DIGEST OF CASES 1903 ACCOUNTS. Audit-Inspection of deposited accounts-"Persons interested"-Ex-member of urban authority-Adjudication of bankruptcy-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55) 8. 247 (4, 6).—An ex-member and ex-chairman of the finance committee of an urban authority, who had become disqualified as a member by being adjudicated bankrupt, claimed under section 247 (4) of the Public Health Act, 1875, as a "person interested" the right to inspect the accounts of the authority when deposited prior to the audit, on the ground that if any irregular or illegal payments were disclosed he might be liable to be surcharged. A court of summary jurisdiction found that, as a former chairman of the finance committee, the applicant would have been a person interested and entitled to see the accounts had he not been a bankrupt, but that the adjudication of bankruptcy deprived him of this right. Held, that upon this finding, the mere fact of bankruptcy was not a reason for depriving the applicant of a right to which he was otherwise entitled, since the accounts themselves might affect the dividend he had to pay. MARGINSON V. Tildsley. ADJUSTMENTS. 333 Formation of New Urban District-Loss of profitable area-Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41) ss. 57, 62-Local Government Act, 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), ss. 54, 68.— Where a parish in a rural district is formed into an urban district under section 57 of the Local Government Act, 1888, a claim by the council of the rural district against the council of the urban district for compensation for loss of income, based on the allegation that the contributions of the parish towards the highway expenses of the rural district council exceeded the expenditure of that council on the highways in the parish, so that the council derived a profit from the parish, is (in the absence of any provision to the contrary in the order constituting the urban district) a subject matter for adjustment under section 62 of the Act. Re Rochdale Union and Haslingden Union, 1899, 1 Q. B. 540, followed. Matters which ought to be taken into consideration by an arbitrator dealing with such a claim considered. Re GODSTONE RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL and Caterham UrBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL. 311 ADULTERATION. (1) Brandy-Analyst's certificate-Certificate stating extent of reduction below proof onlySale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 6 Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 30), s. 6.-By section 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879, it is a good defence to proceedings under section 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, in the case of brandy not adulterated otherwise than by the admixture of water, to prove that the admixture of water has not reduced the brandy more than 25 degrees under proof. Having regard to the standard thus prescribed, the certificate of an analyst, which states, merely, that a sample of brandy submitted to him for analysis has been reduced from 25 degrees under proof to 27.6 degrees under proof, is sufficient; it is not necessary that the certificate should specify the total quantities of pure spirit and of added water or other ingredients, if any, contained in the sample. FINDLEY v. HAAS. 377 (2) Drug-British Pharmacopoeia - Commercial standard — Admissibility of evidence of a commercial standard different from that of British Pharmacopoeia-Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 6-Pharmacy Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 121), s. 15.—Evidence of the existence of a commercial standard for the composition of a drug differing from the standard laid down in the formula given by the British Pharmacopoeia, is admissible in proceedings under section 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, for the sale of a drug not of the nature, &c., demanded by the purchaser. Dickins v. Randerson, 1901, 1 K. B. 437; 70 L. J. K. B. 344, considered. BOOTS, CASH Chemists v. CoWLING. 884 (3) Drug-British Pharmacopoeia-Vinegar of Squills-Certificate of Analyst-Article liable to decomposition Statement as to change in constitution of article which would interfere with analysis-Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), ss. 6, 7, 20; schedule.-The British Pharmacopoeia gives a formula for the preparation of vinegar of squills, but fixes no standard as to the amounts of its ingredients which that drug in its finished state is to contain. On an information under the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts for selling vinegar of squills otherwise than in accordance with the demand of the purchaser, it was proved that the drug sold contained less acetic acid than vinegar of squills freshly made in accordance with the formula of the British Pharmacopoeia would contain, but that vinegar of squills, even though properly kept, gradually undergoes a loss of acetic acid. The justices, without considering whether deficiency in acetic acid impairs the efficiency of the drug, convicted on this evidence. Held, that there was no evidence to justify the conviction. Semble, that if the analyst's certificate does not, in the case of a drug liable to decomposition, contain a report as to whether any change has taken place in the constitution of the *. article which would interfere with the analysis, as is required by the note in the schedule to the Act of 1875, the defect would be a bar to a conviction based on the evidence afforded by the certificate alone; and query whether the defect can be cured by evidence given by the analyst. Per Channell J. The words "interfere with the analysis" in the note in question mean prevent the analysis from being effective for the purpose of showing what the constitution of the article was at the time of sale. And where an article varies in its composition so that at one time it will contain more of a particular ingredient than at another, then the analyst ought in his certificate to state whether any change has taken place at the time of his analysis which would prevent his analysis from showing what the constitution of the article was at the time it was sold. HUDSON V. BRIDGE. 400 (4) Fertilisers and feeding stuffs-Invoice false in material particular to the prejudice of the purchaser-Analysis-Mens rea-Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 56), ss. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7.-The observance of the provisions of section 5 of the Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Act, 1893, and of the Regulations of the Board of Agriculture thereunder, as to the taking of samples and analysis, is not a condition precedent to a prosecution under the Act. The managing director of a company trading as manufacturers of fertilisers coming within the scope of the Act was convicted of an offence under section 3 (1, b) of the Act, (which makes it an offence for any person who sells any article for use as a fertiliser of the soil to cause or permit an invoice of the article sold by him to be false in a material particular to the prejudice of the purchaser) in respect of an invoice false in fact sent out with an article sold by the company, upon evidence that he was cognisant of the form of invoice used in connection with sales of that article, that he knew the article to be one liable to vary in its constituents, and that in the ordinary course of business sales of the article would come under his cognisance and invoices would not be sent out without his knowledge, notwithstanding the absence of evidence that he ever saw or was personally aware of the sending of the particular invoice. Held, that there was evidence that he had "permitted" the invoice to be false within the meaning of the subsection. Per Wills J. (Channell J. dissentiente), mens rea is not an element of the offence under section 3 (1, b). KORTEN v. WEST SUSSEX COUNTY COUNCIL. 445 (5) Milk-Sample taken at place of delivery-Inspector acting outside his own districtSale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63) s. 13-Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 30) s. 3.-Section 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act Amendment Act, 1879, does not empower an officer appointed by and acting under the directions of a local authority to take a sample of milk at a place of delivery outside the district of the authority, even though the milk is consigned to a dairyman carrying on business within that district. MCNAIR V. CAVE. 28 (6) Time for return of summons-Not "less time than fourteen days"-Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899 (62 & 63 Vict. c. 51), s. 19 (2).—The Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899, s. 19 (2), provides that "In any prosecution under the Sale of Food and Drugs Acts the summons ADULTERATION-BOUNDARIES ADULTERATION-Continued. 905 shall not be made returnable in less time than fourteen days from the day on which it is served." Held, that fourteen days must elapse between the day of the service of the summons and the day of the return thereof. MCQUEEN v. JACKSON. 601 (7) Warranty "Without accepting any responsibility after delivery"-Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63) s. 25.-Where an article of food has been delivered by a wholesale dealer direct to the premises of the retail dealer under a contract containing a warranty of purity, the fact that the warranty is expressed to be given "without accepting any responsibility after delivery" does not preclude the retail dealer from relying on it as a defence to proceedings taken against him under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, in accordance with section 25 of that Act. WILSON V. PLAYLE. AFFILIATION.-See POOR LAW, BASTARDY. APPEAL: POOR RATE.-See POOR RATE (1, 2). 870 66, 605 ATTORNEY GENERAL. Action by, to restrain infringement of Bye-Laws.-See STREETS (3, 4). 146, 421 Necessity of joining, as plaintiff-Action by Owner of adjoining property to restrain building on open space.-See OPEN SPACE. AUDIT.-See ACCOUNTS. BANKRUPTCY. Disqualifications-Election of person disqualified by bankruptcy-Quo warranto. BASTARDY.-See POOR LAW, BASTARDY. BICYCLE. Bridge Toll.-See BRIDGE (3, 4). BOUNDARIES. 98, 696 634 235, 393 (1) Alteration of parish boundaries-Effect of Order on Boundaries of Unions-Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), s. 57.-Where by an order of a county council made under section 57 of the Local Government Act, 1888, and confirmed by an order of the Local Government Board, a portion of a parish in one union is transferred to another parish situate in another union, the identity of the latter parish is not destroyed, and the area of the union in which that parish is situate is, as a result, enlarged so as to include the added portion. West Ham Union v. London County Council, 1902, 1 K. B. 562; 71 L. J. K. B. 299, discussed and applied. BOOTLE UNION v. WHITEHAVEN UNION and OTHERS. 585 (2) Intercepting sewer constructed under local Act to serve certain districts-Extension of constituent district-Drainage of added area into intercepting sewer-Brighton Intercepting and Outfall Sewers Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. c.), ss. 4, 35, 36, 37, 91-Hove Commissioners Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. xcv.), ss. 3, 5, 6, 15, 61—Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), ss. 57, 59, 125-Local Government Act, 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), s. 42.—An intercepting sewer was made under the Brighton Intercepting and Outfall Sewers Act, 1870, which provided for the making of intercepting and outfall sewers for Brighton, and two adjoining Improvement Act districts in the parish of Hove, and for the vesting of the sewers in the defendant Sewers Board. Section 91 of the Act provided that if, after the passing of the Act, any local board or body of commissioners should be constituted for any district in which any part of the sewers authorised would be situate, having powers with respect to sewerage, and to levy rates within such district, such local board or commissioners should be at liberty, by notice to the Sewers Board, to participate in the benefits and liabilities of the Act, and should thenceforth be a local authority within the Act. By the Hove Commissioners Act, 1873, a body of Improvement Commissioners was constituted for the whole parish of Hove, and these Commissioners were given the benefits and liabilities of the former Commissioners for the two parts of Hove under 906 BOUNDARIES-BRIDGE BOUNDARIES-Continued. the Act of 1870. By an order made by the county councils of East and West Sussex in 1893, under the Local Government Act, 1888, it was provided that the area of the parish of Aldrington should be transferred to and form part of the urban sanitary district of Hove, and that the "district" in the Act of 1873 should mean the parishes of Hove and Aldrington, instead of the parish of Hove. The district of Hove thus extended was subsequently formed into a borough, and the plaintiffs became the successors of the Hove Commissioners. The plaintiffs claimed to be entitled under these circumstances to send the drainage of Aldrington into the intercepting sewer. Held (reversing the decision of Kekewich J.), that the order of the county councils, having been laid upon the table of both Houses of Parliament, and duly confirmed by the Local Government Board, was unimpeachable; that the case came within section 91 of the Act of 1870; and that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that they were a local authority within the Act of 1870, and as such entitled to discharge into the intercepting sewers the whole of the sewage of Hove, including that coming from the parish of Aldrington; and that the fact that the sewer might not be at present large enough to accommodate the additional sewage was no answer to the claim for a declaration of the plaintiffs' rights, though it might be a ground for giving the defendants reasonable time to comply with the order if an injunction were asked for. HOVE CORPORATION v. BRIGHTON INTERCEPTING AND OUTFALL SEWERS BOARD. 355 Formation of new urban district-Adjustment-Loss of profitable area. 311 Lands transferred by local Act to City of London except for rating purposes-Electoral qualifications in respect of transferred lands.—See REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS (1). BRIDGE. 110 (1) Canal bridge-Local Act-Fences by side of raised approach-Liability to repair10 Geo. IV. c. xlviii. ss. 4, 24, 26.-The defendants under their statutory powers constructed a canal and crossed a highway, which they carried over their canal by means of a bridge, to which they made a raised approach along the highway, fencing it off from the rest of the highway. The fences had since fallen into disrepair, so as to constitute a public nuisance. By a local Act of 1829, such bridges were vested in the defendants, and it was provided that they should not be liable to repair any part of the roads approaching any bridge over the canal after such roads had been first made and used for one year, and then put into good and sufficient repair by the defendant company, beyond or further than the extremity of the wing walls of any such bridge, but nothing therein contained should be construed to exonerate the defendant company from the future repair of all such bridges and the wing walls, ramparts and side banks thereof. Held (affirming Kekewich J.), that the Act of Parliament drew a clear distinction between the bridges, as such, which were vested in the defendants, and the approaches to the bridges, which were not vested in them, and which they were now relieved from all liability to keep in repair, and that the defendants were therefore not liable to repair the fences. Semble, the obligation lay on the county council. 282 (2) Repair Liability of county council Occasional repairs done by highway authorityBridge over artificial cut formed across existing highway.-A county council are not relieved from their primâ facie duty of repairing a bridge built before the County Bridges Act, 1803, by proof that occasional repairs have been done to the bridge by the highway authority, or that the bridge was built over an artificial channel to carry a highway already in existence when the channel was formed. ATTORNEY GENERAL V. WEST RIDING OF YORKSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL. 223 (3) Toll-Bicycle-"Carriage "_"Carriage hung on springs "-5 Geo. IV. c. cxiv. s. 78.— A bicycle is not chargeable as a carriage with tolls on the passage of a bridge under a local Act imposing tolls for, inter alia, "every person on foot, and if with a wheelbarrow or suchlike carriage, the sum of one penny"; and "for every coach, chariot, hearse, chaise, berlin, landau, and phaeton, gig, whiskey, car, chair, or coburg, and for every other carriage hung on springs, the sum of sixpence for each wheel, and for each horse or other beast of draught drawing the same, the sum of twopence." Decision of Wright J., reported 85 L. T. 726, affirmed. Query, whether a bicycle of ordinary construction can be a "carriage hung on springs" within such an Act. Cannan v. Earl of Abingdon, 1900, 2 Q. B. 66, doubted. SIMPSON V. TEIGNMOUTH AND SHALDON BRIDGE COMPANY. 235 BRIDGE-Continued. BRIDGE-BUILDINGS 907 (4) Toll-Bicycle-" Carriage '—“ Sledge, drag, or such-like carriage"-39 Geo. III. c. xxviii. 8. 11.-A bicycle is not chargeable as a carriage with tolls on the passage of a bridge under a local Act imposing tolls for, inter alia, "every sledge, drag, or such-like carriage." Decision of Wright J. rep. 66 J. P. 679, affirmed. SMITH V. KYNNERSLEY and OTHERS. 393 Toll Bridge-Rateable Occupation.-See Poor Rate (5). BUILDING LINE.-See STREETS. BUILDINGS. 613 (1) Deposit of plans-Local Act-Plans null and void if work not commenced within three years-Repeal of bye-laws subject to saving for work commenced or of which plans have been approved-Plan for several houses held null and void as to houses not commenced within three years-Harrogate Corporation Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. ccix.), s. 27.—Where the bye-laws of an urban authority require every person intending to erect a new building to deposit plans of every floor of the building, a plan comprising a number of proposed houses constitutes a separate and independent plan of each house for the purposes of a provision in a local Act enacting that the deposit of a plan of any building shall be null and void if the work specified in such plan is not commenced within a certain period. Consequently, after the expiry of the period named in the Act, the deposit of the plan, as regards houses not already commenced, becomes ineffective, and a fresh deposit is required before the erection of such houses; and, if new bye-laws are made rescinding the previous bye-laws subject to a saving for work already commenced, or of which plans have been approved, such houses must be erected in accordance with the new bye-laws. HARROGATE CORPORATION V. DICKINSON. 275 (2) Metropolis-Electric lighting boxes in street-Notice to District Surveyor-London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 145—City of London Electric Lighting Order, 1899 (scheduled to 62 & 63 Vict. c. cclxxv.), s. 13.—An electric lighting box of considerable size and substantial construction constructed in a street is a "building structure or work" within section 145 of the London Building Act, 1894, and the circumstance that the electric lighting undertakers by whom the box is constructed are required by their Provisional Order to give notice of the construction of such boxes to the local authority, and to the Postmaster-General, and to construct the boxes in accordance with plans approved by those authorities, does not relieve them from the obligation of giving notice to the district surveyor under section 145 of the Act of 1894. Whitechapel Board of Works v. Crow (1901), 84 L. T. 595, approved and followed. 551 (3) Metropolis-Re-erection of buildings on site formerly occupied-Substitution of factory for dwelling-houses-London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 13.—The right reserved by section 13 (5) of the London Building Act, 1894, to re-erect buildings erected before that Act nearer to the centre of the roadway than is allowed by the section in the case of wholly new buildings extends to the erection of buildings differing wholly both in height and class from the previously existing buildings, e.g., to the erection of high factories in substitution for small dwelling-houses, the subsection being concerned with identity of ground area only. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL v. PATMAN & FOTHERINGHAM. 519 (4) Metropolis-"Uniting" of buildings-Blocks of flats commenced as separate buildings but finished as single building-London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 77.— Section 77 (1) of the London Building Act, 1894, which prohibits the "uniting" of buildings except where they are wholly in one occupation or are constructed or adapted to be so, applies only to the uniting of buildings completely erected, in the first instance, as separate structures, and does not apply to the uniting of separate buildings in the course of erection for the purpose of transforming them into and finishing them as a single separate structure. Semble, that pushing a covered way between two buildings is not "uniting" the buildings within the subsection. GOODCHILD v. MATTHEWS. 523 Bye-laws-Reasonableness-Dispensing power-Competence of justices to treat offence as trifling.-See BYE-LAWS (2). 825 Bye-laws-Rescission of former and substitution of new bye-laws-Saving for "work commenced "-Plans for terrace of houses approved before confirmation of new bye-laws-Particular houses commenced after confirmation of new bye-laws.-See BYE-LAWS (4). 483 Bye-laws-Walls of new buildings required to be of incombustible materials-Bye-law in force in sparsely populated rural parish-Reasonableness-Competence of justices to treat offence as trifling.-See BYE-LAWS (3). 753 |