STATUTES-Continued. STATUTES-STREETS 933 60 Vict. c. 5 (Voluntary Schools Act, 1897), s. 3.—See Poor RATE (4). c. ccxxxvi. (Dublin United Tramways (Electrical Power) Act, 1897), s. 37. 61 & 62 Vict. c. cclix. (West Ham Corporation Act, 1898), s. 42.-See DRAINS (2). s. 30.-See OFFICERS (1). c. 38 (Telegraph Act, 1899), s. 3.-See TELEGRAPH. 711 173 386 441 704 777 601 c. 51 (Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899), s. 19.-See ADULTERATION (6). 63 & 64 Vict. c. cxl. (Hastings Tramways Act, 1900), s. 82.-See CONTRACT (2). s. 49, Sched. II. (4).—See FACTORIES AND WORKSHOPS (4). -s. 149, Sched. VI., Pt. I. (20).—See FACTORIES AND WORKSHOPS (1). c. cclxvii. (Derby Corporation Act, 1901), s. 180.-See POOR RATE (6). STOCK.-See LOANS. STREAM. Conversion of stream into sewer.-See RIVER POLLUTION (2). STREETS. 106 41 193, 746 874 673 624 133 (1) Building line-Building in front of front main wall of adjoining house-Offence-Penalty Rumball v Schmidt (1882), 8 Q. B. D. 603, and Blackpool Corporation v. Johnson, 1902, 1 K. B. Semble, that where plans of a proposed building, shown to project beyond the front main MULLIS v. HUBBARD. 769 (2) Building line-Local Act-Part of front wall "taken down to be rebuilt or repaired "— Section 17 of the Bristol Improvement Act, 1847, provides that where any part of the front The respondents, desiring to alter one of the front windows of an ancient beerhouse belong- In doing the work a workman employed by the master builder, without instructions from the respondents or the master builder, and contrary to their intentions, removed the stone sill of the window and replaced it with brickwork. Held, without deciding whether the stone sill was part of the front or external wall of the beerhouse within the meaning of the above section, that the sill, having been removed by mistake and contrary to the intention of the parties, had not been "taken down to be rebuilt or repaired," and, therefore, that the section did not apply. YABBICOME V. BRISTOL BREWERY. 477 (3) New Street-Bye-laws-Building at side of ancient highway-Action in High Court for injunction-Attorney-General not joined-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 157.— The defendants, the owners of a building estate abutting upon two old public highways not previously built upon to any substantial extent, in pursuance of a plan for building on the estate involving the erection of a continuous row of between 20 and 30 houses fronting one of the highways, erected three of that row of houses, one of them flanking on the other highway, and other houses in rear of that row, one of which also flanked on the last-mentioned highway. The defendants had not interfered, and did not intend to interfere, with the roadway of either highway; and they had not removed the fences separating their land from the highways except where they had made the necessary openings for entrance and exit. The plaintiff Corporation, alleging that the defendants were laying out the highways as new streets in contravention of the bye-laws as to new streets in force in the locality, which were of the usual type, inasmuch as the defendants were laying out such new streets of less than the prescribed width, brought the present action, to which the Attorney-General was not a party, claiming an injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing the bye-laws, and alternatively a declaration that the plaintiffs were entitled to pull down any work done by the defendants in breach of the bye-laws. Held, by Joyce, J., (1) that the defendants were not laying out or intending to lay out the highways as new streets within the meaning of the bye-laws; (2) that the bye-laws could not be enforced by action brought by the plaintiffs in their own name, but only by the special statutory remedies or by an action by the Attorney-General. Held, by the Court of Appeal, that the decision of Joyce, J. ought to be affirmed, on the ground that the plaintiffs could not maintain the action in the absence of the AttorneyGeneral. Per Collins, M.R. The decision of Joyce, J., that the defendants were not laying out or intending to lay out a new street, was a decision on a question of fact with which there was no reason to differ. Semble, per Romer, L. J. That the bye-laws, in referring to the laying out of a new street, were intended to deal with something done or to be done on the land forming or intended to form the street itself, and not with the mere erection of buildings at the side of an existing highway. DEVONPORT CORPORATION v. TOZER & SON. 421 (4) Bye laws-New street-New street of insufficient width-Action in High Court for injunction-Liability of concurring owners-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 157, 158, and 251.-The infringement of bye-laws made by a local authority under section 157 of the Public Health Act, 1875, may be restrained by injunction in an action by the AttorneyGeneral on the relation of the local authority, notwithstanding that there are alternative remedies by proceedings for penalties imposed by the bye-laws or by pulling down or removing the offending work. Where several landowners concur in laying out a new street over their land and the new street is of less width than is prescribed by a bye-law requiring that every person who lays out a new street shall so lay out such street that the width thereof shall be so many feet at least, the landowners on whose land the street is of the prescribed width are responsible as well as those on whose land it is of less width. Robinson v. Barton Local Board (1882), 21 Ch. D. 621, followed. ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. ASHBOURNE RECREATION GROUND CO. 146 (5) Nuisances-Litter in thoroughfare-Printed advertisements scattered from van-Metropolitan Police Act, 1839 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47) s. 60 (3).—Printed theatrical advertisements scattered from a van in such quantities as to cause litter, in the ordinary and popular sense, in a metropolitan thoroughfare, may be "litter" within the meaning of the third clause of section 60 of the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, which prohibits the throwing of litter in thoroughfares. HILLS v. DAVIES. 499 (6) Nuisances-Meat or offal, or “other matter or thing" whatsoever overhanging pavement -Reflector lights--Metropolitan Paving Act, 1817 (57 Geo. III. c. xxix.), s. 65.-Reflector lights for increasing light in dimly-lighted rooms, fixed by staples to the brickwork of the front of a house, and supported at an angle by chains, so as to overhang the pavement of the street, are not within the prohibition in section 65 of the Metropolitan Paving Act, 1817 (Michael Angelo Taylor's Act), against the hanging out or exposing of meat or offal or "other matter or thing whatsoever" over the pavement. WINSBORROW v. LONDON JOINT STOCK BANK. 531 STREETS 935 STREETS-Continued. (7) Paving expenses-Metropolis-Apportionment of estimated expenses-Apportionment by temporary surveyor-Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 105-Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), s. 96.-An officer of a metropolitan borough council who, having been their assistant surveyor, was acting as interim surveyor, is their "surveyor for the time being" within the meaning of section 105 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, for the purpose of estimating the cost of paving a new street. Lewis v. Weston-super-Mare Local Board (1888), 40 Ch. D. 55; 58 L. J. Ch. 39, distinguished. KENDAL V. LEWISHAM BOrough. 416 (8) Paving expenses-Metropolis-"Owner"-Common vested in local authority for purposes of recreation ground-“Extra commercium "-Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), ss. 105, 250-Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), s. 77.— A common vested in a local authority by a local Act, or by a scheme under the Metropolitan Commons Acts duly confirmed, for the purpose of being held by the local authority as a public recreation ground, is, by the statutory dedication to the public, placed “extra commercium" ; and the local authority, even though incidentally to the management of the common they derive some revenue from it-such revenue falling far short of the expenditure on the common-are therefore not "owners" of the common within the meaning of the Metropolis Management Acts so as to be liable to contribute to the expenses of paving a new street on which the common abuts. Decision of the Divisional Court reversed. Fulham Vestry v. Minter, 1901, 1 K. B. 501; 70 L. J. K. B. 348, overruled. 462 (9) Paving expenses-Metropolis-"Owner"-Land subject to building agreement Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 250.-The freeholder of a plot of building land entered as "intended lessor" into an agreement with a builder as "intended lessee" by which the latter was to have possession of the land, build 32 houses upon it within a certain time, and in the meantime pay a rent of £200 per annum, which was not a rack-rent. Upon the completion of each house the intended Tessor was to grant to the intended lessee a lease for 99 years. The agreement was to operate as an agreement only and not as an actual demise or to give the intended lessee any legal interest in the land until the leases should have been executed. No houses had been built, but the builder remained in possession of the plot of land and paid the £200 yearly to the freeholder. Held, that the builder was not the "owner" of the land within the meaning of section 250 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, but that the freeholder was such "owner." Holland (Lady) v. Kensington Vestry (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 565; 36 L. J. M. C. 105, followed. DRISCOLL V. BATTERSEA BOROUGH. 511 (10) Paving expenses-Metropolis-Recovery-Action against successive owner-DemandPeriod of limitation-Limitation Act, 1623 (21 Jac. I. c. 16), s. 3-Metropolis Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 105-Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 102), s. 77. Where a new street is paved at the cost of the frontagers under section 105 of the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, and section 77 of the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862, sums apportioned on the owners of houses as well as sums apportioned on the owners of land are recoverable under the latter section by action from any present or future owner. Before an action can be brought under that section against a person who becomes owner of premises after the work is done a demand must be made on him, whether or not a demand has already been made on a previous owner; and therefore the Statute of Limitations, if any, applicable does not begin to run in favour of the succeeding owner until a demand has been made upon him. HAMPSTEAD BOROUGH v. CAUNT. 507 (11) Private street works-Covenant to maintain road until "taken to" by local authority -Recovery by covenantee of expenses of private street works executed by local authorityPublic Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 150-Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 59), s. 41.-The defendant in the course of developing certain building land, in the year 1888, formed a road on the boundary between his property and land belonging to the plaintiff, and laid a sewer under it. The plaintiff contributed towards the expense, and in consideration of such contribution the defendant covenanted with the plaintiff that the plaintiff should not be under any liability to contribute to the maintenance or repair of the road or sewer, or any works connected therewith, but that the same should be wholly maintained by the defendant until the same should be taken to by the parish or some other local authority. In 1900 the local authority made the road up under section 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875, at the expense of the frontagers, and afterwards declared it a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled under the covenant to recover from the defendant the share of the expense of making up the road apportioned on the plaintiff under the section. MOORE 7. TODD. 113 (12) Private street works-Decision of Justices that street is a highway reparable by inhabitants at large-"Res Judicata "--Estoppel-Wakefield Corporation Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. lxxi.), ss. 29, 30, 31-Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), ss. 6, 7, 8.— Proceedings having been taken for the execution of private street works in part of a street under a local Act containing provisions practically identical with those in sections 6-8 of the Private Street Works Act, 1892, objection was taken to the provisional apportionment on the ground that the street was a highway reparable by the inhabitants at large, and the justices decided that the street was such a highway and upheld the objection. Subsequently fresh proceedings were taken under the same Act in relation to a part of the same street comprising the part to which the previous proceedings related together with an additional length of the street; and objection was taken to the new provisional apportionment upon the same ground that the street was a highway reparable by the inhabitants at large. Held, that the matter was res judicata and that the justices were therefore bound to allow the objection. Judgment of the Divisional Court, 1902, I K. B. 188, reversed. Reg. v. Hutchings (1881), 6 Q. B. D. 300; 50 L. J. M. C. 35, distinguished. WAKEFIELD CORPORATION v. COOKE and OTHERS. 337 (13) Private street works-Failure to serve owner with copy of resolution approving provisional apportionment-Service on person erroneously believed to be owner-“ Reputed owner"-Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), ss. 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, schedulePublic Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 150, 267.-To entitle a local authority to recover an apportioned share of the expenses of private street works under the Private Street Works Act, 1892, it is necessary that the true owner of the premises on which that share is apportioned should have been duly served with a copy of the resolution required to be served on the owner by section 6 of the Act. Service on a reputed owner is insufficient, though uuder the schedule to the Act the name of the reputed owner may be inserted in the provisional apportionment. Per Channell, J. The copy of the resolution required to be served by section 6 may, under section 267 of the Public Health Act, 1875, be addressed to "the owner" without naming him, and served in the manner prescribed by that section. "Reputed owner" in the schedule to the Act means a person reasonably believed by the local authority to be the owner. WIRRAL RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL v. CARTER. 206 (14) Private street works-Memorial to local authority by frontagers-Memorial not adjudicated on as objection-Proceedings "de novo" by local authority-Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), s. 6.—The plaintiffs resolved to execute private street works under the Private Street Works Act, 1892, and the usual proceedings were taken accordingly. Within the period prescribed for taking objection to the provisional apportionment certain of the frontagers presented a memorial to the plaintiffs stating, inter alia, that they would prefer that the street should not be taken over by the plaintiffs and that the proposed works were unreasonable and unnecessary, and praying that the plaintiffs would make further inquiry before carrying out the works. The plaintiffs did not cause the questions raised by the memorial to be brought as objections before a court of summary jurisdiction, but, after inquiry, modified their scheme as to the works to be done, and caused all the steps prescribed by the Act to be taken afresh with reference to the modified scheme as if it had been an original scheme. The works comprised in the modified scheme were executed, and a final apportionment of the expenses was made. Held, on the ground that the memorial did not contain any effective objection to the provisional apportionment, that the proceedings were validly taken, and that the plaintiffs could recover the sums apportioned by the final apportionment. Semble (per Mathew, L.J.), that, even had the memorial contained an effective objection, the plaintiffs could have recovered, on the ground that it is competent to the local authority to drop a scheme for private street works under the Act, after objection has been taken to the provisional apportionment, and, without having the objection determined, to proceed de novo with reference to the same street. SOUTHAMPTON CORPORATION v. LORD. 324 (15) Private street works-Road made by railway company on land acquired under special Act-Intention to use as street-"Ultra vires"-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 4, 150-Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20), s. 68.—A railway company made a road upon land acquired by them in 1848 under their statutory powers. The road led from a road which was intercepted by their railway to another road. In the conveyance to them of the land on which the road was made the company gave the vendor a right of way over it, and covenanted to pave it. In 1860, when conveying to a purchaser superfluous land fronting on the road, the company again covenanted to leave it open and unbuilt upon, and use it only as a street or road. The road had been used in accordance with those deeds ever since. In 1900 the local authority sought to make the company liable for a proportion of the cost of making up the road under section 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875, on the footing that it was a street within the Act. Held, that there was nothing in the facts inconsistent with the inference that the road was STREETS-SUB-COMMITTEES 937 STREETS- Continued. an accommodation road within section 68 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845; that, whether this was so or not, the circumstances showed that the promoters of the railway must have acquired the land for the purpose of a road, and that they intended so to use it, and the Court would not now assume that that was inconsistent with the purposes of the company's special Act; and that the local authority could exercise the powers of section 150 of the Act of 1875 with respect to it. Per Vaughan Williams, L.J. Where, to deal with a street under the powers of section 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875, would be inconsistent with the appropriation of the land to the purposes defined by the special Act of a railway company, the powers of section 150 cannot be applied. That appears from City and South London Railway v. London County Council, 1891, 2 Q. B. 513; 60 L. J. M. C. 149; London County Council v. London School Board, 1892, 2 Q. B. 606; 62 L. J. M. C. 30; and Mulliner v. Midland Railway (1879), 11 Ch. D. 611; 48 L. J. Ch. 258. Per Romer, L.J. Where a railway company cannot use a portion of their property except as a road, it is within their powers to allow the public to use it. That appears from Grand Function Canal Co. v. Petty (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 273; 57 L. J. Q. B. 413. STRETFORD URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL v. MANCHESTER, SOUTH JUNCTION, AND ALTRINCHAM RAILWAY. 683 (16) Private street works-Sewering street-Work done by urban authority on default of frontagers-Departure from work specified in notice-Sewer increased in size for purpose of serving adjacent area-Recovery of expenses-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 89 Vict. c. 55), ss. 150, 268.-An urban authority gave notice, under section 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875, to the frontagers on a street, requiring them to lay two sewers, a surface water sewer and a soil sewer, in the street. On the default of the frontagers the authority laid the soil sewer in accordance with the requirements of the notice, and a surface water sewer of larger dimensions than those required by the notice, in order that the latter sewer might serve to carry off water from the adjacent part of the district as well as from the street itself; and they apportioned on the frontagers, as the expenses incurred in sewering the street, the amount it would have cost to lay both sewers in accordance with the notice. Held, that the authority were entitled to recover the amounts so apportioned. 594 (17) Private street works-Work alleged not to have been done-Objection taken on proceedings for recovery of amount apportioned-Objection to final apportionment-Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), s. 12.-An objection to a final apportionment under the Private Street Works Act, 1892, on the ground that the work, though executed to the satisfaction of the local authority, has not in fact been properly carried out, cannot be taken on the hearing of the summons for the recovery of amount apportioned, but only, if at all, in accordance with section 12 of the Act. HAYLES v. SANDOWN URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL. 187 (18) Vesting of street-Extent of vesting-Road formed by turnpike trustees on land acquired in fee simple by them-Electric wires passing over street-Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 149-Turnpike Roads Act, 1822 (3 Geo. IV. c. 126), s. 84.-The vesting of a street in an urban authority by section 149 of the Public Health Act, 1875, gives the authority no more extensive rights in the case of a street formed by turnpike trustees on land of which the fee simple was acquired by them than in the case of ordinary streets. The vesting of the street under that section does not give the urban authority any property beyond what is necessary for the control, protection, and maintenance of the street as a highway for public use; and the authority cannot therefore by virtue of the vesting of the street in them prevent the placing of wires over the street at a considerable height above its surface. Decision of Farwell, J. (reported, 1902, I Ch. 866) reversed. 244 Private street works-Charge on premises-Commencement of charge. 227 Private street works-Landlord and tenant-Tenants' covenant to pay rates, &c. 493 SUB-COMMITTEES. Adoption of recommendation of sub-committee.-See SANITARY CONVENIENCES (1). 9 |