extension of time in consequence of written acknowledgment (m). Actions for arrears of rent or of interest in respect of any sum of money charged upon or payable out of any real estate or in respect of any legacy must be brought within six years next after the same shall have become due or next after a written acknowledgment of liability (n). But if such arrears were secured to the claimant (0) by indenture of demise (p), or by bond or other specialty (q), then twenty years was formerly the period, but now it seems questionable whether or not the period has been reduced to twelve years (r). A mortgagee's remedy on the mortgagor's covenant for payment in the mortgage deed may now be barred in twelve years as well as his remedy against the land (s); and the same observation applies to the case of the mortgagor's contract for payment being contained in a separate deed (t). Payment of interest by a mortgagee keeps alive the remedy against a surety (u). The recovery of a legacy is barred in twelve years, unless it be secured by an express trust (r); and any judgment, it would seem, may now be barred in twelve years, though it do not operate as a charge on land (w). Where a mortgagee or other incumbrancer has been in possession of any real estate within one year next (m) Darby & Bosanquet, 218. (n) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 42; Hodges v. Croydon Canal Co., 3 Beav. 86; Francis v. Grover, 5 Ha. 39; Humfrey v. Gery, 7 C. B. R. 567; Bowyer v. Woodman, L. R. 3 Eq. 313. (0) Hughes v. Kelly, 3 Dru. & W. 482. (p) Paget v. Foley, 2 Bing. N. C. 679. (q) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42, s. 3; Sims v. Thomas, 12 Ad. & El. 536; Hunter v. Nockolds, 1 Mac. & Gord. 640; Elry v. Norwood, 5 De G. & Sm. 240; Sinclair v. (r) Sutton v. Sutton, 22 Ch. D. 511; Fearnside v. Flint, 22 Ch. D. 579; Donegal v. Neil, 16 L. R. Ir. 309; Darby & Bosanquet, 141, 168. (s) Sutton v. Sutton, supra. 119. (w) Jay v. Johnstone, (1893) 1 Q. B. 189. before the proceedings of a subsequent mortgagee or incumbrancer, the latter may recover the arrears of interest which may have become due to him during the whole time that the prior mortgagee or incumbrancer was in possession (x). Choses in action consisting of simple contract debts must be sued for within a period of six years next after the cause of action arose, or within the extended time allowed for removal of disabilities (y); and the period may date from part payment of principal or interest, as well as from written acknowledgment (≈). Actions for debt upon any award where the submission is not by specialty, or for any fine due in respect of copyholds, or for an escape, or for money levied on a fi. fa., where not claimed under seal, must be brought within six years, or similarly extended period (a). For actions for penalties, damages, or sums of money given to a person grieved by any statute now or hereafter to be in force, the limit is two years after right to . bring them has arisen, subject to proviso for disabilities, and subject also to the provision as to any other period which may be mentioned in any particular enactment (a). Actions for slander where the words are not of themselves actionable without special damage must be brought within six years of happening of the damage (b), otherwise two years (c); for assault, battery, wounding, or imprisoning, within four years (d). Death of the creditor makes no difference to the (x) 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 27, s. 42; Wms. Pers. Pro. 521. (y) 21 Jac. I. c. 16, ss. 3, 7; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, ss. 10, 12, 13. See also 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, s. 1; Darby & Bosanquet, 3, 7, 65, 107. (z) See n. (y); and Waugh v. Cope, 6 M. & W. 824, 839; Morgan v. Rowlands, L R. 7 Q. B. 493. running of the statute if the cause of action accrued in lifetime of the deceased; but if it does not arise until after his decease, the time will only begin to count from grant of letters of administration (e). Death of debtor makes no difference either way (f). Formerly, if, by his will, a debtor charged his real estate with the payment of his debts, or if he did so by an express trust, he would thereby prevent the operation of the statute against all such debts as had not been barred thereby during his lifetime (g); but now they will be barrable after twelve years from operation of the statute (h). If dividends upon any stock subject to the National Debt Act, 1870, remain unclaimed for ten years, the stock and dividends will be transferred to the account of the commissioners for the reduction of the National Debt (i), but re-transferable on proof of title (j). Similar provisions have been made with respect to unclaimed dividends and stock of India Stock and Consolidated Stock of the Metropolitan Board of Works, and East Indian Railway Annuities, and East Indian Railway Debentures (j). For other matters affecting the limitations of rights of action, &c., reference should be made to the authorities cited below (). It is obviously of the utmost importance that an intending assignee should, as far as he is able, satisfy himself as to whether there has been any prior assignment by way of charge or otherwise, and whether the (e) Williams, Pers. Pro. 522, and cases cited; Darby & Bosanquet, 49. (f) Rhodes v. Smethurst, 6 M. & W. 351; Freake v. Cranefeldt, 3 My. & Cr. 499; Swindell v. Bulkeley, 18 Q. B. D. 250. (g) Burke v. Jones, 2 V. & B. 275; 13 R. R. 83; Crallan v. Oulton, 3 Beav. 1; Hughes v. Wynne, T. & R. 307, 309; Williams, Pers. Pro. 523. (h) Jacquet v. Jacquet, 27 Beav. 332; Dickinson v. Teasdale, 31 Beav. 511; 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57, ss. 8, 10. (i) 33 & 34 Vict. c. 71, ss. 3, 51, 54, 68. (j) See ante, pp. 119 et seq., 181 et seq. (k) Darby & Bosanquet, Statute of Limitations [1893]: Williams, Pers. Pro. [1894]; Pollock, Torts & Contracts; Leake, Contracts; Addison, Torts & Contracts; Goodeve, Pers. Pro. chose in action is at the present moment free from all incumbrance or not. He may obtain this from the assignor, and in some cases he may, for many reasons, be obliged to rely upon his word and run the risk of the contrary; but wherever it is possible and practicable, the intending assignor should ascertain in writing (1) from the person or persons liable to pay whether the subject-matter of the proposed assignment is owing or payable by him or them, and whether he or they have received notice of any prior charge upon, disposition of, or dealing with the same. When he has obtained this, he should see that the assignment is drawn by the assignor in such manner as to effect, as far as an assignment can, a transfer of all those rights in respect of the subject-matter which the assignee desires to enforce against the person liable to perform the corresponding obligations, and that it is coupled with a power of attorney sufficiently comprehensive to cover all emergencies and to clothe him with full power to sue for, demand, and appropriate to his own use the subjectmatter of the assignment, and an indemnity against all loss in the event of his failing to prove the claim to the subject-matter. When the assignment is completed the assignee should make it his immediate business to communicate the purport of the transaction to the person or persons liable to pay. And here let it be said that nothing less than actually bringing the matter before such person or persons should be relied upon as sufficiently safe. For this purpose a written notice clearly reciting the date, parties, and purport (anyway, so far as the subject-matter, the chose in action, is concerned) of the assignment, should be drawn. This notice should be signed, if possible, by the assignor, and served, if possible, upon the "debtor " or " debtors" personally; and a copy of the (Low v. Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. 82; Lyde v. Barnard, 1 M. & W. 101; Swann v. Phillips, 8 Ad. & E. 457. same kept and indorsed by the server of the original. This appears to be the most direct and effectual manner of bringing the assignment to the knowledge of such person with a view of fixing the funds in his hands. There are, of course, many other modes, viz., by sending the notice by registered letter, and obtaining an acknowledgment of the same, or by embracing the notice in an application for payment, and seeking to get the debtor's reply letter. But anything short of personal service will probably necessitate proving the handwriting of such debtor or the questionable and rebuttable assumption that he received the notice because not returned, &c. If the chose in action assigned be a trust fund, notice must be given to the proper trustee or trustees; if it be a debt, then to the debtor; if a policy of assurance, then to the office, and an indorsement thereof effected on the policy by the society, coupled with possession of the policy. If it be money, stock, or securities now in Court, the assignee should generally obtain a stop order. If shares, the assignee should obtain a transfer into his own name, or otherwise mark his ownership of them; but see prior reference to this (m). If the title to the chose in action depends upon any deed, will or other document, the intending assignee will be entitled to an abstract of the document in question, and the original deeds must be produced, or office copies of the wills for verification, as if dealing with purely real property ("). The assignee will also either be entitled to the possession of the deeds, or a written acknowledgment of his right to their production and to delivery of copies of the same. In short, whatever the nature of the chose in action, the assignee is bound to do all he can to perfect and assert his ownership over the chose in action as against all other persons, in order to protect any subse (m) Bk. II., Ch. II. & III. Williams, Pers. Pro. 531; R. |