1852.

The QUEEN

V.

LEITH.

On the 4th of September 1850, The London & Westminster Steam Boat Company, thinking themselves aggrieved by the last mentioned rate, appealed to the Trustees under sect. 102 of stat. 10 G. 4. c. cxxix. grounds of such appeal were as follows.

The

1. That the property, in respect of which the assessment is made, is not rateable property within the said Act 10 G. 4. c. cxxix.

2. That the said rate does not, on the face of it, shew in respect of what property the Company is rated.

3. That the said property has already been rated to the said rate, and cannot be rated twice over.

The Trustees determined against this appeal, on 4th September 1850. And The London & Westminster Steam Boat Company thereupon appealed to the Quarter Sessions, adding, to the grounds of appeal submitted to the Trustees, the two following.

1. That part of the property is not rateable property; and that, the sum assessed being entire, there is no means of ascertaining how much is assessed on the rateable, and how much on the non-rateable, property; and the whole is therefore void.

2. That the said rate or assessment is not made or assessed upon any person or persons, within the meaning of the said Act 10 G. 4. c. cxxix.

"If, upon the facts stated, the Court should be of opinion that no rate can be maintained, the judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions to be reversed. If the Court should be of opinion that the rate can be maintained, irrespective of its amount, the judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions to be affirmed."

G. Hayes and Bagley, in support of the order of

Sessions. As no point of form is raised, the general question is as to the rateability of the land upon which this pier is constructed.

The words of stat. 10 G. 4.

messuage or tene

c. cxxix. s. 66. are very general :
ment, land, shop, warehouse, or other building, wharf,
yard, storehouse, ground, cellar, hereditaments, or pre-
mises within any part of the said districts." Whether,
as to some of the items mentioned in the rate, the appel-
lants were entitled to use the land as they have done,
is not material to the question of rate; Rex v. Bell (a).
[Lord Campbell C. J. For the present argument, we
must assume the occupation to be rightful.] Land is,
indeed, occupied by the whole of the structure: it is
like the case of a railway constructed over an arch, where
there is an occupation of the land between the abut-
ments, though it partakes of the nature of an easement.
[Lord Campbell C. J. The intention here appears to
be to rate the pier.] The subject of the rate is in fact
that part of the pier which is land. If that be rate-
able, the rate does not become bad by the mention of
the appurtenances, even supposing these not to be rate-
able in themselves. They contribute to the value of
that which is rated. In Rex v. Barnes (b) the pro-
prietors of a bridge over the Thames were rated for
land occupied by them on one side of the river;
and it was considered that the value of the land
arose, in part, from tolls taken elsewhere for passing
over the bridge from the land: it was not made an
objection there that the rate was thus, in effect, partly
in respect of the bridge. In Regina v. Hammersmith

(a) 7 T. R. 598.

(b) 1 B. & Ad. 113.

1852.

The QUEEN

V.

LEITH.

1852.

Bridge Company (a) the Company were rated for the The QUEEN bridge and its appurtenances: and the Court said:

V.

LEITH.

"The bridge itself is the direct source of the rateable value." [Wightman J. Suppose the barges were only moored, and the appellants occupied nothing more, not having any land used as an access to the barges. Lord Campbell C. J. Take the case of a floating bath, moored in the middle of the river, accessible by boats only.] In these cases there would legally be an occupation of the land where the barge or bark was moored; and the occupiers would be rateable: the present case, however, does not require this. The occupiers of a floating bridge attached to each side of a river would in like manner be liable. No objection can be founded on the fact, if it were so, that another party, who is not occupier, has been rated for the same property that would be only ground for an appeal by him. But in fact it is not for the pier that Simmonds is rated. No informality in the rate can be objected to, as the case is stated: if it could, the Court would amend the rate, inasmuch as the Sessions have power to do so under sect. 103. [Patteson J. The power rather seems intended for the relief of persons appealing, not respondents.]

The real question is,

Needham and Sumner, contrà. whether the appellants are to be rated for the barges and the bridges: whether the word "pier" be a proper one is immaterial. The question is as to all which is not building. [Coleridge J. The other side will not admit that that is the question.] It is as if the barges and bridges were occupied by one person and the

(a) 15 Q. B. 369. 377.

building by another, and the appeal were by the former. The barges and bridges cannot properly be classed under any of the subjects of rating specified in sect. 66. The only terms which can be suggested as applicable are "hereditaments, or premises." But this is a statute imposing a burthen, and must be construed strictly. The statutable purpose of the rate is "to defray the expenses of watching, lighting, and otherwise improving the roads, streets, lanes, courts, alleys, and other public passages and places under the jurisdiction of the said Trustees within the said districts, and for removing and preventing nuisances, annoyances, and encroachments therein and incidental thereto, and for other the purposes of this Act." Now the barges and bridges are not passages or places within the jurisdiction of the Trustees; they could not be paved or lighted. [Lord Campbell C. J. Is nothing to be rated which cannot be paved or lighted?] It is enough to say that the subjects here rated are not expressly mentioned, and do not fall within the general purpose of the Act. No benefit is derived in respect of them from putting the Act in execution. The general object of the Act appears from earlier sections. Sect. 19 gives the Trustees power to light and watch "the several roads, streets, squares, lanes, alleys, courts, yards, and other public passages and places under" their jurisdiction; this clearly applies only to what is on land. The same inference arises from sects. 20 and 21. The word "places," which is the most general, is manifestly applied only to so much of the shore and soil as is benefited by the Act. [Lord Campbell C. J. The owners of the pier would be benefited by the lighting of the neighbouring soil.] That would apply to many

1852.

The QUEEN

V.

LEITH.