benefit of this absolute right of publication. And this is still more so if the comment involves some new fact. Hence one who reports or publishes an account manifestly one-sided should take care to let it clearly appear, that one side only was heard; and no comments of the reporter should be interlarded or added, tending to suggest a partisan view of the case. Report and comment should always be kept separate, and it should be recollected, that the conclusions drawn by a bystander are in general wholly immaterial and misleading, for the judge or jury alone are to decide the proper inferences to be drawn for the time being. And a sensational heading to the report is deemed a comment in the above sense. And for like reasons a party is not justified in publishing without discrimination everything that falls from the mouth of counsel. Everybody knows, that the statement of a counsel is ex parte, and that he is often instructed to make allegations which it is afterwards impossible to support in proof. And, though it be lawful for counsel thus to utter matter injurious to individuals, the subsequent publication of this has no such protection, and may be actionable. For example, to insinuate that a witness had committed perjury is wholly beyond the province of the reporter, for it is for the judge and jury alone to deal with that conclusion; and every witness on his oath is entitled at least from bystanders to have his statement taken and fairly represented as he gave it, it being exclusively the business and main function of the court to estimate and weigh it.

How far the report must be verbatim or abridged.— With regard to the accuracy of the report of proceedings in courts of justice, it is not meant, that there should be a verbatim report. Any summary of various length may be as accurate as a verbatim report, and in general is the only practicable kind of report. All that a reporter usually requires to do is to give such account of what he has heard as an intelligent bystander would give when relating it

2

1 R. v Fleet, 1 B. & Ald. 379. 746. 3 Lewis v Levy, E. B. E. 544; 4 Lewis v Clement, 3 B. & Ald. 702. 213; Lewis v Walter, 4 B. & Ald. 605; 525. 6 Flint v Pike, 4 B. & C. 473. Bing. 519; Cooper v Lawson, 8 A. & E.

Cooper v Lawson, 8 A. & E. Stiles v Nokes, 7 East, 453. 5 Saunders v Mills, 6 Bing. Roberts v Brown, 10 Bing. 7 Roberts Brown, 10

746.

afterwards, the reporter's function being merely that of giving eyes and ears to the absent.1 And some discretion is required as to the parts of a case which should be reported and the proper proportions of those parts. If, for example, the statement of facts made by one counsel should alone be given, that is to say, his version of the facts which he intended or expected to prove, and an account of the facts actually proved thereafter was omitted or slurred over, an unfair report might be the result, seeing that counsel often without any fault of theirs make allegations, which it is afterwards impossible to support in proof.2

How far contempt punishable if act is done out of court. The contempt of a court may be committed by words used in presence of the court itself, if these words imply either from their meaning or the gesture and manner accompanying them, that an insult is intended and understood. For the bystanders of the moment may from the use of such language conceive a contemptuous opinion of its authority, if no remedy be available. Each court is presumed to know its own law and to put the right interpretation on the character of the act done, so far as it is contemptuous, for if the contempt is by a gesture none but the court can judge of it. On this subject a useful distinction was drawn, when it was held, that, if the words used are spoken in presence of the judge himself, this may be punished summarily by attachment for contempt; but if the words were used elsewhere than in court, the proceeding should be by way of indictment, as no great urgency is then required. And this may be said to be the rule as to inferior courts. In 1743 a court-martial passed a resolution reflecting on certain comments made by a Chief Justice, who had tried an action against the president for an illegal sentence on a prior occasion, and this resolution was sent to the king. The Chief Justice committed all the members of the court-martial, whereupon they wrote a contrite submission to be read in court, after which they were released. In 1808, after the trial and acquittal of a ship's captain charged with murdering one

1 Andrews v Chapman, 3 C. & K. 289. C. 473; Saunders v Mills, 6 Bing. 218. 1015. 4 Re Pater, 5 B. & S. 299.

L. Lib. 158.

2 Flint v Pike, 4 B. & 3 Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B.

5 Willes, C. J., Holt,

of the crew, a newspaper writer wrote an article, insisting that the prisoner had been guilty, and censuring the judge and jury for acquitting him. The article was a mere declamatory invective, and without any fair and temperate discussion of evidence; and the writer was indicted and convicted, and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.1 And where the writer in commenting on a recent trial and execution for murder imputed corruption to the judge, the defendant was found guilty of a seditious libel.2

The libels for which a superior court may commit are thus not merely those published in the court or the immediate neighbourhood, but include those which are published at a considerable distance, and though the court was not sitting at the time of publication. And a solicitor, who published a pamphlet relating to a recent judgment, describing it as wholly beside the merits of the case, and as having as its only object to deter solicitors from exposing abuses in the court, was committed for contempt. And in another case, where an unsuccessful applicant wrote a letter to the judge using a threat, tending to induce him to alter the decision, that was deemed a contempt for which an attachment issued.5 A letter offering money to the judge is also treated as a gross contempt. It is equally a contempt to send a letter, threatening a party or witness if he attend the court, or publishing insinuations that they are perjured. And where a judge had cleared his court of the public owing to excessive noise, and the high sheriff resisted this, and told his officers to admit the public, as it was an unlawful proceeding to exclude them, the latter was fined 5007. for this as a contempt.8

What courts can commit for this contempt.-This power to commit for contempt was said to be a necessary incident to every court of Justice, whether of record or not. Wilmot, C. J., insisted, that not only could a judge

2 R. Sullivan, 11 Cox, C. C. 57. Charlton's Case, 2 My. & Cr. 316; 4 Exp. Turner, 3 M. D. & De G.

1 R. v White, 1 Camp. 359. 3 Crawford's Case, 13 Q. B. 613; R. v Onslow, L. R. 9 Q. B. 219. 523; Exp. Jones, 13 Ves. 237. 6 Martin's Case, 2 R. & My. 674. 305; Shaw & Shaw, 2 Sw. & T. 515; 8 Re Sheriff of Surrey, 2 F. & F. 237.

5 Re Charlton, 2 My. & C. 316. 7 Smith Lakeman, 26 L. J. Ch. Re Mulock, 33 L. J. Prob. 205. 9 1 Vent. 1.

of a court of record commit for contempt when he was sitting in the Court, but he had the same powers when doing any judicial business, even in his private chamber, or in the judge's chamber auxiliary to the court. But this has on further examination been deemed to be too wide, and the line has been drawn between a judge sitting in open court and sitting in camera, in which latter case no power of committal for contempt is inherent.'

Courts of record are usually divided into those of a superior and of an inferior kind. And the superior courts have been held to include all the highest courts, the House of Lords, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court and High Court of Justice. This class also includes courts of assize and judges sitting at nisi prius and the Central Criminal Court.2 And the Court of Quarter Sessions is also classed among the superior courts in this respect. With regard to all these courts the important characteristic is, that the commitment need only mention, that the party committed a contempt of court, without stating further particulars, it being deemed conclusive, and as if the court could not go wrong in such a matter.4

Punishment for contempt.-The mode of punishment for a contempt of court is fine or imprisonment, and neither the extent of the one nor the duration of the other is settled. In one old case, the party committed, being a barrister-for tampering with a witness in the Popish Plot-besides being fined and imprisoned, had his gown pulled over his ears by the tipstaff5 It is however a general rule on this subject, that when a commitment is in the nature of a punishment, and not like a commitment of a party till he answer, which is rather in the nature of process, it ought to be certain as a sentence. No English court, if their attention were called to the point, would commit by way of punishment except for a time certain."

1 R. Faulkner, 2 Mont. & A. 338, 344. 2 Re Fernandez, 10 C. B., N. S. 3; 6 H. & N. 717. 3 R. v Clements, 4 B. & Ald. 223; Re Pater, 5 B. & S. 300. • Crawford, re, 13 Q. B. 613, Re Pater, 5 B. & S. 299. 5 Bac. Abr. Court E.

6 Re Crawford, 13 Q. B. 628. In the case of Bingley, a bookseller who was charged with contempt of the Court of Queen's

Contempt of inferior judges and courts.-Sometimes this kind of disrespectful language is used towards justices of the peace, as by calling them fools, knaves, and rascals. And some of the older authorities seem to assume, that a justice of the peace may for words of contempt uttered in his presence commit the party to prison; though perhaps these powers were understood to apply only to binding over the party to keep the peace. For words contemptuous of a justice of the peace uttered in his presence seem not even to be indictable, far less to be matter for which the speaker may be committed. At least where the words are spoken of a justice, but not in his presence, the words are not indictable.3 And though the older authorities are confused and contradictory as to whether a justice acting as such can commit a party for contempt in his presence, at all events he must at the very least make out a warrant of commitment specifying the term of imprisonment. And it would probably require a masterly hand to draw such a warrant of imprisonment as would withstand the remedy of habeas corpus.5

A county court is classed among inferior courts, and though it has power given by statute to commit for a contempt done in the face of the court, its power does not extend to contempts committed elsewhere. And as regards the ecclesiastical courts, the mode of procedure is limited to this, that the judge must certify the contempt, whether committed in the face of the court or not to the Lord Chancellor, who thereupon issues a writ de contumace capiendo to arrest the party.7

Comments on conduct of public officers.-While it is open to any member of the public to comment either in Bench, he was, on refusing to answer interrogatories, committed to prison, where he was detained two years, still refusing during all that time to submit to the jurisdiction of the court. At last the Attorney-General moved for his discharge, on the ground that his imprisonment had been of longer duration than he might have suffered if he had received judgment for the original offence.-16 Parl. Deb. 469.

1 Cro. Eliz. 78; R. v Revell, 1 Str. 420; R. v Langley, 2 L. Raym. 1030. 2 R. v Pocock, 2 Str. 1157; Ex p. Chapman, 4 A. & E. 773. 3 R. v Weltje, 2 Camp. 142. R. James, 5 B. & Ald. 894. See 2 Pat. Com. (Pers ) 212. 7 2 & 3 Will. IV. c. 93, § 1.

4 Mayhew Locke, 7 Taunt. 62; 5 Howard Gossett, 10 Q. B. 452; 6 R. v Lefroy, L. R., 8 Q. B. 134.