-money if he does not become the devisee, is not invalid either at common law as creating an unlawful interest in the present owner's death, or as a bargain for a pretended title under the statute ().

But the rules against champerty do not apply to proceedings in lunacy, which are pre-eminently for the protection of the person and property of the lunatic, which is in itself to be encouraged (7).

Where a person sues for a statutory penalty as a common informer, it is maintenance to indemnify him against costs (m). But the principles applicable to cases of maintenance and champerty are subject to certain qualifications dependent upon particular conditions and circumstances.

They cannot apply, for example, to a person having an interest in or honestly believing that he has an interest in the subject-matter in dispute, and honestly

Harrington v. Long, 2 My. & K. 590; 39 R. R. 304; Hoghton v. Money, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 164; Seear v. Lawson, 15 Ch. D. 426; Guy v. Churchill, 40 Ch. D. 481; 56 L. J. Ch. 670.

(i) Williams v. Protheroe, 5 Bing. 309, 314; 30 R. R. 608. (j) Bloxam v. Met. Rail. Co., 3 Ch. 353.

(k) Cook v. Field, 15 Q. B. R. 460; 19 L. J. Q. B. 441. But cp. Just. C. 2, 3, de pactis, 30; D. 18, 4.

(1) Persse v. Persse, 7 Cl. & F. 279, 316.

(m) Bradlaugh v. Newdegate, 11 Q. B. D. 1; 52 L. J. Q. B. 454; Alabaster v. Harness, (1895) 1 Q. B. 339.

acting on that belief (n); nor to a person who charitably assists a suitor in his action, believing him to be a poor man oppressed by a rich man (o). Nor do the rules apply where certain peculiar relations obtain between the parties to the transaction; such as that of father and child, or of an heir apparent (p), or of the husband of an heiress (4), or of master and servant (r), and the like.

Nor is it maintenance for a creditor, who has instituted proceedings at law and in equity against his debtor, to agree with such debtor to abandon those proceedings, and to surrender his securities, in consideration of the debtor's giving him a lien on other securities in the hands of another creditor, with authority to sue the latter, and agreeing to use his best endeavours to assist in adjusting his accounts with the holder, and in recovering those securities. For there was no bargain, or colour of bargain, that the assignee should maintain the suit, instituted in the assignor's name, against the creditor who had the other securities, in consideration of sharing in the profits to be derived from that suit. Such an agreement is, in effect, nothing more than an assignment of the equity of redemption of the assignor in the securities held by such creditor in exchange for the prior securities held by the assignee. And the authority, given to the assignee to sue such creditor, was the common legal provision in the case of an ordinary assignment of debt or security (s).

A bankrupt whose adjudication has not been set

(n) Findon v. Farker, 11 M. & W. 675, 682; Pechell v. Watson, 8 M. & W. 691; Hunter v. Daniel, 4 Ha. 420; Flight v. Leman, 4 Q. B. R. 883.

(0) Harris v. Brisco, 17 Q. B. D.

504.

(p) Burke v. Green, 2 Ball & B. 521.

(9) Moore v. Usher, 7 Sim. 384; Story, Eq. [1892], 703.

(r) 4 Bl. Comm. 135; Elborough v. Ayres, L. R. 10 Eq. 367, 371, 375; Wallis v. Portland, 3 Ves. Jun. 503; 4 R. R. 78; Vin. Abr., Maintenance, K.; Wilson v. Short, 6 Ha. 366; Dickinson v. Burrell, 35 Beav. 257.

(s) Hartley v. Russell, 2 Sim. & Stu. 244; 25 R. R. 196. Cp. Williams V. Protheroe, supra; Harrington v. Long, 2 My. & K. 591 et seq.; 39 R. R. 304.

aside, cannot maintain an action for maintenance on the ground that the defendant incited and supported bankruptcy in which he had no common interest, since the cause of action (if any) passed to the trustee in bankruptcy; and such action may be summarily dismissed as frivolous and vexatious (); and a corporation in liquidation as distinct from the individual liquidation is, it seems, incapable of committing such an act of maintenance (t).

By the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the trustee can assign the subject-matter of an action which he has already commenced without being subject to a charge of maintenance (u).

By the Companies Act, 1862, claims which a company may have against its directors for improper dealings with the assets of the company (as, for example, improper sales or purchases by them as fiduciaries), are choses in action which may be sold by the liquidator, even although the existence of the claim was not known. when the assignment was executed (r).

But an agreement by a shareholder in a company which is being compulsorily wound up that, in consideration of a pecuniary equivalent, he would endeavour to postpone the making of a call, or would support the claim of a creditor, was held to be invalid (w).

But an assignment of a debt even to an attorney, after a judge's order for payment, but before the order was made a rule of Court, was held to be valid if there were no other objection to the transaction ().

Where a legatee, too poor to sue, assigned the legacy for less than its value to the plaintiff, who bought it in

(t) Met. Bank v. Pooley, 10 App. Ca. 210; Whitworth v. Hall, 2 B. & Ad. 695; 36 R. R. 715; 1 Wh. & T. 147.

(u) Ss. 44, 56; Seear v. Lawson, 15 C. D. 426; Guy v. Churchill, 40 Ch. D. 481.

(v) Re Park Gate, &c. Co., 17

Ch. D. 234. Cp. New Westminster Brewery v. Hannah, W. N. [1876], 215; [1877], 35.

(w) Elliott v. Richardson, L. R. 5 C. P. 744, 748; 1 Wh. & T. 148.

(x) Smith v. Selwyn, 5 W. R. 682.

order to sue therefor, it was held, that this was not maintenance or champerty (y).

Formerly, actions for tort were never assignable, and, generally speaking, they are not so now. How far such choses in action are or may be assignable it is very difficult to say, but the subject has already been referred to in the previous chapters on the Judicature Act, where authorities will be found cited (yy).

Here, it is sufficient to say that, generally speaking, actions for injuries, not to property, but to the person either physical or moral, are still deemed to be not assignable; while injuries to property are, in some qualified and restricted degree, often assignable where the measure of damages is able to be estimated by the injury done to the estate.

Finally, every right of action, in tort or otherwise, which vests in a bankrupt's trustee, is assignable by the latter, even though it might have been not assignable by the bankrupt himself (z).

The Judicature Act in no way affects or alters the law as to maintenance and champerty (a).

(y) Tyson v. Jackson, 30 Beav. 384; 1 Wh. & T. 150. See also Pollock, Contracts.

(yy) Ante, Bk. III.

(z) Secar v. Lawson, 15 C. D.

426; Guy v. Churchill, 40 Ch. D. 481.

(a) Ball v. Warwick, 50 L. J. C. P. D. 382; James v. Kerr, supra; Guy v. Churchill, supra.

Book V.

SOME STATUTES AFFECTING THE OWNERSHIP AND DISPOSITION OF CHOSES IN ACTION.

CHAPTER I.

FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES.

By 13 Eliz. c. 5, a statute for the avoiding of feigned, covinous, and fraudulent feoffments, gifts, grants, alienations, conveyances, bonds, suits, judgments, and executions, as well of lands as of goods and chattels, contrived of malice, fraud, &c. to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, &c., &c., it was enacted that all and every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain, and conveyance of lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, and chattels, or any of them, or of any lease, rent, common or other profit or charge out of the same lands, tenements, hereditaments, goods, and chattels, or any of them, by writing or otherwise, and all and every bond, suit, judgment, and execution at any time had or made to or for any intent or purpose before declared and expressed, shall be from henceforth deemed and taken (only as against that person or persons, his or their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, and every of them, whose actions, suits, debts, accounts, penalties, forfeitures, heriots, mortuaries, and reliefs, by such guileful, covinous, or fraudulent devices and practices as is aforesaid, are,