legislature to prevent the spread of corruption at elections. There was another evil too that was disclosed, and which had to be met. The returns obtained showed that the increased expenditure at elections was an evil almost as great in its effect as the evils of direct corruption."* That this lavish extravagance, which was emphatically condemned by Sir Henry James as "the father of corruption," is wholly unnecessary, was abundantly proved by the returns quoted from various constituences. Thus in Hackney, with upwards of 44,000 electors, the expenditure of the two successful candidates amounted to only £914. In Herefordshire the Liberal candidate won the seat with 2,726 votes, on a register of 8,222 electors, at an expenditure of only £296; and South Northumberland (a constituency of 8,800 electors) was won with an outlay of £1,004 only. If these figures are compared with the amounts which will be permitted in those constituencies respectively, under Schedule I. Part IV. of the new Act, it will at once be seen that the figures in each of those successful contests fall considerably short of what will henceforth be the legal maximum. In fact, Sir Henry James stated on the second reading of the Bill in the Session of 1882, that he could name 35 borough constituencies, the successful candidates for which had been able to conduct their elections for an expenditure much less than that specified in the Bill. The secret of that success was, as the Attorney-General at the same time pointed out, that instead of employing *Hansard, vol. 279, 1,697. See table of expenses at p. 308. armies of paid agents, who "set an example of corruption and were the means of corrupting others,"* the candidates relied on the volunteer efforts of their supporters animated by enthusiasm for their cause. It is this principle which (it may be said) the Corrupt Practices Act of 1883 is intended, as far as possible, to embody. During the debates in Parliament it was more than once declared to be the intention of the framers of the Bill to do away with the old system of electioneering, and establish an entirely new order of things, under which as much of the actual election work as possible shall be left to voluntary effort.† Another eminently salutary principle which it embodies is that of fining the delinquent constituency, by saddling it with heavy costs, if corrupt practices have extensively prevailed (s. 44). This practice is, after all, but a return to a time-honoured precedent. For in the earliest recorded case of punishment for bribery, "the House inflicted a fine on the borough of Westbury for receiving a bribe of £4 from one Thomas Long." None will deny the justice of such a course, but it suggests also the question which contains the most probable solution of the whole problem, why the constituencies themselves should not, in the first instance, bear the cost of returning their members to Parliament. Members serve their constituents, and their duties are sufficiently onerous, if honestly fulfilled. Why, in addition to such sacrifice of time, and often of health, they should be compelled to pay even the comparatively moderate sums to be permitted under the new Act, it is difficult to see, while a system, under which it would be the interest of every constituency to aim at returning its members at the smallest possible cost, has certainly much to recommend it. Until, however, public opinion is ripe for that step, the surest ally of a measure such as the present will probably be found in the extinction of small, separate boroughs, and the substitution for these hot-beds of corruption of constituencies far greater in extent, and therefore less accessible to mean and corrupting influences. Those who are wont to lament that, with the disappearance of the pocket borough, the glory of the English Parliament has departed, may perhaps find some consolation in the fact that similar complaints found utterance as far back as the days when the first Resolution against Treating was passed.* It is possible that even this attempt may not be immediately successful; and that nothing will avail but the purification of the political atmosphere in the constituencies, which time alone can bring about. But even so, this Act will be found to have done its work. For, by transferring the sanction of the law to the side of economy and purity, it will conduce to the growth of a more healthy public opinion in those constituencies, which are at present the most corrupt. The nature of the reform by which it is hoped that these results may be attained will be gathered from an Analysis of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883, in which its various provisions are summarised under the following heads: I. Provisions defining the offences which may be committed under the Act, and providing for the punishment of the same (ss. 1-21; 36-38). II. Authorised excuse and exception for some of such offences (ss. 22, 23). III. Enactments relating to election expenses (ss. 24-35). IV. Provisions respecting the trial of election petitions, and other legal proceedings relating thereto, or arising out of the same (ss. 40-46 ; 49-62). V. Amendment of law as to polling districts, &c. VI. Definitions (ss. 63, 64); application of Act to VII. Schedules. I.-Provisions relating to Offences against the Act. The offences punishable under the Corrupt Practice Acts are divided into four classes: : A.-Corrupt Practices. B.-Illegal Practices. C.-Illegal payments, employment and hiring. The following is a complete Table of these offences, setting forth the Punishments and Incapacities which are involved in each case :- |