liable under a judgment or order, to the amount paid or levied, although such proceeding may be set aside, or the judgment or order reversed (h).

Costs of such proceedings are in the discretion of the Court or judge (i)..

The judgment or order (by virtue of which garnishee proceedings are permissible) must be one for "recovery or payment of money"; an order for mere payment into Court is not one which can be enforced by garnishee proceedings (j). Equitable as well as legal debts are attachable ().

The debt must be actually due from the garnishee, either presently payable, or presently due, though payable at a future day, i.e., debitum in præsenti, solvendum in futuro (1).

Money paid into Court is not attachable (m); but money in the hands of the sheriff is (n); debts due jointly are not attachable (o); nor an income of trust funds for a married woman which she is restrained from anticipating (p); nor wages of servants, labourers, and workmen (7); nor wages of seamen (r); nor, generally, pensions (s), for pensions not assignable are not attachable ($).

(h) Ord. XLV. r. 7. (i) Id. r. 9.

(j) In re Greer, (1895) 2 Ch. 217. See Holtby v. Hodgson, 24 Q. B. D. 103.

(k) In re Cowan's Estate, 14 Ch. D. 638; Webb v. Stenton, 11 Q. B. D. 518.

(1) Webb v. Stenton, supra; Jones v. Thompson, El. B. & E. 63; Tapp v. Jones, L. R. 10 Q. B. 591.

(m) Stevens v. Phillips, L. R. 10 Ch. Ap. 417; Dolphin v. Layton, 4 C. P. D. 130; Prout v. Gregory, 24 Q. B. D. 281.

(n) Murray v. Simpson, 8 Ir. R. C. L. App. xlv; In re Greer,

supra.

(0) Macdonald v. Tacquah Gold

Mine Co., 13 Q. B. D. 535. But see Beasley v. Roney, (1891) 1 Q. B. 509; and Ord. XLVIIIA. r. 9.

(p) Chapman v. Biggs, 11 Q. B. D. 27. But see Galmoye v. Cowan, 58 L. J. Ch. 769; Hood-Barrs v. Heriot, (1896) Ap. Ca. 174.

(q) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 30; Gordon v. Jennings, 9 Q. B. D. 45; Booth v. Trail, 12 Q. B. D. 8.

(r) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 163. (s) 28 & 29 Vict. c. 73, s. 4; 34 & 35 Vict. c. 44; 44 & 45 Vict. c. 58, s. 141. See also Apthorpe v. Apthorpe, 12 P. D. 192; Lucas v. Harris, 18 Q. B. D. 127, 135, 136. See also Bk. IV., Ch. III., on Choses in Action never Assignable, ante, p. 269. For the general

The order for attachment does not transfer the debt in the sense of making the garnishor a creditor and the garnishee his debtor; consequently a debt attached is not attachable by a judgment creditor of the garnishor (t).

The garnishee is bound the moment he is served by the order nisi, and not until then (u).

The attachment is completed by the actual receipt of the debt (r).

A garnishee order absolute is not a "final judgment" within Bankruptcy Act, 1883, sect. 4 (1) (g), upon which a bankruptcy notice can be grounded (w).

The lien of a solicitor for his costs of recovering or preserving the property takes priority over a garnishee order (x); but otherwise, as to general lien (y).

Lastly, it is to be observed that the garnishee is unconditionally released from all liability by paying the amount attached into Court under and in compliance with the order nisi; that if he omits to do so an order for execution may issue against him; and that if he contests the claim he may be held liable for all the costs occasioned by his disputing the liability to pay.

subject of debts attachable or not, see Cababé, Attachment of Debts; Anderson, Execution; Edwards, Execution.

(t) Chatterton v. Watney, 17 Ch. D. 259; In re Combined Weighing & Advertising Machine Co., 43 Ch. D. 99, 105, 106; Cooper v. Lawson, 6 T. L. R. 34.

(u) In re Stanhope Silkstone Collieries Co., 11 Ch. D. 160; Hamer v. Giles, 11 Ch. D. 942.

(v) Bkey. Act, 1883, s. 45 (1),

(2); Butler v. Wearing, 17 Q. B. D. 182; In re Trehearne, 63 L. T.

323.

(w) Ex parte Chinery, 12 Q. B. D. 342; In re Connan, 20 Q. B. D. 690; In re Combined Weighing, &c. Co., supra.

(x) Dallow v. Garrold, 13 Q. B. D. 543; The Leader, L. R. 2 Ad. & Ec. 314; Birchall v. Pugin, L. R. 10 C. P. 397.

(y) Hough v. Edwards, 26 L. J. Ex. 54.

CHAPTER III.

OF ASSIGNEES; AND HEREIN OF TITLE.

As the previous chapters of this work will have demonstrated, there are many questions to which an intending assignee will need an answer previously to entering into a contract for the assignment of a chose in action.

Doubtless the first question will be, Is the chose in action assignable? and this must be answered in the light of the foregoing cases. Next he will wish to know what title the intending assignor has in the subject-matter; with this point we shall deal subsequently in this chapter. Assured of the assignability of the chose in action and that the assignor has a good title thereto, the assignee will require to know whether the person by whom payment is to be made is reasonably solvent, and what chances there are of recovery in the event of the necessity to have recourse to proceedings, and to what equities (if any) the assignment will or may be subject. He may also think it well to consider whether the chose in action is one which has been or may be held to fall within the operation of the Judicature Act, 1873, and therefore to need strict compliance with all the formalities therein enacted. The intending assignee will also be desirous of ascertaining whether there is already any charge effected in respect of the subject-matter of the proposed assignment, and, if any, the amount and terms and conditions of such charge. With regard to title, it is, of course, obviously necessary for the intending assignee to satisfy himself

as to the assignor's stability, bona fides and position generally, and to remember the effect of the various statutory enactments herein contained affecting the disposition of choses in action. The following points are also worthy to be considered.

Anyone who has a voidable title to goods may, before his title is avoided, dispose of them for value to another, who takes them in good faith, without notice of defect in the assignor's title, and the assignee will thereby acquire a valid title to such goods (a).

A valid title may be acquired from one who is not their owner, by reason of the law of estoppel (b).

A good title may also be acquired to chattels in a foreign country by any transaction in respect of them, which, by the law of that place, confers a good and valid title to them in rem; and this title will be valid even if the chattel be brought to England (c).

Similarly, a bonâ fide indorsement and delivery for value of a bill of lading by a buyer of goods forwarded by sea, confers a good title on the indorsee innocent of the imperfect title of the indorser who has not paid for them. For such an indorsement defeats the unpaid vendor's right of stoppage in transitu (d).

By the Statute of Limitations all actions for trespass, detinue, and replevin for goods or cattle must be brought within six years next after the cause of action, subject to the following extension of time. If the person entitled to any such action be under age, feme covert, or non compos mentis, such person shall be at liberty to bring the same action within six years after the removal of the disability (e). The time within which actions

(a) White v. Garden, 10 C. B. R. 919. And see Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Ca. 459; Vilmont v. Bentley, 18 Q. B. D. 322; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 23.

(b) Pickard v. Sears, 4 A. & E. 448; Goodwin v. Roberts, 1 App. Ca. 476. And see Bkcy. Act

(46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 44.

(c) Williams [1894], Pers. Pro. 513.

(d) Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T. R. 63; Ex parte Golding, Davis & Co., 13 Ch. D. 628.

(e) Stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 16, ss. 3, 7; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, ss. 10,

may be brought on choses in action, generally, depends partly upon the nature of the chose in action and partly upon that of the document of title, or kind of security relied on by the owner of the chose in action. Thus, to enforce payment of money secured by mortgage deeds, judgment (f) or lien, or charged upon or payable out of any real estate, or any legacy (g), the action must be brought within twelve years (h) next after a present right to receive the same should have accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for or release of the same. But if in the meantime there be payment of principal or part thereof, or of interest, or a written acknowledgment of the liability, then twelve years from such payment or other acknowledgment (i).

It seems that a period of twenty years is similarly given for recovery of the personal estate or any share in the personal estate of a person dying intestate (j).

For an action of debt for rent secured upon an indenture of demise, or money secured by bond or other specialty, but not charged upon or payable out of any land or rent (), or money secured by a recognizance, a similar period of twenty years with similar extensions (7).

But actions for arrears of dower, and damages on account thereof, can only be brought within six years after such were due (7), and no provision is made for an

518, 519; Darby & Bosanquet, Statute of Limitations [1893],

172.

(k) Freeman v. Stacy, Hutton, 109; Re Powers, 30 Ch. D. 291; 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, ss. 3, 4; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 10; Pardo v. Bingham, 17 W. R. 419; Roddam v. Morley, 1 De G. & J. 1; Moodie v. Banister, 4 Drew. 432; Coope v. Cresswell, L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 112; Dibb v. Walker, (1893) 2 Ch. 429.

(7) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 41.